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Abstract
Two longstanding questions preoccupying political scientists, military officers and po-
licymakers alike are how should and how do political leaders interact with military profes-
sionals? This thesis argues that historic patterns of civil-military relations underlay distinct
national defense policymaking institutions, which, in turn, shape how states produce and em-
ploy force. Thus, long after states are no longer prey to military interventions in politics, the
institutions originally created to protect governmentfrom the armed forces will continue to
shape how governments use military force. In states where civil-military conflict prompted
sustained periods of institutional development, present day governments will possess institu-
tional resources to exert maximal civilian control over defense policymaking. States with
harmonious civil-military legacies will lack these institutional structures and will exercise a
lesser degree of civilian control. Each form of political control embodies distinct comparative
advantages, one privileging the integration of military activities with the state's foreign policy,
while the other provides for greater military effectiveness.
Termed "civil-military legacy theory," the analytical framework of the dissertation is
rooted in historic institutionalism. The theory is tested by examining the elaboration of mili-
tary doctrine, the acquisition of new weapons and the conduct of military interventions in
France and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom and France have, since the Second
World War, possessed and expended comparable resources on defense. The United Kingdom
and France have, however, diametrically opposite experiences of civil-military relations. The
United Kingdom has never experienced a significant civil-military crisis; France has six times
seen a general become head of state without being elected, and nine times seen military fac-
tions attempt to supplant the government. As predicted, France's history of fractious civil-
military relations led it to develop civil-military control institutions that permit civilian lead-
ers to micromanage military doctrine, procurement and operations. Conversely, the United
Kingdom's record of civil-military concord has resulted in the armed forces retaining authori-
ty over an autonomous sphere of military competence. The principle of civilian control of the
armed forces is acknowledged in both cases, but its practice varies widely, with a functional
division of labor in the British case and more intrusive civilian control in the French.
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Chapter I:
Introduction
I. Introduction
The civil-military disputes of the Clinton-era and the failure of the United States' military
occupation of Iraq have resuscitated the age-old questions of who does and who should forge a
state's defense policies. As expectations of a peaceful and democratic Iraq dissolved into anti-
American and sectarian violence, military leaders proved swift to blame the debacle on the mis-
guided meddling of political leaders and their appointees. Meanwhile, civilian leaders have been
no less rapid in denouncing the military high command as parochial and obstructionist. Coming
after the lesser civil-military controversies of the 1990s, where elements within the armed forces
contested presidential policy on Bosnia, Kosovo and Haiti, the debate over failure in Iraq has
placed the matter of civil-military institutions and relations at the center of the policy agenda.
At the center of the current controversy are two diametrically opposed concepts of civil-
military relations. On the one hand, there is the assertion that training and experience equip only
military professionals to make certain judgments about military operations, doctrines and plans.
On the other hand, there are those who echo French President Georges Clemenceau's statement
that "war is too important to be left to the generals" and that political leaders must implicate
themselves in every aspect of its preparation if they are to obtain their desired results. Unfortu-
nately, within the American context it is difficult to ascertain either which pattern prevails and
which is most advantageous. Failures, such as Vietnam and Iraq, are paradoxically attributed to
both too much political micro-management and not enough political control of the armed forces,
while the successes of World War II and the 1991 Gulf War are alternatively credited to the
preeminence of politics or military autonomy.
To gain insight on the questions of who does and who should control defense policymak-
ing, this study examines two states that differ in terms of how political leaders control their armed
forces. In the United Kingdom, the armed forces enjoy control over an autonomous sphere of
military competence. By way of contrast, French political leaders intervene in almost every as-
pect of defense policymaking, including minute details of air strikes and war plans. The principle
of civilian control of the armed forces is acknowledged in both cases, but its practice varies wide-
ly, with a functional division of labor in the British case and more intrusive civilian control in the
French.
To develop my explanation of defense policymaking, I draw on both the civil-military re-
lations literature and scholarship on bureaucratic politics. The analytical framework I developed,
which I term "Civil-Military Legacy Theory," links past civil-military relations with systemically
different patterns of defense policymaking, which in turn, give rise to distinct comparative advan-
tages in how states generate military power. Institutions are the binding element, linking legacies
of civil-military relations with how contemporary political leaders exert control over their armed
forces.
In states that experienced a high degree of civil-military strife, political leaders develop
institutional mechanisms for protecting the state from the military. When civil-military tensions
gradually disappear as a result of political, economic and social modernization, these civil-
military control mechanisms persist and enable political leaders to exert a high degree of control
over military activities. In states that have enjoyed harmonious civil-military relations, political
leaders have no incentive to develop intrusive control mechanisms. Instead, civil-military rela-
tions evolve on more functional lines, with the armed forces exercising freedom within a sphere
of delegated authority.
Because of the political and administrative costs of changing from one system to another,
and the ambiguity of the outcome, advanced industrialized states show continuity in how they
formulate defense policies. Thus, in a certain sense, present day defense politics are an after ef-
fect of past civil-military relations.
Civil-military legacy theory yields three new insights for the fields of security studies and
comparative politics. First of all, there is no single prevalent or optimal model for how civilian
leaders should control their armed forces. Instead, there are at least two models, each embodying
comparative strengths and weaknesses. Second, civil-military events in the sometimes-distant
past shape the elaboration of defense policymaking in even those advanced industrial states that
are today immune from military interventions in politics. Recognizing that patterns of defense
policymaking are path-dependent should lead future scholars to spend more time distinguishing
formative moments, when institutional structures emerge, from periods that merely confirm their
trajectories. Third and finally, with a recognition that states exhibit distinct patterns of defense
policymaking and possess comparative institutional advantages, one of the main tasks for security
studies scholars becomes identifying and understanding the characteristics marking each state.
11. What Roles for Soldiers and Statesmen?
Two longstanding questions haunting political scientists, military officers and policymak-
ers alike are how should and how do political leaders interact with military professionals? The
principle of civilian control over the armed forces is accepted in advanced industrialized demo-
cracies, even if it remains problematic in the developing world. However, the mere term "civilian
control" is open to ambiguity and many variations are possible.
A minimalist interpretation of civilian control could entail no more than armed forces not
supplanting political authorities and accomplishing the broad missions set for them. The ability
of armed forces to manage their own budgets, exercise judicial authority over their members and
plan and fight wars as they please are all consistent with this minimal version of civilian control.
At the opposite extreme, a maximal vision of civilian control consists of political leaders select-
ing targets for bombardment, deciding on tactics and telling military commanders how to plan for
the next war.' The Prussian / German Armies of the late-191h and early 2 0th centuries and the
American military during the McNamara-era both obeyed "civilian control." However, the nature
of that control differed, with the Prussians approximating a minimal definition of civilian control
and the Americans approaching the maximum.
Scholars and practitioners have long debated what form of civilian control provides great-
er advantages to the state. The classic works on military strategy are either silent or contradictory
on the subject. The ancient Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, argued that political authority should not
extend beyond the choice of a military commander and the right to replace that commander
should he prove incompetent. Once selected by his sovereign, the military commander should be
free to mobilize resources, dispense justice and elaborate strategy.2
Sun Tzu's principal modern rival, the 19th Century Prussian General Carl von Clauswitz,
argued that the scope for civilian intervention in military decisions was potentially vast. Accord-
ing to Clauswitz, "If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character.... Political consid-
erations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are the
more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle." Clauswitz
continued by arguing against the existence of an independent sphere where "military expertise"
could operate independently of political considerations.3 While Sun Tzu and Clauswitz held op-
posite opinions, other classic strategists, such as Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte and
Marshal de Saxe, remain silent on civil-military relations.
In many respects, Samuel Huntington's The Soldier and the State represents the first sys-
tematic attempt to explore how political leaders should exercise control over the armed forces.
Built around the notion that military officers are a profession equivalent to doctors or lawyers,
but whose expertise resides in the management of violence, Huntington argues for an expansive
military role in defense policymaking. For Huntington, professionalism justifies military organi-
zations possessing an "autonomous sphere" of military competence wherein political leaders
should not interfere.
Huntington believes that the elaboration of military doctrine, the formulation of war plans
and the conduct of military operations are the exclusive preserve of military professionals.4 Al-
though Huntington never specifies all activities falling within the sphere of military competence,
he feels that military officers should play a broad role in shaping national security policy because
their pessimism, conservatism, collectivism and emphasis on power render them more apt to re-
solve security problems than civilian elites.5 For Huntington, military professionals are more
cautious about using force, but more likely to know how to apply it successfully when the need
arises.6 Thus, an autonomous and influential military will eschew unnecessary conflicts, fight
better, generate superior military doctrine and eschew politics to a greater extent than military
organizations that suffer from a more intrusive form of political control.
Huntington's formulation echoed the preferences expressed by military theorists since the
late-19th century. The Prussian General Helmuth von Moltke argued that political leaders dictate
when a state goes to war and negotiate the peace terms after its conclusion, but military profes-
sionals should have a free hand in obtaining the best possible results given the resources at their
disposition. 7 French General Jean Colin likewise stated, "Once war is decided upon, it is abso-
lutely necessary for the [commanding] general to remain free to conduct [strategy] as he sees fit,
prepared to be replaced if he demonstrates little energy or competence. War plans must be the
personal product of the general. Government intervention in the conduct of operations has almost
never produced happy results."8
In fact, Huntington's work reflected the consensus view of military professionals as to
what their proper role should be. However, by formulating his argument in theoretical and histor-
ic terms, Huntington imparted a new dlan to the notion that states are best served when they grant
their military professionals an autonomous and expansive role in defense policymaking. Given
its congenial message and artful articulation, The Soldier and the State became a classic amongst
military officers and today constitutes the model by which they judge civil-military relations.9
Influenced by Huntington, military intellectuals have expanded on the concept of an auto-
nomous sphere and the role of "professional" military advice in the decades since Huntington's
original formulation. With the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine of 1984, the future Chairman of the
American Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the armed forces should only be used when political
leaders set specific objectives, intend to achieve a military victory, provide the overwhelming
force needed to secure that victory and guarantee a high degree of popular support.' 0 In books
immensely popular within armed forces themselves, veteran officers argue that military leaders
should resist civilian interference with strategy and have a "duty" to thwart civilian decisions that
they disagree with."
Meanwhile, scholars have leant credence to other elements of Huntington's thesis. Studies
by Richard Betts, Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi proved that military elites are less inclined
to favor military intervention than their civilian counterparts.' 2 Likewise, Stephen Rosen demon-
strated that military organizations, left to themselves, regularly transform how they use force,
develop new doctrines and foster promising technologies. Driven by their professional ethic,
senior officers scrutinize technical and geo-strategic changes, promoting junior officers with in-
novative ideas for adapting to new realities.' 3
Articulated by Huntington, but preceded by likeminded military writers and embellished
by later scholars, the theory that military professionals are best suited to managing an autonom-
ous sphere of defense policymaking has gained a broad following. At its base is the notion that a
professional education and ethic equips military leaders with the ability formulate doctrine, lay
war plans and conduct operations. Unsuited to such exercises, political leaders will only do harm
by trespassing in these domains. Instead, they should concentrate themselves on deciding when
to use force, occupying themselves with the diplomacy surrounding its use and negotiating the
end to hostilities. I define this vision of civil-military relations as "minimal civilian control,"
because it grants the armed forces the greatest degree of autonomy consistent with their still be-
ing subservient to political leaders.
In contrast to Huntington's idyllic vision of professional officers competently and disinte-
restedly guiding defense policy, subsequent generations of political scientists detected pernicious
military biases and have argued for a more maximal concept of political control. Originating in
the 1960s, research into "bureaucratic politics" and "organization theory" have prompted scholars
to study military officers as the representatives of bureaucracies striving for wealth and autono-
my, rather than exemplars of a profession uniquely concerned with discharging their chosen
mdtier. The two visions of the military high command, as a self-centered interest group and a
professional corporation dedicated to the well being of its client, are fundamentally opposed and
lead to different prescriptions for how to structure civil-military relations. If the behavior of mili-
tary organizations are motivated by their struggle to enhance values such as wealth, autonomy
and prestige, then invasive political control will be necessary to ensure that their activities corres-
pond with the state's overall aims.
Because of their organizational imperative to extract resources from the state, military or-
ganizations are likely to exaggerate threats and the resources needed to counter them. Having to
justify large force structures and imbued by the pessimism of Huntington's military mind, mili-
tary officers are likely to view threats in purely military terms and demand inordinate resources to
meet them.14 They are temperamentally less accustomed to evaluating the economic and social
costs of acquiring the resources they covet.' Thus, if not controlled, armed forces can pursue
their quest for resources to the point of parasitically draining societies of the wherewithal to pur-
sue non-military goals.' 6
Military organizations prefer offensive doctrines to defensive or deterrent postures. Be-
cause they require complex and expert planning, offensive doctrines are less accessible to civilian
control and, thereby, reinforce military autonomy. They also permit military organizations to
control uncertainty. An armed force executing its offensive plan will possess the initiative, whe-
reas one standing on the defensive has to await and adapt to its adversary's actions. Finally, of-
fensive operations normally require more resources than defensive or deterrent doctrines. Thus,
by adopting offensive doctrines, military organizations enhance their claims to the state's re-
sources.' 7 Because they serve armed forces' organizational needs, militaries are biased in favor
of offensive operations, whether or not they best serve a state's foreign policy objectives or are
even militarily optimal.
Concomitant with their offensive bias, military organizations favor escalating conflicts by
introducing more resources and loosing restraints about what forms of military activities are per-
mitted. Although conservative about decisions of when the state should use force, military offic-
ers believe that military force should be used in overwhelming quantities.' In general, military
professionals also see few compelling reasons not to wage total war, provided that they cannot
quickly obtain a military victory with lesser results. 19 Sanctuaries in "neutral" territory, bans on
using particular weapons and restrictions on using force near civilian habitations are anathema to
them. When they perceive a future threat, military leaders prefer preemption, destroying a poten-
tial enemy before it can act.20 Taken as an ensemble, military organizations' preferences for
overwhelming force, few restraints and preemption tend to escalate the violence and stakes of a
conflict.
Beyond pursuing the specific objectives of resources and autonomy, organizations also
work to advance the less concrete objectives frequently referred to as "organizational essence."
According to Morton Halperin, organizational essence is "the view held by the dominant group in
the organization about what the missions and capabilities should be." 21 Socialized into armed
services at a young age and spending much of their lives within a single structure, military offic-
ers have a strong attachment to the lifestyle and self-image of their organization. This can lead
itself to a romantic attachment to outmoded forms of warfare, as the long survival of the horse
cavalry attests. It also translates into armed forces focusing only on the missions compatible
with their self-image, neglecting those that would require greater psychological adaptation. Thus,
certain armies neglect counter-insurgency operations, even when they are frequent, to concentrate
on the more valorizing task of preparing for conventional war.2 3 Equally, it can lead military
organizations to focus their resources on the most prestigious combat arms, at the expense of vital
24
support functions.
Because of the many organizational imperatives shaping their activities, military organiza-
tions frequently enact policies poorly suited to the broader foreign and security policies pursued
by political leaders. When this occurs, the integration of defense policy with the state's overall
policy can break down.2 5 There are many historic examples of poorly integrated military activi-
ties causing irreparable harm to the state. The Schlieffen Plan left Imperial German leaders with-
out any war plans, save one, whereby a Russian mobilization provoked a German invasion of
France via neutral Belgium. Even if war was inevitable or in the national interest, the Schlieffen
Plan ensured that Germany would fight the otherwise neutral British Empire and Belgium. Later,
the disjuncture between France's defensive military doctrine and its alliance network in Eastern
Europe, which required offensive capabilities, proved equally fatal in the face of Adolph Hitler's
calculated acts of aggression. Under very different circumstances, American military actions
during the Cuban Missile Crisis threatened the measured and un-provocative strategy pursued by
civilian leaders.
The risk of military activities becoming divorced from a state's overall strategy has led
many scholars to argue for political leaders to take an invasive and proactive role. Only the di-
rect intervention of political leaders in the conduct of military operations, drawing-up of war
plans and formulation of doctrine guarantees that armed forces will contribute to accomplishing
political goals. Elliot Cohen argues that political leaders must interrogate, probe and bully armed
forces to obtain success in war.26 Graham Allison demonstrates that intrusive monitoring is like-
wise necessary for crisis management, where standard military behavior is overly provocative.
Finally, Barry Posen contents that civilian intervention is necessary to ensure that military doc-
trines correspond with broader national security needs.
Taken as an ensemble, these scholars present a model of civil-military interactions fun-
damentally at odds with the notion of minimal civilian control. Only by monitoring and interven-
ing in every facet of defense policymaking can states ensure that military force will be a reliable
servant of foreign policy. No autonomous sphere of military expertise ought to be respected and
each military action should be examined lest it reflect pernicious organizational biases. I define
this vision of civil-military relations as "maximal civilian control" because it accepts political
involvement in all domains of military activity.
Thus, two broad forms of civilian control of the armed forces are possible in advanced in-
dustrialized democracies. Minimal political control involves political leaders deciding on foreign
policy objectives, when force will be employed and the resources they will consecrate to the
armed forces. Beyond setting the framework within which military activities will occur, political
leaders recognize an expansive "independent military sphere." The alternative to minimal control
of the armed forces acknowledges political leaders' right to interfere with any aspect of defense
policymaking. Maximal civilian control of the armed forces rejects claims to autonomous mili-
tary authority. Rather, all military activities have potential diplomatic and political conse-
quences, and should be subject to civilian direction.
Scholars and practitioners differ as to what form of civilian control they prefer. However,
the preferences they express frequently correspond to the values they seek to maximize. Authors
that favor "minimal control" tend to argue on the bases of military efficiency and the need to
avoid ill-conceived foreign policy entanglements. On the contrary, scholars championing "max-
imal control" advance the superior integration of military activities with overall national aims.
By synthesizing the arguments advanced by each group with the counterarguments about each
system's weaknesses, it is possible to advance hypotheses on the pros and cons of minimal and
maximal civilian control of the armed forces.
The comparative advantages of minimal control lay in the superior ability of military pro-
fessionals to effectively employ force and understand technical factors affecting the conduct of
war. The disadvantages of minimal control reside in the offensive and escalatory tendencies of
armed forces, and the likelihood of their military actions being poorly integrated with the state's
overall foreign and economic policies. Table I, below, illustrates hypotheses about the strengths
and weaknesses of minimal civilian control.
Table I:
Table I:
Minimal Civilian Control
WeaknessesStreni'ths
Operational and tactical military excellence
Doctrines that reflect professional consensus
on military "best practices"
Force unlikely to be used unless in quantities
that guarantee military success
Military forces innovate in response to
technical and geo-strategic change
Escalatory behavior on part of armed forces
Offensive bias in war plans
Military activities lack close integration with
diplomacy and domestic politics
Missions incompatible with "organizational
essence" likely to be neglected
In sharp contrast to minimal control, the comparative advantage of maximal civilian control re-
sides in the close association of military activities and overall foreign policy aims. However, too
much meddling by inexperienced politicians can produce militarily ineffective doctrines and op-
erations. Table II, below, illustrates the comparative advantages of maximal
civilian control of the armed forces.
Table II:
Maximal Civilian Control
WeaknessesStrengths
Close integration of military, diplomatic and
political activities
Force likely to be used in a restricted and
flexible manner to accomplish political
objectives
Changes in military doctrine prompted by
overall foreign policy environment and
political priorities
Military effectiveness compromised by
civilian meddling
Insufficient resources likely to be allocated
for demanding missions
Military-technical changes and imperatives
likely to remain unaddressed
In sum, there are two theoretical models for how political leaders should control the armed forces
in advanced industrial democracies. Either they recognize the existence of an independent sphere
of military competence or they intervene in every domain of military activities that has an inci-
Strenot 
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dence on politics. Each form of control has been praised for its strengths and damned for its
shortcomings. However, a close examination of the arguments advanced by partisans of both
forms of control reveals that each possesses comparative advantages.
III. Who Controls Defense Policy?
While there are two broad alternatives for exercising civilian control in an advanced in-
dustrial democracy, it requires more than the will of political leaders to implement one mode or
another. Defense politics are characterized by asymmetries of information and authority that
complicate the assertion of political control. In order for elected leaders to impose maximal po-
litical control over the armed forces, they must dispose of multiple independent sources of advice
on military affairs, the ability to intrusively monitor military activities, and the capacity to com-
municate their orders directly to the echelons of the hierarchy tasked with executing them. Gov-
ernments that lack these three capacities will be reduced to implementing a more minimal variety
of political control.
As the state's recognized experts on the management of violence, military professionals
possess a superior understanding of the operational, technical and logistic aspects of war-making
than the elected leaders whom they serve. Thus, in formulating their own opinions on what poli-
cies to pursue, civilian leaders are normally beholden to military advice. Political leaders' theo-
retically superior position in the state's hierarchy is therefore hamstrung by the armed forces' mo-
nopoly on military expertise.
When military preferences clash with those of their political superiors, soldiers have fre-
quently abused their monopoly on military expertise to evade civilian control. For example,
when German political leaders urged the armed forces to revise their war plans in July 1914, ab-
orting the Schlieffen Plan in favor of an offensive in the east, the military high command claimed
that it was technically impossible. From the information now available, it appears that the Ger-
man generals dissembled, cloaking their desire to launch the Schlieffen Plan under specious tech-
28nical claims that alternatives were impossible. More recently, the Soviet armed forces argued,
on technical grounds, that only an armored blitzkrieg into Western Europe would render the So-
viet Union secure in the event of war. In fact, a defensive doctrine would have accomplished
political leaders' objectives at less cost and danger of escalation. However, Soviet military pro-
fessionals sustained their preferred policy for decades until a broadening of the defense policy
community and economic decline precipitated change.29 These two examples suggest how easy
it is for military professionals to use their claim to superior expertise to advance policies that civi-
lian leaders would oppose, if they fully understood.
Classification and secrecy practices exacerbate the information asymmetries between
military professionals and political leaders. Because defense policy touches the survival of the
state, much of the information touching it is restricted to individuals that have been vetted by a
screening process and possess a "need to know." However, procedures originally designed to
protect national security permit military organizations to conceal much of their behavior from
civilian scrutiny.30 An extreme example of this occurred in the Soviet Union, where the armed
forces refused to give the Foreign Ministry information on the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal
during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The military high command hoped it could
thereby sabotage the arms control process, but the United States supplied information to the So-
viet negotiators on their proper nuclear forces. Even when political leaders have the right to
know, secret information is rarely available to the think tanks, academics, parliamentarians and
journalists that would otherwise scrutinize military activities.
Absent countervailing information, political leaders have difficulty assessing whether the
military's advice is objective or has been manipulated to advance preferred policies. It is even
more difficult for them to formulate their own alternatives to the plans, procurement projects and
doctrines proposed by the armed forces. Faced with a monopoly on relevant expertise, civilians
elected to high offices cannot challenge military claims about weapons effectiveness, logistics
constraints and tactical principles. Thus, a high degree of civilian control of the armed forces is
only possible if civilians have access to multiple or independent sources of military advice.
Even if political leaders know how they want the armed forces to act, it is difficult for
them to ensure the enactment of their directives. When civilian orders clash with military prefe-
rences, military professionals often interpret civilian injunctions in ways that serve their own in-
terests. Without careful civilian monitoring, armed forces avoid executing the spirit, if not the
letter, of direct political orders. For example, the United States Army responded to President
John Kennedy's order that it teach counter-insurgency at the Command and General Staff College
by renaming its existing courses on jungle and mountain warfare as counter-insurgency, without
changing the content of either. More broadly, the Army thwarted the spirit of Kennedy's demand
that it explore counter-insurgency warfare of the type the British had applied in Malaya and Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Edward Lansdale in the Philippines.32 Later, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
and Secretary of Defense James Schlessinger faced significant difficulties in cajoling the armed
forces to develop options for limited nuclear war. 33 Because military organizations conceal their
resistance to political directives behind a fagade of obedience, only intrusive monitoring will
permit political leaders to know whether their orders are being fulfilled in the spirit that they were
issued.
The hierarchic nature of military organizations aggravates the problem of ensuring mili-
tary compliance with political directives. More than other formal organizations, armed forces
thrive on hierarchies. Each individual has his place in a chain-of-command stretching from the
state's highest political authority to the lowliest private. Because political leaders occupy the
apex of this hierarchy, their orders must transit several levels of military command before they
reach military officers responsible for conducting field operations, elaborating war plans and es-
tablishing procurement requirements. Unfortunately, each of these intermediate levels of com-
mand has the potential to reinterpret political directives in a manner congenial to the organiza-
tion's own preferences. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy directed the Navy to
show utmost caution in its blockade of Cuba. However, Kennedy's injunctions lost force as they
were transmitted down the chain-of-command, such that field commanders conducted the block-
ade according to the Navy's more confrontational standard procedures, rather than Kennedy's
strictures to avoid confrontation.34
Faithful compliance with political instructions demands the ability of political leaders to
communicate their wishes directly to the officers responsible for executing their orders. When
the question at hand is a military operation, maximal political control requires political leaders to
directly oversee field commanders. When political leaders seek more broadly to influence mili-
tary doctrine, they must publicize their order widely to the many individuals with a part in its
execution. 35
In short, the degree of control political leaders can exert on military organizations depends
on the administrative powers they possess. Exerting maximal control of the armed forces is more
demanding than its alternative. Civilian leaders must possess multiple independent sources of
advice on military affairs, the ability to intrusively monitor the military activities, and the capaci-
ty to communicate their orders directly to the echelons of the hierarchy tasked with executing
them. Absent these capabilities, even vigorous efforts by political leaders to interfere in areas
military officers consider within their "independent sphere" are likely to falter against the mili-
tary's monopoly on professional expertise and ability to interpret orders selectively.
Because minimal political control does not require that civilian leaders possess the same
degree of administrative capabilities, it can be enacted even when political leaders lack indepen-
dent advice and means of invasive monitoring. Residing on political leaders confining them-
selves to shaping the diplomatic and domestic-political aspects of policy, minimal political con-
trol assumes that military actors will competently discharge all functions lying within the expan-
sive independent military sphere. Political leaders will make political decisions and the armed
forces' hierarchy will control military activity. There is, thus, no need for independent advice,
invasive monitoring or direct communication with low echelons of command. Because it re-
quires fewer specific administrative resources for its implementation, minimal control of the
armed forces is likely to be the default solution whenever the underlying prerequisites for max-
imal civilian control are absent in a state.
IV. Institutions and Civilian Control
If the presence or absence of certain administrative capabilities determines whether politi-
cal leaders will exert maximal or minimal control over the armed forces, then the next logical
question is what concrete arrangements correspond with each form of control? A long tradition
of social science research suggests that specific forms of institutions are necessary if political
leaders are to draw on multiple sources of military advice and effectively monitor military activi-
ties. The following pages examine the institutional strategies that maximize political control over
the armed forces.
The challenge of obtaining multiple independent sources of military advice is, at base, a
question of breaking the monopoly on professional expertise possessed by a cohesive high com-
mand. Political leaders have the fewest options available to them when they are themselves un-
educated about security affairs and must interact with a single general staff that speaks for the
armed forces as a whole.36 However, four institutional strategies exist for redressing this asym-
metric balance of expertise. First, political leaders can exploit the struggle between military ser-
vices for resources and prestige to obtain competing analyses and recommendations. Second, by
creating think tanks and research institutes, political leaders introduce new actors and opinions
into the defense policymaking debate. Third, political leaders can create parallel inter-service
military staffs capable of giving independent advice. Fourth and finally, specialized educational
programs enhance civilian policymakers' knowledge of defense matters and ability to evaluate
military claims. Each of these institutional strategies contributes to political leaders' ability to tap
into discordant sources of military expertise and, taken as an ensemble, they radically increase
the options available to political leaders.
Because armed services compete with one another for the wealth and autonomy that polit-
ical leaders apportion, inter-service rivalry prompts armed services to satisfy political leaders'
needs. When services compete with one another for limited resources, they provide political
leaders with alternative intelligence analyses, doctrines, strategies and procurement projects. By
choosing amongst these alternatives, political leaders can enhance their ability to shape defense
policy and undermine the military establishment's capability to exercise its monopoly on profes-
sional expertise. Huntington himself recognized that inter-service rivalry increased political con-
trol.37 Subsequent research has highlighted the role of inter-service rivalry in prompting military
organizations to change procurement priorities and adopt new doctrines. For example, only
competition between the Air Force and Navy permitted American political leaders to enact supe-
rior technical solutions such as ballistic missile submarines and solid fuelled intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (ICBMs) rather than continuing to depend on costly suboptimal solutions such as
manned bombers and liquid fuelled missiles.
While inter-service competition yielded uncontestable results in the United States' case,
few states are capable of profiting from the efforts of rival services to secure roles and missions.
One reason why inter-service rivalry is so productive in the United States is that the state has typ-
ically faced a multiplicity of threats that can be addressed in several ways. By way of contrast,
most states face a dominant threat, which can only be met by confiding preponderant responsi-
bility to a single service. In their respective works, Kimberly Zisk and Pascal Vennesson demon-
strated how the overwhelming threat of terrestrial invasion led to armies becoming the predomi-
nant armed service in the Soviet Union and France. 39 In these cases, inter-service competition
was circumscribed by the leadership role that ground forces came to assume in matters of nation-
al defense.
Another reason why inter-service rivalry is only productive in a small number of states is
the scale of overall defense effort needed to present political leaders with viable alternatives. In
order for armed services to compete for civilian favors, they must be capable of substituting for
one another in accomplishing key missions. This entails a degree of redundancy in terms of pro-
curement. For example, the evolution of an efficient American nuclear deterrent in the 1960s
depended on the concurrent development of rival programs by the Air Force (XB-70 bomber,
Skybolt missiles and Minuteman ICBMs) and Navy (ballistic missile submarines and the A-5
Vigilante bomber). Only in the latter development stages of these programs was it obvious which
were most advantageous and which ones could be cancelled. Unfortunately, few states can afford
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the duplication of procurement effort needed for inter-service rivalry to pay dividends.
In addition to depending on competition in procurement, inter-service rivalry is only pro-
ductive when armed forces replicate elements of each other's force structures. In the United
States, the Air Force, Navy and Marines all maintain sizeable fleets of fixed-wing aircraft, the
Army owns large numbers of attack helicopters, and with the Marine Corps, the Navy possesses
more ground forces than the United Kingdom.41 While this duplication of capabilities has in-
creased the leverage of American policymakers vis-a-vis the armed forces and fostered military
innovation, it is only affordable for a nation such as the United States, with a military establish-
ment of 1.5 million and the world's largest defense budget.42 Thus, although inter-service compe-
tition can enhance civilian control of the armed forces and prompt military innovation, few states
can afford to exploit the advantages it provides.
Besides these costs, relying on inter-service rivalry for political control can entail other
disadvantages. During a period of budgetary uncertainty, inter-service rivalry may prompt armed
services to run needless operational risks to guarantee their organizational future. For example,
well-placed observers remarked that the United States Marines wanted to "win the [1991 Gulf]
War on their own" to ensure their organization's well being in the post-Cold War environment. 43
Fears about their standing relative to the other armed services prompted marine commanders to
lobby for a perilous amphibious landing and volunteer to attack Iraq's strongest defenses in Ku-
wait.
Akin to the tendency of rival armed services to run excessive risks for operational glory is
their propensity to oversell what a single service can achieve. To obtain a greater share of the
budget, armed services are prone to dismiss the joint nature of warfare and focus on their ability
to single-handedly deliver decisive results. Thus, inter-service competition fosters tropisms such
as "air power" or "sea power." Unfortunately, these single-service strategies rarely perform as
effectively as advertised. Even worse than the tendency of competing services to oversell their
individual capabilities is their propensity to pursue independent grand strategies. For example,
the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army planned for entirely different wars throughout the 1930s.
The Army focused on fighting China and preparing for a war with the Soviet Union in Northeast
Asia, and the Navy planned for a maritime and amphibious struggle with the United States and
Britain in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.44
In short, inter-service competition enhances civilian control over the armed forces, but not
without a cost. Although it may seem like inter-service rivalry will prevail wherever multiple
armed services exist, the scope and intensity of inter-service competition depends on the institu-
tional structure of defense policymaking. Inter-service rivalry will be less pronounced where
armed services are overseen by a powerful joint staff and provide collective advice to political
leaders via their common structures.45 In some cases, the commander of the joint staff may even
be designated by law as the government's primary advisor on military affairs.46 In these so-called
"general staff systems," the armed services can logroll their differences beyond the gaze of politi-
cal leaders and present their civilian superiors with unified positions. 47
By way of contrast, inter-service rivalry will be most pronounced when the leaders of
armed services interact directly with political leaders and have minimal contract with one anoth-
er. Without any joint structures, armed forces are likely to compete more vigorously for re-
sources. However, the absence of any joint structures is also likely to prevent the cooperation
necessary to successful military planning and operations. Debacles, such as Britain's 1882 cam-
paign against Alexandria, when the Navy arrived and began bombarding the city six weeks be-
fore the Army arrived, can be attributed to the want of joint structures.48
Experience has shown that a chiefs of staff committee and some form of joint staff are necessary
for modern military operations, and it is no accident that most states possess such structures.
However, it remains to be seen what mixture of inter-service competition and cooperation is most
conducive to military effectiveness and civil-military relations. Although exalted to the status of
a secular religion in recent American debates, the real benefits of inter-service "jointness" are
difficult to ascertain. In terms of American defense policymaking, the "jointness" instituted in
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act has been blamed for reducing civilian control of the armed
forces, sustaining an inflexible division of resources between services and promoting bad poli-
cies, such as the Powell Doctrine of "overwhelming force." Table III, below, analyses the trade-
offs associated with greater or lesser degrees of inter-service competition.
Increases political control of the armed
forces
Fosters military innovation
Prevents inter-service log-rolling
Broadens strategic debates and options
Requires more active involvement in defense
policymaking by civilian leaders
Necessitates procurement and force structure
redundancies
Promotes single-service strategic tropisms
Limits operational jointness
Designating a political figure, such as the minister of defense, to chair the chiefs of staff
committee is one means of exploiting inter-service rivalry, while limiting efficiency costs due to
poor joint coordination. If the professional leaders of separate services cannot meet without po-
litical supervision, then political leaders will become exposed to their internal quarrels. Even if
political leaders do not actively direct chiefs of staff meetings, knowledge of inter-service dis-
putes enhances their leverage.
Broadly speaking, inter-service competition will be maximized when weak joint structures exist
or political leaders oversee meetings of the armed services' chiefs of staff. On the contrary, inter-
service rivalry will be weakest when a powerful joint staff exists, if the commander of the joint
staff is designated the government's principal military advisor and when the chiefs of staff can
Advantages
Table III:
Advantages and Disadvantages of Inter-Service Competition
Disadvantages
meet without political supervision. Table IV, below, highlights the organizational forms that
promote or limit inter-service competition.
Table IV:
Institutions and Inter-Service Competition
Promote Inter-Service Competition Discourage Inter-Service Competition
Service chiefs of staff coequal to chief Chief of joint staff superior to service chiefs
of the joint staff
Chiefs of staff meet under political Chiefs of staff negotiate joint positions before
supervision meeting with political leaders
Minimal or nonexistent joint staff Powerful joint staff
While inter-service rivalry is one means of undermining the high command's monopoly
on military expertise, "broadening the defense policy community" is another. 49 As Kimberly
Zisk demonstrated in the Soviet context, political leaders can enhance their options by sponsoring
think tanks focused on security matters. When given direct access to policymakers, think tanks
permit social scientists, economists and retired military officers to offer analyses and tender rec-
ommendations. Introducing these new actors into policy debates hitherto dominated by military
organizations provides political leaders with more sources of advice. By employing a variety of
analytic approaches, think-tank experts also offer different perspectives. And their noninvolve-
ment in military organizations' competition for wealth and autonomy also helps guarantee the
objectivity of their recommendations.
Although broadening the policy community provides fresh outlooks for political leaders
to consider, think tanks constitute an imperfect counterweight to a cohesive high command's mo-
nopoly on military expertise. Secrecy permits military organizations to conceal background in-
formation from think-tank analysts, who must rely more heavily on open sources.5 If they suc-
cessfully restrict access to information, military organizations can discredit think tanks by ar-
guing that their own analyses are based on superior data. Moreover, even when think tanks ob-
tain classified data, their influence is generally limited to specific policy areas. Economists and
social scientists can criticize procurement strategies, military doctrines and grand strategy. How-
ever, they generally lack the arcane knowledge to debate tactics or operations.5 1
From an institutional perspective, the impact of think tanks depends on their funding,
access to classified information and contact with political leaders. When endowed with all three
of these attributes, think tanks provide policymakers with new and additional sources of exper-
tise, thereby enhancing political control of the armed forces. However, even if well funded, think
tanks will have a marginal impact on defense policymaking if they rely on open sources and lack
direct contact with decision-makers.
Duplication planning and advisory staffs constitute a third technique for reducing the abil-
ity of the armed forces to wield its monopoly on military expertise. Unlike inter-service rivalry,
which generates single-service strategies, fostering competition amongst rival inter-service staffs
will generate multiple joint recommendations about operations and doctrine. Also, the know-
ledge that political leaders have direct access to another source of equivalent expertise increases
the incentives for the principal joint staff to collaborate wholeheartedly with political leaders,
rather than profiting from its informational advantage to pursue policies it prefers for bureaucrat-
ic-political reasons. With the creation of a joint Presidents' Military Staff, French political lead-
ers acquired a counterweight to the larger joint Armed Forces General Staff. As will be seen in
later chapters, political leaders elicited separate proposals from each staff and selectively enacted
recommendations emanating from each.
Erecting a system of parallel military staffs requires a conscientious campaign of institu-
tional creation on the part of political leaders. Enshrining clear hierarchy as their leitmotiv,
armed forces are likely to oppose the existence of parallel staffs. Because it is impractical to
create two joint staffs of equal size, political leaders must guard against the secondary staff be-
coming a subordinate appendage of larger staff. One means of guaranteeing the influence of the
secondary staff is to give it superior access to political leaders than the principle staff, whose in-
fluence resides in its superior resources for implementing policy. Another means of empowering
the secondary staff is to force the principle-staff to communicate with political leaders via the
secondary staff.
Besides relying on inter-service rivalry, think tanks and parallel staffs to provide multiple
policy options, political leaders can also enhance civilian control through educational programs
designed to familiarize civilian elites with military affairs. Because military influence inversely
correlates with civilian decision-makers' understanding of defense matters, increasing civilian
expertise decreases the ability of military professionals to manipulate them. Even if not compe-
tent to run military operations themselves, knowledgeable civilians can better question, prod and
direct the armed forces. Also, direct exposure to military professionals through a common post-
graduate professional education permits civilian policymakers to nurture ties with individual of-
ficers, breaking down the otherwise monolithic nature of the military establishment.
Efforts to provide civilian elites with a national security education can take many forms.
It can target either a restricted number of senior civil servants or broad segments of political, civil
servant, industrial and academic elites. Educational programs can be nested within civilian uni-
versities or entrusted to specially conceived organizations. And civilians can be educated along-
side military officers, or independently of them. When examined closely, seemingly similar edu-
cational programs appear highly distinct. For example, the British Royal College of Defence
Studies (RCDS) and French Institut des Hautes Etudes de D6fense Nationale (IHEDN) purpor-
tedly serve the same role, but 75 percent of the RCDS's trainees are military officers, while 66
percent of the IHEDN is comprised of civilians. In general, the impact of civilian education
programs increases with the depth of instruction dispensed, the scope of the civilian audience
addressed and the ability of civilian elites to foster links with rising military officers.
In short, although the armed forces' monopoly on professional military expertise consti-
tutes one of the greatest obstacles to a high degree of political control over the armed forces,
there are at least four institutional means diminishing information asymmetries between military
professionals and political leaders. Table V, below, illustrates the strategies for enhancing civi-
lian control and the institutional structures that correspond to them.
Table V:
Strategies for Redressing the Asymmetric Balance of Expertise
Strategy Institutional Structures
Inter-Service Rivalry Requires a weak joint staff and/or placing chiefs of
staff committee meetings under political supervision
Broadening the Policy Community Think-tanks must be created, given high quality
information and accorded access to political leaders
Parallel Joint Military Staffs Parallel military staffs must be created and given
access to political leaders
Educating Civilian Decision-makers Educational institutions must be created
As already discussed, each of these strategies for enhancing civilian control has its limits, but
none of them are mutually exclusive. A combination of the above-mentioned institutions will
permit political leaders to draw on multiple independent sources of advice on military affairs.
However, if few or none of these institutions are present, the control exercised political leaders
over the armed forces will be bounded by the armed forces' monopoly on professional military
expertise.
While the maximal political control rests on politician's tapping multiple independent
sources of military advice, it also requires intensive monitoring of military activities to guarantee
that the armed forces are complying with political instructions. Unless they can verify how their
orders are implemented, political leaders risk having their directives reinterpreted to suite the
armed forces' internal preferences. In general, monitoring rests in equal measure on technical and
organizational capabilities.
Advances in communications technologies have progressively enhanced the ability of po-
litical leaders to monitor military operations from afar. Both the instantaneity and quality of
monitoring have improved from Abraham Lincoln's use of the telegraph to follow Civil War
campaigns to Kennedy's exploitation of radio and teletype during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In-
formation technologies and satellite imagery has recently enhanced the potential for civilian mon-
itoring still further.5 3 However, the ability to monitor military operations nevertheless depends
on substantial investments in technical means and special facilities.
Although armed forces are likely to favor monitoring technologies because they permit
the high command to supervise field commanders, they prefer that political leaders not have
access to similar facilities. 54 For this reason, the physical location of monitoring facilities plays a
crucial role in determining whether civilian leaders will be able to exploit them. The French gov-
ernment deliberately installed the Armed Forces' Operational Center underneath the Ministry of
Defense so that the Minister and his civilian collaborators can descend without notice and moni-
tor the progress of French operations throughout the world. By way of contrast, the armed
forces monitor British interventions from traditional military headquarters' such as Northwood
and High Wycomb. Although in the London area, these headquarters are sufficiently far from
Whitehall and Downing Street that political leaders have difficulty exerted a regular presence.
While technical monitoring enhances civilian control over military operations, it is less
suited to more prosaic challenges such as ensuring that military doctrine and procurement prac-
tices are consonant with political desiderata. Dubbed "police patrol" monitoring, regular investi-
gations of military behavior provides a powerful incentive for armed forces to comply with polit-
ical directives. Dedicated investigatory bodies can audit, examine and report on military activi-
ties, informing political leaders whether on not their wishes are being complied with. Officers
found guilty of ignoring political instructions can be punished or relieved, while more pliant ones
can be promoted into key positions. In order to be effective, such investigatory bodies must have
a high degree of technical expertise, access to all relevant information and complete indepen-
dence from the armed services.56
In addition to institutions that provide political leaders with multiple sources of advice
and monitor military activities, a third institutional check on military autonomy lies in constrain-
ing the limits of military authority. In addition to the purely military functions of conducting
operations and developing war plans, defense policymaking compasses many roles that can
equally be undertaken by military officers or civil servants. Procurement policy, budget man-
agement, supply contracting, base construction, force level recommendations and intelligence are
all functions that can be handled either by the armed forces or civilian agencies.57
While armed forces may willingly divest themselves of routine management functions,
they prefer to control areas such as procurement, force level recommendations and intelligence,
which enhance their influence vis-a-vis political leaders. When the armed forces undertake all of
the non-military tasks associated with defense policy, they will wield greater influence. By way
of contrast, political leaders can constrain military influence by divesting armed forces of all
functions besides those associated with their central function of preparing for and conducting
military operations. 58
Although no single institution defines whether a state will enjoy maximal or minimal con-
trol over the armed forces, the aggregate influence of many institutional factors shapes the degree
of control that political leaders will enjoy. The institutional structure of decision-making defines
the degree of power different groups of actors will have over policy outcomes and how those
groups will interact with one another.59 Political control will be maximized when armed forces
are divested of all non-military functions, monitored by electronic means and oversight agencies,
counterbalanced by civilian think-tanks, divided by inter-service rivalries, managed by specially
trained civilians and commanded via parallel, yet redundant, joint staffs. By way of contrast,
military influence will be maximized when the armed forces control the non-military aspects of
defense policymaking, deal with their political superiors as a monolithic whole, and can restrict
the information available to civilians in both the government and think tanks. In short, institu-
tions can be expected to determine which form of political control over the armed forces a state
will enjoy.
V. The Origins of Civil-Military Institutions
If institutions play a critical role in determining how political leaders control armed
forces, it is natural to examine the processes whereby states develop civil-military institutions.
At a basic level, institutions are created to fulfil specific needs and are subject to regular revision.
However, routine institutional change occurs along path-dependent trajectories, whereby future
institutional change is conditioned by and reinforces already dominant patterns. This form of
change characterizes most periods of time and represents how states respond to all but the most
traumatic events. Disruptive institutional change is much rarer and only occurs when circum-
stances demonstrate that existing institutional structures are no longer viable. Only then are
states likely to substantially reinvent their civil-military institutions.
Because most institutional change is self-reinforcing and disruptive institutional change is
comparatively rare, institutional patterns and performance remain stable over long periods of
time. Through research on other domains of state activity, scholars have demonstrated how per-
sistent certain institutional structures can be. Examining the foundations of economic perform-
ance, Peter Hall and David Soskice demonstrate that distinct institutional structures, in place by
the 1950s, have shaped both the comparative advantages that states possess and the commercial
sectors where they excel.0 Kees van Kersbergen, Philip Manow and Berhard Ebbinghaus have
argued that the origins of welfare regimes in today's advanced industrial states lie in institutional
structures generated by political compromises reached as states industrialized and consolidated in
the 19th century.61 Likewise, Stein Rokkan and Seymore Lipset proved that modern party sys-
tems have roots in how political cleavages were represented and institutionalized as states democ-
ratized.62
If domains as different as economic performance, welfare regimes and political party
structures are all influenced by institutional developments that occurred long ago, the question
arises as to whether defense policymaking is also the product of institutional structures devised
over time. The extant literature on institutions highlights three reasons why institutional patterns
persist. Firstly, once stable institutions are established, there are costs to changing them. Sec-
ondly, political leaders tend to "satisfice" rather than optimize when it comes to institutions. Fi-
nally, because path-dependency produces multiple equilibriums that each produce comparative
advantages, there may not be any clearly "optimal" set of civil-military institutions.
Ever since Niccollo Machiavelli, political scientists have recognized that reforming insti-
tutions is a costly process.63 The costs of reforming institutions are threefold and lie in the oppo-
sition of groups opposed to the reform, the difficulty in predicting the performance of new insti-
tutions and the policymaking friction that tends to result whenever institutional structures are
subjected to comprehensive reform. Partisans of existing institutions will defend them, while
beneficiaries of new ones will support change only lukewarmly.
Moreover, the performance of existing institutions is comparatively easy to measure, but
it is unpredictable how new institutions will perform. Therefore, it is difficult to be certain that
new institutions will prove better than those they replace and it is entirely possible that they con-
tain unanticipated defects. In addition to the political opposition and uncertain outcome of insti-
tutional reforms, the friction generated by the reform process itself constitutes an obstacle to re-
form. Even if new institutions are superior to those they replace, changing from one institutional
process to another temporarily creates chaos as existing hierarchical relations are replaced by new
ones.
Because institutional reform is an unpredictable and costly process, political leaders tend
to satisfice. As long as existing institutions perform adequately, political leaders will not seek to
make them perform optimally. Satisficing is a rationale behavior on the part of political leaders
because decision-makers rarely possess the information needed to judge whether alternative insti-
tutional arrangements would function better than those in place.64
While the costs of change and the tendency to satisfice inhibit disruptive institutional
change, political economists also suggest that diverse institutional structures underlay distinct
comparative advantages. Neither minimal nor maximal control of the armed forces represents a
superior form of organizing defense policymaking. Rather, each embodies unique comparative
advantages. Because each system possesses its own logic, which is rooted in networks of com-
plementary institutions, it is costly and of dubious utility to shift from one institutional pattern to
another. By way of contrast, it is simpler to meet new challenges by modifying existing institu-
tions in a manner keeping with their essential logic.65
If routine institutional change is commonplace and disruptive change rare, then states can
be expected to retain their existing institutional structures for defense policymaking in most cir-
cumstances. However, this begs the problem of how maximal civilian control comes about.
Unlike its minimal counterpart, maximal civilian control depends on the existence of a network
of specific institutions to provide alternative advice, monitor military activity and divest the
armed services of non-military functions. Creating such institutions is clearly an act of disruptive
institutional change. Thus, the question emerges as to what conditions are necessary for a disrup-
tive reform of defense policymaking institutions to occur?
By its nature, disruptive institutional change is a product of events demonstrating massive
failings in existing institutional arrangements. At base, civil-military control institutions serve
two purposes: 1) protecting the state against external threats; and 2) ensuring government's con-
trol over the armed forces. By extension, either a catastrophic military defeat or a significant
crisis in civil-military relations might prompt the disruptive reforms needed to create the institu-
tional networks required for maximal civilian control of the armed forces.
It has frequently been argued that military defeat is a primary cause for defense reforms.
France after 1763 and Prussia after 1806 are both prominent cases where catastrophic military
failure prompted a transformation of military practices and institutions. Logically, civil-military
institutions bear a degree of responsibility in military failures and should be reformed along with
other aspects of defense policy. Faced with the inadequacy of existing arrangements, political
leaders can be expected to impose a greater degree of political control on the armed forces.
However, it would be false to infer that military defeat inexorably leads to institutional re-
forms and increased civilian control. Catastrophic military defeats frequently weaken civilian
regimes more than military organizations. Recriminations between political parties, the collapse
of popular legitimacy and physical eviction from the buildings of government make it difficult
for political leaders to continue governing in the wake of catastrophic military defeat. By way of
contrast, military headquarters and hierarchies continue functioning even when field armies are
vanquished. While the German blitzkrieg of 10 May 1940 precipitated the collapse of French
civilian government on 16 June, the armed forces high command continued to function and ulti-
mately imposed its preferences on the state. Similarly, military defeat in 1918 led to the fall of
the German monarchy and the enfeeblement of civilian government. However, the armed forces
retained enough cohesion to play a critical role in the politics of the immediate post-war period.66
In short, military defeat weakens civilian governments to a greater extent than military organiza-
tions.
Even should civilian governments retain the cohesion needed to propose reforms, defeat
can exalt the status of the armed forces, rendering any diminution of their authority unpopular.
However paradoxical, defeated peoples tend to rally around their armed forces as a symbol of
national strength and defiance. When the subsequent histories of the defeat are written, the re-
sponsibility for military failure is all too frequently (and incorrectly) attributed to political rather
than military leaders. Germany's defeat in 1918 was the result of a "stab in the back" from social-
ists at home, France's collapse in 1940 came about because of the penny-pinching and anti-
military policies of the Popular Front, and the United States' failure in Vietnam resulted from the
gradualism and micromanagement of the Johnson administration.
The tendency of defeated populations to lionize their armed forces and the ability of the
armed forces to shift blame to civilians renders it problematic for political leaders to create insti-
tutions capable of exerting greater control. In fact, defeat strengthens the autonomy and power of
armed forces at least as often as it weakens them. The German Army wielded more political
power under the Weimar Republic than the Second Reich and defeat produced a military regime
in France after 1940. In the United States, the armed forces were so successful at diffusing their
interpretation of the Vietnam War that the 15 years following withdrawal from Indochina where
characterized by a progressive weakening of political control over the armed forces. General
Creighton Abrams' restructuring of the Army (1972-74), the publication of the Weinberger-
Powell Doctrine (1984) and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) all reduced the options available
to political leaders.
In short, although catastrophic military failure can theoretically catalyze disruptive institu-
tional reforms, it is difficult for political leaders to create civil-military control institutions in the
wake of defeat. Because defeat weakens civilian governments and enhances the popularity of the
armed forces, civilian leaders lack the cohesion to propose reforms and military commanders can
leverage their popularity to oppose them. While a tempting culprit for disruptive change, military
defeat is rarely responsible for the creation of civil-military control institutions.
If military defeat does not prompt disruptive institutional change, then civil-military strife
might. While military force remains the regio ultima ratio-the last argument of kings-and is a
fundamental component of national power, militaries can also pose a threat to the civilian gov-
ernments they theoretically serve. In many parts of the world, more governments fall to military
coups d'6tats than foreign invasions. While the danger of a military coup d'6tat appears to have
vanished from the advanced industrialized regions of Western Europe, North America and North-
East Asia, states such as Portugal (1974), Greece (1974), Spain (1975), South Korea (1979) and
Poland (1981) have recently suffered coups or army rule.68 In the slightly more distant past,
France, Italy, Germany and Japan all experienced severe civil-military strife.
While the coup d'dtat is the penultimate form of military intervention in politics, it would
be mistaken to define civil-military relations merely in terms of the presence or absence of coups
d'dtats. S. E. Finer identified four types of civil-military dysfunction, in ascending gravity, in-
cluding influence, blackmail, displacement and supplantation. A coup fits into Finer's final cate-
gory. However, blackmail, which consists of threatening resignation or disobedience to gain a
favored outcome, and displacement, which involves the military precipitating the replacement of
one civilian regime by another, also represents grave transgressions of civilian control of the
armed forces.69
After states experience severe civil-military strike, they guard against future problems by
developing institutions to check the military's power and prevent their intervening in politics.
Thus, as numerous scholars have observed, civil-military crises provide a powerful impetus for
disruptive institutional change.70 Although a wide variety of control mechanisms can be theoreti-
cally developed, few are compatible with democracy. The civil-military institutions discussed
earlier in the context of how political leaders control the armed forces are amongst the only ones
compatible with an industrializing and democratizing state. 71 "Dividing and ruling" the armed
forces through inter-service rivalries and parallel staffs, creating invasive means of monitoring
military behavior and circumscribing military responsibilities prevent armed forces from acting
against a state's legitimate political authorities, but do not undermine the broader process of state-
72building.
Once civil-military control institutions are in place, they are likely to continue to play a
role shaping defense policymaking long after the danger of a civil-military crisis has receded into
the background. It is generally agreed that the growth of civil society and a polity's belief in the
legitimacy of a particular form of government close the door on the most egregious military in-
terventions in politics. And by the time states becomes an advanced industrialized democracies,
a military coup d'dtat or army mutiny is a virtual impossibility. 73 However, there is no compel-
ling reason why institutions created during decades or centuries of civil-military strife should
vanish once the original threat has abated.74
As long as civil-military control institutions do not generate significant negative externali-
ties, governments are unlikely to abolish them. Moreover, a robust network of institutions can
provide benefits that were not anticipated at the time they were first created. As already dis-
cussed, maximal civilian control of the armed forces provides distinct comparative advantages
and political leaders are unlikely to surrender their enhanced powers.
By way of conclusion, past research on institutions and civil-military relations provides
key insights into how states develop their civil-military policymaking institutions. Maximal civ-
il-military control is more demanding in institutional terms than its minimal counterpart. Under
most circumstances, civil-military institutions evolve gradually and along path-dependent trajec-
tories. Only events that starkly demonstrate the inadequacy of existing institutions can prompt
the degree of disruptive change needed to change from one structure of civil-military relations to
another. Even catastrophic military defeats rarely produce this sort of change because blame for
military failure is rarely clear, civilian governments are weakened in the process, and armed
forces benefit from the patriotic ambiance following defeat. However, civil-military crises pro-
duce disruptive institutional change because they unambiguously demonstrate that existing levels
of military autonomy pose a threat to civilian government.
Thus, states that have experienced significant civil-military conflicts are likely to possess
a network of civil-military control institutions. At the time of their creation, these institutions
exist for the express purpose of protecting civilian government from the armed forces. However,
as time goes by and the risks of civil-military strife diminishes, civil-military control institutions
persist and permit political leaders to exert a greater degree of control over the armed forces than
would otherwise be possible. States that have not suffered from significant civil-military conflict
are unlikely to ever feel the impetus to create the many institutions associated with maximal con-
trol of the armed forces. Instead, the development of their civil-military institutions will evolve,
by default, into a form of minimal control of the armed forces.
VI. Theory Summary
The theory I propose to explain defense policymaking in advanced industrialized demo-
cracies can be termed "Civil-Military Legacy Theory." Reduced to its fundamentals, civil-
military legacy theory holds that historic patterns of civil-military relations underscore institu-
tional patterns of civil-military relations in advanced industrialized states. Long after states are
no longer prey to military interventions in politics, the institutions originally created to protect
government from the armed forces will continue to shape how governments use military force. In
states where civil-military conflict prompted sustained periods of institutional development,
present day governments will possess institutional resources to exert maximal civilian control
over defense policymaking. States with harmonious civil-military legacies will lack these institu-
tional structures and will exercise a weaker degree of civilian control, manifested in a functional
division of labor between political and military spheres. Each form of political control embodies
distinct comparative advantages, one privileging the integration of military activities with the
state's foreign policy, while the other provides for greater military effectiveness.
Explained by arrow diagrams, civil-military legacy theory possesses four steps in its caus-
al chain. Table VI, below, illustrates the theory.
Because most of the variables in the theory are bi-variant, there are two ideal typical models of
defense policymaking. In states that have suffered significant civil-military conflict in their pasts,
the causal chain leads to the creation of a network of civil-military control institutions, the impo-
sition of maximal political control over the armed forces and comparative advantages based on
the tight integration of defense policies with the state's overall aims. Table VII, below, illustrates
this causal chain.
Table VI:
Arrow Diagram (Generic) of Civil-Military Legacy Theory
Conversely, states that have not suffered from civil-military problems are unlikely to develop
elaborate institutional control mechanisms. Lacking the institutional tools, political leaders will
exercise only minimal control of the armed forces. Political leaders will occupy themselves with
determining foreign policy aims and allocating means to accomplish them, while the armed
forces will enjoy substantial freedom to manage operations, doctrine and procurement. The re-
sulting defense policies will reflect the professional judgments of military organizations above
other considerations.
Table VIII:
The Legacy of Harmonious Civil-Military Relations Operational anTactical Military
Excellence
Weak or Non- Minimal Civi Doctrines Re-
History of Civil- Existent Civil- ian Control of flect Military
MiliaryConordMilitary Control the Armed fetMltr
"Best Practices"
ilitary Innovates
in Response to
echnical Change
In the cases of both harmonious and contentious civil-military legacies, the character of present
day defense policymaking derives from institutional developments prompted by circumstances
that no longer exist.
To test civil-military legacy theory it is useful to break it down into six postulates.
Hypothesis #1: States that have suffered from substantial civil-military strife are likely to
develop a network of civil-military control institutions. States that have enjoyed more harmo-
nious civil-military relations are unlikely to possess these institutions.
Hypothesis #2: The danger of military interventions in politics recedes with the develop-
ment of vibrant civil societies and the development of a belief that civilian government is legiti-
mate. However, civil-military control institutions are likely to persist unless events prove them
unreliable.
Hypothesis #3: The presence of a network of civil-military control institutions permits
civilian leaders to exert maximal political control over the armed forces. This involves political
leaders shaping military doctrine, micromanaging military interventions and dominating the pro-
curement process.
Hypothesis #4: The absence of specific institutional structures consigns civilian leaders
to exercising a minimal degree of political control over the armed forces. This consists of politi-
cal leaders recognizing an independent sphere of military competence, and leaving military pro-
fessionals a high degree of autonomy to manage operations and elaborate doctrine.
Hypothesis #5: Maximal political control of the armed forces is the source of distinct
comparative advantages in the integration of military actions and doctrines with the overall for-
eign policy of the state. The disadvantages of this form of political control lay in the inexpert
meddling of civilian politicians, who are less likely to comprehend military-technical realities
than professional officers.
Hypothesis #6: Minimal political control of the armed forces is associated with other
comparative advantages. More autonomous military organizations will be able to craft doctrines
and conduct operations according to what the military profession considers "best practices." The
drawbacks of minimal political control reside in the offensive and escalatory inclinations of mili-
tary officers, and the likelihood that military actions will be poorly integrated with the state's for-
eign policy.
All six hypotheses will be tested in the seven case-study chapters that follow. While these
hypotheses draw on existing theories of bureaucratic politics, civil-military relations and institu-
tionalism, civil-military legacy theory represents the first attempt to connect past civil-military
relations with present day institutional structures and military performance. If the theory can be
demonstrated to hold true, it has powerful implications for students of security studies and com-
parative politics. The identification of systemically different national processes of defense poli-
cymaking should lead scholars of doctrine, war plans and military innovation to shift their focus
from proposing universalistic theories to examining the particular processes by which different
states produce military power.
Furthermore, by placing past civil-military relations at the heart of military performance,
civil-military legacy theory should change the temporal outlook of scholars. Rather than examin-
ing only recent and large developments, a proper understanding of how a state produces military
power obliges researchers to examine smaller and more remote events. Recognition that funda-
mentally different institutional processes underlay defense policymaking in advanced industria-
lized democracies may also open the door for developing policymaking typologies. Are maximal
and minimal political controls the only two alternatives? Are they fixed categories or two ex-
tremes along a continuum, with mixed results possible? Finally, what implications do fundamen-
tal differences in domestic defense policymaking processes have for international cooperation?
Especially in a European context, where many small and medium sized states are attempting to
coordinate their defense policies and military interventions via the European Union and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), do radically different models of political control of the
armed forces pose a challenge to effective collaboration?
If proven to hold true, civil-military legacy theory will be a powerful analytic tool for un-
derstanding dynamics of defense policymaking and raises tantalizing questions for further inves-
tigation. Although the conclusion will touch further on the implications of the theory, the pur-
pose of the following chapters is to test and hopefully prove the hypotheses underlying civil-
military legacy theory.
VII. Road Map
To test civil-military legacy theory, I examine two states that have much in common, but
differ according to their histories of civil-military relations. Both France and the United King-
dom are states whose levels of economic and democratic development render them immune from
a military intrusion into politics. However, while the United Kingdom never experienced signifi-
cant civil-military problems, France suffered from periodic civil-military turmoil for much of its
modem history. The first successful military coup in France occurred in 1799, a decade after
revolutionaries stormed the Bastille, while the last successful coup transpired exactly fifty-years
ago, in May 1958. Because they differ according to this crucial independent variable, the United
Kingdom and France can also be expected to vary in terms of the institutions they possess, the
form of political control exercised and the types of policies that are enacted.
Similarities in other respects make it easier to determine the independent effect of institu-
tions on policy outcomes. Unlike the United States, Britain and France both possess forms of
government that concentrate political power in the hands of the executive. Cabinet government
in the United Kingdom and semi-presidentialism in France grant a foreign and defense policy-
making monopoly to the prime minister or president. Legislative oversight is virtually non-
existent in both cases.
While their governmental systems are similar with respect to defense policymaking, the
United Kingdom and France also have the same psychological views on the use of force. Unlike
Japan, Germany and Italy, where the Second World War discredited the notion that military force
is a legitimate foreign policy tool, British and French leaders are swift to use force in defense of
national interests. Both states also feel entitled to possess the entire gamut of weapons, including
nuclear armaments.
During the period covered in my case studies, France and the United Kingdom dedicated
almost identical resources to national defense. With populations of the same magnitude and simi-
lar technological means at a societal level, the two states had the same raw materials with which
to plan the nation's defense. Moreover, as illustrated by Table IX below, France and the United
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Kingdom spent almost identical sums on defense.
Table IX:
Defense Spending 1975-84
Mean Defense Spending Defense Spending
Country Per Annum As a % of GDP
United Kingdom $25.7 billion 4.9 %
France $25.7 billion 4.0 %
Saying that the United Kingdom and France are comparable does not mean that their for-
eign policies were identical. The United Kingdom strove to enhance its influence by positioning
itself as the United States' most reliable ally, while France attempted to leverage its strategic in-
dependence to gain international influence and sympathy. Divergent views on the United States
were reflected in different policies towards NATO, with Britain striving for a preeminent place
and France keeping the alliance at arms length. Thus, comparability means that the United King-
dom and France dispose of similar means and face analogous constraints.
Tracing the origins of civil-military institutions and diagnosing their impact on policy-
making requires in-depth process tracing of selected cases. The first step in testing civil-military
legacy theory involves proving a relationship between historic civil-military relations and con-
temporary defense policymaking institutions. In Chapter 2, I explore the origins of civil-military
institutions in the United Kingdom and France, weighing the relative impacts of routine function-
al pressures, military defeats and civil-military crises on institutional change. Because states are
most liable to suffer from civil-military tensions while they are modernizing economically and
democratizing politically, this chapter covers a temporally vast swath of time, from the late-
eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century.
Once the contours of British and French institutional structures are adequately defined,
Chapters 3-8 examine the effects of these institutions on specific policy areas. To best ascertain
the impact of different form of civilian control, I focus on three specific areas of defense policy-
making where civil-military tensions run particularly high. In Chapters 3 and 4, I compare how
France and Britain developed military doctrines and war plans. As already mentioned, prior re-
search on civil-military interactions indicate that technical complexity and opacity make it partic-
ularly onerous for civilian leaders to meaningfully influence military doctrines.77 Thus, military
doctrine poses a tough test for the proposition that civilian leaders can shape military doctrines.
In Chapters 5 and 6, I examine the effect of civil-military institutions on procurement pol-
icies. According to Huntington, procurement is a policy domain that can either be managed by
the armed forces, a civilian agency, or a combination of the two.78 Under maximal control, civi-
lian authority should be expected to be high, while military participation will be significant under
minimal control. Because procurement involves defense policymaking institutions in intensive
interactions with a variety of social actors, including enterprises and economic ministries, it pro-
vides a hard test for the ability of armed services to impose their preferences.
In Chapters 7 and 8, I contrast the way that France and the United Kingdom conduct mili-
tary operations. Because the application of violent force lies at the heart of Huntington's defini-
tion of military professionalism, control of tactics and operations constitutes the core of his "in-
dependent sphere of military competence." Therefore, military organizations are likely to resist
political intrusions into this domain with the greatest vehemence. However, because military
success or failure can make or break a government, political leaders have a strong incentive to
interfere. With political leaders prone to meddle and military commanders inclined to resist, mil-
itary operations provide a valuable opportunity to examine the comparative power of each side.
Chapter 9 closes the dissertation with a conclusion summarizing the arguments presented
and examining applications of civil-military legacy theory.
Because demonstrating the independent causal power of institutions is an empirically dif-
ficult task, the case studies in Chapters 3-8 demand rich sources of fine-grained information on
how operational, tactical, doctrinal and procurement decisions were made. This sort of evidence
is currently unavailable for events that transpired since the end of the Cold War. However, arc-
hival records, interviews with decision-makers and published primary sources provide the data
for examining cases from the second half of the Cold War. For this reason, my case studies are
drawn from the period stretching from 1965 until 1991. By 1965, France and the United King-
dom had largely divested themselves of their colonial empires, reducing both states to the status
of middle-sized European states. With 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Cold
War came to a definitive end, opening a new chapter in the history of the international relations.
While France and the United Kingdom were chosen as objects of study because they dif-
fer according to the independent variable (civil-military histories) and have rich sources of infor-
mation available, both states are important actors in their own right. Although middle-sized
states, France and the United Kingdom are recognized to exert more influence than their size
alone would normally permit. Both states are permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council and enjoy status as nuclear powers. Willing to use force to accomplish political goals,
France and the United Kingdom have also intervened in more foreign conflicts than any state
besides the United States. Through these interventions, French and British decision-makers have
arguably played a disproportionate role in shaping the contemporary world. Today, as European
states attempt to formulate a single defense policy, France and the United Kingdom are the natu-
ral leaders of a more integrated and internationally assertive European Union (EU). Anglo-
French concord is the probable motor for European defense integration, while Franco-British
struggles for influence will likely mark the EU's policy debates.
In addition to proposing an innovative theory on the effects of civil-military legacies on
defense policymaking, I hope that my work also illuminates the strengths, weaknesses and inter-
nal policymaking processes of two key international actors.
Endnotes
I Here I avoid using Huntington's terms of "subjective" and "objective" control of the
armed forces. As Huntington presents them, these two modes of control represent a false dichot-
omy. For Huntington, subjective control aimed at "the maximizing of the power of some particu-
lar civilian group or groups [over the military]." For Huntington, this entails civilian leaders
"trespassing" into military matters and politicizing the officer corps by promoting commanders
based on their political credentials. The obverse of subjective control is objective control, which
aims to professionalize the armed forces through "the recognition of autonomous military profes-
sionalism." Each of Huntington's two modes of control depends on two factors. Objective con-
trol combines a high degree of military autonomy with a high degree of military professionalism.
Subjective control denies military autonomy and presupposes a lack of military professionalism.
Unfortunately, Huntington's typology denies the possibility that high autonomy can be combined
with low professionalism, or low autonomy with high professionalism. Huntington's explanation
for his presentation of a dichotomy, when his two variables allow for four combinations, is that
professionalism is a dependent variable of autonomy. Autonomous armed forces will be profes-
sional and non-autonomous armed forces will be unprofessional. Unfortunately, there is little
proof for this proposition. Some armed forces, such as the West German Bundeswehr, sustained
a high degree of professionalism despite severe limits on their autonomy. Others, such as many
post-colonial African armed forces, have become unprofessional despite a high degree of auton-
omy. In fact, African cases demonstrate a trend whereby the professionalism of armed forces
waned in direct proportion to their autonomy.
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for political intervention in all forms of military activity. See Samuel Huntington, The Soldier
and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
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egy, mobilizing resources, punishment and espionage to the military commander. The only role
accorded the sovereign is selecting his general and, if necessary, relieving him. The 2 Century
General Cao Cao wrote in his commentary on Sun Tzu that "He [the sovereign] must dismiss and
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Chapter II:
The Origins of Civil-Military Institutions
I. Introduction
Writing in the early 19th century, Prussian military theorist Karl von Clauswitz
observed that war was the extension of politics by other means. With this apparently
anodyne statement, Clauswitz advanced a normative ideal as to what the proper
relationship between armed forces and governments ought to be. If military force is a
means of achieving the ends set by a state's political leaders, then the high command of
the armed forces must be subordinate to the government. Occupying this proper and
subservient role in a well-constituted state, armed forces need only concern themselves
with perfecting the martial skills needed to vanquish international opponents. Confident
in the loyalty of its military servants, governments can draw on the leaders of their armed
forces as a reservoir of the specialized knowledge and capabilities necessary for survival
in an international environment characterized by antagonistic relations between states.
Ironically, Clauswitz's military idol, Napoleon Bonaparte, demonstrated precisely
how problematic it can be for a state to wield, yet control military force. As the most
powerful component of the state's "monopoly on legitimate violence," armed forces are
physically capable of imposing their will on civilian governments and essential to
defending states against significant internal threats. Before ever commanding an army,
Napoleon used artillery to dispel rioters threatening the Directory ruling France.
Napoleon learnt from this experience how dependent civilian government is on military
forces serving it and how force (a proverbial "whiff of grapeshot") can be used to quell
civilian malcontents. After subduing Italy at the head of a French army and leading
another French army, less successfully, to the pyramids, Napoleon seized power with the
help of only a handful of soldiers.
Seven years of warfare and the combined armies of Europe's monarchies failed to
unseat France's revolutionary governments. However, on 9 November 1799 (the 18th
Brumaire), a single ambitious general and a small number of loyal soldiers succeeded
where Prussia, Russia, Austria and the United Kingdom had not.
The gulf between Clauswitz's ideal of subservient and professional armed forces
and the reality of Napoleon's creation of the first modem military dictatorship
demonstrates the ambiguity of the relationship between armed forces and the states they
are supposed to serve. While armed forces represent the state's final rampart against
foreign aggression and provide the state's most forceful means of imposing its will on
rivals, armed forces also constitute a threat to the governments they are supposed to
serve.
The problem of armed forces abusing their position transcends the question of
coups d'dtats. There are many other ways that armed forces can depart from perfect
obedience. Without seizing power, armed forces can substitute one civilian regime for
another, sabotage government policies, precipitate unwanted wars, refuse to defend the
state from internal disturbances and claim excessive human and material resources. Peter
Feaver likened all military deviations from civilian preferences to "shirking" within a
principal-agent framework.' More specifically, S. E. Finer identified four types of civil-
military dysfunction, in ascending order-influence, blackmail, displacement and
supplantation, with coups d'dtats fitting into the final category.
The dual nature of armed forces, as the guardians of a state against external
threats, yet themselves representing a threat to domestic regimes, cannot help but impact
how armed forces are structured and integrated with the rest of government. Armed
forces are amongst the oldest, most costly and largest bureaucratic organizations. The
institutional structures needed to produce, manage and control armed force have evolved
continuously, although at highly variable speeds. Two distinct causes account for a vast
majority of institutional reforms. The first category of factors prompting institutional
reforms are the functional imperatives of adapting existing military institutions to
perform more effectively and/or fulfill new combat roles. The second category of factors
has to do with improving the ability of governments to control their armed forces.
Warfare has changed immensely since the birth of bureaucratic armies and navies.
With the industrial revolution, military bureaucracies had to develop institutional
mechanisms for introducing new technology. After centuries of dominance, the muzzle-
loading canon, horse and musket have been displaced by waves of innovation, including
quick-firing guns, breech-loading rifles, nitrous explosives, machine guns, tanks, gas,
aircraft, rockets and nuclear weapons. Failure to introduce technology as efficiently as
one's enemies has meant defeat, if not national extinction.
Likewise, armed forces have had to develop the planning capacity, embodied in
the general staff system, to foresee the many separate tasks comprised in a military action
or campaign. To master new technologies and lay complex plans requires a more
professional military ethic and education than existed in ancien regime Europe. More
recently, the need to combine the actions of diverse military services has led to the
development of combined or joint staffs, schools and ministries of defense.
The functional demands of improving military effectiveness are such that many
institutional innovations have been international in scope. Modern military academies
were founded in Europe and the United States at the beginning of the 19th century.
General staff systems multiplied throughout Europe and abroad after the German
victories of 1866 and 1870 demonstrated their utility. Later, the United States, the United
Kingdom and France developed multi-service ministries of defense within the space of a
couple decades. International competition obliges states to respond to foreign
improvements in military institutions, either by copying foreign institutions or developing
a domestic counter to them.
If the functional demands of military efficiency are one sources of pressure for
institutional reform, the need to guarantee or improve political control of armed forces
provides another. Because military force is capable of overthrowing the regime it is
supposed to serve, governments have developed institutional structures and processes
designed to control their armed forces. Historically, these systems have adopted a wide
variety of forms, including political commissars, parallel militias, paramilitary forces, the
selection of commanders based on political criteria, invasive intelligence agencies and
divided command structures.
Not all structures designed to enable civilian leaders to control their armed forces
are of equal efficacy however. Civil-military control institutions are frequently found
wanting, either because they fail at their primary task of controlling the armed forces, or
because they adversely impact on military effectiveness. In both cases, proven defects in
civil-military institutions are habitually addressed by new rounds of institutional reform.
Thus, civil-military institutions can be the product of two distinct set of
concerns-the need for greater military effectiveness and the struggle of governments to
assert control over their armed forces. Perceived shortcomings or manifest failings in
either domain are likely to prompt further cycles of institutional development.
Conversely, existing institutions are less likely to be subjected to disruptive reforms if
they are perceived to function adequately. As such, an Army that has never been
defeated is less likely to be subjected to significant reforms aimed at improving its
military efficacy than one that has suffered substantial and unexpected reverses.
Similarly, an Army that has never given its political masters cause to fear is less likely to
have its autonomy questioned and be saddled with intrusive control institutions than one
that has meddled in politics. Finally, if institutional reform is highly correlated with
failure of existing structures to provide either military victory or civil-military peace, then
periods of domestic and international calm will be less likely to witness dramatic change
then more tumultuous periods.
This chapter will examine the evolution of civil-military institutions in France and
the United Kingdom, from the beginning of the modern-era in 1789 until the latter stages
of de-colonization in the 1960s. Compared to the subsequent decades, this period
witnessed waves of significant political and strategic upheavals. Major wars alternatively
confronted France and the United Kingdom with evidence that their existing institutions
needed to be improved. At the same time, both states evolved from early modern forms
of government-an absolute monarchy in France's case and a limited democracy in the
United Kingdom's case-to liberal democracies based on universal adult suffrage. In
France's case this transformation was accompanied by considerable tension between
military and civilian elites. In the United Kingdom, civil-military relations were
comparatively calm, although problems were not entirely absent.
Neither state has endured a significant military or a civil-military crisis since the
mid-1960s. If reforms of civil-military institutions are prompted by the failure of existing
arrangements under the pressure of events, then it is reasonable to assume that the
institutional structures of defense policymaking in France and the United Kingdom have
evolved slowly since the mid-1960s, compared with the preceding epoch when periodic
crises promoted disruptive reforms.
If one accepts the argument that the process of institutional creation is more rapid
during crises than periods of calm, then civil-military institutions in France and the
United Kingdom evolved in two very different environments. In the United Kingdom,
civil-military institutions evolved under the sole constraint of improving military
efficiency. Military disasters, including the siege of Sebastopol, the British Army's
"Black Week" of 1899, the strategic controversies of 1917 and necessities of joint- and
global-warfare during the Second World War all expedited institutional reform.
As in the United Kingdom, civil-military institutions in France were also
periodically renovated in the wake of military defeat-the debacles of 1870 and 1940
providing the most notable examples. However, French institutions were also reformed
in response to a sequence of civil-military crisis. The Boulanger Crisis, the Dreyfus
Affair, the governmental crisis of 1940 and the General's Putsch of 1961 prompted
civilian governments to act to prevent similar events from repeating themselves in the
future.
Civil-military institutions in the United Kingdom were the result of the state's
need to defend itself against foreign threats, while equivalent institutions in France
delicately balanced the imperatives of thwarting external enemies with protecting the
Republic's government from its own armed forces.
II. France, 1789-1871: The Origins of Civil-Military Problems
As with most aspects of French history, the Revolution of 1789 looms chasm-like
in French civil-military relations, separating the modern-era from the more distant past.
The ancien regime was a period of civil-military harmony, at least at the elite level.
Noble and bourgeois officers had an innate loyalty to monarch and state. This
relationship was reinforced by the symbiosis of the highest echelons of the armed forces
and the state. Major commanders frequented the royal court, while the king periodically
accompanied his armies in the field.
Revolution fissured this edifice of civil-military relations. When the Revolution
took a radical turn with the King's arrest and the purge of the Girondins, much of the
officer corps emigrated or fought for France's enemies. Faced with the rapid collapse of
the Monarchy's officer corps, the Republic hurriedly created a new one out of the few
Royal officers remaining loyal, non-commissioned officers promoted from the ranks,
revolutionary politicians and fresh volunteers.
Although the new officer corps won its first battle in September 1792, mistrust
colored the relations of the Republic with its generals. During the debates preceding the
Republic's declaration of war, Jacobin leader Maximillian Robespierre warned that war
would permit a military Caesar to overthrow the Republic. Over the course of the
following years, the Republic's efforts to control its officers and the panicked responses
of these latter did little to improve civil-military relations. The Jacobin-run Committee
for Public Safety dispatched political commissars to the armies and guillotined
commanders suspected of disloyalty. Fearing for their lives, a number of prominent
generals, including Lafayette, Rochambeau and Dumoriez defected to France's enemies.
At the same time, officers were promoted for political reliability rather than
military experience. Some of these men, including Napoleon Bonaparte, proved
remarkable strategists, while others, such as Generals Ldchelle and Westermann, were
dismal failures.2 Whatever their abilities, politicized officers helped political factions
crush opponents. Before ever commanding armies, Napoleon and Joachim Murat (future
Marshal of France and King of Naples) used artillery and cavalry to disperse a Parisian
royalist mob on 13 Vendemiaire 1795. Four years later, political schemers, including
Napoleon's brother, convinced the general to overthrow the governing Directory.
Napoleon seized this opportunity and took power in the coup d'6tat of 18
Brumaire. However, contrary to the expectations of civilian politicians, Napoleon kept
power for himself and ruled France as a dictator. Thus, in 1799, a Jacobin general
realised Robespierre's nightmare, the advent of a French Caesar. Superficially, Napoleon
brought an end to the ambiguities of civil-military relations in revolutionary France.
Having seized power in a coup d'dtat. Napoleon placated civilian elites with reforms of
public administration, including the creation of the Code Civil, the metric system and the
establishment of prefectures. He also rendered his new regime more palatable to
catholics by signing a concordate with the Vatican.
On the military level, Napoleon struggled to co-opt the Army's elites into his
regime. He bestowed the rank of Marshal and gave peerages in the imperial nobility to
influential generals. To coerce where co-opting might fail, Napoleon created his own
praetorian institution-the Imperial Guard-and established an efficient secret police.
While these measures solidified Napoleon's authority, he never assured himself of
unquestioned loyalty.
Having built his power on support from comrades-of-arms from the Army of
Italy, Napoleon possessed only the equivocal allegiance of the Army of the Rhine. After
a political disagreement, Napoleon exiled the popular former commander of the Army of
the Rhine, General Jean-Victor Moreau. 3 Although Moreau's exile prevented his serving
as a rallying point for military disaffection, the tenuous nature of Napoleon's hold over
the officer corps became apparent after he began suffering military setbacks. As France's
Grande Armie braved atrocious weather and enemy attacks during the 1812 retreat from
Russia, General Claude-Frangois de Malet attempted a Republican coup d'dtat. 4
While Malet's coup d'dtat failed, Napoleon faced two French generals in battle
the following year, 1813. Having become king of Sweden, Marshal Jean Baptiste
Bernadotte joined the coalition against Napoleon to win the French throne.5 Meanwhile,
as military councilor to Tsar Alexander I, Moreau assisted Russia in toppling Napoleon's
dictatorship. 6 The defeats of 1814 had an even more dramatic effect, prompting many of
Napoleon's closest associates to abandon or betray him.
During 1814 and 1815, when France changed regimes three times, the fragility of
French civil-military relations became apparent. While most French officers followed
Napoleon so long as the Emperor was victorious, the prospect of military collapse raised
the question of to whom did commanders owe their loyalty-a given regime, the state,
the nation or merely their own interests. The absence of any universally accepted
definition of loyalty helps explain the many unpredictable changes of allegiance leading
to two monarchic restorations and Napoleon's "Hundred Days."
Louis XVIII's definitive restoration in 1815 and Napoleon's exile to South
Atlantic brought an end to a period of civil-military crises. Nevertheless, it would be a
mistake to infer that the reestablishment of the Bourbon monarchy marked a return to the
civil-military symbiosis of the ancien regime. By and large, the Restoration inherited an
officer corps that was a product of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Officers
were more liberal than the state's governing elite and retired generals became pillars of
the left-wing opposition.7 The Monarchy's policy of reincorporating imigrd officers into
the Army did little to change the institution's political coloration, which only evolved
with the passage of time and the aging of revolutionary officers. 8
During this epoch, many officers came to distinguish between the regime and the
state. French officers owed the state enthusiastic loyalty, but only formal obedience to
the regime. Explaining this doctrine of "passive obedience," Raoul Girardet remarked
that, "The political loyalty of the Army thus became both revocable and perpetual. It [the
loyalty] was not attached to any one of the changing political regimes, but to the concept
of political power itself."9 This concept of "passive obedience" was problematic because
it left ambiguous when a regime was considered "in power." The situation was clear so
long as the government issued clear orders from official buildings in Paris, however did
the Army still owe the regime loyalty if the government abandoned the national capital?
What if two "legitimate" authorities competed for the Army's support?
When Parisian crowds attacked the Bourbon monarchy in 1830, the Paris garrison
struggled for three days to repress the insurrection. The Army followed royal orders as
long as King Charles X remained in power. However, military commanders did not
display great zeal in their task and withdrew to barracks once the king abdicated. When
the new constitutional "Monarchy of July" faced popular insurrections in 1831 (Lyon),
1832 (Paris) and 1834 (Lyon and Paris), the Army obeyed the dictates of King Louis-
Philippe. During the Revolution of February 1848, the Army followed the government's
orders with lackluster enthusiasm until the regime abdicated.10 Ultimately, Charles X and
Louis-Philippe surrendered power once the Paris garrison failed to put-down uprisings.
Neither monarch attempted to call on outside military forces to retake the capital because
they were uncertain how the Army would respond.
The low-prestige and apolitical Army of the Restoration and Monarchy of July
came to an abrupt end with the revolutions of 1848. After the successful February
revolution, fresh disturbances in June prompted France's national assembly to invest
General Louis Cavaignac with executive authority. Cavaignac, in turn, used 50,000
regular soldiers to suppress Paris-killing 1,500 insurgents and deporting a further
11,000. The June 1848 disturbances marked a minor watershed in French civil-military
relations, with the Army using hitherto undreamt of force to repress social unrest."
Although the French Army did no more than it had during previous crises,
obeying the orders of a legally constituted regime, the nature of the 1848 combats altered
the Army's perceived role in society. A significant portion of the French populace,
including the peasantry and the bourgeoisie, came to view the Army as a rampart against
socialism and the urban proletariat. Conversely, the French political left began to see the
Army as a force of political reaction and obstacle to social progress.
In the meantime, the Army's entry into politics did not end with the repression of
1848. In December 1848, an unlikely alliance of populists, peasants and monarchists
swept Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the nephew of Emperor Napoleon I, to power.' Faced
with disputes between the President and a National Assembly dominated by conservative
monarchists, Louis Napoleon mounted a coup d'dtat against the National Assembly on 2
December 1851. Although Louis Napoleon's coup d'dtat was an act of one elected
institution (the presidency) against another (the legislature), it benefited from military
support and was partially planned by General Le Roy Saint-Arnauld.
Under the Second Empire, which Louis Napoleon ruled as Emperor Napoleon III,
France's armed forces were revalorized after decades of neglect. Imitating his uncle,
Louis Napoleon made military pomp a feature of official festivities, recreated the
Imperial Guard and dressed in military uniform. He showered titles on successful
generals and invested heavily in new barracks and weaponry. These intangible signs
gave the Second Empire a martial air.13 At the same time, Louis Napoleon broke with the
conservative foreign policies of the Restoration and Monarchy of July.
Soon French armies were once again engaged in foreign campaigns against major
armies, providing martial glory and greater visibility within France. During the Crimean
War (1854 to 1856), the French Army proved more competent than its British, Russian,
Sardinian and Turkish counterparts, before going on to vanquish the Austrian Army in
Italy in 1858 and 1859. Added to numerous colonial campaigns and the navy's
development of the first ironclad, these triumphs restored the French Army's prestige.
Unfortunately, martial pomp and close civil-military relations failed to overcome
Prussia. When France declared war on Prussia in 1870, French military commanders
proved incapable of mobilizing and maneuvering large military forces. The French Army
neither had a General Staff nor any body designated, during peacetime, with elaborating
war plans. The Army botched its mobilization and concentration of troops by railway. In
less than a month, German armies surrounded France's largest army in Metz and then
cut-off its reserve army at Sedan. Personally accompanying the reserve army, Napoleon
III was captured at Sedan. On 4 September 1870, the Third Republic was proclaimed in
Paris.
The birth of the Republic was attended by unparalleled military and civil-military
challenges. Militarily, the state produced new armies in a vain attempt to break the
German siege of Paris. After the inevitable conclusion of a disadvantageous peace with
the new German Empire, the provisional government confronted a mass uprising, the
Paris Commune, whose suppression resulted in 20,000 insurgent deaths and contributed
to the growing enmity between the Army and France's extreme left.
In sum, between the French Revolution of 1789 and the advent of continuous
republican governments in 1870, the French armed forces' relationship to the state and
government changed considerably. Unlike the ancien regime, French governments never
felt that they enjoyed the unreserved loyalty and support of the armed forces. Between
1789 and 1799, civilians feared the rise of a military "Caesar." After Napoleon's coup
d'dtat, the new Imperial regime went to great lengths to co-opt and control ambitious
commanders. However, even these measures failed to guarantee officers' loyalty once
military defeats sapped Napoleon's prestige. After Napoleon, the Army punctiliously
demonstrated "passive obedience" to the Restoration (1815 to 1830) and Monarchy of
July (1830 to 1848) regimes, but neither government felt that it enjoyed sufficient
military support to suppress significant urban uprisings. Finally, the Army's role in
Louis Napoleon's coup d'dtat produced an overtly militaristic regime, which fell only
when the Army suffered a catastrophic military defeat.
III. France, 1871-1940: The Third Republic and the Army
The advent of the Third Republic in 1870 created a dilemma for civil-military
policymaking. Existing military institutions had proved their inefficacity. However, the
end of the Imperial regime also swept away the mechanisms for exercising civilian
control over the armed forces. Over the coming decades, political leaders repeatedly
attempted to reconcile the requirements for military efficiency and civilian control of the
armed forces. This process was cybernetic, with civil-military crises and worries about
military preparedness alternatively forcing civilian and military leaders to reengineer
civil-military institutions.
Because of the enormity of the challenges facing it, the Republic's early
governments improvised solutions to their twin dilemmas of producing a military
institution that would be both efficient and loyal to the regime. The dramatic collapse of
the French Army meant that rebuilding credible military institutions enjoyed a greater
priority than addressing the civil-military question. Since the Republic's first regularly
elected president, Marshal Patrice Mac-Mahon, was a respected commander in the
imperial army, the military's loyalty was accepted explicitly during his tenure. At a
broader level, republican politicians and military leaders of the Franco-Prussian War held
a grudging respect for one another. Republican politicians such as Leon Gambetta and
Charles de Freycinet proved better leaders than Napoleon III or reactionaries like
Adolphe Thiers.
During the first years of the Third Republic, civil-military concord depended on
collaboration between a small cadre of (perhaps 20) loyal, competent generals and the
republican politicians they had come to esteem. 16 Political leaders intended to
institutionalize the cooperative civil-military relations of this period, by isolating the
Army from politics, yet giving the high command autonomy over operational and
administrative matters.17
Elected leaders constructed a legal framework designed to segregate the Army
from politics. Laws promulgated in 1872, 1875, 1884 and 1889 denied soldiers and
officers the rights to vote and stand for election. 8 Simultaneously, in 1871 and 1872,
Minister of War General Courtot de Cissey created disciplinary statutes that prohibited
soldiers from politically expressing themselves.19 As a counterpoint to isolating the
armed forces from politics, elected leaders granted the military high command technical,
administrative and operational autonomy.
Ministers of war played a crucial role in this system. For the first 18 years of the
Third Republic and intermittently thereafter, political leaders selected ministers of war
from the ranks of the Army's general officers to serve as "ambassadors" between the
Army, the state and the rest of society. 20 Initially, war ministers enjoyed sweeping
powers to accomplish their objectives. They oversaw military planning, would command
the armed forces in the event of war and enjoyed sole authority to present the Army's
desiderata to the government, legislature and press.
New institutions permitted ministers of war to exercise their vast authority.
When the government formed a general staff, based on the victorious German model, it
subordinated the new structure to the minister of defense. The minister of war also
presided over the superior war council, which assembled important military commanders
to advise on strategy and organization.2 4 A third organization, the General Control of the
25Armies, reinforced the minister's ability to monitor the application of his directives.
Initially this system worked well, but the Third Republic's civil-military
institutions began showing their deficiencies as the political and military leaders of the
Franco-Prussian War retired or passed away. The first civil-military crisis to shake the
Republic erupted in 1886 with the nomination of General Georges Boulanger as Minister
of War. As a member of the government, Boulanger capitalized on his right of public
expression to claim credit for a range of military reforms and diffuse a virulently
nationalistic message. During the Schnaebeld war scare of 1887, Boulanger's bellicose
statements won him popular support, while increasing the likelihood of war and
undermining parliamentary support for the government.26
Following the collapse of the government, the general capitalized on his
popularity to launch a nationalistic and anti-Republican political movement. After
Boulanger won a Parisian legislative seat in January 1889, his supporters urged him to
seize power. However, Boulanger demurred and his political coalition disintegrated.
Destabilized by his political failure, Boulanger committed suicide two years later.
The Boulanger crisis highlighted the parlous state of civil-military relations.
Although Boulanger enjoyed little support within the officer corps, many segments of the
electorate preferred a charismatic military autocrat to ephemeral civilian governments. 27
The exceptional powers accorded to the Minister of War permitted him to play this role.
The government's immediate reaction to the Boulanger affair was to name Charles de
Freycinet as the Republic's first civilian Minister of War.28 Although generals continued
to be appointed minister of war for some time, Freycinet's nomination ended their
monopoly on the post.
More fundamentally, Freycinet contrived to reduce the minister of war's role,
dividing the minister's former powers amongst the occupants of three positions.
Freycinet strengthened the General Staff and rendered it autonomous of the minister of
war. However, unlike in the German Army, the chief of the general staff was not the
designated commander-in-chief in the event of war. This latter role devolved onto the
occupant of a new position, the vice-president of the Superior War Council. Under this
system, no single individual wielded the extensive powers Boulanger had enjoyed.
Rather, the minister of war served as the government's liaison with the army, the chief of
the general staff oversaw war planning and the vice-president of the superior war council
29
prepared to lead France's armies.
Shortly after the denouement of the Boulanger affair, a longer and more complex
civil-military crisis, the Dreyfus Affair of 1894 to 1899, proved highly corrosive to civil-
military relations. By framing an innocent Jewish staff officer, Captain Albert Dreyfus,
of passing classified documents to Germany, Minister of War General Auguste Mercier
committed an injustice. The high command's exoneration of the actual traitor, Captain
Esterhazy, and refusal to revise Dreyfus' sentence convinced political leaders and the
intelligentsia that the Army was riddled with anti-republican and anti-semitic officers. 30
Whether the Army was in fact a bastion of political reaction is open to debate.
However, the Dreyfus Affair gave birth to the myth of an anti-republican army, which
republicans struggled to control and nationalists, such as Paul D6roulede, tried to coax
into mounting a coup d'dtat.3 1 Changing perceptions of the Army, in turn, discredited the
Third Republic's existing mode of civil-military relations, which was based on the
existence of an autonomous, apolitical officer corps. Perceptions that the officer corps
had become anti-republican despite its autonomy generated political pressure to change
the ideological composition of the officer corps, limit its autonomy and symbolically
punish the Army for its transgressions.
When Rend Waldeck-Rousseau formed a new Radical Republican government in
the wake the Dreyfus Affair, his priority was increasing government control over the
officer corps. His first minister of war, General Gaston de Galliffet, summarily retired
the vice-president of the superior war council as a punishment for derogatory remarks
about the government. 32 Galliffet then seized control of all officer promotions. Elected
leaders had excoriated the prior system of promotion commissions, wherein hierarchical
committees of superior officers assessed the aptitude of junior officers for promotion, for
empowering a reactionary clique of generals. 33
Gallifet refused to go further and resigned as Minister of War in 1900, to be
replaced by General Louis Andrd, a freemason and radical republican. 34 Serving in this
capacity for almost five years, from June 1900 to November 1904, Andri struggled to
fundamentally transform the political loyalties and organizational structure of the French
high command. Within a year of coming to power, Andrd drove France's two most
important officers to resignation. Then, with the help of a web of informants, Andrd
denied promotion and desirable assignments to officers on the basis of social origin,
religious beliefs or political affiliation. 35
Andrd struggled to heighten the high command's internal divisions as a response
to its diffidence during the Dreyfus Affair. To begin with, he formalized the command
structure introduced by Freycinet, which entrusted the Army's peacetime management
and wartime leadership to separate officers, of equal rank. Then, Andrd insisted that the
minister of war, rather than the chief of the general staff, could name officers to the
general staff. Finally, Andr6 prohibited the designated wartime commanders of army
corps from inspecting their units in peacetime. 37 As an ensemble, these measures
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atomized the high command and limited the authority any individual yielded.
Andrd politicized and divided the officer corps in a manner unprecedented since
the Revolution. However, Andr6's policy backfired when it provoked a crisis in military
morale. During Andrd' s tenure, the number of applicants to the French Military
Academy (Saint-Cyr) fell by 50 percent, non-commissioned officer reenlistments fell by
43 percent and duals motivated by politicized promotions increased 12 fold. At higher
levels, divisions and interpersonal animosity reduced the army's leadership to "a ruined
citadel incapable... of providing the army with effective leadership." 40 When
newspapers revealed that personnel reports were clandestinely held at France's most
influential Masonic lodge, the scandal brought down the government.41
In his crusade to divide the high command and ideologically remold the officer
corps, Andri grievously affected the army's military readiness. Although Andre's fall
from power in 1904 brought an end to the worst of his abuses, the army's morale
remained low and its command divided as the clock ticked onwards to the First World
War.
Elected leaders had little incentive to revisit Andre's reforms so long as civil-
military tensions appeared likely and inter-state conflict improbable. The provocative
arrival of the German gunboat Panther in the Moroccan Port of Agadir in July 1911
refocused French political leaders on the danger of war and promoted them to maximize
military effectiveness, even if it meant relinquishing the control entailed by a divided
chain-of-command.42 Having deliberately divided control of the army after civil-military
crises in 1888 and 1903, the danger of war prompted the government to concentrate more
power in General Joseph Joffre's hands than any of his predecessors.43
The 1911 reunification of command authority arguably permitted the army to
weather the German onslaught of 1914.44 Although the challenges of a war longer and
larger than expected obliged civilian and military leaders to reassess command
relationships, victory and the absence of a civil-military crisis superficially confirmed the
soundness of French civil-military institutions.45
Despite the apparent validation of a unified command in 1914, the functions of
chief of the general staff and vice-president of the superior war council were again
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separated in 1917. After the war, Field Marshal Henri Pdtain sustained this division of
command as a means of reducing his own workload as vice-president of the superior war
council. However, when most of the high command argued for the return to a unified
structure in 1929, civilian leaders perpetuated divided command as an instrument of civil-
military control.47
Divided command inhibited the development of a dynamic military doctrine.4 In
a repetition of the pre-war period, the increasing threat of war prompted the French
government to reunify command authority in the cautious hands of General Maurice
Gamelin in 1935. Given a timorous disposition, sweeping powers and his position as the
government's sole source of military advice only reinforced Gamelin's ability to prevent
the government from thwarting the first German and Italian challenges to the balance of
power.49 Thus, extensive powers concentrated in the wrong hands contributed directly to
the diplomatic failures of 1935 to 1939, as well as the military collapse of 1940.
In sum, French defense policymaking institutions evolved considerably between
1870 and 1940. Although reforms were discussed almost continuously, meaningful
changed was the product of events and crises that revealed defects in existing
arrangements. As Table I below illustrates, military and civil-military crises contributed
in equal measure to this process.
Cause
Major French
Year
Franco-Prussian War
Boulanger Crisis
Schnaebeld Incident
Dreyfus Affair
Moroccan Crisis
German Rearmament
Table I:
Reforms and their Origins, 1870-1940
Resulting Reforms
1870-71 Creation of a General Staff
Creation of the Superior War Council
Creation of the General Control of the Armies
Legislating the "Apolitical Army"
1887-89 First Civilian Minister of War
1887 Strengthening General Staff
Reconvening Superior War Council
1894-99 Division of the Chain of Command
Abolition of Classification Boards
Attempt to politicize army
1911 Reunification of the Chain of Command
1920 Division of Chain of Command, as requested by
Pdtain, but sustained for civil-military reasons
1933 Reunification of the Chain of Command (1935)
Cause
Military defeat in 1870 led to the creation of a weak general staff subordinated to
a powerful technocratic minister of war. The civil-military crises of the Boulanger Crisis
and the Dreyfus Affair forced civilian leaders to revise the institutions they had recently
created, civilianizing the ministry of war, strengthening the general staff and then
dividing the army's high command. Experience demonstrated that certain civil-military
"solutions" bore unacceptable costs. Civilian leaders' early attempt to trade
organizational autonomy for apolitical loyalty failed when the officer corps did not
demonstrate the anticipated degree of subordination. Andrd's politicization of the officer
corps proved even more costly as it provoked grave problems in officer recruitment and
retention at a time when war with Germany loomed on the horizon.
Debates raged from the Boulanger Crisis until the defeat of 1940 concerned
whether it was better to concentrate military authority under a single generalissimo or
entrust peacetime planning and wartime command to separate individuals. In theory, a
divided command enhanced civilian control, while a unified command maximized
military effectiveness. However, historians have rightly questioned whether unified
command under Joffre or Gamelin best served France's strategic interests.
IV. France, 1940-1962: Reforming Civil-Military Institutions
During the inter-war period, debate on civil-military relations focused on the
hackneyed issues of how officers should be promoted and whether the high command
should be united or divided. However, behind the scenes two subtle changes occurred-
the role of the General Control of the Armies grew and the government created the
College for Higher National Defense Studies. Although these developments ultimately
proved beneficial, they occurred too late to improve the quality of civil-military
policymaking during the inter-war period.
Military defeat in 1940 demonstrated the inefficacy of French military institutions
and inaugurated a epoch of poor civil-military relations, which lasted until General
Charles de Gaulle's return to power in 1958. Facing a recent legacy of military collapse
and civil-military crisis, de Gaulle's government undertook the most comprehensive
reorganization of civil-military decision-making since the opening decades of the Third
Republic. De Gaulle's government removed procurement authority from the armed
forces, formed parallel military staffs and created a think-tank answerable to the Minister
of Defense.
Even before the collapse of 1940, France's political and military leaders
recognized that the state's civil-military institutions functioned inadequately. During the
post-war investigation of the causes of the defeat, General Weygand argued that, "This
[mutual distrust] is properly insane... [and] is at the base of our defeat. It is necessary
that between our military leaders... and those who have direct charge over our interests
there exist a complete understanding."5 Weygand contended that the problem was too
little military input into the government's foreign, defense and economic policies.
Testifying in front of the same parliamentary committee, former President of the
Council of Ministers Albert Sarraut complained about the difficult civilian leaders had in
either obtaining neutral military advice or influencing military plans. He argued that,
"Statesmen and heads of state always hesitated before making the smallest intrusion in
the military domain.... We did not have the right to involve ourselves in those issues
and when, from time to time, a politician would comment on military affairs ... a
denunciation would appear in the press saying: 'What's this! Soldiers know their
business, you don't! Why are you meddling?'" 5 Thus, while agreeing with Weygand
that France's collapse was a result of dysfunctional civil-military policymaking, Sarraut
believed that more political oversight and participation in military planning was the
solution.
Any dispassionate examination of whether the armed forces or civilians should
wield more authority over state policy was forestalled by a succession of civil-military
incidents. During the negotiations over the Rhineland clauses of the Versailles Treaty
(1919), French policy towards the Geneva disarmament negotiations (1930 to 1934) and
the reduction of the duration of compulsory military service (1933), the high command
used pressure tactics to impose its preferred policies. Even worse, elements of the high
command were suspected of complicity in anti-government plots during the Stavisky
Riots (1934) and the Cagoule and Corvignolles conspiracies (1937 and 1938). 3
What many elected officials and military leaders could agree on was the need for
officers and civilian elites to possess a greater understanding of their respective missions
and responsibilities. Weygand, his frequent political opponent Edouard Daladier and
Major de Gaulle shared the conviction that France should create an educative institution
designed to prepare civil and military elites to work together in the national interest.5 4 To
this end, Daladier founded the College for Higher National Defense Studies in 1936.
The College mixed high-level civil servants and military officers in a single body.
As per Daladier's vision, the College's curriculum was balanced, addressing equal time
to economic and military considerations, and half as much time to foreign policy and
colonial affairs. Initial feedback from the College was positive and convinced Daladier
that the institution was fulfilling its role. However, as with any educative institution, the
College's could only exert an impact on defense policymaking over the long-term, once a
critical mass of its students had attained top positions in their respective armed services,
branches and ministries. Unfortunately, war interrupted the College's activities after only
three annual sessions of students had benefited from it.
At the same time as civilian and military leaders collaborated to create the
College, ministers of war relied increasingly on the General Control of the Armies to
administer the ministry's growing bureaucracy. From 1919 until 1939, three members of
the General Control of the Armies successively occupied the highest administrative
position in the Ministry of War and members of the Control were tasked with numerous
specialized studies about how France should organize its defense. 57
Defeat in 1940 revealed the defects of defense policymaking and the fragility of
civil-military relations. General Weygand refusal to permit Paul Reynaud's government
to withdraw to North Africa made capitulation inevitable after the May defeats. Then
pressure from Weygand and Pitain brought the government down and replaced it with
Pitain's authoritarian regime. Although military errors produced defeat in May,
disobedience to elected leaders destroyed the Third Republic in June 1940.58 Almost as
soon as it was created, the Vichy Government put many Third Republic politicians on
trial. While the Riom trials were quickly adjourned, elected leaders, including Reynaud,
remained imprisoned, while at least one, Georges Mandel, was executed without trial.
The war itself soon dissolved conventions of military discipline. Officers chose
whose orders they would follow, Marshal Pdtain or (brevet) Brigadier-General de Gaulle,
each claiming to incarnate France's honor and interests. Although events vindicated the
minority who followed de Gaulle, P6tain possessed a more legitimate claim to obedience
and most officers followed his dictates until late- 1942.59 While the allied victory restored
France's borders, the norm of disobeying orders to uphold the nation's true interests
remained ingrained in the psyche of the officer corps. Marshal Alphone Juin, who
commanded French forces during the Italian Campaign, set an early, corrosive example
by disobeying government dictates about the de-colonization of Tunisia and sabotaging
the government's efforts to ratify the European Defense Community.
Ironically, Juin also favored expanding the mandate of the College for Higher
National Defense Studies. Renamed the Institute for Higher National Defense Studies,
the College reopened in 1949. In addition to military officers and civil servants, the
Institute now included industrialists, union leaders, scientists, parliamentarians and
academics. After its reestablishment, the Institute played a greater role than during its
brief inter-war existence. Under the Fourth Republic, ministers systematically used
reports produced by working groups of Institute students as an alternative source of
advice on defense matters.60 With time, the Institute added abbreviated sessions for
regional elites and graduate students.
Soon the Algerian War (1954 to 1962) brought French civil-military relations to a
nadir not reached since the depths of French Revolution. The decline in civil-military
relations can be divided into four phases. Elements within the armed forces went from
sabotaging government policies, to substituting one civilian regime for another, to
mounting a military coup d'dtat, and finally, to resorting to outright terrorism against the
government. The first step in this evolution was crossed on 22 October 1956, when the
French Air Force intercepted and incarcerated the leaders of the Algerian insurgency,
who were flying on a Moroccan aircraft to negotiations with the French government. The
second stage was reached in May 1958, when elements within the armed forces used an
uprising planned by the Fourth Republic's civilian enemies to call for the creation of a
new government under General de Gaulle.
Although the Army returned him to power, de Gaulle upset many officers by
favoring Algerian independence. When de Gaulle clearly enunciated his plan, a
conspiracy of colonels mounted a coup d'itat in Algiers, in the hopes of replacing de
Gaulle's government in Paris. The colonels who planned the 22 April 1961 putsch
recruited four generals to their cause. Although the putsch collapsed after four days, the
attempt marks the only time that the armed forces corporately challenged the abstract
concept of civilian primacy. After the failure of the putsch, many of its architects
continued their struggle as part of the terrorist Organisation de l'Armde Secret (OAS).
De Gaulle understood that France's civil-military institutions needed renovation
and introduced three distinct reforms. First, he reorganized the command structure of the
armed forces. Based on his analyses of the inter-war period, de Gaulle concluded that
neither unified nor divided command systems were effective. Instead, France required a
system combining elements of both systems. France needed a general staff of the armed
forces with the centralized authority to efficiently carry out government directives, but
political leaders should possess multiple sources of independent military advice so as not
to be beholden to a general staff monopoly on military expertise.
Inter-service policymaking was consolidated under the General Staff of the
Armed Forces, which coordinated the army, air force and navy staffs. However, the
French government developed a number of safeguards to inhibit the greater centralization
of inter-service decision-making from enabling the armed forces to wield greater
authority vis-a-vis elected leaders. One check on the armed forces' corporate authority
was the inability of the service chiefs to meet without civilian oversight. Borrowing from
the 1888 reform of the Superior War Council, de Gaulle specified that the Minister of
Defense rather than the Chief of Staff of the Armies, should convoke and preside over all
meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.61 By this measure, the Minister of Defense
became privy to inter-service disputes and could control the agenda discussed by the
service chiefs.
The creation of parallel military staffs constituted another barrier to a monopoly
on defense expertise. De Gaulle endowed each of the three most important governmental
officials involved in defense policymaking-the president, the prime minister and the
minister of defense-with an independent military staff presided over by a general or
admiral. The President possesses a Private Military Staff, the Prime Minister controls the
General Secretariat of National Defense, and the Minister of Defense can call on his
military cabinet.
The second major institutional innovation that de Gaulle introduced as President
was his decision to remove military procurement from the authority of the armed
services. Through personal experience, de Gaulle became convinced that military
officers are conservative, preferring horses to tanks, and tanks to nuclear weapons.62
When the traditional armament directorates failed to accord a high priority to nuclear
missiles, de Gaulle's Defense Minister, Pierre Messmer, created a new procurement
organization, independent of the services and directly subordinated to the Minister of
Defense. De Gaulle approved Messmer's initiative and the Ministerial Delegation for
Armament was formed and strengthened between 1961 and 1963.63
The third and final structural innovation introduced during de Gaulle's presidency
was the creation of a think-tank under the Minister of Defense's authority. As Zisk
argued, governments can use think-tanks to provide them with advice and opinions
different from conventional military wisdom. In France's case, Messmer capitalized on a
suggestion by an ambitious armaments engineer, Hughes de l'Etoile, and created the
Center for Perspectives and Evaluations.64 Although de Gaulle did not play a personal
role in the Center's creation, he rapidly assigned it critical tasks and ensured its longevity.
The institutions created during the first years of the Fifth Republic empower
civilian leaders to control the armed forces and shape defense policymaking. In
chronological order, the General Control of the Armies, the Institute for Higher National
Defense Studies, parallel chains of command, the Ministerial Delegation for Armament
and think-tanks have shifted the balance-of-power between military professionals and
political leaders in favor of the latter. Since the mid-1960s, these institutions have proven
durable and only undergone minor modifications. Table II shows the civil-military
institutions developed during this period.
Table II:
Major French Reforms and their Origins, 1918-1962
Cause Year Resulting Reforms
Inter-War Period 1918-39 Creation of the College of Higher National
Defense Studies
Enhanced role of the General Control of the
Armies
The Algerian War 1958-62 Creation of Parallel Chains of Command
Creation of the Ministerial Delegation for
Armament
Creation of the Centre d'Analyse et Provision
France's military and civil-military institutions have been the result of continuous
engineering and considerable trial-and-error. Significant changes occurred in the wake of
crises, both military and civil-military. While the defeats of 1870 and 1940 sparked
reforms, equal impetus came from civil-military crises such as the Dreyfus Affair and
praetorianism during the Algerian War. As a consequence, the institutional structure of
French defense policymaking evolved under the difficult dual constraint of ensuring both
the loyalty and competitive efficiency of the armed forces.
V. The United Kingdom and the 191h Century: 1793-1899
Whereas French institutions developed in response to both military and civil-
military imperatives, their British counterparts have evolved more narrowly in response
to requirements for increased military effectiveness. While the British armed forces have
not necessarily eschewed politics and have frequently pushed for a wider interpretation of
military autonomy, they have rarely threatened outright disobedience or regime change.
The dominant pattern marking the evolution of British civil-military institutions has
therefore been one of enhancing the professional qualifications of officers and the
centralized administration of the armed forces once military disaster demonstrates that
reforms are necessary.
The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars called for a military effort
hitherto unparalleled in British history, resulting in a six-fold increase in the army's
strength and a five-fold growth in the navy.65 Although geographic separation from
continental Europe meant that the United Kingdom could avoid France's main armies and
concentrate against lesser forces in Egypt, Calabria, Copenhagen, Portugal, Spain and the
Scheldt, early military disasters demonstrated that only a reformed army could beat the
French.
Commanding the ill-starred Flanders campaign of 1793 to 1794, Frederick
Augustus, the Duke of York, witnessed the British Army's shortcomings at first hand.
Upon being named Commander-in-Chief in 1795, York led the army's quest for greater
professionalism. To rectify the worst excesses of the purchase system, whereby British
officers purchased ranks, York promulgated mandatory periods of service needed for
specific ranks and established military schools, introducing professional education into
the British Army.66 York went on to standardize infantry drills, improve soldier living
conditions and ameliorate the military justice system.
The victories won by Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, vindicated York's
institutional reforms and comforted conservatives in their belief that further reform was
unnecessary.67 A social conservative, Wellington opposed educating soldiers and favored
retaining the purchase system. After succeeding York as the army's commander-in-chief,
Wellington opposed reforms until his demise in 1852.
The post-Napoleonic era British officer corps was therefore increasingly
professional, but lagged behind the most innovative continental powers in terms of
professional education, administrative organization and promotion according to merit.
Nevertheless, incessant overseas campaigning, involving between 65 and 75 percent of
the infantry, meant that the army retained a professional ethos, confining amateurism to
68the socially prestigious Guards regiments and cavalry.
Although would-be reformers gradually succeeded in renovating insalubrious
barracks and restricting flogging, they failed to change the armed forces' bureaucratic
structure or promotion system. In the absence of international crises, the influence of
Wellington and other military conservatives prevented thoroughgoing reforms. Likewise,
while the Army continued to act as a loyal partner to civilian government, the imprecise
nature of the relationship between military commanders and colonial authorities remained
a constant source of friction, with military commanders frequently interpreting their
mandates very broadly.69
To a limited extent, the Crimean War of 1854 to 1856 shook the British Army
from its self-satisfied torpor. Although British forces proved brave and well disciplined,
the Army was deficient in the higher arts of war. Critically, the commissariat and
medical services proved incapable of responding to dysentery, cholera and cold weather,
which swept away 15 percent of the British expeditionary force. Fighting in identical
conditions, French non-combat casualties were half those of the British.70 The British
Army's performance in the technically intensive siege of Sevastopol also proved
disappointing, while revelations about infighting amongst field commanders scandalized
the light brigade's suicidal charge at Balaklava.7'
William Russel's articles in The Times exposed the British public and parliament
to the chaotic administration and unsanitary conditions afflicting British soldiers.
Popular outrage, parliamentary commissions and the Army's own efforts to improve its
performance soon led to reform. The Army's cumbersome administration-divided
between six major governmental departments (War Office, Colonial Office, Home
Office, Treasury, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Bureau of Ordnance)-was
reorganized as a diarchy, with the newly created Secretary of War and the Commander-
in-Chief sharing responsibility for equipping, paying and supplying the Army.
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Meanwhile, the Army's newly-appointed Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of
Cambridge, worked to repair the British Army's deficiency in staff and technical officers.
By changing the selection criteria and doubling the intake of officers at the Senior
Department of the Royal Military College, Cambridge paved the way for the creation of
the dedicated Staff College at Camberley.73 Similar reforms to the technical school at
Woolwich improved the professionalism of the Army's artillery and engineering
branches. Although politicians argued for further structural reforms, they disagreed on
exactly what should be done. Meanwhile, the search for scapegoats to blame for the
Army's shortcomings in the Crimea overshadowed the more technical and productive
matter of improving the system.
The next wave of institutional reform therefore occurred under the guidance of
Edward Cardwell, who served as Secretary of State for War from 1868 until 1874. The
Army's difficulties meeting increasingly global commitments demanded improved
organization and a more scientifically trained officer corps. One of Cardwell's most
dramatic reforms involved abolishing the purchase system, whereby officers bought and
sold their commissions. Because pay was not raised to a level whereby officers could
subsist without a second income, the end of the purchase system had little impact on the
social composition of the officer corps. However, it obliged ambitious officers to pay
greater attention to their professional education if they hoped for promotion.
Of more immediate consequence were Cardwell's reforms of the War Office.
Cardwell reorganized the Office along functional lines, empowering the Commander-in-
Chief, the Surveyor General of Ordnance and the Financial Secretary to respectively
manage military, supply and financial matters. Cardwell also obliged the Commander-in-
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Chief to relocate to the War Office building in Pall Mall, where the Secretary of State and
the Commander-in-Chief could henceforth work in close proximity to one another.
While the Cardwell reforms significantly improved the British Army's command
and administration, they did not go as far as they might have. A revolution in warfare
was underway in continental Europe when Cardwell was appointed. Prussian victories
over Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870) set new standards for effective
military administration and demonstrated the value of a general staff system. Based on
these lessons, Undersecretary for War Lord Northfield pleaded for the creation of a
Prussian-style General Staff. However, entrenched interests and the mistaken belief that
the British Army would never have to fight a large-scale war led Cardwell to dismiss the
notion of a British general staff.76
Colonial policing, rather than continental warfare, prompted the United
Kingdom's first effort at institutionalized inter-service cooperation in the guise of the
Colonial Defence Committee, which was established in 1885. Subordinated to the
Colonial Office, this interdepartmental committee dealt exclusively with the defense of
Britain's colonies.77 With the creation of the Joint Naval and Military Committee
(1891) and the Standard Defence Committee of the Cabinet (1895) elected officials
continued to enhance institutional structures for inter-service and inter-ministerial
coordination. 8
Misguided fears of a French invasion prompted the government created a Royal
Commission, under Spencer Cavendish, Marquis of Hartington, to examine military
reform in the late-i 880s. The Hartington Commission recommended the creation of
permanent military and naval planning staffs based on the German General Staff. Shortly
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thereafter, Oxford professor Spenser Wilkinson's 1890 book The Brain of the Army
popularized the concept of a general staff amongst civilian and military elites alike.79
However, opposition within the Army, especially from the serving Commander-
in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge, prevented the creation of a general staff.80 A cousin of
Queen Victoria, Cambridge used his influence to stymie the creation of a general staff,
which he did not believe events justified and feared would supplant his own role.
Candidly, Cambridge reflected that, "There is a time for all things: there is even a time
for change; and that is when it can no longer be resisted."8 The Navy, for its part,
argued from a firmer basis in fact that its existing structure sufficed.
Although repeatedly reformed, the British armed forces, particularly the Army,
embarked on an era of large-scale warfare with administrative structures that lagged
behind those of continental Europe. While some British civilian and military
policymakers understood developments on the continent, the paucity of direct experience
with large-scale warfare after 1815 enabled conservative political and military elements
to stifle certain reforms. Table III below shows causes of changes in the United
Kingdom's institutional structure for defense policymaking, demonstrating that direct
military experience was critical for most reforms.
103
Cause
Table III:
Table III:
Major British Reforms and their Origins, 1793-1899
Year Resulting Reforms
French Revolutionary
& Napoleonic Wars
Crimean War
Imperial Policing
1793- Creation of Military College and Cadet School
1815 Permanent existence in Peacetime of the
Commander-in-Chief
Establishment of Minimum Durations of Service
for Advancement
1854-56 Reorganization of Army Administration
Creation of a Dedicated Ministry of War
Expansion of Staff and Technical Training
Creation of an Independent Staff College
1868-74 Abolition of the Purchase of Ranks
Reorganization of the War Office
Co-location of Commander-in-Chief and
Secretary of State
The comparative rarity and limited stakes of Britain's 1 9 1h Century wars with European
great powers fostered an unwarranted degree of complacency in the country's military
institutions. Meanwhile, the unquestionable loyalty of the armed forces to the state
meant that politicians were both predisposed to accept the professional judgments of the
high command and willing to countenance the armed forces' demands for a high degree
of operational autonomy.
VI. The United Kingdom and Great Power Warfare, 1899-1945
Although the advantages of institutionalized inter-service cooperation and
permanent planning staffs had been recognized for some time, entrenched interests and
organizational inertia impeded serious reforms until events proved that existing
institutions were inadequate. At the end of the 1 9 th Century, British defense
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policymaking institutions lagged behind those of most European great powers.
Thankfully for the United Kingdom, the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899 to 1902
discredited the existing system and permitted reforms that were largely complete before
the nation faced the much greater challenge of the First World War. From the Boer War
onwards, regular exposure to great power warfare forced successive British governments
to reform defense-policymaking institutions at regular intervals.
Misplaced civilian and military confidence that the British Army would quickly
route what it considered unorganized farmers was shattered by the three defeats of "Black
Week" in 1899. Beyond questions of tactics and training, failures during the Boer War
highlighted deficiencies in the United Kingdom's higher administrative machinery for
waging war. Army planning, joint operations and civil-military integration were all
found wanting. As the Marquis of Salisbury told Parliament, "It is evident that there is
something in your machinery that is wrong." 82
As during the invasion scare of the late-1880s, the government created
commissions and committees, including the Education of Officers Committee (1902), the
Royal Commission on the Boer War (1903) and the Esher Committee (1904), to
determine the root causes of poor military performance. The Royal Commission, under
the chairmanship of Lord Elgin, recommended reorganizing the War Office along the
same lines as the Board of the Admiralty-a reform that was duly implemented. In line
with the spirit of Elgin's reforms, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour remodeled the Cabinet's
Standing Defence Committee into the Committee for Imperial Defence (CID), within
which both the armed services and relevant ministries were represented.
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Meanwhile, the committee chaired by Viscount Reginald Esher focused its energy
on the poor quality of British staff work. On close inspection, the Esher Committee was
appalled to learn that the Army possessed neither adequate planning machinery nor
competent staff officers capable of filling senior posts. Faced with this situation, the
Committee urged the creation of a general staff and suggested expedients for improving
the quality of staff officers. 83 Contrary to the situation prevailing when Northfield and
Hartington proposed the same reforms in previous decades, the Army's poor performance
in South Africa undermined its ability to oppose unwanted change.84 Long after Europe's
other great powers had shown the way, the British Army finally acquired a General Staff
organization between 1904 and 1909.85
The institutions founded in the wake of the South African debacle permitted the
United Kingdom to elaborate the sound policies and plans with which it entered the First
World War. Grand strategic issues were examined in the CID, where the Army and Navy
presented their preferred strategies and the CID adjudicated between them. Once the
Army's proposal to send an expeditionary force to France was accepted over naval plans
to conduct amphibious operations in the North Sea, the Army's General Staff prepared
administratively and diplomatically for the dispatch of a small but superbly trained
expeditionary force to France. Faced with its comparative inability to argue strategic
matters at the CID., the Navy reluctantly adopted a general staff organization in 1912.86
While the relative success of Britain's military intervention in 1914 owes much to
the reforms implemented in the wake of the Boer War, the First World War revealed the
shortcomings of even these new institutions. Both the General Staff and the CID were
designed for peacetime planning, rather than managing large-scale military operations in
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war. The CID closed its doors and all but one member of its secretariat assumed active
service military appointments in August 1914. Likewise, most of the key members of the
Army's General Staff quit their positions for command assignments with the field army.87
The decapitation of military and civil-military structures in London inhibited
strategic planning and contributed to the Dardanelles debacle and inter-service and inter-
ministerial disputes over manpower allocations. Faced with a war much longer and
larger war than anticipated, the government reinvigorated the Army's General Staff in
88September 1915. Meanwhile, the higher direction of war was entrusted to a War
Council on which the two service chiefs were advisors, but not members. Ad hoc cabinet
committees and new ministries established to oversee munitions production and the
allocation of manpower dealt with many of the practical questions of industrial
mobilization and the allocation of scarce human and material resources. Nevertheless,
strategic policymaking and joint operations remained two domains where the institutional
processes of British decision-making proved continually unreliable.89
Arguably, poor civil-military relations in the period immediately preceding the
First World War hindered the United Kingdom's prosecution of the war. Imperial service
accustomed many military commanders to pro-consular status during the Victorian and
Edwardian eras. For officers accustomed to interpreting the national interest when
serving on the fringes of Empire, it was a short step to disobedience of political orders
deemed contrary to the good of the Empire. The political question of Irish Home Rule
crystallized the willingness of many officers to defy the British government.
Genuinely worried lest Irish Home Rule incite rebellion elsewhere in the Empire,
a sentiment magnified by the many Anglo-Irish officers prominent in the Army's ranks,
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powerful elements within the British Army opposed the government's plans for Irish
Home Rule. The former commander-in-chief of the army, Field Marshal Frederick
Roberts, helped create the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force in 1912. Dedicated to
forcibly preventing Ulster from being incorporated in a more autonomous Ireland, the
Ulster Volunteers drew 62 percent of their battalion, regimental and divisional
commanders from the Army and were led by a retired Army general.
When the British government moved forward its plans for Irish Home Rule,
military officers publicly expressed their refusal to coerce Ulster or fight their former
comrades-in-arms in the Ulster Volunteers. The Curragh Incident of March 1914 brought
civil-military tensions to a head. Although details remain murky, a majority of officers in
the 3rd Cavalry Brigade requested dismissal rather than face the possibility of coercing
Ulster Unionists. The prospect of mass resignations alarmed the British government,
which feared that it could not rely on the Army to execute its orders for Ireland.
Although the Curragh Incident resulted from a misunderstanding, suspicions linger that
military authorities contrived the episode as a warning to the government. 90
While the outbreak of the First World War temporarily pushed the issue of Irish
Home Rule into the background, the Curragh Incident demonstrated that military officers
were well versed in political scheming and willing to use their skills. Importantly, two of
the officers suspected of duplicity during the Curragh Incident, John French and Henry
Wilson, played active roles in the civil-military controversies of the First World War.
Although the first months of the war were remarkably free of civil-military
tensions, considering that the Curragh Incident transpired only three months before the
assassination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, the stabilization of the front in late-1914 and
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repeated failures to break the stalemate precipitated a search for scapegoats. Civil-
military tensions came to a head in May 1915, when General French publicly blamed the
Lord Asquith's Liberal Government for the failure of the British attack at Aubers Ridge,
which cost 12,000 British lives. The resultant Munitions Crisis brought down the Liberal
Government.91 Ironically, French's victory was short lived as two of his subordinates,
Douglas Haig and Henry Rawlinson, conspired to blame him for the failure of the Loos
Offensive in September 1915. Throughout the remainder of the war, relations remained
tense between military commanders and political leaders, however no clash such as
occurred in 1915 transpired again.92
Winning the First World War necessitated the creation of new ministries and
cabinet committees to apportion scarce manpower, develop weapons and organize the
production of armaments on hitherto unimaginable scales. Created under the pressure of
war, most of the new institutions could not be retained after the Armistice, when the size
of the British government shrunk and its defense budget returned to pre-war levels.
However, some institutional innovation was necessary. Pre-war institutions had been
found wanting and new imperatives, such as fielding ever improved weapons and
mounting joint operations, called for organizational efforts unappreciated in 1914.
Conscious of the many ad hoc changes being made to government as a result of
the First World War, Prime Minister David Lloyd George appointed Lord Haldane to
chair a committee to examine the reorganization of government administration after the
war. Naturally, the higher coordination of defense occupied much of this committee's
attention when it began meeting in late 1917. In terms of the procurement, the committee
recommended creating a single ministry, the Ministry of Supply, responsible for
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transmitting the operational requirements of the armed services to industry.93 When it
came to addressing the more complicated matter of strategic policymaking, the
committee vacillated between two distinct alternatives, and ultimately presented the
cabinet with both; either resuscitating the pre-war Committee for Imperial Defence (CID)
or uniting the armed services under a single centralized Ministry of Defence. 94
Despite pressures from prominent political leaders and the armed services for a
Ministry of Defence, the conservative alternative of reviving the CID prevailed, due in
large measure to the lobbying of its pre-war secretary, Maurice Hankey. Nevertheless,
some effort had to be made to rectify the worse deficiencies of the CID and appease calls
for a more radical reorganization of Britain's defense. One attempt to improve the CID
resulted in the creation of a Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee. Comprised of the three
service chiefs, this body was supposed to discuss inter-service defense matters and advise
the CID. The other major effort to improve the CID consisted of establishing the
Imperial Defence College to train senior officers from the three services and a limited
number of civil servants to manage the CID's secretariat and conduct joint operations. 95
Regardless of these efforts to improve its efficiency, the CID's performance
during the inter-war period was lackluster.96 The Prime Minister's abdication of his right
to chair the CID robbed the committee of its ability to impose controversial decisions on
services or ministries. As a consequence, the body increasingly occupied itself with
routine matters, rather than supervising the formation of higher-level strategy. 97
Meanwhile, increasing inter-service rivalry, occasioned by the formation of the RAF,
generated acrimonious conflicts over resources and authority, rather than cooperative
planning to meet potential threats.
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The public disputes of the service chiefs and increased popular concern for
national security brought renewed calls for a Ministry of Defence in the wake of German
rearmament. However, adepts of the CID resisted this development. Instead, in 1936
Hankey proposed the compromise of creating a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence
(MCD) instead of a new centralized ministry. Under this scheme, the services would
retain their own ministries and the CID would continue to oversee the direction of higher
strategy. The new Minister would merely preside over two CID sub-committees in an
effort to impose inter-service cooperation. 98
Because of its compromise nature, the Ministry for the Co-ordination of Defence
failed to provide the centralized direction needed for the formation of sound security
policy. With a minimal staff, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, Thomas
Inskip, had difficulty challenging the arguments of the services, which possessed greater
administrative resources. Moreover, the continued presence in cabinet of ministers
representing each armed service made it hard for Inskip to impose solutions, obliging him
to work for compromise. However, without clear strategic guidance from the CID, the
services continued independently planning for whichever missions were most congenial
to them.99 Commenting on, Inskip's failure to generate sound defense policies Admiral
Roger Backhouse's opined that, "I do not think it is the man so much as the machine." 100
Britain's failure to create adequate defense-policymaking institutions proved
catastrophic in the last years preceding the Second World War and the initial stages of
that conflict. Not without reason, Williamson Murray has harshly described the end of
the inter-war period as one during which, "nearly every decision made by the British... in
terms of rearmament, diplomacy and military doctrine appears in the harsh light of May
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1940 to have been disastrous." 101 Lacking centralized direction, the navy planned for a
war with Japan, the RAF focused on Germany and the army concentrated on colonial
policing. The British government lacked the neutral administrative and scientific
institutions necessary for weighing the biased solutions promoted by the services. With
too many resources invested in an ill-conceived bomber offensive and the fortification of
Singapore, and too few in the British Army's expeditionary force, the United Kingdom's
military resources were poorly configured for war with Germany.
Because of the gravity of the crisis, Winston Churchill personally assumed the
burden of acting as the United Kingdom's Minister of Defence beginning in 1940.
Churchill had agreed with pre-war proponents of the need to create a unified Ministry of
Defence. However, the crisis environment of war was ill-suited to fundamentally re-
thinking defense-policymaking institutions and determining the respective roles of Prime
Minister and Minister of Defence. Churchill, therefore, unified both roles in his person,
and undertook managing cabinet and the parliament, while at the same time coordinating
the actions of three armed services and their respective ministries. Without the
centralized policymaking staff of a ministry of defense, Churchill relied heavily on
strategic instinct and his wealth of personal experience.
Churchill's wartime tenure as both Minister of Defence and Prime Minister was
felicitous. The war cabinet and chiefs of staff succeeded, under Churchill's prodding and
interference, in establishing clear priorities between competing armed services, industries
and theaters. However, Churchill's wartime fulfillment of two functions provided no
model for his peacetime successors to follow. During peacetime, the Prime Minister
could not act as minister of defence. Even worse, lacking Churchill's unique
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combination of military and political-military experience, no other British politician
possessed the skills needed to coordinate British defense efforts in the absence of a
centralized bureaucracy.' 02
Thus, the era of large-scale warfare that began with the Second Anglo-Boer War
and ended with the Allied victory of 1945 witnessed a more-or-less continuous process
whereby British defense policymaking institutions evolved within a crucible. New
enemies and the evolving character of warfare tested the effectiveness of British
institutions and prompted reforms when they were found wanting. Table IV below
illustrates this process.
Cause
Table IV:
Major British Reforms and their Origins, 1899-1945
Year Resulting Reforms
Boer War
First World War
German Rearmament
Second World War
1899- Creation of the Committee for Imperial Defence
1902 Creation of the Army General Staff
Reorganization of War Office
1914-18 Resuscitation of the Committee for Imperial
Defence
Creation of the Ministry of Supply
Creation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee
Creation of the Imperial Defence College
1933-39 Creation of the Minister of Defence
Co-operation
1939-45 Attribution of the Title Minister of Defence to
Prime Minister Winston Churchill
The overall trend behind British defense organization is one of increasing
centralization and coordination. However, British political leaders were hesitant to
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challenge the prerogatives of existing services and agencies, and only did so when
military experience proved the necessity of reform. Although the Hartington Committee
recommended the creation of a Prussian-style General Staff in the late-1880s, it took the
dolorous experience of the Boer War to prompt actual reform. Even worse, despite the
fact that a unified ministry of defense had been suggested in parliamentary debate as
early as 1890, the title of Minister of Defence was only provisionally given life in 1940.
While this period also witnessed the nadir of modem British civil-military relations, as
demonstrated by the Curragh Incident and the 1915 Munitions Scandal, the mildness of
civil-military problems compared to the demands of warfare meant that civil-military
factors accounted for no appreciable change in defense policymaking institutions.
VII. The United Kingdom and the Armed Peace, 1945-1964
While the United Kingdom's improvised decision-making structures proved
adequate to the demands of winning the Second World War, Churchill's personalized
role in making the machinery of government function posed a grave challenge for his
successors. As was done in the wake of the First World War, Clement Attlee's post-war
government appointed a committee of three, including Generals Hastings Ismay and Ian
Jacob, and Lord Bridges, to recommend how British defense policymaking should be
structured. Because Ismay, Jacob and Bridges were all "insiders" familiar with the
workings of Churchill's wartime system, the aim of their committee was
institutionalizing practices and lessons from the war.
In typically British fashion, the Ismay-Jacob Committee recommended
incremental improvements on pre-war structures. Its greatest innovation was the
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establishment of a Ministry of Defence for peacetime. By carrying through Churchill's
wartime practice of excluding service ministers from cabinet, the new Minister of
Defence became cabinet's exclusive contact when dealing with military affairs. Under
the Ismay-Jacob recommendations, the Ministry of Defence also received a small,
centralized staff drawn from the armed forces and civil service. However, with less than
500 personnel compared to the thousands in the service departments, the role of the new
Ministry remained one of coordinating and prioritizing between the activities of the
separate services, rather than creating policy.
Although it was intended that the new Ministry would fulfill many of the
Committee for Imperial Defence's (CID) former duties of coordinating the armed
services, the Ismay-Jacob Committee nonetheless felt that the CID system should be
retained to oversee policymaking at the higher political-strategic level. Renamed and
integrated in the United Kingdom's evolving system of cabinet government, the CID
became the cabinet's Defence Committee. Despite their exclusion from the full cabinet,
the service ministers still retained seats on the Defence Committee, where they could
contest the Minister of Defence's authority.' 0 4
The Korean War and the accompanying military buildup sorely tested the United
Kingdom's administrative structures. Facing the prospect of war with the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom rearmed. However, the increasing cost and complexity of weaponry
posed new challenges to British defense policymakers. The United Kingdom simply
could not afford to develop the entire panoply that the superpowers were acquiring and it
was far from evident which military service should possess certain weaponry. Should the
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Army or the RAF develop land-based anti-aircraft missiles? And should carrier-based or
land-based aircraft deliver nuclear weapons?
The dilemmas were numerous and called for a greater degree of centralized inter-
service planning. Duplication and waste were the inevitable result. Although created
shortly before the Korean War, the office of the Ministry of Defence's chief science
advisor grew in both size and importance during this period. So too did the Ministry of
Defence's role in procurement, which was virtually nil at the beginning of the 1950s, but
evolved into a veto power over service requests by the end of the decade.10 5
However, by the mid-1950s greater reforms were clearly needed. Based on the
reports of a Cabinet subcommittee, Prime Minister Anthony Eden promulgated a series of
measures in October 1955 to ease friction in British defense planning. Foremost amongst
Eden's reforms was the creation of the separate position of Chairman of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee (COS), which had previously been occupied by the service chiefs on a
rotating basis. The government's desire to obtain neutral recommendations about defense
needs and the requirement of representing the armed forces at NATO conferences meant
that a service chief could no longer adequately chair the committee. Eden also
strengthened the Ministry of Defence, by giving it authority over the Ministry of Supply
and rendering it responsible for military force structures complemented policies
determined by the Defence Committee.106
Although significant, the 1955 reforms were always viewed as a provisional step
in a broader process of institutional development. Debate continued unabated as to what
form British defense institutions should take. Two lexicographical changes in the 1950s
pointed to the direction that reformers were taking. The Cabinet's Defence Committee
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was renamed the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, emphasizing its focus on
strategic rather than defense matters, and the title of Chief of Defence Staff was appended
to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, highlighting this officer's role in
presenting advice unmarred by a service bias and his nominal status as primus inter pares
amongst the chiefs of staff.
After more than a decade of tentative reforms following the Second World War,
the years 1958 to 1963 loom as the decisive period for the centralization of defense
policymaking. While British elected leaders favored centralization, military
professionals provided the impulse for reform. Admiral Louis Mountbatten, who served
for six years as Chief of Defence Staff, broached the controversial subject in 1962 by
proposing to reorganize the ministry of defence along functional, rather than inter-service
lines. Mountbatten's suggestion provoked united opposition from the three service
chiefs, who favored continued service autonomy over functional integration.
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan called on General Ismay and Jacob, the authors
of the 1946 reforms, to resolve the dispute between Mountbatten and the chiefs. Adopted
in 1963, the Ismay and Jacob compromise administratively subordinated service
departments to the ministry of defense and physically relocated them to the ministry's
office block. Abolishing separate service staffs in favor of a centralized "defense staff'
was nonetheless rejected. 0 7
Mountbatten hoped to push through larger reforms under the Labour government
elected in 1964. However, the new Minister of Defence, Denis Healey, considered inter-
service rivalry one of the few means of extracting honest analyses and multiple policy
options from the services. Healey refused to renew Mountbatten's mandate and shelved
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his proposal for reorganizing the ministry.108 Nevertheless, Healey pursued other
dimensions of defense centralization. In 1967 and 1968, he introduced combined defense
estimates, whereby services budgets were approved collectively rather than individually,
downgraded service ministers to parliamentary under-secretaries, and abolished the
deputy service chiefs. 109
Healey's rejection of further efforts to strengthen the defense staff and eliminate
service departments postponed the final round of administrative centralization until the
early 1980s. By the early 1980s, the armed services were exasperated with ministers
exploiting their internal rivalries and understood that a united defense voice would carry
greater weight vis-a-vis other elements of the state than a cacophony of inter-service
bickering. Critically, two of the chiefs of staff in the early 1980s, Field Marshal Edwin
Bramall and Admiral Terence Lewin, contributed to Mountbatten's earlier proposals as
junior members of his staff. With Bramall's support, Lewin changed the relationship
between the service staffs and the defense staff. After 1982, the chief of defence staff
became the government's principal strategic advisor, rather than the chair of a fractious
committee, and represented the chiefs of staff on the war cabinet. Instead of reporting to
the chiefs of staff committee, field commanders henceforth answered to the chief of
defence staff alone. Other measures, such as increasing the size of the defense staff and
the creation of a deputy chief of defence staff, enhanced the ability of the central defence
staff to coordinate service requirements." 0
In a related development, 1981 saw the abolition of service undersecretaries and
their replacement by "functional" undersecretaries responsible for armed forces and
procurement. Under a new Minister of Defence, Michael Heseltine, the process of
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defense centralization beginning after the Second World War finally ground to a
conclusion. Heseltine reinforce the central defense staff further, relegating the service
chiefs and staffs to purely administrative functions. Although united opposition from the
chiefs obliged Heseltine to moderate his reforms, he halved the size of service staffs and
abolished the policy whereby the services took turns nominating candidates for chief of
defence staff."'
In retrospect, the period from 1945 until the mid-1980s represents a period of
continuous, steady evolution towards a unified defense staff and centralized ministry of
defense. The lessons of the Second World War and pressures of the Cold War
demonstrated the necessity of centralization. However, entrenched interests, bureaucratic
inertia and natural conservatism meant that reforms were implemented in small
increments, rather than a single massive reorganization. Table V illustrates this process.
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Gradualism was an inevitable result of dealing with armed services that were
organizationally conservative, yet respected for their professional expertise. In many
cases, the initiative came from military officers, including Ismay, Jacob, Mountbatten and
Lewin. Even when ministers promoted reform, they usually proved unwilling to overrule
the chiefs of staff and only attempted reform when at least part of the high command
supported them. As a consequence, the pace of reform was dictated by evolving
perceptions of military professionals, who disliked hurried change. Reflecting on his
time in office, Healey remarked that, "The services were sick and tired of continual
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Table V:
Major British Reforms, 1945-1985
Year Reforms
1946 Creation of the Ministry of Defence
" Exclusion of Service Ministers from Cabinet
* Ministry endowed with small staff
CID renamed the Cabinet Defence Committee
1955 Establishment of a Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee
Ministry of Supply subordinated to Ministry of Defence
1958 Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee re-designated
Chief of Defence Staff
1963 Service departments subordinated to Ministry of Defence and
relocated to a common office block
1967-1968 Combined defense estimates introduced
Service Ministers downgraded to Permanent Under-secretaries
1981 Service undersecretaries abolished, replaced by functional
undersecretaries for armed forces and procurement
1982-1984 Central defense staff strengthened
" Chief of Defence Staff becomes Cabinet's strategic advisor
" Field Commanders subordinated to Chief of Defence Staff
* Service staffs halved, defence staff enlarged
" Rotation of Chief of Defence Staff amongst services
abolished
reorganization."m Given the military role in reforms, institutional changes
unsurprisingly enhanced military autonomy by limiting the ability of civilian leaders to
exploit inter-service rivalries.
VIII. The Origins of Institutions
Defense policymaking institutions, by their nature, evolve continually in response
to external stimuli. The economic, scientific and social components of warfare developed
rapidly between the end of the eighteenth century and the second half of the twentieth. In
order to remain competitive in a changing environment, great powers have been obliged
to reform their military institutions. One by one, states had to professionalize and
educate their officer corps, form general staff systems, create inter-service planning
organizations and improve weapons procurement procedures. Entrenched interests and
organizational inertia blocked most reforms until military failure pointed the way
forward.
Britain fought four significant wars (Crimean, Boer and the World Wars) between
1815 and 1945, while France fought five (Crimean, Italian, Franco-Prussian and the
World Wars). Shortcomings revealed by these conflicts provided a prime impetus for
military reforms, proving more important than colonial warfare or peacetime imitation of
foreign developments. Twice suffering the supreme humiliation of defeat and
occupation, France's disasters in 1870 and 1940 laid the basis for thoroughgoing reform.
Sheltered by geography, military defeat did not bring the British state down. However,
scandalous and unexpected failures led to institutional changes after each of the United
Kingdom's major wars.
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Because reforms were driven by technical realities and international competition,
many British and French institutional developments parallel one another. France and the
United Kingdom introduced professional military education within several years of one
another. Later, both states formed general staffs within a space of three decades-France
in 1874 to 1888 and the United Kingdom in 1904 to 1909. Finally, since the Second
World War, both states have established unified ministries of defense and inter-service
defense staffs.
While British and French defense establishments have been subject to similar
external stimuli, civil-military problems featured more prominently in the development of
French institutions than their British counterparts. Although the British Army was never
the ideal apolitical servant of politicians and the French Army rarely threatened civilian
regimes directly, French civil-military relations were qualitatively much worse than their
British counterpart.
Returning to Finer's typology of military interventions in politics, omitting
"influence" which is difficult to detect, the French Army planned two coups d'dtats, was
involved in four efforts to substitute one civilian regime with another and attempted to
blackmail governments on at least three occasions. The British Army, by contrast, was
implicated in one attempt at substitution and one blackmail effort. Table V compares
civil-military crises in both states. 13
Table V:
Military Interventions in Politics, 1789-1962
Country Blackmail Substitution Supplantation
France 3 4 2
United Kingdom 1 1 0
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If anything, Finer's typology understates the difference between British and
French civil-military relations. Finer's categories fail to capture the enmity that socialists
felt to the army as a result of the Commune and Dreyfus Affair, the regimes that fell in
1830, 1848 and 1934 because political leaders doubted the army's willingness to quell
disturbances, and the attempts by right-wing nationalists to drag the army into coups
d'itats in 1889, 1899 and 1934.
Because of civil-military problems, French politicians delegated less authority to
the armed forces and developed mechanisms for monitoring and controlling the military
high command. Some attempts to control the armed forces bore intolerable costs. The
Third Republic's initial effort to exchange military autonomy for apolitical obedience
backfired. Later, outright politicization of the officer corps and a fragmented command
structure degraded military efficiency to an unacceptable degree, leading political leaders
to repeal both efforts.
Through trial and error as much as engineering, French developed institutions that
ensured civilian supremacy at an acceptable cost in terms of military efficiency. While
not sacrificing the advantages of an inter-service general staff, political leaders have
given themselves multiple sources of alternative advice in the form of the smaller
military staffs beholden to the president, prime minister and minister of defense. Civilian
authority to monitor the armed forces and exploit inter-service rivalry is enhanced by the
activities of the General Control of the Armies and the chiefs of staff committee's
statutory inability to meet without the minister of defense. Finally, the outsourcing of
procurement to an independent agency limits the scope of military authority.
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Absent the civil-military tensions afflicting France, British politicians have
delegated more power to their armed forces. In the United Kingdom, the armed forces'
monopoly on military advice has grown rather than diminished with the introduction of
general staff systems (1904-1912), the creation of the chiefs of staff committee (1924)
and the designation of the chief of defence staff as the cabinet's principal strategic
advisor (1982). Without the ability to exploit inter-departmental, inter-branch and inter-
service rivalries, British governments have become more vulnerable to bureaucratic
collusion amongst the armed forces. Meanwhile, functional reforms increasing the
centralization of the defense bureaucracy have had ambiguous effects on military
autonomy.
Having evolved along different lines for two hundred years, British and French
defense policymaking institutions are likely to remain distinct. Recent studies suggest
that institutions are durable, resisting dramatic change and evolving along predictable
"paths." Moreover, present-day British and French defense policymaking institutions are
perceived as adequate and will enjoy confidence so long as there are no military or civil-
military catastrophes. In France's case, institutional path dependence means that civil-
military monitoring and control mechanisms developed between 1882 and 1963 can be
expected to endure even though civil-military relations have been excellent since 1962
and are likely to remain so.1
The following chapters will examine the effect of distinct British and French
institutions on how these two states develop and employ military power. Based on the
institutions they possess, one expects French elected leaders to invasively monitor,
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manage and control the armed forces, while British politicians will establish broad
objectives and accord the armed forces considerable autonomy in accomplishing them.
Social science theory is contradictory as to which procedure produces better
results. Samuel Huntington argues that functional autonomy is a prerequisite for
effective performance, Feaver implies all forms of civilian monitoring bear a cost in
terms of military effectiveness, and Stephen Biddle and Kenneth Pollack highlight
pernicious effects of poor civil-military relations on military performance.1 15 In contrast
to these arguments in favor of military autonomy, other authors focus on the beneficial
results of invasive civilian control. Eliot Cohen suggests that intrusive civilian control
enhances military performance, and Barry Posen argues that civilian intervention
generates military innovation and guarantees that military doctrines complement foreign
policies. To preview coming chapters, I contend that neither system is superior, but
each embodies specific comparative advantages.
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Chapter III:
French Military Doctrine (1958-1991)
I. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that
the stimulus for French military doctrine comes from political leaders' evolving percep-
tions of international relations. If this hypothesis proves correct, doctrinal changes
should exhibit two characteristics. Doctrinal changes should originate from clear direc-
tives issued by elected leaders and should correspond to diplomatic imperatives rather
than responding to perceived changes in the future character of war. Contingent on the
first hypothesis, the second hypothesis tested in this chapter is that France's elected lead-
ers shape the evolution of military doctrine through an institutional structure of defense
policymaking that maximizes their ability to impose reforms. To test these propositions,
this chapter will explore four distinct shifts in France's military doctrine that occurred
between the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1959 and the end of the Cold War
thirty years later.
Studies have demonstrated that elected leaders are normally ill-placed to force
armed forces to fundamentally change the way they plan to conduct military operations.
As Stephen Rosen pointed out, a civilian command that the armed forces must change
their tactics and organization is inherently difficult to enforce.' Because the armed forces
themselves are a state's primary repository of expert knowledge on how to fight, the mili-
tary high command of a state can normally obstruct reforms they oppose.
Elected leaders therefore need distinct capabilities to devise and implement doc-
trinal reforms. These include, the ability to publicize an unambiguous order for change,
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possessing full knowledge of the options available, ensuring that the individuals charged
with implementing the order control everything needed to carry it out, and being able to
monitor the armed forces' execution of executive orders. If elected leaders lack these
facilities, they will have trouble imposing changes on military organizations.
To overcome the difficulties that elected officials normally encounter, French
leaders take advantage of France's institutional structure of defense policymaking and
draw on a variety of specialized organizations that enhance their authority. As detailed in
Chapter 2, the institutional structure and organizational components of French defense
policymaking evolved over time as a direct response to civil-military crises. Concretely,
France's institutional structure of defense policymaking empowers civilian leaders by: 1)
endowing them with multiple independent sources of military advice, 2) providing them
with forums whereby doctrinal changes can be publicly and unambiguously announced,
and 3) enabling them to monitor and control the implementation of a reform.
Because civilian leaders can only impose doctrinal reforms if they understand the
range of options available, any civilian dominated model of doctrinal change must ac-
count for how elected officials are educated about potential changes or alternatives to an
existing doctrine. If elected officials rely exclusively on an armed service to inform them
about doctrinal alternatives, and if that armed service is represented solely by its com-
mander-in-chief or a unitary general staff, civilian leaders will only be able to choose
from the options the armed service chooses to present. France's institutional structure of
defense policymaking addresses this problem in two ways: by giving elected leaders ac-
cess to a wide variety of opinions from within the armed forces and providing them with
outside expertise in the form of government-controlled think-tanks and study-groups.
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To maximize the doctrinal options presented to elected officials, the institutional
structure of defense policymaking ensures that French civilian leaders are never obliged
to deal with a French armed service as a monolithic whole. The Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces (CEMA) is theoretically the government's advisor on military affairs and
presides over the three service chiefs of staff, who technically control the administration
of the Army, Navy and Air Force. However, unlike the United Kingdom, where the
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the three service chiefs are the government's sole in-
terlocutors with the armed services, French elected leaders have direct access to and au-
thority over a plethora of high-ranking military commanders, while many French generals
and admirals lack hierarchic authority over one another.
The three most important governmental officials involved in defense policymak-
ing-the president, the prime minister and the minister of defense-possess independent
military staffs presided over by generals or admirals. In addition to these staffs, France's
president has, since 1964, had the statutory authority to consult with and issue directives
to the commanders of French nuclear forces, which included five major commands at the
end of the Cold War.2 Meanwhile, the Minister of Defense has the exclusive power to
convoke and preside over the chiefs of staff committee, comprised of the chiefs of
France's three armed services and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMA).
Taken as an ensemble, the French government (president, prime minister and min-
ister of defense) has direct authority over and routinely interacts with 12 generals and
admirals-the CEMA, the CEMP, the SGDN, the chief of staff of the Minister of De-
fense's military cabinet, the three service chiefs of staff, and five operational command-
ers of nuclear forces. Table I, below, graphically illustrates the alternative sources of
military advice available to French civilian leaders:
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Table I.
Sources of Military Advice to Civilian Leaders
in France
.- 444 4Presidento.oo.mPresident's Private
V V Military Staff (EMP)
V V
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V Prime Ministero o . .oSecretary General
V Vof National Defense
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v V V Military Cabinet
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V v Armed Forces (CEMA)
V V V
V V V
V V V
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* Civilian leaders are represented in normal script, military officers and/or
structures are in italics.
Because military officers differ from one another in terms of personal opinions
and analyses of military developments, multiplying the number of high-level military
officers that provide advice to political authorities increases the range of options pre-
sented to elected leaders. In the French context, armed services will be at a comparative
disadvantage when it comes to advancing their corporate interests, while elected leaders
will have greater facilities for promoting developments that respond to their perceived
requirements.
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Although access to a wide range of opinions guarantees that French civilian poli-
cymakers do not have to deal with the armed forces as a monolithic whole, in itself this
did not ensure that they will be presented with comprehensive information on potential
doctrines. Studies of bureaucratic politics have demonstrated that military professionals
favor offensive doctrines over defensive or attritional ones, prefer clear commitments to
use force massively, and struggle to perpetuate the basic force structure of armed ser-
vices.3
To obtain advice at variance with the beliefs of high-ranking officers as a profes-
sional group, civilian leaders can draw on specialized think-tanks. Recourse to think-
tanks broadens defense debates by drawing other professional groups, such as econo-
mists, scientists and political scientists, into doctrinal deliberations. To this end, French
civilian leaders can call upon four sources of military expertise entirely outside the pur-
view of the professional armed forces. Funded by and answering directly to the Minister
of Defense, these four bodies consist of two dedicated think-tanks and two institutions
(IHEDN and the CGA) that occasionally provide advice on doctrine and force structures.
The senior of the two dedicated think-tanks is the Centre de Perspective et
d'Evaluations (CPE ), which was renamed Groupe d'Etudes et de Planification Strati-
giques (GROUPES) by the Mitterrand administration. Founded in 1965, the CPE was
created with the specific mission of advising the French government on nuclear doctrine.
Since its inception, the Minister of Defense has traditionally appointed armament engi-
neers to preside over the CPE, ensuring that doctrinal questions were treated on their
technical merits and that the structure remained aloof from the armed forces.
In 1972, a second think-tank was created. The Fondation pour les Etudes de
D fense Nationale (FEDN) was established with the specific goals of "imposing a con-
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sensus on strategy" and serving as "the bridge between military society and the academic
world."4 The FEDN has been managed by a combination of civilian defense intellectuals
and retired iconoclastic military officers, including Lucien Poirier, who authored France's
first statement of nuclear doctrine, and Charles Fricaud-Chagnaud, who developed the
concept of a rapid deployment force (the FAR) in 1981.
Besides these dedicated think-tanks, the Ministry of Defense possesses two other
sources of alternative advice. Although the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Difense Na-
tionale (IHEDN) primarily fulfills the educational role, the fact that its students include
medium-ranking officers, armament engineers, defense intellectuals, elected officials and
civil servants from other ministries means that the IHEDN can form ad hoc study groups.
Every year, IHEDN study groups produce detailed studies on current doctrinal and pro-
curement issues. These studies are then transmitted to the Minister of Defense, where
they provide alternative and multidisciplinary analyses of doctrinal issues. Another or-
ganization that became involved in military doctrine despite its having an originally dif-
ferent mission was the Contrale Giniral des Armies (CGA). Since its creation, the CGA
has branched out from its original oversight mission and come to view itself as a "force
of proposition" capable of proposing far ranging changes to force structure and doctrine.6
Logically, the better civilian leaders are at accessing a variety of independent
sources of expertise on military doctrine, both within the armed services and outside them
in the form of think-tanks and study groups, the greater will be their ability to elaborate
alternatives to a given military doctrine. However, two other requirements exist for civil-
ian leaders to be able to impose military doctrines-they must be able to publicize the
new doctrine unambiguously and enforce its implementation by the armed forces.
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In France, the process of signaling doctrinal change is extremely formal and con-
trolled by the Minister of Defense. Although details of military planning are withheld,
presidents, prime ministers and defense ministers announce significant doctrinal changes
during their regularly scheduled speeches at the IHEDN. To ensure that the new doctrine
is communicated to the French armed forces as well as concerned civil servants, impor-
tant IHEDN speeches are published in the Ministry of Defense's journal Difense Nation-
ale. As a corollary to political leaders controlling the means of diffusing ideas about doc-
trine, they can prevent active-duty military personnel from publishing counter-arguments.
Once a new doctrine has been elaborated and publicly announced, the final re-
quirement for political leaders to impose it on the armed forces remains their ability to
monitor its execution. In France, elected officials possess two distinct advantages in im-
plementing changes to military doctrine. First of all, because of their access to multiple
echelons of the armed forces' high command, they can empower the officers most sym-
pathetic to their reform. For example, if political leaders want to impose a doctrinal re-
form concerning the French First Army, they have the choice of confiding the execution
of the reform to either the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMA), the Chief of Staff
of Ground Forces (CEMAT) or the commander of the First Army himself. Secondly,
once an explicit directive has been issued to adopt a new doctrine, the CGA can be tasked
with monitoring and investigating its implementation. According to a knowledgeable
observer, the mere possibility of an investigation plays a significant role in ensuring
compliance with political dictates. 7
In short, elected leaders need specific institutional tools if they are to formulate
and impose military doctrines that meet their broader political needs. The institutional
structure of French defense policymaking provides civilian leaders with critical capacities
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for obtaining multiple independent sources of advice on doctrinal matters, publicly de-
creeing what French doctrine actually is supposed to be, and controlling the implementa-
tion of the new doctrine. This chapter examines the impact of French policymaking insti-
tutions on the elaboration of four military doctrines: 1) the creation of France's "two bat-
tles" doctrine of 1966; 2) the shift towards a single battle with tactical nuclear weapons in
1968; 3) the development of a doctrine of "enlarged sanctuarization" between 1974 and
1981; and 4) the creation of the Rapid Action Force (FAR) between 1981 and 1985.
II. The Evolution of a Commitment, 1944-1966
Events between 1944 and 1966 established the fundamental contours of France's
participation in the defense of Western Europe. Because of how France participated in
the victorious offensives of 1944, its preoccupation with colonial wars during NATO's
first crucial decade and de Gaulle's policy of national independence, the French Army
came to occupy a geographical position behind NATO's other armies on the Central
Front. This meant that France, alone amongst the states committed to defending Western
Europe, lacked a military presence on the border with the Warsaw Pact. Geographic dis-
tance dictated that the proper role of French forces was to serve as a strategic reserve for
NATO's other forces. However, France remained torn between the necessity to support
its allies and the temptation of withholding forces to defend national territory. Impor-
tantly, the geographic distribution of French forces, which were heavily concentrated in
Alsace, Lorraine and Southwest Germany, left the French Army poorly prepared to meet
the most dangerous Soviet threat -- an offensive across the North German Plain and into
Northern France.
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Although vanquished in 1940, France ended the Second World War as one of the
victorious allied powers thanks to the tenacity of Brigadier-General Charles de Gaulle
and the political calculations of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. From August
1944, a French Army participated in France's liberation. Landing in Provence, participat-
ing in the bloody battles for the Colmar Pocket, and helping blunt the Third Reich's pe-
nultimate Nordwind offensive, the French First Army ended the war occupying large por-
tions of Southwest Germany.8 This French occupation of German territory received the
official sanction of France's allies at the international conferences ending the war. Unlike
the analogous British and American dispositions in Germany, the French did not share a
common border with the zones of Soviet occupation. Moreover, adjacent to national ter-
ritory, French leaders viewed their zone as providing a buffer against a renewed threat
from the east.
When the Korean War prompted Western European rearmament in 1950, Western
leaders expected France to play the preponderant role in Europe's defense. With the
United States and United Kingdom occupied overseas and European states understanda-
bly worried lest West Germany re-emerge as the continent's premier military power, most
states looked to France to provide the forces and leadership necessary to defend Europe
conventionally. At NATO's Lisbon Conference in 1952, France pledged to provide 15 to
20 divisions, versus 12 for West Germany and nine for the United Kingdom.9 Unfortu-
nately, France's colonial wars soon consumed the forces needed for Europe's defense.10
From the 1950 defeats in Indochina until the peak of the Algerian War, one French unit
after another redeployed from the Rhine to the colonies. By 1957, France had 450,000
soldiers in Algeria, but did not possess a single operational division in Eastern France or
Southwest Germany between 1956 and 1961.
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Physically absent, the French Army devoted little thought to Europe's defense un-
til de Gaulle showed his determination to extricate France from Algeria. The first de-
tailed French study of a Warsaw Pact attack, therefore, was not completed until 1959. In
many respects, this study set the tone for most French analyses until the end of the Cold
War. French planners anticipated that geographic factors would channel a Warsaw Pact
offensive along three corridors: 1) from the North across the North German Plain,
through Hanover, towards Liege, and then to Paris or the French channel ports; 2) in the
Center, from East Germany to Paris via Lorraine, through two gaps in the Rhine high-
lands via Marburg-Koblenz-Luxembourg-Verdun-Paris starting at the G6ttingen Corri-
dor, and/or Fulda-Frankfurt-Nancy-Paris, beginning at the Fulda Gap; and 3) in the
South, through the Bavarian Plain, crossing the Rhine between Karlsruhe and Stras-
bourg. 1 According to French analysts, enemy forces could either focus on a single inva-
sion route or attempt to advance via all three.
In 1960, French planners concluded that the main Soviet offensive was most
likely to come via the Northern route, where the geography was most permissive and al-
lied forces comparatively weak.13 Most later French analyses confirmed this supposition.
A 1966 study arrived at identical conclusions and a Czech defector brought confirmatory
information in 1970.14 Ultimately, much French military planning during the 1970s and
1980s focused on meeting an attack across the Northern Route. Only a lone French
analysis, written by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Charles Ailleret,
concluded differently, that the main attack would come along the Southern route. 5 Table
II, below, details French analyses of the Soviet threat.
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Invasion Route
Predicted
Anticipated Soviet
Nuclear Policy
Anticipated Outcome
Enemy Forces
in Main Thrust
Nature of Analysis
Table II:
Table II:
French Analyses of World War III
1962 1966
Northern Route
No First Use
Not Stated
10-14 divisions
(first echelon)
Analysis by HQ.
of French Forces
in Germany
Southern Route
No First Use
Not Stated
Not Stated
Analysis by Chief
of Staff of the
French Armed
Forces (Ailleret)
Northern Route
Immediate Nuclear
Use
Soviets Reach
Atlantic Ocean in
10 to 12 days
Not Stated
Analysis by French
Military
Intelligence
1970
Central and Northern
Routes
Uncertain
Bridgehead over
Rhine in 6 to 10 days
10-15 divisions in N.
10 divisions in C.
(first echelon)
Information brought by
Czech defector
While France was most vulnerable to an attack through Northern Germany,
French forces in Southwest Germany and Eastern France were only capable of countering
attacks via the central and southern invasion routes. Despite the growing recognition that
France was particularly vulnerable to an attack in the North, neither domestic nor interna-
tional politics favored a redistribution of France's defense effort. Although the de facto
product of historic accidents, de Gaulle considered the French Army's distance from the
Iron Curtain and presence in Southwest Germany to be geopolitical advantages. In de
Gaulle's eyes, distance from the frontline would give France greater leverage in a crisis.
In the event of war, de Gaulle hoped this same distance would translate into an option for
non-belligerence.16 Because he feared being dragged into a conflict unconnected with
French interests, de Gaulle argued that France should uphold its alliance obligations if the
Warsaw Pact attacked Western Europe, but remain uncommitted should an extra-
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European conflict or West German revaunchism lead to war.17 Involvement in the for-
ward defense of Western Europe would both reduce France's freedom of action and rend-
er non-belligerence impossible.
As France withdrew troops from Algeria, de Gaulle refused to allocate more
forces to NATO or Germany.' 8 In 1963, he formally rebuffed a German request to allo-
cate two divisions to NATO's frontline, in Staubing, Bavaria.' 9 Three years later, de
Gaulle went further by withdrawing France from NATO's integrated force structure and
expelling American forces from France. Following this dramatic reassertion of national
autonomy, de Gaulle bilaterally renegotiated France's strategic relationship with NATO
and West Germany.21 French soldiers would remain in Southwest Germany, but their
participation in a future conflict would depend on the French government's decision to
subordinate its forces to NATO.
In sum, by the 1960s, France had a permanent military presence in Southwest
German regions adjacent to France: Baden, the Saar and the Palatinate. Unlike other al-
lied forces, the French did not occupy a section on NATO's forward defense-line and
were not subordinate to a multinational NATO headquarters. This posture increased the
options available to French political leaders, preserved French leverage over West Ger-
many and permitted the French Army to serve as NATO's strategic reserve. However,
French forces were poorly deployed to respond to the strategic threat French analysts
viewed as most pressing--an attack through the North German Plain. In effect, France's
vulnerable border with Belgium would remain bereft of forces until the late- 1970s and
would not have a strategic force contributing to the defense of the North German Plain
until the 1980s. Thus, through a combination of historic accident and political calcula-
tion, the French armed forces came, by the 1960s, to occupy positions best adapted to
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meeting the least urgent military threat, an attack in Southern Germany, and least capable
of countering the urgent message of an offensive in Northern Germany.
III. Institutions and Military Doctrine under de Gaulle, 1958-1967
When de Gaulle assumed power in 1958, he was convinced that France's prestige
and security depended on creating a nuclear deterrent, reconstituting France's mechanized
forces and asserting France's independence vis-a-vis NATO.22 For a military establish-
ment mired in colonial warfare and convinced about the necessity of Western unity, de
Gaulle's vision called for a paradigm shift in French military doctrine. Unfortunately,
most of the armed forces' leadership opposed de Gaulle's initiatives.23 After decades of
warfare against insurgents in Indochina and Algeria, many officers believed that Com-
munist subversion posed a greater threat to the West than the Soviet Union's armored
divisions or nuclear weapons. Moreover, the prevailing spirit in the French Army was
unscientific and anti-intellectual, leading many prominent commanders to dismiss the
value of nuclear armaments and propose simplistic counters to their use.25
During his administration, de Gaulle had recourse to three stratagems to overcome
the armed forces' resistance and develop a doctrine reconciling France's alliance ambi-
tions with national independence and nuclear deterrence.26 De Gaulle: 1) promoted tech-
nically trained officers to critical posts and used France's parallel staff systems to margin-
alize lass pliant commanders; 2) deprived the armed forces of their ability to shape pro-
curement decisions with the creation of the DMA; and 3) broadened policy debates
through the creation of a Ministry of Defense sponsored think-tank. Drawing on the mul-
tiple sources of advice at his disposal, de Gaulle revolutionized French military doctrine
and force structures. By the end of 1966, French doctrine envisaged defending French
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territory and interests with a combination of conventional and nuclear forces. France's
alliance obligations would be upheld by exclusively conventional forces; a combination
of conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons would administer a "final warning"
to enemy as they approached the French border; and, strategic nuclear weapons would
remain in reserve as a final "anti-cities" deterrent, discouraging an enemy from crossing
the French border.
Resistance from the officer corps both dismayed and upset de Gaulle, who real-
ized that a proactive approach was necessary to convert the French armed forces to a
strategy based on nuclear deterrence and national independence. De Gaulle's response to
this problem was twofold. First of all, he promoted individuals associated with France's
nuclear weapons program to key positions in the armed forces and ministry of defense.
Later and more importantly, he created durable institutional structures designed to refine
and implement the president's strategic vision.
De Gaulle's initial response to the armed forces' indifference was a pragmatic one
- elevating individuals already associated with France's nuclear programs to the highest
military and defense-policymaking posts. From personal experience, de Gaulle under-
stood the necessity of protecting the careers of and promoting individuals with strategic
concepts akin to his own. When briefed by Colonel (later General) Pierre Gallois in 1956
on the usefulness of nuclear weapons to a medium power, such as France, de Gaulle con-
cluded the interview by telling Gallois, "it is late, go sleep, I'll look after your career."27
Once in office, de Gaulle's first critical appointment was his nomination of Pierre
Guillaumat, the civilian director of France's Commisariate d'Energie Atomique (CEA or
Commission for Atomic Energy), to the post of Minister of the Armies between 1958 and
1960.28 Later, when de Gaulle created the Ddligation Ministdrielle pour l'Armement
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(DMA) in 1961, he named General Gaston Lavaud, the former armaments advisor to De-
fense Minister Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, to pilot the new structure. Importantly from
de Gaulle's perspective, Lavaud was already deeply involved in France's ballistic missile
programs.
When it came to choosing his military collaborators, de Gaulle began by appoint-
ing General Charles Ailleret (Army), the former head of the Armed Forces' Commande-
ment des Armes Spiciales (CAE), a small structure dedicated to studying atomic weap-
ons, to the position of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMA) in 1962. Ailleret oc-
cupied this post throughout most of de Gaulle's administration, until he perished in a
plane crash in 1968. In the same vein, de Gaulle appointed General Michel Fourquet (Air
Force) as successively Secretary General of National Defense (1962-65), Chief of the
President's Private Military Staff (CEMP 1965-68) and Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces (CEMA 1968-71).
Importantly from de Gaulle's point of view, Ailleret and Fourquet were atypical
within the French military establishment. Rather than graduating from the service acad-
emies that produced most French officers, Ailleret and Fourquet were products of
France's elite engineering school, Ecole Polytechnique. After receiving engineering de-
grees, Ailleret and Fourquet served in technically challenging branches, the artillery and
air force respectively. De Gaulle could therefore count on these two technocrats to ap-
preciate the value of nuclear weapons and help him impose them on France's armed
forces.
The appointments of Guillaumat, Lavaud, Ailleret and Fourquet, and de Gaulle's
subsequent nomination of political disciple Pierre Messmer to the Ministry of Defense
ensured that de Gaulle's highest-level interlocutors at the Ministry of Defense and the
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armed forces were broadly sympathetic to his policies. These steps were necessary, but
they were not sufficient condition for developing and implementing a military doctrine
consonant with de Gaulle's security policies.
To elaborate and codify military doctrine consonant with his security policy, de
Gaulle also created a dynamic new "think tank" within the Ministry of Defense that was
funded by and answerable directly to the minister. As Kimberly Zisk demonstrated in
Engaging the Enemy, political leaders can enhance their influence over defense policy by
broadening the policy debate. The Centre de Perspective et d'Evaluations (CPE or Cen-
ter for Perspectives and Evaluations) filled this role by both advising de Gaulle on nu-
clear matters and translating his strategic concepts into arguments couched in the terms of
military theory. Created in 1965 by Minister of Defense Pierre Messmer, with de
Gaulle's approval, the CPE benefited from high-level patronage that enabled it to exert a
greater weight in policy debates than the comparatively low ranks of its officers would
normally permit. Originally put under the directorship of an armaments engineer,
Hughes de l'Etoile, the twenty-odd members of the CPE were drawn from a variety of
defense-related backgrounds, including officers from all three services, engineers and
academics. 29
Because of its multidisciplinary and inter-service nature, and the fact that it was
both independent of the armed forces high command, yet dependant on the Minister of
Defense, the CPE was well suited to translating political directives into military doctrine.
As a founding member, Lieutenant-Colonel (later General) Lucien Poirier observed, "The
Centre de Perspective et d'Evaluations [CPE] filled the void in official military thought
and gave conceptual and practical substance to the politico-strategic framework outlined
by the government."30 Another early participant, Captain (later Admiral) Pierre Lacoste
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noted in a similar vein that, "In reality we only gave form and rendered applicable de
Gaulle's vision and thoughts." 3'
Having surrounded himself with partisans of a French nuclear deterrent, de Gaulle
drew on multiple sources of advice on how French nuclear forces should be constituted
and integrated with conventional forces. Table III, below, illustrates the different con-
cepts advanced by de Gaulle's theorists.
Table III:
De Gaulle's Theorists and their Contributions
Theorists Theories
Charles Ailleret Omni-directional (tous azimuts) deterrence;
Conventional and tactical nuclear forces of little value;
Need for ICBMs for global reach
Pierre-Marie Gallois Extended deterrence not credible;
Minimal (existential) deterrence possible;
Conventional forces of no value;
Tactical nuclear forces of some utility;
Nuclear deterrence incompatible with the alliance
Michel Fourquet Conventional forces necessary against limited aggression;
Tactical nuclear weapons necessary if conventional forces are
to remain credible
General Ailleret, for example, adhered to a vision combining strategic nuclear
weapons with a dramatically independent foreign policy. To this end, he argued that
France needed ICBMs capable of hitting targets anywhere on the planet. With this capac-
ity, France could have a security policy aimed at deterring attacks truly coming from any
direction. With respect to the doctrine finally adopted, Ailleret's notion of dissuasion
tous azimuts (all-direction deterrence) forecast a minor role for France's conventional
forces, even if equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, and a negligible role within the
Atlantic Alliance.
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In contrast to Ailleret's vision, de Gaulle's Private Military Chief of Staff
(CEMP), General Michel Fourquet argued that tactical nuclear weapons were necessary if
France's ground forces were to remain combat-capable and relevant. As already men-
tioned, he reasoned that a French army without tactical nuclear weapons would be value-
less against a Soviet army equipped with such weapons.32 Accepting Fourquet's reason-
ing, de Gaulle decided, albeit reluctantly, to build tactical nuclear weapons in 1963. Ini-
tially de Gaulle viewed tactical nuclear weapons as a luxury. He confided to Peyrefitte
that, "As to the tactical [nuclear] weapon, I'm not too attached to it. I do not think that it
will reinforce deterrence because its existence presupposes that deterrence could fail....
But the tactical weapon is necessary for the morale of the Army." 33
After de Gaulle decided to build tactical nuclear weapons, the CPE set about
elaborating a doctrine for combining the efforts of conventional, tactical nuclear and stra-
tegic nuclear forces into a coherent ensemble. The result of their theoretical labors, enti-
tled Etude logique d'un modle strategique concevable pour la France, was addressed to
de Gaulle and Minister of Defense Messmer on 15 March 1966." The CPE assumed that
France's strategic goal was to establish French national territory as a "sanctuary" that the
Soviet Union would neither invade nor strike with nuclear weapons for fear of nuclear
reprisals.
The study envisioned that a national strategy based entirely on strategic nuclear
deterrence would be vulnerable to two forms of aggression. First of all, an invader (in-
variably the Warsaw Pact) could invade the rest of Western Europe, halting its advance
just short of the French border, where strategic deterrence became credible. Although
France would remain physically unharmed, a scenario that left the rest of Europe in So-
viet hands was highly undesirable. Secondly, and more realistically from the point of
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view of the CPE, the Warsaw Pact could exploit a crisis to launch limited, prudent, at-
tacks interspersed with bargaining. The CPE feared that in such a scenario, "insidious
and progressive operations would accumulate solid gains, but not one of them [the ag-
gressive actions] would individually justify a massive nuclear riposte." 35
Analyzing these two scenarios, the CPE determined that France needed a capacity
to "test" the intentions of its adversary and send a "final warning" before initiating a stra-
tegic nuclear response against cities. According to the CPE, conventional and tactical
nuclear forces were necessary for both of these missions.
They proposed that, if the Warsaw Pact invaded Western Europe, conventional
forces, comprised of armored and mechanized divisions supported by tactical air power,
would engage enemy land forces beyond, but near France's borders. This engagement
would theoretically oblige Warsaw Pact forces to either halt their offensive, sparing
France from a land invasion, or commit sufficient forces to push France's conventional
forces aside, demonstrating a desire to occupy metropolitan France. For Poirier and the
CPE, "Given the inequality of conventional forces, the [conventional] forces must not
fight a prolonged defensive battle, but place the aggressor in a military situation where he
cannot increase or modify the strength of his action without revealing his ultimate objec-
tives and accepting the prohibitive risk [of strategic nuclear reprisals]." 36
The CPE argued that tactical nuclear weapons would augment the efficacy of this
"test" of Warsaw Pact intentions. Because French tactical nuclear weapons would remain
in France while French conventional forces engaged Warsaw Pact forces in Germany,
any Warsaw Pact effort to preemptively destroy French tactical nuclear weapons would
run the risk of pushing France to initiate strategic nuclear reprisals. Barring this, tactical
nuclear weapons could also be employed as French conventional forces faltered to pro-
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long and enhance the "test" of Warsaw Pact intentions, by forcing the Warsaw Pact to
commit additional means and thereby reveal its strategic intentions.
In addition to improving the ability of French forces to "test" Warsaw Pact inten-
tions, the CPE contended that tactical nuclear weapons would play another vital role in
France's defense by permitting French leaders to send a "final warning" to the Soviet
High Command. As recounted by Poirier, "in the case of an aggression begun under the
vital threshold [for strategic nuclear reprisals] and continuing to approach it, they [tactical
nuclear weapons] give the supreme command the ability to demonstrate the imminence of
retaliation against cities by a [tactical nuclear] warning shot against opposing military
forces." 37
The CPE's twin notions of a "test" of enemy intentions and a tactical nuclear
"warning shot" provided a blueprint for how French tactical nuclear weapons, strategic
nuclear weapons and conventional forces could be integrated into a coherent whole, enti-
tled the "national deterrence maneuver". In this schema, conventional and tactical nu-
clear forces would prevent an enemy from "neutralizing" deterrence while, at the same
time, providing French leaders with accurate information about enemy intentions.
Despite being logical and innovative, the CPE's studies provoked opposition from
within the armed forces. For organizations that prided themselves on fighting or prepar-
ing to fight, the CPE's relegating the armed forces to sending elaborate diplomatic signals
was seen as demeaning.38 For example, in its own technocratic language, the CPE de-
scribed the role of French conventional forces as "testing an adversary's intentions" be-
cause France "refused a battle that it would certainly lose." If an enemy's intentions were
judged hostile, tactical nuclear weapons would "materialize the threshold of critical ag-
gression."39
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Even General Ailleret, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMA), who was
an ardent supporter of de Gaulle and a proponent of nuclear weapons, resented the CPE's
effort to edify a national doctrine. 40 Ailleret attempted to marginalize the CPE and con-
fine it to analyzing the strategic environment, leaving military doctrine to the high com-
mand.41 However, Messmer and de Gaulle protected the CPE and encouraged its contin-
ued development.
In 1966, de Gaulle used the CPE's conclusions as evidence for why France had to
develop two varieties of tactical nuclear weapons-gravity bombs for fighter-bombers (in
service 1972) and battlefield nuclear missiles for the army (in service 1974). After de
Gaulle's 1969 resignation, the CPE's formula for the interactions of conventional forces
and tactical nuclear forces was enshrined under President Georges Pompidou's admini-
stration in France's 1972 Defense White Paper.
In sum, de Gaulle both created and used the CPE to justify strategic decisions he
had already made, namely to develop tactical nuclear weapons and maintain large ar-
mored maneuver forces. The CPE also dutifully elaborated a theoretical scheme integrat-
ing the three elements of the French armed forces whose main function was deterring
and, if need be, combating a Warsaw Pact assault.
Although de Gaulle doubtlessly subscribed to many of the CPE's arguments and
used them during internal and public policy debates, it would be mistaken to claim that
the CPE's Etude logique d'un modele strategique concevable pour la France was the
sole, or even dominant, influence on military doctrine, plans and force structure for con-
fronting the Warsaw Pact. In addition to the primary strategic goal of transforming
French territory into a strategic "sanctuary" in the event of war, de Gaulle had a strong
secondary objective of contributing to the solidity of the Atlantic Alliance during both
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peacetime and wartime. Moreover, for internal political reasons, de Gaulle chose to re-
tain a mass conscript army, rather than the comparatively smaller force comprised en-
tirely of armored and mechanized divisions that the CPE considered integral to the "na-
tional deterrence maneuver."
De Gaulle's desire to manifest solidarity with the Atlantic Alliance during either a
crisis or war led him to envision employing French conventional forces to defend Ger-
many. However, by employing some of France's conventional forces further away from
France's borders than consonant with the concept of a conventional "test," de Gaulle sub-
tly altered the logic of the CPE's model. Now, French conventional forces would effec-
tively fight two battles in the event of a Third World War.
First, part of France's conventional tank and mechanized forces would be subor-
dinated to NATO's operational control in the event of war. These forces would contrib-
ute to the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany by serving as a concentrated re-
serve to counterattack Warsaw Pact forces that had penetrated NATO's forward defense.
If this "first battle" failed to stop a Warsaw Pact offensive and NATO's forward
defense crumbled, then France's remaining tank and mechanized forces would conduct a
"second battle" in German territory, but near the French border. During this "second
battle" France would employ its tactical nuclear weapons to "test" and "warn" a Warsaw
Pact invader.
To prepare for the first battle, de Gaulle entrusted General Ailleret, Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces, to negotiate the modalities for France's participation in the collec-
tive defense of Germany in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack. To fulfill de Gaulle's di-
rective, Ailleret concluded a still-unpublished accord with NATO's Supreme Commander
of Allied Forces Europe (SACEUR), General Lemnitzer, in 1967. According to the Ail-
162
leret-Lemnitzer Accord, when a French President decided to participate in a NATO de-
fense against the Warsaw Pact, the French 2 Corps, located in Germany, would fall un-
der the operational control of NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG).42
Following the conclusion of the Ailleret-Lemnitzer Accord, General Ailleret
charged the commander of French Forces in Germany, General Jacques Massu, with de-
veloping contingency plans jointly with CENTAG for how the French 2nd Corps could be
employed to counterattack a Soviet penetration of CENTAG's forward defense.43 By all
accounts, joint planning between CENTAG and the French 2 "d Corps focused on Bavaria
and the South German Plain-precisely the region where de Gaulle had refused a French
role in forward defense back in 1963.
Given sufficient warning of an attack and a prompt decision by the French Presi-
dent, contingency plans allowed for the French 2 "d Corps to be deployed virtually to Pas-
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sau, near Bavaria's border with Czechoslovakia. With less warning or a slower political
decision, the French 2"d Corps would either be engaged as a mobile counterattack force
further to the west or perhaps attempt to improvise a defense on the River Lech, the only
natural obstacle running perpendicularly across the Bavarian Plain.
With the two divisions of the French 2 Corps designated to participate in
NATO's defense of Germany, the three divisions of the French 1 s' Corps, based in Metz
in Eastern France, had the mission of cooperating with French tactical nuclear forces to
"test" whether the Warsaw Pact intended to invade France and administer the tactical
nuclear "warning shot" to deter them from doing so. De Gaulle hoped that France's use
of tactical nuclear weapons would convince the Warsaw Pact to halt military operations
for fear that France could use its strategic nuclear weapons against Soviet cities. This
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"second battle" would be fought near the Franco-German border and would thereby entail
France's tactical nuclear weapons detonating in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Relative to de Gaulle's doctrine, France faced, for the first time ever since univer-
sal military service was instituted following the Franco-Prussian War (1870), the problem
of having more conscripts than the state could afford to equip to fight on a modem battle-
field. For a variety of reasons-the increasing costs of conventional armaments, France's
baby boom generation reaching the age for military service and the diversion of financial
resources to France's nuclear deterrent-the French Army could only afford to equip
155,000 men (108,000 conscripts) with the heavy armaments and logistics support
needed to fight the Warsaw Pact, while conscription furnished over 221,000 soldiers an-
nually.45 However, de Gaulle both believed in the heuristic value of military service in
forming French citizens and thought it would be unfair on the annual classes who served
up to three years during the Algerian War to entirely exempt the following annual classes
from military service.
To accommodate the larger numbers of troops available, de Gaulle adopted a con-
cept entitled "Defense Operationelle du Territoire" (DOT - Operational Territorial De-
fense). Drawing on concepts developed since 1947, the forces assigned to the DOT had
the triple vocation of protecting critical French military and command installations, de-
feating attempts by Communist partisans and agents to attack the French home front and,
in the event of a Soviet invasion, organizing a guerrilla war against the invader.46 This
last mission, especially, justified the large size of the DOT, comprising 53,000 soldiers
(34,000 conscripts) in three brigades, four light armor regiments and 20 independent in-
fantry regiments. 47 Equipped with lighter equipment and possessing fewer professional
cadres, the DOT remained the poor relation within the French Army.
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In sum, by supporting a pro-nuclear minority within the armed forces and creating
a think-tank answerable directly to the Ministry of Defense, de Gaulle successfully over-
came the armed forces' resistance to nuclear weapons. Moreover, by drawing on the di-
verging opinions of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Committee (General Ailleret),
the Chairman of the President's Private Military Staff (General Fourquet), the CPE and a
military maverick (General Gallois), de Gaulle was able to construct a military doctrine
and strategic policy that complemented his foreign policy objectives.
Having developed a military doctrine, de Gaulle and his followers relied on the
Institut des Hautes Etudes de D6fense Nationale (IHEDN - Institute for Higher National
Defense Studies) to inculcate France's political, military and industrial elite as to its logic
and merit. Several of the theoreticians who contributed to French nuclear doctrine played
an active role in this process. Lucien Poirier, who joined the CPE as a lieutenant-colonel,
ran the military section of IHEDN during the Pompidou Administration. Similarly, Gen-
eral Gallois also became a regular lecturer at IHEDN.
IV. The Ambiguities of Deterrence, 1968-1974
Although French military doctrine evolved rapidly and coherently under de
Gaulle's presidency up till 1967, the following six years were a period of disjointed de-
velopment in which two mutually exclusive strategic doctrines won simultaneous accep-
tance. The origins of the doctrinal confusion of this period lie in de Gaulle's changing
strategic vision. During the last two years of his presidency (1968-69), de Gaulle's views
on French military doctrine changed markedly. However, de Gaulle's new position was
only partially diffused by the time he left office in 1969. De Gaulle's successor, Presi-
dent Georges Pompidou, lacked both the knowledge and desire to intervene personally in
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decisions of military doctrine. Instead, he left such matters to subordinate levels of au-
thority, including the Minister of Defense, the commanders of the French First Army and
the theoreticians of the CPE. Unfortunately, the aggregate efforts of these different
groups only perpetuated the doctrinal uncertainty.
While coherent and increasingly accepted by French political and military elites,
de Gaulle's military doctrine quickly produced discontent. One of the first individuals to
question the effectiveness of French doctrine, as enshrined in the decisions of 1966 and
1967, was, ironically enough, de Gaulle himself.
As a professional soldier, de Gaulle's mind revolted at the notion of French forces
being engaged piecemeal in a Third World War. If sent into battle as stipulated, French
land forces, comprising roughly 208,000 men in combat formations, would fight during
three sequential phases of a conflict, divided into three components of more-or-less equal
size.48 General Fourquet, who had been Chief of de Gaulle's Private Military Staff from
1962 to 1968, and became the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces upon Ailleret's death in
1968, confirmed de Gaulle's doubts about the CPE inspired doctrine and argued for the
abandonment of the "two battles" doctrine [actually three counting the DOT].
Faced with this problem, de Gaulle decided in 1968, to commit all of France's
heavy armored and mechanized forces as a single bloc. To this end, he decided to place
both the French 1st Corps (in Eastern France) and the French 2 Corps (in Germany) un-
der a single command. The new unit, the French First Army, would have its headquarters
in Strasbourg, on the French side of the Franco-German border. According to a com-
mander of the French First Army, de Gaulle viewed the creation of a single maneuver
force as critically important and personally "took the decision [to create the French First
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Army], named its commander, chose the location of its headquarters and wrote the direc-
tives destined for its [the Army's] commander" 49
On 12 September 1968, de Gaulle personally informed the designated commander
of the French First Army, "You have amongst your tasks to prepare for the engagement
of our battle forces [corps de bataillel... you should keep in mind that our forces must act
offensively [i.e. a counteroffensive], as a single bloc and with all of the conventional and
tactical nuclear, land-based and aerial fire-support available."50 This statement, arguing
for a single battle supported by tactical nuclear weapons, ran contrary to the conclusions
of the CPE.
Accompanying de Gaulle's new concept of operations came a new theory of nu-
clear deterrence. Now, rather than using tactical nuclear weapons to "test" and "warn"
the Warsaw Pact, de Gaulle believed that French tactical nuclear weapons could be used
to force the United States to either engage its own tactical nuclear weapons or threaten to
use its strategic nuclear weapons. De Gaulle's logic ran as follows, if NATO needed the
assistance of the five divisions of the French First Army, it would accept their right to use
tactical nuclear weapons. If French forces launched tactical nuclear weapons as part of a
NATO battle for Germany, Soviet retaliation would be directed at NATO forces, and not
just the French. If the Soviets used tactical nuclear weapons against NATO forces, the
United States would be obliged to respond. America's use of its large tactical nuclear
stockpile would bring Warsaw Pact operations to a halt.
Viewed as a cycle of actions and reactions, de Gaulle believed that using tactical
nuclear weapons in support of the French First Army would permit France's small tacti-
cal nuclear arsenal to serve as the "detonator" for the United States' far larger arsenal.5'
Explaining himself to the commander of the French First Army, de Gaulle reasoned that,
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From the moment that the First Army and the FATAC [Force d'Aviation
Tactique] possess tactical atomic weapons, the Alliance will not be able to
plan to use them conventionally alone. You must explain to them [NATO]
that you plan to counter-attack with the support of our tactical nuclear
weapons. Thus, if the [NATO] high command needs this unique strategic
reserve [the First Army and FATAC] available in Europe, they will have
to be ready to use their nuclear weapons before or at the same time as
ours. Believe me, tactical nuclear weapons are an essential element of our
defense.... If you must choose one day between strategic and tactical nuc-
lear weapons, choose the latter, because its better to perfect what comes
before the Apocalypse than the Apocalypse [itself].
De Gaulle hoped that the mere prospect of escalation would lead the Warsaw Pact to halt
its offensive when it encountered the First Army. As General Valentine recalls, "French
intervention would be a signal to the adversary saying 'careful, you are running the risk
of nuclear escalation."' 5 3
While de Gaulle's views on military doctrine evolved late in his administration,
de Gaulle's failed referendum and precipitate exit from politics on 28 April 1969 pre-
vented him from adequately diffusing his new strategic vision. As a result, two con-
flicting doctrines existed side-by-side within the French Ministry of Defense and gov-
ernment, the doctrine de Gaulle accepted in 1966-67 and the one he favored in 1968-69.
France's new president, Georges Pompidou, was not personally interested in de-
fense issues and ostensibly only sought to uphold de Gaulle's strategic legacy. Unfortu-
nately, because of the centrality of the President in the institutional process of French
defense policymaking, Pompidou's lack of personal involvement in defense policymak-
ing perpetuated the contradictions created by de Gaulle's last strategic initiatives. On the
one hand, Minister of Defense Michel Debrd and the theoreticians of the CPE produced a
Defense White Paper that erected the notion of "two battles" into official doctrine. On
the other hand, the leadership of the armed forces planned to engage French conventional
and tactical nuclear forces as a single entity, as de Gaulle enunciated in 1968.
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Drawing heavily on the CPE's work, Pompidou's defense minister, Michel Debrd
(who had served de Gaulle as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister) oversaw the writing
of a Defense White Paper, that enshrined as official doctrine much of the conceptual
framework developed by the CPE. According to the 1972 Defense White Paper, French
security interests were divided into three circles of unequal value. The interior, and most
valuable, circle consisted of France's national (metropolitan) territory. The second circle
consisted of France's immediate approaches, including Western Europe and the Western
Mediterranean. Finally, the exterior circle comprised France's overseas interests, mainly
Francophone Africa.
The White Paper assigned a different category of military forces to defend each
circle. Because of the difficulty involved in making a nuclear deterrent credible, France
would only threaten to use nuclear weapons to halt an assault on the first circle.5 5 French
conventional forces could be used to defend the second circle. Finally, comparatively
small elite forces, the 11 t Parachute Division and the 9th Marine Brigade, would uphold
French interests in the third circle.
Because tactical nuclear weapons could only be used in conjunction with conven-
tional forces, whose defensive actions would force Warsaw Pact forces to render them-
selves vulnerable by massing for a breakthrough battle, substantial French conventional
forces would have to be withheld from the battle in Germany for use near France's bor-
ders. As the White Paper explicitly states,
France must be able to participate, according to its capacities and along-
side its allies, in the prevention or resolution of a crisis [in Europe]. It is
normal that this [French] capacity for intervention will be limited in vol-
ume and in time, because it is necessary [that we do] not prematurely wear
out the forces necessary for the defense of our borders and their ap-
proaches. 56
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By drawing a stark distinction between operations near France's borders and further to
the east, the French 1972 White Paper contravened de Gaulle's last pronouncements on
military doctrine.
The White Paper's message that tactical nuclear weapons along with substantial
conventional forces had to be shepherded for a unilateral deterrent maneuver near the
French border owed much to Debr6's skepticism about NATO. Writing years later, De-
brd tacitly admitted disagreeing with de Gaulle's later views on military doctrine. Ac-
cording to Debrd, "When I became Minister [1969]... the 'First Army' had been created
and a tactical air force [the FATAC] capable of carrying nuclear weapons was associated
with it. This decision corresponded to a vision of combined action with our allies. I re-
member thinking about participating in a forward battle and being unsatisfied with what
would come of it."5 7 Debr6 therefore returned to the doctrine annunciated by the CPE in
1966.
To promote his vision of French doctrine, Debr6 had recourse to a version of the
same tactics used by de Gaulle and Messmer in 1965, namely creating a new think tank to
promote his chosen strategy. To complement the CPE, which produced doctrinal argu-
ments, and the IHEDN, which exposed French elites to official strategic thought, Debrd
created an institution designed to shape defense policy debates amongst "defense intellec-
tuals." He established the Fondation pour les Etudes de Ddfense Nationale (FEDN or
Foundation for National Defense Studies) in 1972. According to Debr6, "The Foundation
had, in my mind, another goal: we lived and live in a time of strong political opposition.
How can one impose a consensus on strategy, especially nuclear strategy, at the summit
of the nation? That's what I saw as key."58
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While Debrd struggled to implement his preferred doctrine, the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces, General Fourquet, and the Commanders of the French First Army,
Generals Hublot and Valentin, persevered in implementing de Gaulle's directive to pre-
pare for a single battle employing conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons.59 At
the practical level of war plans, Generals Hublot and Valentin developed a series of nine
contingency plans in case the Warsaw Pact invaded West Germany. Importantly, all the
plans anticipated the French First Army, comprising all five divisions (15 brigades) of
armored and mechanized forces, being used as a single counterattack force.
What differentiated the plans from one another were both the geographic axis
where the First Army would deploy and the depth into West Germany at which they
would engage the enemy. Basically, three plans each corresponded to the three invasion
corridors already mentioned. For each invasion corridor, there were forward, medium
and rear hypotheses.60
As per de Gaulle's directive, Generals Fourquet, Hublot and Valentin all argued
for France's tactical nuclear weapons had to be used quickly and massively to comple-
ment the actions of the First Army. As Hublot wrote,
The First Army must not be considered to be a conventional military force
equipped with several nuclear weapons, but as a land maneuver force with
atomic capabilities, able to combine [atomic] fire and movement to strike
the enemy a blow that will be both the strongest and most politically sig-
nificant possible.... The nuclear [attack] will achieve its maximal effect
because of the actions [by conventional forces] that preceded and pre-
pared, as well as followed and exploited it.6 1
Thus, actual French war plans differed fundamentally from the White Paper by envision-
ing a single battle, which could occur near the inter-German border, involving both con-
ventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons.
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The contradictions between two incompatible military doctrines confused both
French military officers and allies. Table IV, below, illustrates the two incompatible doc-
trines.
Table IV:
De Gaulle's Conflicting Doctrines
Two Baittles Single N1ue1e2r/Cnnvention~d Fn~i~enient
CPE Study (1966);
White Paper (1972)
De Gaulle's 1968 instructions;
First Army War Plans
Conventional
Battle
Tactical Nuclear
Use
Tactical Nuclear
Theory
2 " Corps participates in NATO's
defense;
1 " Corps defends near French border
2 " Corps fights conventionally;
1s' Corps uses nuclear weapons from
first engagement
"Final Warning"
threatens strategic escalation and
persuades the Warsaw Pact to halt
Both corps participate in single battle besides
NATO or near French border (according to
presidential decision)
Both corps use nuclear weapons immediately
"Detonator"
French use provokes Soviet retaliation and
American use
Puzzled over conflicting information emanating from French sources, NATO's Central
Army Group's (CENTAG) contacted General Valentin, commander of the French First
Army, in 1972 to query whether the French 2 Corps or the entire First Army would be
committed to battle in Germany. Regrettably, even General Valentin, commander of the
First Army, was not entirely certain what French policy was on the matter. 62
If the commander of the French First Army was unclear how his forces would be
employed in the event of war, the doctrinal confusion was widespread elsewhere in the
armed forces. Writing in 1972, General Hublot candidly admitted, "We are facing sig-
nificant problems in establishing a theory and a doctrine... A complication emerges [as
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Textual
Origins
Two Battles Sin-ale Nuclear/Conventional Envaf7ement
to] whether we should think in terms of bilateral deterrence, of one power against an-
other, or of triangular deterrence, in which a medium nuclear power intervenes [in a quar-
rel concerning two superpowers] .63 While Hublot preferred the latter conception of
French strategy, the ultimate choice remained with the President.
Precisely what was President Pompidou's strategic vision? Unfortunately, Pom-
pidou never firmly declared in favor of either of the two competing strategic doctrines.
Rather, his actions gave the appearance of favoring both, mutually incompatible though
they were. By validating Debrd's 1972 White Paper, Pompidou appeared to favor the
CPE's conception of distinct engagements forward in Germany and near France's border.
However, in a 1973 National Defense Council, Pompidou reviewed and validated the
contingency plans for employing the French First Army, which all envisioned the massed
use of French conventional forces supported by tactical nuclear weapons. Later, in his
secret "Strategic Testament" of 1 February 1974, he specified that, while France would
probably fight alongside its NATO allies, its forces must employ their tactical nuclear
weapons from the outset.64
As a result, the evolution of French military doctrine during the Pompidou ad-
ministration was confused. Key to this problem was de Gaulle's changing strategic vi-
sion, which differed materially in 1968-69 from what it had been in 1966-67. De
Gaulle's earlier conception became the inspiration for France's 1972 White Paper, while
his later views were translated into France's military contingency plans. Because of the
President's central role in the elaboration of French military doctrine, Pompidou's lack of
inclination and expertise in defense matters sustained the contradictions between France's
accepted doctrine and its military plans. Thankfully, the Warsaw Pact did not invade
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Western Europe during the Pompidou administration (1969-74), when France did not
possess a coherent theory of how to oppose them.6 5
V. Giscard and Extended Sanctuarization, 1974-1981
Valery Giscard d'Estaing's election to the French presidency in 1974 marked a
new wave of doctrinal reform. Existing French doctrine damaged Franco-West German
relations because of the French Army's limited participation in the defense of West Ger-
many and intention to use tactical nuclear weapons on German territory. Combined with
the political deficiencies of French doctrine, the technical problems inherent in French
plans for delivering a single tactical nuclear salvo and the lack of forces capable of coun-
tering an attack into northern France motivated a comprehensive revision of French mili-
tary doctrine and force structures. With the assistance of a small number of trusted mili-
tary collaborators, especially Generals Guy Mdry, Claude Vanbremeersch and Jean La-
garde, Giscard promulgated a series of reforms between 1974 and 1980 that can be col-
lectively termed a shift to "enlarged sanctuarization." Giscard's measures included: 1)
plans to deploy the Army forward into West Germany in the event of a crisis; 2) a deci-
sion to fight conventionally as long as possible before resorting to tactical nuclear weap-
ons; 3) the doctrinal shift from a single "warning" salvo to a period of tactical nuclear
warfare; 4) a change in nuclear targeting plans, dedicating France's silo-based Intermedi-
ate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) to strikes on Soviet command-and-control facili-
ties; and 5) a revision in force structure to create a third Army corps to defend France
against an attack via the North German Plain. With comparative rapidity, Giscard chal-
lenged many of the strategic canons erected by de Gaulle. However, the centrality of
political concerns in military reform led France's military doctrine to become a partisan
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political issue in the lead-up to the 1981 elections, prompting Giscard to abandon further
reforms towards the end of his election.
At the heart of Giscard's military reforms was his recognition that France's exist-
ing military doctrines harmed Franco-West German relations. As created by de Gaulle,
French doctrine envisaged only the commitment of limited forces (one-third of French
ground troops under the "two-battles" doctrine) to defend only a small portion of West
German territory. With maximum geographic limits drawn at Munich in the south and
Dortmund in the northeast, French forces would not begin fighting until over half of West
Germany had already been abandoned.
Worse, France's nuclear doctrine dictated that West Germany be subjected to a
devastating French nuclear salvo, should NATO's military front collapse.66 As exempli-
fied in the CPE's 1966 study and the 1972 White Paper, French doctrine called for the
near simultaneous use of all France's tactical nuclear weapons to send a "final warning"
to the Soviet Union when its forces approached the French border. Because France's only
tactical nuclear missile, the Pluton, had a maximum range of 120 kilometers (70 miles)
they would necessarily land in West German territory. Comparatively inaccurate and
equipped with powerful 10- or 25- kiloton warheads, the Plutons could hardly fail to kill
large numbers of German civilians.67 Thus, given the size of the French arsenal, France's
nuclear doctrine amounted, in West German eyes, to a decision to bombard heavily popu-
lated areas with 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear warheads.68
In addition to being politically contentious, France's military doctrine was also in-
effective. The doctrinal emphasis on launching a coordinated tactical nuclear salvo and
then exploiting it with conventional forces placed a heavy technical requirement on de-
tecting enemy forces beyond visual range, collating and diffusing a single target list, and
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launching weapons before enemy forces had shifted positions. Given the state of elec-
tronics in the 1970s, such performance and integration between reconnaissance and strike
platforms was probably impossible.69
When tested, the French system failed in one exercise after another. After esti-
mating that the optimal depth for nuclear strikes was 10 to 20 kilometers in front of
French lines, French reconnaissance assets failed to detect more than eight to ten percent
of enemy units at this depth.70 Even assuming perfect intelligence, French command-
and-control systems proved incapable of collating available information and finalizing a
nuclear fire plan.7 1 Whereas operational analyses indicated that the whole cycle could
not be allowed to exceed several minutes, it took several hours during the ExellTerre ex-
ercise of 1974.72 During another exercise, command-and-control broke down completely,
with 500 unexamined telegrams accumulating over two days and urgent messages taking
24 hours to receive attention.73
Without better reconnaissance or command-and-control systems, France's tactical
nuclear doctrine of a concentrated "warning shot," was physically unworkable. 74 In all
likelihood, Warsaw Pact tanks would have moved by the time French missiles arrived,
75leaving German civilians the primary victims of French nuclear attacks. In his own
denunciation of French doctrine, the former Vice Chief of Staff of the French Air Force
protested, "The doctrine of the 'final warning' must be rejected.... existing [French] tacti-
cal nuclear weapons are very capable of killing [German] civilians, but incapable of kill-
ing [Soviet] soldiers." 76
Very soon after assuming office, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt confronted
Giscard over French military doctrine. 77 For Schmidt, French doctrine provided an addi-
tional argument for the West German far left, which wanted to extricate West Germany
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from NATO and hindered progress toward European economic integration.78 Worse, the
potential use of French nuclear weapons on German territory would, in the event of war,
probably catalyze NATO's collapse. Schmidt emphasized this point, warning:
The minute that a nuclear weapon lands on German soil we will raise the
white flag. The minute! Whatever our obligations, we will stop fighting!
I am telling you this so that you never forget it in your calculations [about
tactical nuclear weapons].... One has to be stupid to think that we will
stand by to see Germany destroyed by atomic bombs, whether our enemies
or our allies launch them, and continue fighting !7
Thus, Schmidt dramatically confronted Giscard about the negative political ramifications
of France's military doctrine shortly after the beginning of Giscard's regime.
Soon after his encounter with Schmidt, Giscard encountered domestic critics of
French military doctrine. At a lunch in July 1974, Giscard solicited advice from the
Chief of his Private Military Staff General (CEMP) Guy Mdry, retired Generals Andrd
Beaufre and Pierre-Marie Gallois, political scientist Raymond Aron, and defense com-
mentators Jacques Isnard (le Monde) and Jean-Pierre Mithois (Figaro).80 After impas-
sioned debate between the partisans and detractors of de Gaulle's military doctrine, Gis-
card felt more dissatisfied than ever with France's military posture. French military doc-
trine seemed precariously balanced between pledges of alliance solidarity and policies
tantamount to neutralism. More concretely, Giscard had personal trouble understanding
when, during a conflict, he would be asked to authorize the use of nuclear weapons.81
Giscard's dissatisfaction with existing French military doctrine led him to search
for alternatives. Giscard's principle desiderata were developing a doctrine that would
contribute more directly to West Germany's defense and delay France's use of tactical
nuclear weapons without actually reintegrating French forces into NATO's integrated
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force structure. Giscard quickly focused on General Mdry, the Chief of his Private Mili-
tary Staff (CEMP), as the person most capable of helping him elaborate such reforms. 82
Appointed under Pompidou, Mdry shared many of Giscard's worries about French
doctrine. Mdry felt that de Gaulle's attempt to distinguish France's defense from the rest
of Western Europe's was fundamentally wrong. 83 France could not maintain any real de-
gree of sovereignty if the rest of Western Europe had been overrun and a French threat to
use tactical nuclear weapons would appear hollow if NATO had already been van-
quished.84 Therefore, Mdry argued the necessity of French forces participating further
forward in NATO's conventional defense. Should conventional defense fail, Mdry be-
lieved France needed nuclear plans that could compel the United States to use its own
nuclear weapons. 85
Once Giscard came to appreciate Mdry's views, he promoted him to Armed
Forces Chief of Staff (CEMA). To support Mdry's efforts, Giscard elevated two col-
leagues, recommended by Mdry, to the key positions of Chief of Staff of the President's
Private Military Staff (CEMP) and Army Chief of Staff (CEMAT). General Vanbre-
meersch, a class-mate and friend of Mdry from St. Cyr's class of 1939 succeeded Mdry as
CEMP when Mdry was promoted, while another one of Mdry's classmates, General La-
garde, enjoyed a fruitful and long (1975 to 1980) period as CEMAT thanks to Mdry's
influence and Giscard's patronage. 86
The first step in step in Giscard's defense reforms was the development of flexible
options for how France would respond to an international crisis. Because of the risk that
any conflict would escalate into a mutually suicidal nuclear exchange between the super-
powers, neither Giscard nor Mdry believed that a war between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact could begin with a rationale political decision.87 They therefore concluded that the
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greatest threat came from crisis situations when miscalculation, mistakes and local initia-
tives could create an escalatory climate.
Faced with the unpredictable and accidental character of crises, Giscard and Mdry
felt that France's doctrine of immediate tactical nuclear use and homeland defense would
only add to instability. A French decision to keep a significant quantity of forces near the
French border, as called for by the two-battles doctrine, could embolden an adversary
hesitating whether or not to attack. Conversely, if France responded to its first significant
encounter with enemy forces with an enormous tactical nuclear salvo, the Soviets could
retaliate massively against targets throughout Europe. Therefore, to respond flexibly to
crisis situations, France needed a military doctrine capable of exercising a de-escalatory
effect, reassuring friends, warning adversaries and buying time for statesmen to conclude
a ceasefire. Giscard himself reasoned, "France can find itself in complex situations.... if
France can only speak in terms of 'all-or-nothing' its gestures will lack credibility."8 9
In terms of a future conflict in Central Europe, the doctrine Mdry developed and
Giscard approved comprised three distinct elements. First, French forces would be en-
gaged as far forward in West Germany as possible once the French president decided to
assist France's NATO allies. Second, French forces would fight conventionally as long
as possible, until their military position became untenable. Third, once this occurred,
they would use tactical nuclear weapons on a large scale, not merely to "warn" the War-
saw Pact, but to inflict as much damage on their forces as possible and oblige the United
States to use its own tactical nuclear weapons.
The principle of France forward deploying its forces and engaging wholeheartedly
in the defense of Europe lay at the core of Giscard's reforms. In the event of a crisis, Gis-
card planned to reassure allies and deter opponents by shifting forces into West Germany.
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Conducted before the advent of hostilities, such a move would permit French forces to
participate in NATO's main battle near the Iron Curtain, where their forces would be
most useful. According to Giscard, "Conventional forces, by their variety and the flexi-
bility of their use, are suited to the very diverse crisis situations that characterize our
era.... In case of a crisis in Europe... their deployment permits the government to signal
its willingness to intervene." 90 Emphasizing the military rationale behind forward de-
ployment, Mdry added, "When they [Warsaw Pact forces] arrive at the [French] border
the situation is already fruitless, because NATO's collective defense will already have
collapsed." 91 Thus, politically and militarily, French interests would be best served by
forward deploying French forces during a crisis, but before hostilities had actually broken
out.
New operational plans where therefore drawn, permitting French forces to deploy
further eastwards than previously envisaged. France's internal elaboration of the new
doctrine was accompanied by the negotiation of two military accords with NATO, resolv-
ing the practical problems associated with France's changing role. Signed in December
1978, the Biard (commander of the French First Army) - Schultz (the NATO Central
Army Group Commander) laid the groundwork for France to assist NATO in case of a
crisis or limited war. In a scenario of this genre, the French 2 Corps would be commit-
ted early to the forward defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, while the remainder
of the First Army remained in reserve, ready to intervene when fighting broke out of the
situation degenerated.92
Part and parcel to Giscard's willingness to deploy French forces further forward
was a different view of how conventional and tactical nuclear weapons should be com-
bined. Whereas French doctrine previously envisioned the massive use of tactical nuclear
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weapons at the moment when the bulk of French forces encountered powerful enemy
units, Giscard wanted French forces to fight conventionally as long as possible. If war
had begun as a result of miscalculation, a period of conventional warfare would give
statesmen an opportunity to agree on a ceasefire, before escalation acquired a dynamic of
its own. Giscard wrote, "Conventional forces... by their engagement... waging battle,
show an adversary that France is willing to oppose any aggression with all of the means it
possesses." 93 Mdry added, "[France] must be able, if need be to intervene to wage a bat-
tle that, in certain cases, will be entirely conventional." 94
When further conventional resistance became impossible, Giscard intended for his
forces to use tactical nuclear weapons while still deep inside West Germany. By advocat-
ing the use of tactical nuclear weapons by forces participating in NATO's main defensive
battle, Giscard rejected the CPE's finding that French tactical nuclear weapons and the
threat of escalation would only be credible if used near France's national borders. Gis-
card also abandoned the doctrinaire notion that tactical nuclear weapons should only
serve to "warn" the Soviet Union of France's imminent escalation to strategic nuclear
warfare. Instead, tactical nuclear weapons would be used flexibly, rather than in a single
salvo, to inflict damage on Warsaw Pact forces and buy time to negotiate a ceasefire.
According to Giscard, "A defense institution must be organized to give battle.... tactical
nuclear weapons... are not only an instrument of deterrence, but also an instrument of
battle."95
The decision to use tactical nuclear weapons as part of NATO's main defensive
battle was announced by Giscard at the Defense Council's meeting of 20 January 1975.
Public hints of the change in French tactical nuclear doctrine were then given in several
181
of Giscard's speeches and the preambule to the Five Year Military Planning Law, adopted
in 1976.
Because France would participate in NATO's main battle, Giscard and Mdry an-
ticipated the French would cross the tactical nuclear threshold at approximately the same
time as the United States. Either French use of tactical nuclear weapons would provoke
Soviet retaliation, obliging the United States to use its own tactical nuclear weapons, or
an American decision to use tactical nuclear weapons would compel the French to follow
suite. In both cases, Giscard and Mdry anticipated that the use of tactical nuclear weap-
ons by any allied contingent would result in the Soviet Union retaliating in kind against
NATO as a whole. To prepare for such eventualities, Giscard deputized Mdry to discuss
tactical nuclear warfare with SACEUR Alexander Haig beginning in 1975.
Although Giscard insisted on France's independence to decide when and where it
would use tactical nuclear weapons, Mdry and Haig developed procedures for consulta-
tion, liaison and joint planning. In theory, France and the United States would exchange
information about their respective tactical nuclear intentions, providing forewarning
should either partner choose to go nuclear. If both used tactical nuclear weapons, the
liaison procedures elaborated by Mdry and Haig were designed to permit France and the
United States to share targeting intelligence and harmonize their efforts so as not to waste
nuclear munitions on the same targets or impede each others' actions with nuclear fratri-
cide. A 1977 accord on aerial cooperation further smoothed the way for French tactical
nuclear use by enabling French tactical aviation to operate in NATO airspace.96
Along with their revision of French tactical nuclear doctrine, Giscard and Mdry
also re-examined strategic nuclear plans, which hitherto consisted of a single annihilating
strike against Soviet population centers. Innovating on French doctrine, Mdry envisioned
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an intermediate stage in nuclear escalation between tactical nuclear weapons and strikes
against Soviet cities. Rather than immediately launch nuclear reprisals against Soviet
cities if Warsaw Pact forces failed to halt after France's use of tactical nuclear weapons,
French leaders would now have the option of launching a limited nuclear strike against
command-and-control targets in the Soviet Union. By retargeting France's 18 silo-based
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) located on the Plateau of Albion, near
Grenoble, from Soviet cities to critical military targets, Mdry reasoned that France could
inflict a strategically crippling blow on the Soviet Union.97 Explaining his logic, Mdry
recounted that, "In the first years of France's nuclear deterrent [theforce defrappe] we
had relatively limited strike plans that targeted several large cities. But later on we modi-
fied our strike plans.... We made plans designed to inflict significant disorganization in
the Soviet Union, practically not attacking cities, but [rather] command posts, sites of
strategic policymaking if you like." 98
By striking Soviet command-and-control targets with its silo-based MRBMs,
while maintaining its submarine-launched ballistic missiles in reserve, Mdry reasoned
that France could deter Soviet nuclear reprisals against French cities. In the meantime,
the disruption inflicted on Soviet strategic command-and-control would leave the Soviet
Union vulnerable to American initiatives, whether political or military. In explaining the
effects of French strikes against Soviet command-and-control facilities, Mdry maintained
that, "We would have produced a period of [strategic] disorganization that the Americans
would not have failed to exploit." Elsewhere, Mdry reiterated the same theme, stating
that, "[Since the end of the Cold War] I have had the occasion to speak to several Soviets
[former Soviet military leaders] openly who recognized that what we would have done
would have put them in a very difficult position vis-a-vis the United States." 99
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Having revised France's deployment arrangements, tactical nuclear doctrine and
strategic nuclear plans, Giscard and Mary considered it necessary to revisit the organiza-
tion of French ground forces. In this context, Mdry delegated authority to his friend and
St. Cyr classmate, General Lagarde, who served as Army Chief of Staff from 1975 to
1980. With an exceptional degree of authority and a long tenure in office, Lagarde pre-
sided over sweeping changes within the Army. Lagarde's reforms included: 1) a signifi-
cant increase in the resources dedicated to the Army; 2) the creation of a third army corps
to protect against an attack across the North German Plain; and 3) the reorganization of
territorial regiments and brigades into multipurpose divisions capable of meeting secon-
dary threats.
Because of their scope, the Lagarde reforms are best understood with the assis-
tance of Table V below: 00
Table V:
Before and After the Lagarde Reforms (1975-1980)
Before the Lagarde Reform
Battle Forces
2 Army Corps (light organic elements)
- 5 mechanized divisions (16000 men)
Territorial Forces (DOT)
2 alpine brigades
20 infantry regiments
4 light armored regiments
6 engineer regiments
Intervention Forces
1 paratroop division
1 marine infantry brigade
Reserve Forces
77 infantry regiments (mobilized)
14 regiments formed from school
After the Lagarde Reform
Battle Forces
3 Army Corps (heavier organic elements)
- 8 armored divisions (7500 men)
- 2 motorized infantry divisions
Multi-Purpose Forces
3 infantry divisions (1 alpine)
I demi-brigade
Intervention Forces
1 paratroop division
1 marine infantry division
Reserve Forces
10 infantry divisions (formed by derivation)
4 divisions formed from schools
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With de Gaulle's pursuit of a powerful nuclear deterrent, French ground forces had been
starved of resources prior to Giscard's presidency, receiving only 15 to 16 percent of de-
fense expenditures between 1960 and 1970.101 As a result of this budgetary penury, nu-
merous procurement programs were cancelled or deferred, and five brigades were
equipped with cheaper wheeled vehicles rather than the more effective tracked vehicles
originally planned. 0 2 To make matters worse, the 1973 oil crisis precipitated a 20 per-
cent reduction in training activities.' 03 While the Army's equipment and training suffered
economically, it still remained ill-deployed to counter an attack via the North German
Plain. 104
By the time Giscard assumed power, the French Army's plight had become suffi-
ciently grave for the West German Chancellor to highlight the French conventional
weakness at one of their first meetings.'05 To both French and outside observers, the
Army was ill-prepared to fight conventionally.io6 Internally, the Army's poverty resulted
in conscripts protesting and the formation of soldier's committees.'07
To rectify problems with equipment and morale, Giscard consecrated a larger part
of the defense budget to ground forces, which benefited from pay increases and a greater
numbers of procurement programs (15 out of 36 in the 1977 Defense Planning Law).' 08
Lagarde then reorganized France's least motivated troops, the territorial defense forces
(DOT), into five multipurpose divisions, rather than detached regiments and brigades.109
To give the new multipurpose forces a sense of utility and improve their combat readi-
ness, Lagarde exercised them in a series of mammoth exercises held in the French coun-
tryside.110
As part of his overall mandate, Lagarde next tackled the problem of defending
France from an attack across the North German Plain.' By restructuring French mecha-
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nized forces into smaller divisions, Lagarde reduced the French Second Corps, in Ger-
many, by 5,000 personnel.'2 With these troops, Lagarde formed an armored division for
service in Northern France, which Lagarde subsequently partnered with two motorized
divisions formed from his reorganization of French territorial forces." 3 Subordinating
these three divisions to a headquarters near Paris, Lagarde created France's 3 rd Army
Corps in 1979. Table VI, below, details Lagarde's reform of French battle forces.
Table VI:
French Battle Forces
1969 Organization Lagarde Reorganization
First Army (HQ Strasbourg) First Army (HQ Strasbourg)
- 1I' Corps (HQ Nancy) - 1s' Corps (HQ Metz)
- 3 mechanized divisions (67) - 4 armored divisions (77)
- 2 nd Corps (HQ Baden) - 2 "d Corps (HQ Baden)
- 2 mechanized divisions (67) - 3 armored divisions (77)
Third Corps (HQ Saint-Germain-en-Laye)
* 1 armored division (77)
* 2 infantry divisions (motorized - 77)
Weaker than the two existing corps, the 3 Corps was destined to advance into Belgium,
delaying Soviet forces that had broken through the North German Plain. If the 3 Corps
proved insufficient, Lagarde examined having the 1st Corps counterattack westwards
against an adversary that had broken into Northern France.' 14 However inadequate, La-
garde's reforms represent the French Fifth Republic's first attempt to counter an attack
from the North.
Taken as an ensemble, Giscard's measures represent a comprehensive revision of
French military doctrine. From deployment arrangements, to battle plans, force structure
and nuclear release procedures, Giscard transformed how the French armed forces
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planned and prepared to fight. Table VII, below, illustrates the magnitude of Giscard's
reforms by comparing his doctrine with that which preceded it:
Table VII:
Giscard's and de Gaulle's Doctrines Compared
Giscard's Doctrine
Deployment To begin after debut of a conflict;
in Germany Large forces potentially retained for
France's defense
Conventional Very brief;
Battle Tactical nuclear weapons to be used
as soon as French forces make contact
with large Soviet forces
Tactical Nuclear Concentrated in time;
Use [How] Preferably in a single salvo
Tactical Nuclear As Soviet forces reach French border
Use [Where]
Strategic Nuclear
Transition
Anti-city strikes by all French delivery
means
To begin during a crisis or period of tension,
before fighting erupts
As long as possible;
Tactical nuclear weapons to only be used
when conventional battle no longer possible
Tactical nuclear battle of a [slightly] longer
duration
When French forces can no longer hold deep
in Germany
Selective strikes against Soviet command-and
-control and military targets with silo-based
IRBMs;
Submarine launched missiles kept in reserve
as ultimate anti-city deterrent
Giscard decided the broad contours of his reforms after his initial encounters with allied
leaders and French defense intellectuals. The detailed elaboration of Giscard's reforms
owed much to the compatibility of his views with those of his CEMP, General Mdry.
Giscard's collaboration with Mdry illustrates the impact of France's institutional structures
of defense policymaking. Having access to multiple sources of advice, Giscard found
and used a military commander whose strategic analyses coincided with his own. Once
they agreed on principles, Giscard promoted Mdry to CEMA, approved Mdry's choice to
succeed him as CEMP and supported Lagarde's efforts as CEMAT.
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de Gaulle's Doctrines Giscard's Doctrinede Gaulle's Doctrines
In total, it took about 18 months to elaborate a comprehensive program of doc-
trinal reforms. Once completed, these reforms were enacted despite the loquacious cri-
tiques of many of the theorists who had developed de Gaulle's strategic doctrine and oc-
cupied positions in the CPE. Certain matters, such as strategic nuclear re-targeting and
negotiations with the Americans, were shrouded in the greatest secrecy. Other matters,
including the overall thrust of Giscard's reforms, were publicized for all in the French
defense policymaking community to understand."5 Using habitual instruments, such as
IHEDN and the official journal Difense Nationale, Giscard, Mdry and Prime Minister
Jacques Chirac exposed policymaking elites to new French doctrine in a series of articles
and speeches.116 The culminating point in this process came in March 1976, when Mdry
declared that Giscard's new doctrine was "enlarged sanctuarization," meaning that French
nuclear power would contribute to Western Europe's security as a whole.11 7
Politically, Giscard's doctrinal reforms had the diplomatic impact he intended.
Schmidt warmly greeted Giscard's reforms, especially the commitment of forces to Ger-
many's forward defense and the strengthening of French conventional forces. Thereafter,
Schmidt and Giscard collaborated wholeheartedly on Giscard's project of furthering
European integration, laying the bases of eventual European monetary union. In terms of
transatlantic relations, Henry Kissinger admits that Giscard's defense policies contributed
to a climate of Franco-American entente unknown for decades."18 When the Euromissile
Crisis debuted in 1977, Giscard capitalized on his privileged relations to invite American,
British and West German leaders to the French island of Guadeloupe, where Giscard
helped negotiate NATO's "double decision" policy.119
While motivated by foreign policy concerns, Giscard's doctrinal reforms had dis-
tinct military advantages. French forces could contribute substantially to NATO's de-
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fense by operating further forward, the new tactical nuclear doctrine promised to give
diplomats more time to conclude a ceasefire, and the creation of a third army corps per-
mitted France to resist an attack in the North. If all else failed, the new strategic nuclear
plan might bring hostilities to an end without sparking mutually ruinous nuclear strikes
on cities.
The only difficulties in enacting the new doctrine occurred when Giscard vacil-
lated as to what policy to pursue. From 1976 onwards, the Gaullist RPR Party attacked
Giscard's strategic policy by accusing him of abandoning the national independence as-
serted by de Gaulle. Although incapable of preventing Giscard from promulgating his
reforms, the RPR attacks led him to drop "enlarged sanctuarization" and "forward de-
fense" from the administration's official rhetoric. More problematic from a policy per-
spective, Giscard entertained fresh doubts about French doctrine towards the end of his
term in office. In 1980, during a large scale command post exercise, Giscard refused to
pre-delegate authority to use tactical nuclear weapons when conventional resistance be-
came impossible.120 According to Mdry, Giscard thereby violated the premises of his
own doctrine and "with this single act demolished all our nuclear theories."' 2
Thus, empowered by France's defense policymaking institutions, Giscard master-
minded far reaching reforms of military doctrine in a remarkably short time and despite
his own absence of prior personal experience with defense policymaking. The only limit
to Giscard's ability to craft doctrine was his flagging will and certitude in enacting
changes.
VI. Mitterrand, Hernu and the Rapid Action Force, 1981-1990
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Frangois Mitterrand's election to the French presidency in 1981 created a need for
a further revision of military doctrine. As leader of France's socialists, Mitterrand had
opposed Giscard's moves towards "enlarged sanctuarization," "forward deployment," and
"tactical nuclear battle."122 Once in power, Mitterrand now had to formulate an alternative
to Giscard's doctrine that fulfilled the same political need of reassuring West German
leaders and demonstrating France's commitment to Europe's collective defense. Drawing
on the institutional tools at his disposal, Defense Minister Charles Hernu created a five-
division Force d'Action Rapide (FAR, which translates as Rapid Action Force) destined
for rapid projection toward NATO's borders. In theory, the FAR would intervene before
France's mechanized forces and would fight without the support of tactical nuclear weap-
ons, which were again relegated to the role of delivering the "final warning" before nu-
clear escalation. For technical and bureaucratic reasons, much of the Army's hierarchy
opposed Hernu's reforms and repeatedly attempted to sabotage them. Using the parallel
staff structures and multiple sources of advice at his disposal, Hernu neutralized his op-
ponents. By 1984, the FAR was a reality. Conceived for diplomatic reasons, the FAR
accomplished its political mission of facilitating Franco-German and Franco-American
relations, while maintaining France's strategic independence. Unfortunately, many of the
military critiques of the FAR appear founded and the doctrine's military effectiveness
remains doubtful.
In the years preceding Mitterrand's election, the French Socialist Party repeatedly
criticized Giscard's defense policies. When the Socialists adopted their defense plat-
form in 1978, the Party's acceptance of nuclear deterrence was predicated on France re-
maining autonomous from NATO's force structure and reserving its nuclear weapons for
the defense of French territory. 124 The Communists, who were coalition partners with the
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Socialists, accusing Giscard of compromising France's independence and secretly prepar-
ing to rejoin NATO. Having taken a public stand against Giscard's reforms, Mitterrand
would appear hypocritical if he pursued the same policies as his predecessors.
While Mitterrand could not continue along the same trajectory as Giscard, his
doctrine had to address the same underlying concerns. Maintaining a close political rela-
tionship with West Germany was still considered France's chief foreign policy objec-
tive. With the West German government assailed by an influential peace movement,
feeling menaced by Soviet intermediate range nuclear weapons (INF) and Franco-
German entente critical for European integration, Mitterrand could not afford to abandon
Giscard's vigorous commitment to West Germany's defense.' 26 Similarly, after the
heightening of Cold War tensions in the late-1970s, Mitterrand did not want to take any
actions that could be interpreted as "going soft" on the Soviet Union or abandoning
France's NATO allies.
Thus, the dilemma facing the Mitterrand administration when it assumed office
was to find a means of reassuring West Germany and other NATO allies that France
would contribute effectively to Western Europe's defense while, at the same time, aban-
doning Giscard's pledges to forward deploy French forces and use nuclear weapons in
defense of West Germany. Rather than immerse himself personally in the details of
military doctrine, as de Gaulle and Giscard had done, Mitterrand delegated responsibility
for shaping French doctrine to his Minister of Defense, Hernu.128 Having led the Social-
ist Party's Defense Commission since 1972 and masterminded the Party's acceptance of
nuclear deterrence in 1978, Hernu was the Socialist leader most familiar with defense
policy and deserves much credit for the Party's adoption of a defense platform palatable
to the majority of French voters.129 As such, it was natural for Mitterrand to entrust
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Hernu with the delicate new task of developing a military doctrine that satisfied both for-
eign powers and domestic audiences.' 30
At the beginning of the Mitterrand administration, Hernu lacked clear ideas about
how to accomplish his objective. 131 However, he informed collaborators that their goal
was to find a means for "allowing France to participate in the opening stages of a war in
Central Europe," but that they had to "work along lines of a slightly different inspiration"
from "enlarged sanctuarization."132 To find a doctrine capable of meeting their require-
ments, Hernu and his collaborators canvassed different sources of military advice.
In October 1981, Hernu enjoyed his first breakthrough in the quest for a new mili-
tary doctrine. During a lunch, General Georges Fricaud-Chagnaud, France's representa-
tive to NATO's Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), suggested to Hernu that French
military helicopters should be grouped into single division, forming a "very mobile and
powerful anti-tank force." According to Fricaud-Chagnaud, such a division could inter-
vene at long distances and short notice, permitting France to participate in NATO's for-
ward battle without forward deploying prior to hostilities. Politically, Fricaud-Chagnaud
ventured that his proposal would permit France to satisfy its NATO allies while retaining
its mechanized forces and tactical nuclear weapons for the defense of France's immediate
approaches.' Concluding his argument, Fricaud-Chagnaud presented Hernu with a
well-crafted memorandum that he had dissimulated from his military colleagues for fear
of their opposing it.1 34
For Hemu, Fricaud-Chagnaud's idea of forming units that could be rapidly de-
ployed from French territory to NATO's front line resolved the dilemma of participating
in NATO's main battle without moving forces in peacetime. However, a single division
would be inadequate in the eyes of France's NATO allies and too insignificant to capture
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the attention of France's NATO allies. Moreover, both Hernu and Fricaud-Chagnaud
knew that Fricaud-Chagnaud's proposal would be resisted by the Army, which preferred
to use its helicopter assets to support French mechanized corps.135
To give a rapid deployment force the political and military dimensions considered
necessary, Hernu's staff began examining what other military forces could be combined
with a helicopter division in a fast-moving ensemble.136 Given the French Army's limited
helicopter resources, creating a single helicopter division would deprive the rest of the
Army of 40 percent of their helicopters and 70 percent of its anti-tank helicopters.137
Sufficient resources simply did not exist to create two helicopter divisions. Therefore,
the remaining divisions associated with a rapid deployment force would have to be com-
posed differently. However, in order to operate in conjunction with a fast-moving heli-
copter division, they would have to be light and highly mobile.
One idea that quickly gained support was the creation of light armored divisions.
During the past several years, France had introduced a new generation of wheeled ar-
mored vehicles, including the AMX-10RC wheeled gun system and the VAB armored
personnel carrier.138 Although much lighter a main battle tank (10 tons versus 32), the
AMX-10RC possessed a large 105mm gun capable of destroying most Warsaw Pact
tanks at ranges up to 1,200 meters.139 Both the AMX-1ORC and the VAB required less
logistics support than classic armored forces and could therefore advance over compara-
tively long distances. Until Mitterrand's administration, these wheeled vehicles had been
fractioned among many small units.
Now Hemu's collaborators proposed concentrating a critical mass of wheeled ar-
mored vehicles to create two light armored divisions. By equipping the 9th Marine Divi-
sion with light armored divisions and expanding the 3 1st Motorized Brigade to divisional
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size, Hernu could transform two existing formations, habituated to small-scale operations
in Africa, into combat units capable of defending Western Europe. Table VIII, below,
illustrates the forces structure of the light armored divisions:
The cost of creating light armored divisions was depriving French mechanized corps of
vehicles they used for armored reconnaissance. Table IX, below, illustrates the redistri-
bution of light armored regiments within the Army.
Table IX:
French Light Armored Forces
Pre-FAR Post-FAR
Corps Reconnaissance Assets: Corps Reconnaissance Assets
3 Corps x 2 regiments = 6 regiments 3 Corps x 1 regiment = 3 regiments
Light Infantry Divisions Infantry Divisions
6 Divisions x 1 regiment = 6 regiments 4 Divisions x 1 regiment = 4 regiments
Light Armored Divisions
2 Divisions x 2 regiments = 4 regiments
Besides the light armored divisions, Hemu's staff decided to attach France's para-
troop division (the 1 1 th Parachute Division) to the rapid deployment force. Historically
used for interventions in Africa, France's paratroops were an elite that could be rapidly
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Table VIII:
France's Light Armored Divisions
Motorized Infantry = 2 to 3 regiments
Light Armored = 2 regiments
Artillery = 1 regiment
Engineers = 2 companies or 1 regiment
= 11I regimentsTotal = 12 regiments
flown to NATO's front line. Experiments and thought had been given to their use in Cen-
tral Europe under the Giscard administration, but the insufficient mobility and firepower
of paratroopers once on the ground stymied efforts to employ them.140 Now Hernu's de-
cision to create a rapid deployment force led the government to consider paratroopers apt
to combat Soviet tanks for the first time ever.
To further increase the size of Hernu's new force, his staff also included France's
mountain division (the 27 th Alpine Division) in the rapid deployment force. Based in
Central France and equipped with modest numbers of vehicles, the mountain division
could only, with great difficulty, be deployed to Central Europe. Moreover, the mountain
division's meager supply of anti-tank weaponry meant that it would be exceptionally vul-
nerable to Soviet armor. 14 Despite these deficiencies, Hernu insisted on including the
mountain division to increase the putative mass of France's projection force.142 However,
it appears likely that the mountain division was never actually slated to operate in Central
Europe alongside the other four rapidly deployable divisions, but would remain in Central
France to guard ballistic missile silos against enemy special forces.
Thus, Hernu expanded Fricaud-Chagnaud's vision of a fast moving force capable
of intervening in Central Europe from one division to five. Table X, below, illustrates the
rapid deployment force as articulated by Hernu.
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Table X:
The Force d'Action Rapide
One Helicopter Division (4'" Division A6romobile)
5,100 personnel
241 helicopters
One Light Armored Division (6i"" Division L6gere Blindde)
7,400 personnel
77 AMX-10RC (wheeled cannon vehicles)
One Marine Division (9"" Division d'Infanterie de Marine)
8,500 personnel
77 AMX- ORC (wheeled cannon vehicles)
One Paratroop Division (11l"m Division Parachutiste)
13,500 personnel
One Mountain Division (27'"' Division Alpine)
9,100 personnel
Total = 47,000 personnel (including corps headquarters)
The reasons behind creating a large force, of five divisions, were overwhelmingly politi-
cal. Only a sizeable military force, of at least corps size, would convince friends and
enemies alike that France would play a major role in NATO's forward battle. Once the
concept had been finalized, Hernu named France's rapid deployment force the Force
d'Action Rapide (Rapid Action Force), which soon became known for its acronym, the
FAR.
While Hernu, his private staff and a few collaborators sufficed to develop a blue-
print for reform, actually changing French doctrine and force structures proved more dif-
ficult. When they became aware of Hernu's plans, most of the Army's high command
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opposed the FAR. Military officers advanced four broad arguments against Hemu's pro-
ject, including: 1) the military high command was insufficiently consulted in elaborating
the reform; 2) creating the FAR could deprive France's mechanized corps of helicopters
and armored reconnaissance assets; 3) the FAR would divert motivated career soldiers
away from the rest of the Army; and 4) the light divisions of the FAR would not be able
to stand up to the Soviet Union's armored forces. From March 1982 until November
1983, Hernu and his colleagues contended with the Army's efforts to sabotage the FAR.
However, using the institutional tools at his disposal, Hernu prevailed over the high
command.
From the outset, Hernu's cabinet anticipated the Army's resistance to their re-
forms. The Army had broadly approved of Giscard's doctrinal changes and was unlikely
to welcome further reforms that it had little role in developing. Table XI, below, illus-
trates the Army's attempts to oppose Hernu's reforms.
November 1981:
October 1982:
January 1983:
March 1983:
June 1983:
Table XI:
The Force d'Action Rapide
Unenthusiastic appraisal of helicopter division concept by Hemu's
military cabinet
The Army's Chief of Staff, General Delaunay, wrote letter critical
of Hernu to General Lacaze. Letter leaked to newspaper.
Armed Forces Chief of Staff's letter to Hernu urging Hernu to rely
on service chiefs is published in the armed forces information
bulletin.
Violent confrontation between Hernu and Army Chief of Staff.
Army Chief of Staff, Delaunay, obliged to retire.
Experimental helicopter force fails after exercise's organizers
"sabotage" trial.
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Fricaud-Chagnaud was so certain that his hierarchy would oppose his proposal for a heli-
copter division that he hid it from his military superiors and brought it to the direct atten-
tion of the Minister of Defense.
Anticipating resistance from the military high command, Hernu excluded the
Army from the initial stages of elaborating a new doctrine and confided Fricaud-
Chagnaud's dossier to his personal military cabinet, which answered directly to the Min-
ister of Defense. However, contrary to Hernu's expectations, the military cabinet re-
sponded to Fricaud-Chagnaud's memorandum in November 1981 with a lukewarm ap-
praisal. The military cabinet's paper stated that Fricaud-Chagnaud's judgement about the
relative value of helicopters and tanks "seemed somewhat premature" and that his pro-
posal to confine the First Army to a more rearward role "raised a psychological problem
that cannot be ignored." 14 3 After these cautionary notes, the military cabinet suggested
that no immediate action should be taken and Fricaud-Chagnaud's proposal be studied
further.
Undaunted by the tepid response from his military cabinet, Hernu confided the
next stages in elaborating a new doctrine to bodies entirely beholden to him. On 10
March 1982, he tasked the CPE's successor, the Groupe d'Etudes et de Planification
Strat6giques (GROUPES), with studying Fricaud-Chagnaud's proposal with an eye to
assessing its operational validity and examining its financial and doctrinal implications.144
By entrusting the further elaboration of Fricaud-Chagnaud's proposal to a think-tank
managed by an armament engineer, Hernu ensured that the proposal would receive both
the positive evaluation and the detailed elaboration necessary for its implementation.
Barely two months after the think-tank was charged with studying Fricaud-
Chagnaud's proposal, GROUPES presented Hernu with an analysis supporting the heli-
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copter division and providing arguments for pushing the idea further. The GROUPES
study asserted that Fricaud-Chagnaud's proposal "complements without difficulty our
doctrine of deterrence and would permit [France] to materialize its contribution earlier to
the defense of Europe by offering our allies significant support." 14 5 With the GROUPES
study in hand, Hernu and his civilian entourage decided that the next step in developing
an airmobile intervention force would be the creation of a provisional helicopter unit and
experimentation with it during full-scale exercises.
Only after GROUPES had produced its study and Hernu's cabinet had elaborated
a detailed project of reform did Hernu decide to inform the Army's leadership of his plans
to create the FAR. On 24 November 1982, at a meeting of the Superior Council for
Ground Forces, Hemu told the Army's assembled leadership that he intended to create a
rapid deployment command with the mission of "engaging an expeditionary force in sup-
port of allied forces in Europe wherever they need assistance and from the beginnings of
a crisis."146 Shortly after Hemu's speech, the Minister of Defense's cabinet set in motion
the creation of an experimental helicopter unit, the force iclair (literally "lightning
force") as a precursor to Fricaud-Chagnaud's helicopter division.147
Unfortunately, Hernu's efforts to delay military opposition miscarried when in-
formation about the FAR leaked to the Army's high command in October 1982, before
Hernu announced the reform to the Army's leadership. Having unofficially heard snip-
pets about the FAR, the Army's Chief of Staff, General Delaunay, wrote the Armed
Forces' Chief of Staff, General Jeannou Lacaze, a letter condemning it. Although origi-
nally composed as a confidential letter in October, Delaunay's text was published in a
Parisian paper on 6 December.14 8 Delaunay was angered in equal measures by the reduc-
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tion of the Army's size, the creation of a "two tiered" force and the elaboration of major
changes without him, the head of the French Army, being consulted.149
Sensitive to Delaunay's complaint that the Army's leadership was being excluded
from the reform process, Lacaze attempted to persuade Hernu that military doctrine
should not be formulated in isolation from the armed forces' professional leadership. In
January 1983, Lacaze wrote Hernu to protest how the FAR was elaborated and urge Her-
nu to include service chiefs in all future deliberations. According to Lacaze,
In view of the reforms already begun, it is indispensable to associate mili-
tary experience with the reflections of those advancing new doctrines. In
this respect, Mr. Minister, it is normal for you to be able to rely entirely on
the service chiefs, whose experience should naturally make them privi-
leged partners when discussing necessary reforms.'5
To pressure Hernu into taking his message seriously, Lacaze arranged for it to be pub-
lished in the armed forces information bulletin, where officers and journalists would have
access to it. Meanwhile, Lacaze also urged Delaunay to forgive Hernu's past behavior
and collaborate on the next stages of the reform process.
Ultimately, Lacaze's message had little impact on Hernu or Delaunay. Hernu con-
tinued to circumvent the Army's high command and dealt directly with subordinate offi-
cer, particularly the commander of the First Army, General Jacques de Barry. Mean-
while, Delaunay did what he could to block the government's initiatives. By March 1983
Delaunay and Hernu were in open conflict. According to a source close to Hernu, "The
general [Delaunay] lacked the slightest sense of diplomacy and Charles Hernu wanted to
force him to recognize that the political authorities would have the final word."' 5 ' During
one explosive meeting, Hernu and Delaunay resorted to shouting at one another. By the
time it was over, Hernu had torn the cables from his phone in anger and Delaunay had
showered the floor with 181h century stucco, detached from the ceiling by the force of his
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slamming the door. After this explosive meeting, Hernu retired Delaunay, replacing him
with a more pliant officer.
Despite Delaunay's ouster, the Army continued to resist Hernu's reforms. When it
came time to test the helicopter division idea in June 1983, the corps commander tasked
with organizing the exercise attempted to sabotage the concept. By issuing an unrealistic
requirement for helicopters to "demonstrate a good capacity to control a geographic sec-
tor by remaining above it and repelling the enemy" General Bernard de Montaudouin
created a scenario whereby the experimental helicopter force was bound to fail.153 With
numerous journalists assembled for the exercise, de Montaudouin acerbically commented
on the government's initiatives. After subordinate officers explained that the experimen-
tal helicopter force had been defeated, de Montaudouin quipped, "In the Army we do
things thoroughly.... We are sceptical of theoretical or enthusiastic chatter emananting
from Parisian [government] offices." 5 4
Hernu's immediate response to the failure of his doctrine during the June 1983 ex-
ercise was to replace the responsible officers and organize a new trial. De Montaudouin,
the "saboteur" of the June exercise was retired, the commander of the experimental heli-
copter unit was replaced, and the new exercise was placed under the direct auspices of a
general known for his support of the FAR. To make sure that nothing went wrong,
Hernu's staff controlled every detail of the exercise's elaboration. Not surprisingly, the
Moselle 83 exercise of September 1983 was judged a complete success, "confirming" the
validity of the government's plans. After the exercise, it was assessed that 60 attack heli-
copters could stop an enemy armored division over 600 kilometers from the helicopters'
peacetime bases.
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With the FAR's principal opponents neutralized, a detailed plan for reforms elabo-
rated and the validity of the concept demonstrated by an exercise, Hernu could proceed
with the implementation of reform. In November 1983, Hernu officially announced the
government's new doctrine and the FAR's imminent creation.'5 6 The FAR's central
command structures and new light armored division (the 6th Light Armored Division)
were created and declared operational in 1984. The FAR's three existing divisions were
then transferred to the new structure. Finally, in June 1985, the FAR's most novel com-
ponent, the helicopter division, was declared operational. Thus, within four years of Fri-
caud-Chagnaud presenting his proposal, Hernu succeeded in creating a rapid deployment
force of 47,000 men, including two types of entirely new divisions. 5 7
From a political point of view, the FAR fulfilled the requirements originally laid
out for it. West Germany greeted the FAR's creation with considerable enthusiasm and
General Frido von Senger und Etterlin hailed it as a significant military development.
France's adoption of a military doctrine amenable to the Germans paved the way for
broader security cooperation, culminating in the reactivation of the Western European
Union (WEU) in 1984, the adoption of a common European security platform in 1987,
the establishment of a Franco-German brigade in 1987 and, ultimately, the creation of the
Eurocorps in 1992. Viewed retrospectively, a former Hernu collaborator reflected that
the FAR was critical to Franco-German relations and that "Getting the Franco-German
relationship right was one of the keys to winning the Cold War." Besides West Germany,
France's other allies also supported the FAR, with the United States' Army's Chief of
Staff, General Edward Meyer, a particular enthusiast.
Unlike Giscard's doctrinal reforms, the FAR proved domestically uncontroversial
as well. Combined with Mitterrand's abandonment of "forward deployment" and "tactical
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nuclear battle" the creation of the FAR even found support from doctrinaire Gaullists.
One of the CPE's former theorists and an avid critic of Giscard, General Poirier, wrote
several articles defending the Gaullist foundations of Socialist defense policy. In an ul-
timate homage to the FAR, the Soviets listed it as one of the primary elements changing
the correlation of forces in Europe. As early as 1984, Soviet military intelligence evalu-
ated the FAR as contributing the equivalent of three additional divisions to NATO's de-
fense, constituting half of the land forces that NATO had added in six years.
While foreign and domestic audiences appreciated the FAR, France's own armed
forces remained sceptical of its value and suspected that the FAR's existence weakened
the Army as a whole. The creation of the FAR had entailed a significant diminution in
the combat power of France's mechanized forces. Creating the light armored divisions
consumed half of corps reconnaissance assets, and developing the helicopter division
diverted 70 percent of the Army's combat helicopters and 40 percent of its total helicop-
ters. To enable the FAR's infantry to combat Soviet tanks, the FAR received 38 percent
of the Army's Milan anti-tank missiles (450 of 1,200). 158 Besides consuming large
amounts of specialized equipment, the force also required a high percentage of volunteer
soldiers and career non-commissioned officers , which could only be obtained by poach-
ing high quality manpower from the rest of the Army to fulfil the complex missions as-
signed to the FAR. Thus, in the words of General Delaunay,
The Minister [Hernu] wanted to create two armies, the FAR for difficult
operations and the rest to serve as armed valets.... The Army's best units
have always had a tendency to cream off the best junior officers as they
exit St. Cyr. This became worse with the creation of the FAR. The FAR
also called for volunteers. This meant that the bravest and most highly
motivated men were concentrated in this one formation, leaving the rest
worse off. 159
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Many French officers feared that depriving France's three mechanized corps of helicop-
ters, anti-tank missiles, wheeled armored vehicles and high quality manpower was a poor
trade off, crippling the ability of the 155,000 men of the First Army to fight in order to
create a rapid deployment force of 47,000.160
Besides their general opposition to providing the FAR with resources at the ex-
pense of the rest of the Army, many French officers doubted whether its light forces
would succeed at their mission. Using divisions of helicopters, light armor and para-
troops to confront the Soviet Union's armored and mechanized forces was a bold endea-
vor, and little evidence existed to suggest that the French would succeed with their mis-
sion. French helicopters required significant logistics support and were vulnerable to
enemy aircraft and air defenses, wheeled armored vehicles lacked the protection and off-
road mobility of tracked vehicles, and paratroops possessed no artillery and were unpro-
tected against chemical or nuclear warfare. Exercises in 1981 and 1983 had already
demonstrated the shortcomings of paratroop and heliborne forces against enemy armor.
Because of these deficiencies, many officers feared the FAR would fail the test of battle.
Although the FAR never saw action in its original mission, the greatest test of the
FAR, the Kecker-Spatz (Strong Sparrow) exercise of 1987, yielded equivocal results.
Involving 20,000 French troops and 55,000 West German soldiers, the Franco-German
Kecker-Spatz exercise examined a scenario whereby the FAR would deploy to Southern
Germany to halt Soviet armored forces until the French 2"d Corps arrived to reestablish a
defense line in conjunction with German forces. With both France's President Mitterrand
and West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl in attendance, Kecker-Spatz had a public
relations function in addition to its military purpose.
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For observers, certain aspects of the FAR concept worked remarkably well, while
others revealed disturbing defects. Logistically, Kecker-Spatz was a success, with the
FAR arriving within 48 hours from bases as far away as Southern France. The helicopter
division was also judged to have accomplished its mission, destroying over 100 simulated
"Soviet" tanks. However, the counterattack by a French light armored division against a
"Soviet" tank division proved a fiasco. French wheeled vehicles bogged down once off
road and the simulated "Soviet" armor handily outmaneuvered and overpowered them.
According to General Frangois Gerin-Rose,
We wanted to have the light armored elements of the FAR counterattack a
'Soviet' armored division. The Germans laughed at us and they were right
to do so.... The German Army was very critical of our performance dur-
ing Kecker-Spatz. The commander of the West German 2 Corps did not
stifle his criticisms, and he was right.' 61
After the exercise, doubts also emerged as to whether France possessed enough logistics
resources to employ both the FAR and the First Army at the same time. Insofar as the
FAR was ever subjected to a rigorous test, it failed on more counts than it succeeded.
However, in the eyes of the national leaders watching the exercise, the FAR was a sym-
bol of Franco-German strategic partnership and the in-dissociable nature of the two
states.
In sum, the FAR represents a successful attempt by political leaders to impose
unwanted change on the armed forces. Using the institutional tools at his disposal, Hernu
marginalized elements of the armed forces who opposed his reforms. Instead, pliant bo-
dies and favorable officers were used to articulate reform under the overall guidance of
Hemu's staff. Because Hernu's concerns were political in nature, fulfilled political crite-
ria, such as demonstrating France's commitment to West Germany's defense and its reten-
tion of its own strategic independence. Unfortunately, significant elements of the FAR
205
concept were militarily unviable. Professional soldiers suspected and argued this from
the doctrine's inception, but were powerless in their efforts to change the government's
objectives.
VII. Conclusion
Between 1958 and 1989, French military doctrine underwent four distinct
changes. Prior to 1962, involvement in colonial wars hindered France's developing a
doctrine for the defense of Western Europe. After coming to power, de Gaulle gradually
imposed a strategic policy based on national independence, nuclear defense and selective
engagement with the Atlantic Alliance. By 1966 de Gaulle imposed the "two battles"
concept, based on participating conventionally in NATO's defense with a single army
corps and withholding another army corps, tactical nuclear weapons and territorial forces
to deter an attack on France itself. Within two years of approving the "two battles" doc-
trine, de Gaulle had second thoughts and instructed the military high command to prepare
for a single engagement, employing all of France's mechanized and tactical nuclear
forces. This single engagement could potentially take place alongside other NATO
forces, in which case France aimed to compel the United States to use its tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe's defense. During Giscard's administration (1974-81), "enlarged
sanctuarization" was embraced and French forces prepared to fight a longer conventional
battle, further forward and, if need be, with a more calculated and gradual transition to
nuclear warfare. Discarding most of Giscard's developments, the Mitterrand administra-
tion (1981-95) created a Rapid Action Force (FAR) designed to enable France to partici-
pate conventionally in the opening stages of a war in Europe without pre-deploying
forces. Table XII, summarizes France's doctrinal developments.
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Table XII:
Major Changes in French Doctrine, 1958-1990
Single Conventional/ Extended
Nuclear Battle Sanctuarization
Force d'Action
RaDide (FAR)
Date of
Introduction
Conventional
Employment
Nuclear
Threshold
Developments in
Force Structure
Major Actors
Foreign Policy
Considerations
2 "d Corps to fight
with NATO;
1 t Corps reserved for
national defense
2nd Corps to fight
conventionally;
1s Corps to use tactica
nuclear weapons
immediately
Reestablishment of
army corps after
Algeria
President de Gaulle
CPE
General Ailleret
General Fourquet
General Gallois
Affirm France's
strategic independence
while contributing to
NATO's defense
Both corps fight
together either
with NATO or for
national defense
Practically immediate
Creation of the French
First Army
President de Gaulle
General Valentin
General Hublot
Compelling a reluctant
United States to invoke
its nuclear deterrent on
on behalf of Europe
President can
forward deploy units
during a crisis;
French defense
indivisible from
NATO's
When conventional
defense becomes
impossible
Development of
Corps to protect
North
President Giscard
General Mdry
Gen. Vanbremeersch
General Lagarde
Reassure West
Germany and other
NATO allies
FAR to participate
in NATO's forward
battle;
First Army to serve
as reserve
FAR and First Army
to fight conventionally;
tactical nuclear
weapons relegated to
symbolic "final
warning"
Creation of FAR with
five divisions,
weakening mechanized
corps
President Mitterrand
Def. Min. Hernu
GROUPES
Hernu's Staff
G. Fricaud-Chagnaud
Gen. de Barry
Reassure West
Germany of French
support while
reaffirming French
strategic autonomy
The major impetus for these changes was political leaders' perceptions of France's
diplomatic environment. The key issues that motivated their forays into military doctrine
were questions of how to guarantee France's strategic autonomy, contribute to Europe's
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Two Battles
1966 1968 1975-76 1983
Two Battles
collective defense and reassure critical allies of French support. Each administration per-
ceived these questions in a slightly different light and technology shaped the military op-
tions available to them. With the "two battles" doctrine, de Gaulle's aim was to distin-
guish France's defense, which was guaranteed by nuclear weapons, from France's contri-
bution to Europe's overall security, which remained conventional. This military doctrine
can only be appreciated as the military manifestation of de Gaulle's foreign policy of
autonomy from the United States, ddtente with the Soviet Union and cooperation with
West Germany. When de Gaulle revised this doctrine in 1968, he hoped to increase
France's contribution to Europe's collective defense while ensuring that the United States
would use or credibly threaten to use its nuclear forces on behalf of Europe.
The negative diplomatic ramifications of de Gaulle's doctrines, which became
evident with Chancellor Schmidt's complaints in 1974, prompted Giscard to revise
French doctrine and force structure. West German criticisms of French doctrine weighed
heavily on Giscard because the new French government hoped to advance European inte-
gration and feared that ostpolitik could culminate in neutralism. Giscard's focus on
"enlarged sanctuarization" embodied this effort to render France's defense indissociable
from Western Europe's security. Second order reforms, such as the Army's preparations
for conventional conflict, its new tactical nuclear doctrine, the possible forward deploy-
ment of conventional forces and the creation of a third army corps were all designed to
convince France's allies that it would play a significant role in NATO's collective defense
and would not prematurely destroy West Germany with tactical nuclear weapons.
Accepting Giscard's political objectives, but dissatisfied with his rapprochement
with NATO, Mitterrand sought a means of demonstrating France's committing to pre-war
forward deployment or French forces fighting a tactical nuclear battle alongside allies.
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Taking advantage of recent military reflections on the value of helicopters and the in-
creasing lethality of anti-tank missiles, the FAR fulfilled the same political functions as
"enlarged sanctuarization" without equivalent political costs. With a rapidly projection
force, France could participate, at short notice, in NATO's primary battle.
Thus, the different political outlooks of successive French administrations and
changes in the international environment proved the most frequent factors motivating
changes in French doctrine. Given the political components to France's defense policy,
each doctrine bore the mark of the head of state's personality. Not coincidentally, four
successive French presidents (Giscard, Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy)
announced major military reforms within 18 months of being elected, demonstrating the
correlation of election cycles with new military doctrines.
Because political factors and actors predominated in the creation of French doc-
trine, military doctrine emphasized France's overall security, rather than purely military
performance or the pursuit of "victory." In practical terms, this meant that each French
doctrine was designed to reinforce the credibility of nuclear deterrence. Concepts such as
the "national sanctuary," massive retaliation, a conventional "test" of enemy intentions, a
"tactical nuclear warning," "enlarged sanctuarization," and fighting a "tactical nuclear
battle" were all manifestations of French leaders' efforts to render their nuclear posture
both dissuasive and useable. Besides improving nuclear deterrence, the other priority of
political leaders was strengthening France's alliance relationships within a broader
framework of national strategic autonomy.
Next to the primacy of political factors, changes in military technology played a
minor role in French doctrinal developments. In de Gaulle's "two battles" doctrine, tacti-
cal and strategic nuclear weapons played an enabling role. Amongst Giscard's many doc-
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trinal reforms, technology was only critical to the change in strategic nuclear war plans.
The accuracy of French silo-based IRBMs and the invulnerability of its ballistic missile
submarines made it possible for France to adopt a strategy of first targeting Soviet com-
mand-and-control facilities in any escalation to strategic nuclear warfare. Finally, heli-
copters and anti-tank missiles played an important role in the FAR concept under the Mit-
terrand administration.
If military doctrines exploited technological developments in the above cases,
French leaders persisted in supporting military doctrines despite significant technical ob-
stacles to their functioning properly. With the exception of Giscard's administration,
French leaders accepted the technically unworkable notions of a tactical nuclear "warning
shot" and "single salvo." Likewise, Mitterrand and Hernu foisted the FAR on the armed
forces despite strong military reservations concerning the ability of helicopter forces,
light armor and paratroopers to face Soviet tanks and artillery. With both tactical nuclear
weapons and the FAR, the failure of French doctrines during military exercises did not
convince political leaders to revise them. Thus, although political leaders were willing to
instrumentalize military technology when it served their diplomatic purposes, they were
also prone to ignore inconvenient technological realities. While technology had an am-
bivalent impact, sometimes contributing to change and often being disregarded, changing
perceptions of enemy capabilities rarely had any influence on French doctrine.
Although political leaders dominated the French doctrinal process, professional
officers played a critical role in formulating alternatives and implementing changes. Al-
most every French doctrine was connected with one or more high ranking officers. How-
ever, the ability of military professionals to enact change was determined by the support
they received from political leaders. Using France's parallel staffs and chains of com-
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mand, political leaders empowered military commanders whose ideas they appreciated to
serve as agents of change. By way of contrast, political leaders circumvented and mar-
ginalized military commanders they disagreed with. Thus, the military officers associ-
ated with a new doctrine are not necessarily those the most logically placed in the hierar-
chy. Under Giscard it was initially the head of the President's Military Staff (Mdry)
rather than the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Frangois Morin) who spearheaded the
reform process. Even worse, the military officers most closely associated with Mitter-
rand's reforms, Generals Fricaud-Chagnaud and de Berry, held important commands, but
were not institutionally well placed to support reform. In sum, political primacy and
military participation in the French doctrinal process are reconciled by political leaders'
ability to choose their military interlocutors from a broad range of potential candidates.
When political leaders were unsatisfied with the analyses advanced by their mili-
tary advisors, they had recourse to think-tanks to evaluate ideas and articulate reform.
During the de Gaulle administration, the CPE played a critical role in developing France's
"two battles" doctrine. Later, GROUPES played an important advisory function during
the early phases of the FAR's elaboration. Although discreet, the CGA also contributed
to reform through the constant threat of monitoring and an audit that it exercised on mili-
tary commanders.
The downside of the political control of French military doctrine is that the resul-
tant doctrines frequently embodied controversial tactical, operational and technological
suppositions. The "two battles" doctrine fractioned France's limited ground forces into
two battle forces, rather than concentrating them for greater military efficiency. Both the
"two battles" doctrine and its successor also embodied the militarily dubious concept of
the tactical nuclear "warning shot" condensed into a single salvo. Later, Mitterrand's
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FAR was based on the dangerous premise that light armored, helicopter and airborne
forces could halt Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions.
In sum, the institutional structures of French defense policymaking empowered
political leaders to craft doctrines that advanced their foreign policy objectives. With
multiple options at their disposal, political decision-makers empowered selected military
staffs and think-tanks to implement their desiderata. Political leaders used these institu-
tions to develop doctrines that strengthened the credibility of French nuclear deterrence
and demonstrated its commitment to European allies. The downside of this process was
that political leaders lacked adequate understanding of technical military realities and
frequently approved doctrines that failed to take them into account. French doctrine was,
therefore, a faithful translation of the state's foreign policy into military plans and proce-
dures. However, it remains questionable how well French doctrine would performed in
the event of war.
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opments, like a momentarily dormant volcano." Mdry, "R6flexions sur le concept
d'emploi des forces," 19.
102 This decision followed a reduction in France's order for tracked armored per-
sonnel carriers from 4,800 AMX lOPs to 2,400. In the long term, it was planned to equip
the motorized brigades with wheeled armored personnel carriers that would have the en-
vironmental protection if not mobility of their tracked counterparts. Design studies began
on wheeled armored personnel carriers in 1969, but the resultant Vehicule d'Avant
Blind6e (VAB) did not enter service until 1978. See R.M. Ogorkiewicz, "Renault
Wheeled Armoured Vehicles," International Defense Review 5 (1980): 723-27; and de
Lespinois, 109, 128-32.
103 Worse, after being raised in 1972, conscripts still received a monthly salary of
only 37.5 francs, which was well below the French minimum wage. If they renounced
their tobacco ration, soldiers received 41.2 francs per month. See de Lespinois, 122.
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104 According to French analyses, NATO's weakness in Northern Germany was
growing in relative terms. In a 1974 article, written just after he retired as commander of
the French First Army, General Valentin stated that Western Europe required enough
forces that the Warsaw Pact could not "without fighting a veritable battle, advance for-
wards [through NATO's defenses] as through a sieve." Valentin pleaded that the French
Army "needs more 30-ton [medium] tanks and to accelerate the modernization of equip-
ment, which has been too slow."
In Valentin's overall analysis, he viewed the West Germans as well armed and
organized, the Dutch and Belgians as irresponsibly weakening their military forces, and
the British as maintaining adequate, but unmaneuverable forces. On the other hand,
Valentin viewed the Warsaw Pact's military preparedness as rising. See Frangois Valen-
tin, "l'Europe de l'Ouest et la ddfense," Difense nationale 30 (August - September
1974): 35.
105 VaYsse, "Valdry Giscard d'Estaing: de la ddfense de l'Europe a la ddfense eu-
ropdenne," 7.
106 General Jean Callet, a recent (1972-74) director of IHEDN, observed, "With-
out employing tactical nuclear weapons almost immediately, our battle force [the ar-
mored and mechanized units] cannot fight conventionally for any duration without suffer-
ing attrition such that it will be unable to counterattack, when they will finally be able to
use tactical nuclear weapons.... The present head of state [Giscard] has stated unequivo-
cally that in making this later decision [to use tactical nuclear weapons] he will take into
consideration political factors related to crisis management rather than punctual military
imperatives. It follows that our battle force, actually prepared for the immediate exploita-
tion of atomic strikes, must be seriously reinforced with infantry, artillery and combat
engineers, if we want to give it the capacity to fight for as long as necessary." Jean Cal-
let, Ligitime difense (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1976), 109.
107 The creation of soldiers' committees was the culminating point of the French
Army's crisis in morale. The French Army's crisis during the early 1970s was a complex
phenomenon. Poor conditions within the army and the arrival of conscripts who had par-
ticipated in or were sympathetic to the student protests of May 1968 led to protests and
disobedience. Giscard's government responded to the crisis with a variety of measures,
including wage increases, guaranteed leave periods once a month (along with train tickets
for conscripts to return home) and a new command style developed by sociologists (Proc-
ess des Missions Globales or PMG). Retired General Marcel Bigeard, of Indochina and
Algeria fame, was appointed Secretary of State for Defense with the specific mandate of
combating the morale crisis. For a complete treatment of the morale crisis, see de Lespi-
nois, L'Armie de terrefrangais: de la difense d' la projection, vol. 1.
108 The Law raised the amount devoted to ground forces from 15-16 percent be-
tween 1960-1979 to 23-26 percent of defense procurement expenditures in 1976. Be-
cause the defense budget itself expanded at an annual rate of approximately 2.7 percent
(in terms of real expenditures adjusted for inflation), the Army's equipment situation im-
proved dramatically. French ground forces benefited from 15 of a total of 36 acquisition
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programs. This augmentation of the French defense budget occurred within an overall
transatlantic context. NATO's Defense Planning Committee recommended in May 1977
that member states should augment their real (inflation adjusted) defense expenditures by
3 percent annually until 1984. French figures reveal annual average increases of 3.3 per-
cent. However, British General Hugh Beach estimated French augmentations for 1975-
83 at 2.3 percent per year (compared with 6 percent for the United States, 2.2 percent for
the United Kingdom, and less than 2 percent for West Germany, Denmark and Belgium.
The acquisition programs ground forces benefited from included: AMX-30B2 tanks,
AMX-10RC armored cars, VAB APCs, Milan and HOT anti-tank missiles, Roland anti-
aircraft missiles, the RITA communications system, Gazelle helicopters, towed and self-
propelled 155mm artillery systems, 120mm mortars, FAMAS assault rifles and a host of
wheeled vehicles (trucks and jeeps). de Lespinois, L'Armie de terrefrangais: de la di-
fense a la projection, vol. 1, 258-72.
109 The DOT's mission was unclear and its human and material resources derisory.
Reservists were 70 percent of the DOT, versus 30 percent for the First Army. Because of
the minor importance accorded their mission and of budgetary austerity, France's territo-
rial forces came to be viewed as increasingly irrelevant. According to General Callet,
"the DOT's officers and non-commissioned officers have the painful impression of being
relegated to a second-class army - the 'territorial' - whose utility, if not its value, is con-
tested."
The Chief of Staff of the Armies, General Frangois Maurin (Mdry's predecessor),
argued publicly in 1974 that the DOT's mission was counterproductive. According to
Maurin, "If an aggressor is willing to accept the risk of a strategic [nuclear] riposte and
invade [French] national territory, he will have to also weigh the costs of a potentially
stubborn [guerrilla] resistance. But this factor will weigh little in his calculations com-
pared to the nuclear risk that he has already accepted."
By renaming the DOT, Lagarde hoped to eliminate the stigma attached to them.
By way of a public explanation for his semantic reform, Lagarde stated that "It was nec-
essary to render our forces more homogenous by ending the distinction between different
categories of forces, so that all of them can, in any circumstances, stand up to any threat,
without any prior change than to their level of equipment." Jean Lagarde, "Armde de
terre: ses missions," Armi'es d'aujourd'hui (June 1976): 9; Callet, 110; and Maurin, "En-
tretien avec le g6ndral Maurin," Difense nationale (July 1974): 12-13.
110 One variant of this scenario consisted of Warsaw Pact armored forces entering
France's Massif Central after violating Austrian and Swiss neutrality. Exercise Gentiane
23 of 1978 saw the 27 Alpine Divisions practice destroying an enemy force parachuted
into the Maurienne Valley. Exercise Allier of 1979 involved 9,000 men and 2,000 vehi-
cles with the mission of defeating enemy paratroops and commandos. Exercise Extentia,
also of 1979, was the largest military exercise conducted in France since 1945. It in-
volved 17,300 men, 2,600 vehicles and 19 warships in a simulated counteroffensive
against Soviet marines landed in the Vendde (in the Bay of Biscay). The next year, Exer-
cise Kemmel saw the 14 h Infantry Division simulate a counteroffensive in a mountainous
region against enemy armor and paratroops.
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Although the Soviet Union had seven paratroop divisions, it lacked the transport
aircraft to use all these forces and Central France was an unlikely objective for them.
Soviet airborne forces suffered from the perennial handicap of airborne forces, namely
that they had poor mobility and relatively little firepower once they would have landed.
In the context of landing in Central France, a Soviet airborne force would quickly find
itself stranded, unless it was dropped on a priority objective, such as France's IRBM field
on the Plateau of Albion. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union possessed only enough transport
aircraft - civil and military combined - to drop a single airborne division with all of its
equipment. Many more likely objectives existed for this limited airlift force than installa-
tions in the French interior.
Amphibious landings and armored thrusts through Austria and Switzerland were
even less likely, owing to NATO's maritime superiority in the former case and moun-
tainous geography in the latter case. As General Forget observed, "These exercises cer-
tainly provided excellent training.... We must wonder however whether such exercises
corresponded to realistic hypotheses." See de Lespinois, 315-17; Steven Zaloga, Inside
the Blue Berets: A Combat History of Soviet and Russian Airborne Forces (Novato, Cali-
fornia: Presidio, 1995), 153-171; David Isby, Ten Million Bayonets: Inside the Armies of
the Soviet Union (London: Arms and Armour, 1988), 56; and Forget, Notre difense dans
un monde en crise: de 1960 d' nos jours, 63.
m If the Warsaw Pact attacked by surprise, without mobilizing beforehand, there
was a good chance they could rupture NORTHAG's front with little difficulty. Surprise
attack became a particular theme during the 1970s. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War proved
that military surprise was possible against even a first-rate army possessing an excellent
intelligence service. In 1975, the British Military Liaison Mission (BRIXMIS) witnessed
the Soviet Guards 25th Tank Division scramble, exit its peacetime barracks and reach its
designated wartime deployment zone in 12 hours. For this exercise, the Soviets used
telephone lines only, and therefore produced none of the tell-tale radio traffic that would
warn NATO of a Soviet offensive. This incident increased fears of surprise attack. Al-
though little is known of classified French threat analyses after 1970, it is known that a
French 1984 study highlighted the danger of a surprise attack without mobilization. A
book a Belgian general wrote in 1977 alerted French defense policymakers to precisely
this danger, warning that the Soviet Army could reach the Rhine in 48 hours. See Yves le
Chatelier, "La surprise du Yom Kippour," Forces armies frangaises (May 1974): 15-19;
Richard Aldrich, "Intelligence within NATO," (unpublished manuscript, 2007); Maurice
Faivre, "Le rensignement militaire frangais (1970-1985) dans le cadre de l'OTAN," 43-
45; and General Close, Europe sans defense? (Brussels: Arts et Voyages, 1977).
112 Ibid.
113 These were the 14th and 15th infantry divisions and the 27 alpine division.
Only one exercise conducted during this period showed any intention to prepare for the
use of these three comparatively weak divisions to fight the heavy tank and motorized
rifle divisions of the Warsaw Pact. In 1980, the 9 9 th Infantry Regiment of the 14 th Infan-
try Division advanced from Central France to Bavaria to participate in exercise Black
Falcon alongside the West German Army. Lacking modern weaponry, the remaining
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three divisions remained equipped with light or obsolete weapons, with one infantry divi-
sion lacking any artillery whatsoever. de Lespinois, L'Armie de terrefrangais: de la
defense a la projection, vol. 1, 244, 313.
114 One exercise, Exercise Meuse 81 (1st Corps), evaluated a novel scenario - the
French 1 't Corps counterattacking westwards against Warsaw Pact forces that had infil-
trated North-East France, westwards of the 1s' Corps bases. While the scenarios of most
large-scale maneuvers remained simple, that of Meuse 81 was fairly complex and is the
only manifestation, to my knowledge, of the 1" Corps being given a mission to attack
westwards. de Lespinois, L'Armie de terrefrangais: de la difense d' la projection, vol. 1,
308-10.
115 Typically, the Prime Minister (i.e. the Head of Government) will open the an-
nual session of IHEDN and the President (i.e. the Head of State) will close it.
116 Chirac told his audience that, "We cannot content ourselves with 'sanctuariz-
ing' our own territory, [for security] we have to look beyond our borders." Mdry fol-
lowed Chirac's speech up with one of his own, to the Center for Higher Military Studies
(CHEM) in September 1975, where he expressed the view that "the geographic sphere
that influences us most directly and in which nothing can occur that leaves us indifferent
is Europe and its immediate approaches, notably the Mediterranean basin." Guy Mdry,
"Reflexions sur le concept d'emploi des forces," Difense nationale, 20; and Jacques Chi-
rac, "Au sujet des armes nucldaires tactiques frangaises," Difense nationale (May 1975):
11-15.
117 Guy Mdry, "Une armde: Pourquoi faire et comment?" Difense nationale (June
1976): 14.
118 In his memoirs, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recognized
Giscard's accomplishment in transforming Franco-American relations from near confron-
tation to "a close approximation of genuine partnership." Rynning, 89.
119 Giscard's increased influence vis-a-vis the United States and West Germany
became important when the Euromissile Crisis debuted in 1977 with the deployment of
extremely accurate Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles to Eastern Europe. To forge a common
position, he invited the leaders of the United States, West Germany and the United King-
dom to the French Island of Guadeloupe for a summit, where he influenced the United
States and West Germany to adopt a compromise position. The resultant policy, the so-
called "double decision," whereby American Pershing II and ground-launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs) would be deployed to Western Europe if the Soviet Union did not
withdraw its SS-20 missiles by a specific date, remained the basis of NATO's response to
the Euromissile Crisis until its final resolution in 1987. The SS-20 constituted both a
major strategic and political problem for NATO because of its unique characteristics in
terms of mobility, accuracy and range. Carried and launched from a truck chassis, the
SS-20 was difficult to destroy before it could be launched. Because of its accuracy, the
SS-20 was also capable of destroying a wide-range of NATO military targets. Finally,
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the fact that the SS-20s range permitted it to strike targets throughout Europe, but not the
continental United States, raised the diplomatic problem of maintaining alliance solidarity
under circumstances where Western Europe became more vulnerable due to the SS-20,
while the United States became more secure thanks to the SALT treaties. In the vocabu-
lary of the time, the SS-20 threat was described in terms of either giving the Soviet Union
"escalation dominance" during a war or crisis or "de-coupling" the security of the United
States and its NATO allies. The initial West German response was two-fold. First of all,
the West Germans demanded that the United States modernize its own intermediate-range
nuclear forces in Europe in order to maintain a "Eurostrategic balance". Secondly, West
Germany pressured the United States to render the SALT II Treaty conditional on the
Soviet Union's removal of SS-20s from Europe. United States President Jimmy Carter
viewed the SALT II Treaty as an end in itself. Moreover, American officials were gener-
ally hostile to intermediate-range nuclear weapons, preferring instead to use short-range
nuclear weapons for strikes of a limited geographic depth if NATO's conventional battle
collapsed, while also claiming that, if necessary, American strategic forces could be used
to strike targets in Eastern Europe. Giscard's proposed compromise involved de-
coupling any relationship between Soviet SS-20s and the SALT II negotiations, however
extracting an American commitment to produce and deploy Pershing II missiles and
GLCMs should the Soviet Union not withdraw/dismantle its SS-20s. See Giscard, Le
pouvoir et la vie, 662-82; and Christoph Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear
Strategy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 201-37.
1 Giscard d'Estaing, Le pouvoir et la vie, 527.
m SHAT 3 K 4 Entretien avec le G6ndral Guy M6ry, November 1996.
122 Under these circumstances, the French PS's pre-election rhetoric on security
matters, condemning "enlarged sanctuarization" and emphasizing a strictly national nu-
clear deterrent, aggravated Chancellor Schmidt's problems.
When questioned prior to PS's victory about what he thought of working with
Mitterrand, Schmidt tersely replied, "Frangois Mitterrand elected? Don't talk to me
about such a misfortune." Hubert Vddrine, Les mondes de Frangois Mitterrand: A
l'Elysie, 1981-1995 (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 128.
123 Charles Hernu, Mitterrand's future Defense Minister, vocally criticized Gis-
card's "military Atlanticism," opposed the development of ERWs ("neutron bombs") and
intimated that France should not participate in NATO's forward battle. Another leading
socialist and future defense minister, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, mocked Giscard for
wanting to make France "NATO's teacher's pet." David Yost, "The French Defense De-
bate," Survival (Vol. XXIII, No. 1, January/February 1981): 22; and Philippe Engam-
mare, "Les parties politiques frangais face 'a la bombe atomique: de la clandestiniti au
consensus," Difense nationale (February 1987): 49.
Burdened with a strong pacifist wing, Mitterrand viewed the PS as suffering
from a credibility gap when it came to defense policy. The last clear articulation of a
distinct socialist defense policy remained Jean Jaures' L'Armi'e nouvelle of 1910 (whose
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basic arguments were echoed by the PS's defense commission in 1975) and the Party's
defense policy suffered from its anti-nuclear positions. Faced with these problems, Mit-
terrand tasked the Party's defense expert Charles Hernu with "ridding him of the defense
[political] problem before we make our bid for power." Hernu, for his part, undertook a
long-term effort to convince the PS of the value of nuclear deterrence. This effort bore
fruit in 1978 when the PS officially approved of nuclear deterrence. From 1978 until
Mitterrand's 1981 election, the PS's defense rhetoric was essentially Gaullist. However,
the Socialists scrupulously avoided crediting de Gaulle or taking sides in the ongoing
security debate opposing Giscard's UDR and Jacques Chirac's Gaullist RPR. See Jean
Guisnel, Charles Hernu: ou la Ripublique au couer (Paris: Fayard, 1993), 397-425.
125 Mitterrand, like Giscard, viewed positive Franco-West German bilateral rela-
tions as crucial to European integration and the security of Western Europe. According
to long-time collaborator Roland Dumas, Mitterrand believed that "the future of Europe
demands that the ties binding France and Germany together must be tightened" and fre-
quently cited Victor Hugo's remark that "the Union of France and Germany will bring
peace to the world." Roland Dumas, Affaires itrangeres, 1: 1981-1988 (Paris: Fayard,
2007), 143.
126 Mitterrand's foreign and security advisors are unanimous in pointing to the Eu-
romissile Crisis as the most pressing foreign policy challenging facing Mitterrand upon
his election. The Euromissile Crisis crystallized a series of tense dynamics, between
West Germany and the United States within NATO, between the United States and the
Soviet Union on the international arena, between Atlanticists and a growing peace
movement within West Germany, and between the France and West Germany. See Ve-
drine, 93-130; and Dumas.
127 West Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) broke with West Germany's
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, himself a social democrat, over the planned deployment of
Pershing Hs and GLCMs. The shift of West Germany's dominant political party to a
position of open hostility to new nuclear deployments and increasing diffidence vis-a-vis
the United States raised the specter of West Germany's gradual shift to neutralism. Un-
der these circumstances, the French PS's pre-election rhetoric on security matters, con-
demning "enlarged sanctuarization" and emphasizing a strictly national nuclear deterrent,
aggravated Chancellor Schmidt's problems. When questioned prior to PS's victory about
what he thought of working with Mitterrand, Schmidt tersely replied, "Frangois Mitter-
rand elected? Don't talk to me about such a misfortune." Hubert V6drine, Les mondes
de Frangois Mitterrand: A l'Elysie, 1981-1995 (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 128.
128 Frangois Heisbourg, a former member of the Socialist Defense Commission
and the Ministry of Defense's Director of Political Affairs under Hernu, "The Mitterrand-
Hernu connection permitted an osmotic or fusional relationship. This relationship was
not only convenient, but clever. It increased Hemu's throw-weight within the system
because everybody knew that if Hernu spoke it was the President speaking. Being subor-
dinate and close to the President gave Hernu power." Interview with Frangois Heisbourg,
Paris, July 13, 2004.
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129Guisnel, Charles Hernu: ou la Republique au couer, 397-425.
1 Reflecting on Hernu's appointment, one of his collaborators stated that, "The
socialists at the time knew that they could not afford a problem on the military side and
that there was only one man who could do it.... Mitterrand trusted Hernu to keep things
quiet on the military side and tell him what was going on." Interview with Frangois
Heisbourg, Paris, July 13, 2004.
131 Ideas were canvassed from a wide variety of senior military officers, who
were, with the exception of the CEMP, Giscard-era appointees. Secretary of State for
Defense Georges Lemoine openly admitted that, "The question we are asking is the fol-
lowing: are the current dispositions and organization of the First Army the best adapted to
the two requirements of reinforcing allied forces and providing for the immediate defense
of national territory." In the French political system, secretaries of state are lower ranked
officials than ministers. J6r6me de Lespinois, L'Armie de terrefrangais: de la difense a
la projection, vol. 2 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), 453.
132 Interview with Frangois Heisbourg, Paris, July 13, 2004.
133 Fricaud-Chagnaud had good relations with Delaunay, however Fricaud-
Chagnaud predicted correctly that Delaunay would attempt to block his reform. Guisnel,
Les generaux: Enquete sur le pouvoir militaire en France, 149.
134 Fricaud-Chagnaud concluded this line of reasoning by asserting that his new
doctrine would permit France to concentrate its industrial efforts on producing weapons
where it possessed a comparative technological advantage-notably helicopters and anti-
tank missiles-while abandoning the costly development of new tanks, where "our na-
tional products have never been able to rival those of [West] German industry." de Les-
pinois, L'Armie de terrefrangais: de la difense d la projection, vol. 2, 455.
135
136 The political need for France to visibly possess the capability to participate in
West Germany's forward defense became increasingly evident in Hernu's weekly
lunches with Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson. Vddrine, 49-50.
137 Since 1977, each French army corps benefited from the support of two organic
helicopter regiments with 72 combat helicopters apiece and a light helicopter detachment
with 30 machines. To create the FAR's helicopter division, over 40 percent of the
Army's helicopters (241 of 560) would be reassigned to the new unit, including 70 per-
cent of the Army's anti-tank helicopters (90 of 127). Ibid., 459-61.
138 The French Army had a long tradition of using wheeled armored vehicles.
However, the most widespread members of France's previous generation of armored cars
could not have been employed in Western Europe, where they would have faced Soviet
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armor. The AML was a light armored car (4 tons) that was originally developed during
the Algerian War (1954-62) for counterinsurgency operations. After the end of the Alge-
rian War, production of the AML continued and it was used to equip territorial defense
and intervention forces. The AML's lack of firepower and sophistication meant that the
French Army never intended to employ them on NATO's Central Front. The AMX-
10RC entered service in 1979. It was France's first armored vehicle equipped with a la-
ser range finder, which gave it a comparatively high first-hit probability against enemy
tanks. However, the shaped charge warheads it employed would not have been able to
penetrate the explosive reactive armor (ERA) that Soviet T-72 tanks began carrying at the
time-period and the low velocity of the AMX-10RC's cannon placed the vehicle at a
comparative disadvantage in a long-range gunnery dual with T-62s, T-64s or T-72s. At
the time of the AMX-1ORC's introduction, the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG)
was largely equipped with modern T-64s and T-72s, but many Warsaw Pact allies and
second echelon Soviet forces remained equipped with the T-55. Le Chatellier was care-
ful to add that the AMX-ORC was not designed to combat enemy tanks, but as an ar-
mored reconnaissance vehicle. Interview with General Yves le Chatellier, Paris, May 12,
2004; and Stdphan Ferrard, Engins blindisfrangais: Cent ans d'histoire (Paris: EPA,
1996), 112-14, 122-24.
139 The AML was a light armored car (4 tons) that was originally developed dur-
ing the Algerian War (1954-62) for counterinsurgency operations. After the end of the
Algerian War, production of the AML continued and it was used to equip territorial de-
fense and intervention forces. The AML's lack of firepower and sophistication meant
that the French Army never intended to employ on NATO's Central Front. The AMX-
10RC entered service in 1979. It was France's first armored vehicle equipped with a la-
ser range finder, which gave it a comparatively high first-hit probability against enemy
tanks. However, the shaped charge warheads it employed would not have been able to
penetrate the explosive reactive armor (ERA) that Soviet T-72 tanks began carrying at the
time-period and the low velocity of the AMX-1ORC's cannon placed the vehicle at a
comparative disadvantage in a long-range gunnery dual with T-62s, T-64s or T-72s. At
the time of the AMX-ORC's introduction, the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG)
was largely equipped with modem T-64s and T-72s, but many Warsaw Pact allies and
second echelon Soviet forces remained equipped with the T-55. Le Chatellier was care-
ful to add that the AMX-1ORC was not designed to combat enemy tanks, but as an ar-
mored reconnaissance vehicle. Interview with General Yves le Chatellier, Paris, May 12,
2004; and Stdphan Ferrard, Engins blindisfrangais: Cent ans d'histoire (Paris: EPA,
1996), 112-14, 122-24.
140 General Maurice Schmitt, who was a paratroop officer and First Army chief of
staff between 1978 and 1981, suggested at several meetings at a NATO conference at
Bruunssum that the 1 1 th DP could act as the First Army's rapid reaction force. Fricaud-
Chagnaud was present at many of these meetings in his capacity as France's representa-
tive to CINCENT. This may explain how the idea of including the 11 t DP in a rapid
deployment force was transmitted to Hernu' s cabinet.
In 1981, the Army experimented in dropping French paratroops to mount a hasty
anti-tank defense during the Meuse 81 exercise. The employment of paratroops was
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judged problematic after the exercise. Although quickly deployed to their positions, the
paratroops remained basically stationary thereafter because of their dearth of wheeled
vehicles. Moreover, when the exercise provided for an NBC environment, the light and
encumbering equipment of paratroops was judged inadequate. De Lespinois, L'Armie de
terrefrangais: de la d fense a la projection, vol. 1, 309; and Rynning 110-11.
141 General Maurice Schmidt, a future Chief of Staff of Ground Forces (CEMAT)
opined that "The attachment of the alpine to the FAR [Force d'Action Rapide or Rapid
Action Force] was of doubtful utility." Maurice Schmidt, De Dien Bien Phu a Kowert
City (Paris: Grasset, 1992), 148.
142 SHAT 3 K 3 General Francois Gerin-Roze, Paris, October 10, 1996.
143 Guisnel, Les generaux: Enquete sur le pouvoir militaire en France, 150.
144 Under the new socialist government, the CPE was renamed in 1982. Ibid.,
150-51.
145 The GROUPES study was never published, but journalist Jean Guisnel re-
ceived access to it. Guisnel, Les giniraux: Enquete sur le pouvoir militaire en France,
151.
146 Ibid., 152.
147 de Lespinois, L'Armeie de terrefrangais: de la difense a' la projection, vol. 2,
457.
148 Guisnel, Les generaux: Enquete sur le pouvoir militaire en France, 152.
149 Interview with General Jean Delaunay, Versailles, June 15, 2004.
150 SIRPA Actualiti (No. 147, January 6, 1983).
151 Guisnel, Charles Hernu: ou la Republique au couer, 464.
12 Interview with Frangois Heisbourg, Paris, July 13, 2004.
153 Guisnel, Les generaux: Enquete sur le pouvoir militaire en France, 156.
154 Ibid., 157.
155 de Lespinois, L'Armie de terrefrangais: de la difense d la projection, vol. 2,
459.
156 On 15 November 1983, Hernu took advantage of his annual speech at the
IHEDN to announce his intention to create the FAR. After stating the specific composi-
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tion of the FAR, five divisions with 47,000 men, and emphasizing the flexibility with
which it could be employed, Hernu returned to the diplomatic theme that had provided
the impulse for the FAR's creation-France's strategic relationship with West Germany.
According to Hernu, "As soon as France has decided to employ the FAR, our closest
neighbors will benefit from a precious reinforcement. This is particularly true for the
Federal Republic of Germany, with which France is tied by the Elysee Treaty and the two
of which [France and West Germany] constitute an 'alliance within the alliance."'
Charles Hernu, "Discours devant l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale," in
La politique de defense de la France: textes et documents, 268.
157 The United States had operated airmobile divisions since the 1960s. However,
the American concept of airmobile warfare differed from its French counterpart. Ameri-
can airmobile divisions were essentially light infantry divisions that used helicopters for
transport. The French 4th DAM was, by contrast, a division whose offensive power re-
sided in helicopters armed with either HOT anti-tank missiles or automatic 20mm can-
nons. The 4 DAM possessed only a single regiment of infantry, the 1st RI, specialized
in helicopter deployment and anti-tank warfare.
158 Only 134 Milan launchers were delivered to the French Army after 1982 and
the actual percentage of France's Milan's in the FAR probably exceeded one-third. Al-
though 1,257 Milan launchers in total were delivered to the French Army, some of these
were withdrawn from Army service and sold to states in the Persian Gulf, to meet urgent
orders for anti-tank weapons. It is likely that no more than 1,000 Milan launchers ever
served in the French Army at a given time. See de Lespinois, L'Armi'e de terrefrangais:
de la difense d' la projection, vol. 1, 260-61; and de Lespinois, L'Armee de terrefrangais:
de la difense d' la projection, vol. 2, 463.
159 Interview with General Jean Delaunay, Versailles, June 15, 2004.
160 SHAT 3 K 3 General Francois Gerin-Roze, Paris, October 10, 1996.
161 Ibid.
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Chapter IV:
British Military Doctrine in the Cold War
I. Introduction:
As discussed in the previous chapter, military doctrine can be broadly defined as
how military power will contribute to accomplishing a state's foreign policy objectives
through actual or threatened use of force.' Its creation involves the interaction of a state's
political leadership and its military high command. In principle, political leaders are
responsible for establishing the foreign policy ends a state will pursue and the means
available for the armed forces to do so, while armed forces are accountable for
conducting battles and engagements that may result from a foreign policy interest. In
practice, the formulation of military doctrine involves a range of issues that straddle the
boundaries of civilian and military competence. Questions such as how offensive or
defensive a military doctrine should be, what constraints allied or neutral states should
impose on war plans, and how tactical nuclear weapons should be used have military and
political components.
Certain authors argue that doctrine is best produced when political leaders are
involved with the entire process, ensuring that a military tool is forged to accomplish
political ends. Others maintain that political leaders should be content with broadly
determining the political ends the armed forces will pursue and the military means the
state will provide, that determining how military forces will fight is best left to the high
command of armed forces.2 As we have seen, the formulation of French military doctrine
corresponds to the former model.
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This chapter addresses four propositions about the creation of military doctrine in
the United Kingdom. First, unlike France, the institutional process of British defense
policymaking enables its armed forces to develop military doctrine internally. If this is
true, changes in British military doctrine should be prompted by perceived shifts in the
military balance and officers' perceptions of opportunities and constraints presented by
new technology.3 Because military organizations tend to prefer offensive to defensive
doctrines, British military doctrine should reflect an offensive bias insofar as the armed
forces control the processes by which doctrine is formed.4 Also, if primarily developed
within the armed forces, one would predict that the resultant doctrines would be less
closely coordinated with foreign policies than in states where elected leaders have a more
direct impact on military doctrine. The cases used to test these hypotheses in this chapter
are drawn from the British Army's changing views of how it would contribute to the
defense of Central Europe against a Warsaw Pact invasion from 1958 until 1989.
Contrary to France, the institutional process for defense policymaking in the
United Kingdom evolved in an environment where the armed forces were viewed as
loyal, capable and responsive to political needs. Because the state's elected leaders did
not view the army as a problematic partner, successive governments never felt a need to
reduce the autonomy of the armed forces and "reassert" civilian primacy over defense
policy. Changes in the institutional structure for forming British doctrine have been the
evolutionary product of functional imperatives. Although crucial reforms have been
introduced since the Second World War, the basic division of authority between political
and military authorities has not changed.5
Fundamentally, the institutional process by which military doctrine is formed
involves clear hierarchic roles and divisions of authority as to which individuals and
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institutions are authorized to make decisions. By delimiting political and military
domains, the institutional structure for creating British military doctrine matches
Huntington's definition of "objective political control" over the armed forces. At the
uppermost level is the Cabinet, which establishes the ends and means of British defense
policy. Critical issues about the United Kingdom's overall foreign policy, alliances and
defense commitments are addressed in the Cabinet's Defense and Overseas Policy
Committee, known as the DOP. Although participation in the DOP fluctuates according
to the issue discussed, the Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign,
Defense and Commonwealth Ministers are regular attendees. When military input is
needed, the chiefs of staff are invited to participate.
If the ends of British defense policy are determined at the DOP, the means are
defined during the recurring Public Expenditure Review. Annually, the Minister of
Defense argues with his Cabinet colleagues for the Ministry to receive a percentage of the
national budget. Although the chiefs of staff of the armed forces assist the Minister of
Defense in preparing his arguments for the Review, the high command of the armed
forces is not represented at this level. At the ministerial level, the essence of British
defense policymaking revolves around reconciling resources to the United Kingdom's
international interests.6
The detailed allocation of resources for the military objectives is determined
within the Ministry of Defense through a process of bargaining among the Chiefs of Staff
of the armed services and other related bodies. Since much of this discussion occurs
within the Chiefs of Staff Committee, where the Minister of Defense is not a member or
generally in attendance (unlike France where the Minister presides over the Committee),
it is a process dominated by the professional heads of the armed services.7 Financial
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undertakings agreed upon at the Chief of Staff Committee are inscribed in the Ministry's
Long-Term Costing, in which all commitments are planned on a 10-year basis, with
detailed and relatively firm provisions made on a rolling three-year cycle.8 Under most
circumstances, this process results in a seldom-changing division of funds between the
services, occurring in an orderly, collegial atmosphere.9 However, when the chasm
between the demands of the individual armed services and the resources allocated is
great, inter-service rivalry becomes bitter and unconstrained. When the Chiefs of Staff
cannot agree how to divide the defense budget, the Minister of Defense plays a more
active role, and if the Chiefs collectively oppose the Minister of Defense's solution, they
may demand an audience with the Prime Minister.
Once the division of resources has been agreed upon, each service remains
essentially autonomous to determine how it will structure its resources to meet the foreign
policy goals and obligations established by the Cabinet. At the apex of the British Army
lies the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), who administers the army along with its
educational establishments. Under the CGS lie the administrative heads of combat arms:
the infantry, artillery, armored corps and engineers. Normally within each combat arm,
tactical doctrine is compiled into manuals.' 0 Although during the Cold War the Army's
combat arms produced their own tactical manuals under the aegis of the CGS, these had a
limited impact on units in the field. Because of a culture of improvisation to meet the
demands of the theaters and a general belief that tactics were best left to operational
commanders, doctrine centrally produced under the CGS had a limited impact on combat
units. In General John Kiszely's words:
The British Army has a strong antipathy for doctrine.... To most officers
there was no such thing as 'doctrine', only 'pamphlets'-and they were, at
best, a basis for discussion and for quoting in promotion exams. Instead
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there was an ethos - a generally accepted way of approaching matters -
which viewed tactics as being the opinion of the senior officer present: an
agreeable state of affairs (for the senior officer, at least).11
For the defense of Central Europe, the commander of the British Army of the
Rhine (BAOR) held the position of commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's (NATO) Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). Commanding a multi-
national army group of British, Dutch, Belgian and West German army corps, he
coordinated the defense of the northern half of NATO's border with the Warsaw Pact,
including synchronizing the defensive plans of the national army corps under his
command. To this end, he established "lines of contact" beyond which they should not
retreat without permission. To counter a breakthrough of the front, the commander of
BAOR/ NORTHAG also controlled NORTHAG's operational reserve, which until the
1980s consisted of one armored division. In addition, in peacetime the commander of
BAOR/NORTHAG controlled the British Allied Liaison Mission (BRIXMIS) with the
Soviet forces in East Germany, and as such had a central role in disseminating
information on the capabilities and practices of Soviet forces to corps commanders under
his authority. 12
Under the commander of BAOR/NORTHAG, the commander of the 1st British
Corps controlled the United Kingdom's largest single permanent combat formation,
approximately 55,000 soldiers in peacetime and potentially twice as many in war.
Throughout the period in question, the commander the 1 't British Corps was responsible
for plans to defend a 65-mile sector (north to south) of West Germany against a Warsaw
Pact assault. In principal, he developed and modified the General Deployment Plan
(GDP), which identified where particular British units would deploy in the event of
hostilities. Although not necessarily laying out the tactics they were to use, the GDP set
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the tenor for how the defensive battle would be fought in the British sector of NATO's
defense, including determining the percentage of the Corps' divisions that would be
committed to a forward battle and what would remain in reserve. Because the
commander of 1 't British Corps controlled the United Kingdom's heavy armored and
mechanized divisions, he could shape their organizational structure. However,
reorganization of armored and mechanized divisions needed approval from the Chief of
the General Staff (CGS), which meant that reforming or restructuring them involved
major consultation between the commander of the 1st British Corps and the CGS.14
Beneath the commander of the 1 't British Corps were the commanders of the
Corps' three or four divisions. Divisional commanders were usually accorded a wide
margin of autonomy to determine tactics. It was not uncommon for British divisional
commanders to decide to defend "their" particular sectors in ways that contravened the
logic of the GDP.15 Below the division, the commanders of brigades constituted the final,
lowest echelon in the creation of doctrine. Commanding the smallest operational
combined arms formations, British brigadiers frequently developed unique tactical
solutions for how their unit would fulfill its role. As with divisional commanders, their
solutions were sometimes innovative and broke with the general concepts of their
superiors.
As an ensemble, the institutional process for creating British military doctrine
during this time is multi-level and hierarchal, with each echelon having a specific area of
responsibility and no single individual or body having global authority for military
doctrine. Rather, seven layers of authority contribute, each forming procedures for using
the means they possess to fulfill the missions established by the next highest element.
Table I illustrates this structure.
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Table I.
Seven Levels of Actors and Roles in the Creation
of Military Doctrine for British Land Forces
in Central Europe
political level 4444 Cabinet P P P P
V V
V V
V V determine the
Level 1 Defence and Overseas Public Expenditure means and ends
Policy Committee Review of defense policy
V V
V V
V V
political/military v V establish division
level o o o o Chiefs of Staff 4444 of resources
Committee & allocated to
Level 2 Ministry of Defence different ends
V
V
V
military level V
Chief of the General
Staff
V
V
V
V
Commander British Army
of the Rhine
V
V
V
V
Commander British I" Corps
V
Division Commanders
V
V
V
V
Brigade Commanders
administer the
Army and its
educational and
research
institutions
controls intelligence
assets, operational
planning and army
group reserves
determine the
General Defense
Plan for British
forces in Germany
determine tactical
practices of unit
The institutional structure for creating British military doctrine imposes
evolutionary change, limiting the ability of political leaders to influence how British
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Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Level 6
Level 7
armed forces will conduct their missions.16 The capability of an innovative CGS to effect
fundamental reform is likewise constrained by the autonomy of subordinates and by the
CGS' responsibilities in inter-service bargaining over resources for all the services. What
the British system lacks in potential for top-down reform is compensated for by the
development of new concepts from the bottom-up. Commanders at various levels can
advance and experiment with ideas for executing missions entrusted to them, leading to
an almost constant development of new, distinct tactical solutions. However, the lack of
a centralized organization capable of testing concepts and issuing formal doctrine meant
that changes in how the British Army intended to conduct war occurred gradually, as
promising officers with new ideas were promoted to positions of responsibility or
innovative operational concepts gained currency within the high command.
Because of the many hierarchal echelons involved in formulating military
doctrine, it is frequently difficult to detect exactly where and when a change originates
within the system. New doctrinal concepts were frequently adopted haphazardly at
brigade, divisional or army corps levels before being generalized. Certain reforms
became the subject of internal debate and were tested in war games long before
implementation.
The pages that follow examine how the British Army planned to participate in the
collective defense of Central Europe against a Warsaw Pact invasion. Between 1958 and
1989, British military doctrine for the defense of West Germany underwent four major
and six minor transformations. A major transformation of military doctrine can be
defined as a significant change in an Army's theory of how military force can best be
applied to achieve a political aim, while a minor shift consists of a more modest
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modification of the force structure and war plans by which an Army will enact its theory
of warfare.
The four fundamental shifts in military doctrine experienced by British land
forces in West Germany are: 1) From 1958 until 1964, the Army's plan for the defense
of West Germany depended on a massive tactical nuclear air interdiction campaign
against Warsaw Pact lines of supply from the onset of hostilities. 2) From 1964 to 1971,
this doctrine changed to fighting conventionally as long as possible before resorting to
tactical nuclear weapons, in a strategy in which the Army envisaged drawing advancing
Soviet forces into tactical nuclear "killing zones" where concentrations of Soviet armored
and mechanized units could be annihilated by tactical nuclear rockets and artillery. 3)
From 1971 to 1981, the British Army's theory shifted to a reliance on infantry firing anti-
tank guided missiles and tanks fighting from prepared positions to inflict disproportionate
attrition on attacking Warsaw Pact armored forces. 4) Between 1981 and 1989, the
British Army embraced a doctrine of maneuver warfare, predicated on disrupting a
Warsaw Pact offensive by delivering a concentrated and powerful armored counter-thrust
or counter-offensive shortly after the onset of hostilities.
The British Army's operational concepts underwent five minor shifts between
1971 and 1989; and although the British Army's theory of how to defend West Germany
from 1971 to 1981 was based on inflicting attrition on Soviet armored forces using anti-
tank missiles and tanks fighting from defensive positions, plans to achieve this objective
underwent three changes. Likewise, although the British Army embraced a doctrine of
"maneuver warfare" from 1981 to 1989, based on the notion that the Red Army's highly
centralized and rigidly structured manner of fighting could be defeated by shattering its
moral and physical cohesion rather than attempting to destroy enemy forces physically
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through attrition, the modalities of how maneuver warfare would be executed underwent
two distinct evolutions.
II. The Evolution of a Commitment, 1945-1958
Through historic and geographic accidents, the United Kingdom held the primary
burden for defending West Germany's most exposed sector throughout the Cold War.
Vulnerable terrain, an ample road network and weak allies all rendered the British Army's
task more difficult. The United Kingdom did not seek disproportionate responsibility,
but found itself gradually drawn into this commitment as a result of its Second World
War campaigns and the comparative reluctance of Belgian and Dutch taxpayers to invest
in a strong national defense.
Between 1945 and 1959, a series of policy decisions and compromises led to the
British assuming responsibility for defending a 65 mile wide sector of North Germany
with 55,000 soldiers. By the end of the Second World War, the British 210t Army Group
had become a veteran and well-balanced military force with 15 British divisions under
the leadership of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. In Normandy, Belgium, Arnheim,
the Reichswald and Ruhr, British forces overcame determined and expert resistance on
the part of Nazi Germany's flagging legions.17 Success in battle left the 21't Army Group
occupying much of northwest Europe, including the North German plain, which
constituted the historic route by which Eurasian invaders penetrated Western Europe.' 8
Despite the value of the terrain it held, the United Kingdom rushed to disband its costly
war machine with the advent of peace in Europe. Many units were disbanded and others
sent to police the empire. Only a bare minimum of troops were retained in northern
Europe to garrison regions recently devastating by battle and aerial bombardment.
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In keeping with its new mission, the 2 1"t Army Group's remnants were officially
re-designated the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) on 25 August 1945.19 This change
in name was indicative of the BAOR's capabilities. Whereas the 2 1 't Army Group had
been a combat formation that became operational with the Normandy landings, the
BAOR harkened back to the British garrison force that occupied the Rhineland between
1919 and 1929, and was also named the BAOR.
Because its mission was maintaining internal order, the BAOR was neither
structured nor equipped to defend territory.20 With its army corps headquarters
disbanded, the BAOR could not maneuver or fight effectively. Even worse, reliance on
Hamburg for its supplies meant that the BAOR could be quickly cut off from its sources
of food and ammunition.2 ' The BAOR's deficiencies were of little concern to British
political or military leaders between 1945 and 1948, when crises in the Balkans, Middle
East and Asia appeared graver.
However, the Prague Coup and Berlin blockade of 1948 roused British
policymakers to the danger posed by Soviet forces in Central Europe. Troop reductions
were cancelled and the BAOR was frozen at its existing size.2 3 With 1950 and the
Korean War, British policymakers went further and actually decided to expand the
24BAOR from two to four divisions. However, British initiatives alone could do little to
protect western Europe against a Soviet Army estimated to possess 175 divisions.2 A
larger American commitment to Europe and German, Dutch and Belgian rearmament
would be necessary to meet this threat.26
At NATO's Lisbon Conference, in 1952, the United Kingdom committed itself to
27
deploying nine divisions as part of NATO's broader effort to raise 96 divisions.
However, economic realities led to the abandonment of the Lisbon goals almost as soon
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as they had been agreed to.28 The United Kingdom's presence in Germany therefore
stagnated at the four divisions and 77,000 men present in late-1952.29 With conventional
defense unfeasible, the British chiefs of staff argued that even this presence should be
reduced to provide forces for the brushfire wars in Asia and the Middle East.30 However,
a British presence in continental Europe was necessary for western European states to
accept West Germany's rearmament.3 1 Thus, despite the reticence of military
commanders, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden pledged in 1954 that the United Kingdom
would retain 77,000 men in West Germany for the indefinite future. 32
Thus, the United Kingdom's military commitment to defending northwest Europe
owed itself to alliance politics rather than military calculations. However, the forward
basing of Dutch and British forces and West Germany's rearmament gradually reduced
the territory the British had to defend, such that, by the late 1950s, the BAOR defended
only a quarter the territory it had once controlled. However, the BAOR's vulnerability
remained high despite its defending a sector "only" 65 miles wide. 33
Because British forces were comparatively well equipped, they remained
responsible for the broad, long corridor of flat countryside at the heart of the North
German Plain, recognized as providing the geographical prerequisites needed for the
Soviet Army to launch a massive armored offensive.34 Moreover, an ample road network
made it easy for the Soviet Union to concentrate overwhelming forces against the British
should war erupt.35 With only four divisions available to defend 65 miles of such
premium invasion territory--at a time when one division could comfortably defend four
miles--the BAOR's task was considered impossible. 36
To make matters worse, the Dutch and Belgian forces on either flank of the
British never fulfilled their promises to NATO.37 Economically neither state consented to
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spend as high a percentage of their national wealth on defense as Europe's larger powers
(the United Kingdom, France and West Germany). 38 As a consequence, Belgian and
Dutch forces frequently made due with older equipment and withheld many of their
forces at home, where their upkeep was cheaper. 39 Thus, throughout the Cold War,
British commanders worried lest the Belgian and Dutch forces on their flanks collapse,
and allied leaders feared that NORTHAG constituted NATO's Achilles heel.40
Because efforts at conventional defense appeared foredoomed, the British armed
forces began lobbying in 1955 that the BAOR should be reduced, freeing up forces for
conflicts elsewhere. If conventional defense was impossible, then only a small force was
needed to counter "local infiltration" and serve as a "tripwire" for massive nuclear
retaliation.41 Economic necessity soon with military pragmatism to prompt a
reexamination of the BAOR. In 1957, the growing financial burden of defense prompted
Prime Minister Harold MacMillan to promulgate a series of cost-cutting measures. For
the Army, conscription would end and the Army would shrink from 380,000 to 180,000
personnel. For the United Kingdom to maintain its global commitments with this
reduced force, it had to negotiate a commensurate reduction in the size of the BAOR.
Britain's allies understandably resisted Britain's efforts to reduce its force
commitment and invoked Eden's 1954 pledge to deploy 77,000 personnel indefinitely.42
After acrimonious negotiations, the British government obtained an agreement to reduce
forces to 55,000 in 1958 and 45,000 in 1959. Unfortunately for the British government,
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's ultimatum of 27 November 1958 intervened between
the two planned British troop withdrawals. By threatening the status quo in Berlin,
Khrushchev put the British in a position where further troop withdrawals would be seen
as a sign of weakness. 43 The United Kingdom therefore decided to retain its 55,000
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troops in West Germany for the foreseeable future. Although few could have predicted it
at the time, this became the definitive size of the BAOR for the remainder of the Cold
War.44
Thus, by 1959 the United Kingdom's commitment to western Europe's defense
assumed a character and dimension that would not change until the end of the Cold War.
Driven by evolving political and economic factors, the British commitment had fallen
from 15 divisions in 1945, to two divisions in 1948, before rising to a size of four
divisions in 1952, only to suffer a 29 percent reduction in manpower in 1957 and 1958.
Britain's fluctuating contingent ended up responsible for a 65 mile sector of West
Germany's least defensible terrain. Because of the inadequacy of the means at hand to
defend the designated objective, British military leaders repeatedly argued for reductions
in the BAOR.45 If Europe could not be defended conventionally, then the United
Kingdom should waste a minimum of resources in the attempt. Although British political
leaders listened to their military advisors, alliance politics and unforeseen events, such as
the Prague Coup (1948), Korean War (1950) and Berlin Crisis (1958-61) frustrated their
efforts to withdraw troops. In sum, political factors ensured that the BAOR evolved
independently of a specific military rationale. The force was much too weak to
conventionally defend its sector, yet larger than necessary as a mere tripwire of
constabulary force.
III. A Doctrine for Atomic Defense, 1958-1964
Largely because the British Army's commitment to Central Europe was driven by
the necessity of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance politically rather than a desire to
constitute an effective defense of Western Europe, British military planners embarked
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upon the Cold War without having a clear idea of how NORTHAG or the British 1s
Corps could be employed to accomplish their mission of halting a Soviet invasion.
However, their professional ethic drove British officers to examine how their limited
resources could best be employed in the event of war. Independently of political leaders,
British officers determined that tactical nuclear weapons and conventional defense
practices could be combined decisively. From 1952 to 1958 a military doctrine emerged
combining the conventional defense of river lines with a massive atomic interdiction
campaign against Warsaw Pact supply lines.
When the Korean War sparked Western European rearmament in 1950, American
and British intelligence services evaluated the Soviet conventional threat as comprised of
46170 to 175 divisions. To mount an effective defense against this force, allied military
planners calculated that NATO would have to deploy 96 divisions. In the early 1950s,
conventional wisdom held that an American and Western European division could
defend, at most, a front of six miles. 47 Although allied military planners believed that
NATO's 96 would be outnumbered by the Soviet Union's 175, they calculated that
because a defense is tactically more effective than an attack, NATO could win with these
forces.
Soon, however, the political and economic impossibility of maintaining such large
forces led allied planners to revise their force goals downward. In 1954 NATO had 21
front-line divisions in Central Europe and only 18 by 1956, and the United Kingdom
never possessed more than four to defend a front of 65-miles. Judged by the criteria of
the period, which would have allocated 16 to this frontage, the United Kingdom did not
have nearly enough forces to defend the front allocated it.
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NATO's strategic answer to its deficiency in ground troops was the threat of
massive nuclear retaliation. With their 1952 study on "Defence Policy and Global
Strategy," the British Chiefs of Staff Committee accepted the notion of massive
retaliation before the United States or other NATO allies as a cheap alternative to the
prohibitively costly policy of maintaining conventional forces of the scale needed.48
However, massive retaliation raised another question. If war broke out, what would the
United Kingdom's not inconsiderable forces in Western Europe do? Although too small
to defend their 65-mile sector according to an ideal allotment, the BAOR was a large
military formation comprising 20 percent of the British Army.49 Because the BAOR was
the largest permanent commitment of British Army resources, British officers strove to
make it as effective as possible, rather than to accept the passive role of political tripwire.
From 1949, the British Army struggled to retrain the BAOR for large-scale
conventional warfare.50 Efforts to increase the combat readiness of the BAOR initially
focused on re-learning the tactics and attaining the proficiency that British combat forces
had achieved by the end of the War.5 ' However, the British Army did little to examine
whether the tactics, organizational structures and operational practices inherited from the
War were relevant to the new strategic situation.52 In a war with the Soviet Union, the
British Army would not possess the preponderance in armament or air superiority that it
had enjoyed against the Wehrmacht in the latter stages of the last War. Considering that
the British 1" Corps possessed only three divisions to defend its sector of more than 100
miles, the BAOR would in practice be unable to achieve the force-to-space ratios
rehearsed in training.5 3
The British Army's initial response was to maximize the efficiency of its forces to
fight a comparatively static defensive battle. The Royal Armoured Corps' 1949
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requirement for an extremely heavy tank, which entered service as the Conqueror in
1955, exemplified this trend. Reasoning that better firepower and greater armored
protection would permit British armored forces to withstand the assault of numerically
superior enemy forces, the British Army demanded a tank capable of destroying the
heaviest Soviet tanks at a range of 1,000 meters, the majority of Soviet tanks at 2,500
meters, while remaining immune to point-blank hits from most Soviet tanks.54 Although
powerful, the Conqueror heavy tank was a problematic behemoth. At 66-tons, it was the
third heaviest ever manufactured. Although it accommodated significant armor and the
most powerful tank gun yet fielded, Conqueror was too wide to be transported through
most Western European railway tunnels, too heavy for many bridges and for all but the
most solid roads. By distributing Conqueror-equipped units throughout the BAOR's
armored forces, the British armored forces mobility suffered.56 The British Army
intended to use its limited, heavy forces to mount a static, linear defense of the Rhine
River as long as possible, but the reality of the BAOR's weak force-to-space ratio led the
Commander of the BAOR to report in 1952 that it was unlikely that the Rhine could be
held in the event of war.
Gradually, a military doctrine emerged by 1958 that offered a hope of stopping a
Soviet attack on Western Europe. As early as 1952 the British Chiefs of Staff Committee
predicted that the increasing availability of atomic weapons, especially small ones, would
soon make them available for tactical use against military targets, rather than only
retaliatory strikes on the Soviet homeland. Because the United Kingdom's own nuclear
program was not yet developed enough to provide atomic bombs for both the strategic
deterrent role and tactical use in Europe, the British Chiefs of Staff pressured their
American counterparts to provide NATO with tactical nuclear weapons. In May 1957,
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NATO adopted policy document MC 14/2, which stipulated that limited aggression, short
of a conventional enemy offensive, would be met by conventional forces, while a full-
scale enemy attack would be countered with tactical nuclear weapons. Once the United
States agreed to make tactical nuclear weapons available to NATO allies under a variety
of control mechanisms, the British armed forces quickly enacted a doctrine for using
them to halt a Warsaw Pact invasion.
Initially, the main vectors for delivering American-supplied tactical nuclear
weapons were the Royal Air Force's (RAF) Canberra bombers.58 In 1957, the United
Kingdom began transferring five Canberras squadrons to RAF Germany, the British
component of the 2"n Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF), which itself was the air
counterpart of NORTHAG. 59 The British operational plan for how tactical nuclear
weapons would be used resulted from a compromise between the commanders of
BAOR/NORTHAG and RAF Germany. The moment hostilities began, RAF Germany
would unleash its Canberras to destroy critical Warsaw Pact infrastructure and military
assets in Eastern Europe, with the first priority being enemy nuclear forces. Then,
Canberras would target the enemy's radar network in Eastern Europe to cripple the ability
of enemy air defenses to respond to follow-on strikes. The RAF Canberras would devote
their remaining atomic bombs to obliterating targets whose destruction would impact the
movement of enemy forces: supply depots, railway and bridges.
The commanders of British ground forces in Western Europe expected that a
Warsaw Pact offensive against the British 1" Corps sector would subside once the RAF
cut its supply lines. For this to work, the British 1st Corps needed to retain cohesion and
sustain an unbroken line until the atomic interdiction campaign could bear fruit. The
imperative of holding out conventionally until a lack of supplies halted enemy operations
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militated in favor of defending an obstacle, either the Necker or Rhine Rivers, as far
westwards as possible. However, for the Canberras to hit their targets, RAF Germany
relied on a network of radio navigation aids deployed further eastwards, between the
Necker and Weser Rivers. The RAF argued that the 1't British Corps had to halt the
enemy at the Weser until the tactical nuclear interdiction campaign was completed.
The compromise agreed upon by the British 1st Corps and RAF Germany was that
British land forces would defend at the Weser until Soviet pressure forced them to
withdraw further back. At a minimum, it was hoped that British forces would be able to
hold the Weser for 48 hours. If RAF Germany began its nuclear interdiction campaign
immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities-a decision that depended on the permission
of the United States President and the British Prime Minister-two days was judged
sufficient for RAF Germany to destroy its targets in Eastern Europe.
In its broad outlines, the doctrine of meeting a Soviet offensive by a combination
of an atomic air interdiction campaign and static conventional defense of river lines
dominated British war planning from 1958 to 1964. This plan represented the first
British concept of operations that offered hope of preventing Soviet forces from
overrunning Western Europe, or, at least the British portion of NATO's front. Prior to
this doctrine, British military analyses floundered on the inability of British divisions to
defend the vast fronts assigned to them. By employing the new tactical nuclear weapons,
the British armed forces had a remedy for the disadvantageous force-to-space ratio and
superior Soviet numbers. The 1958 doctrine was innovative in that it employed a new
military tool to achieve a previously unattainable military objective.
In other respects, the 1958 British doctrine was an evolutionary development of
practices. The British 1st Corps' organizational structure and basic tactics of conducting a
261
static attritional defense of river lines remained unchanged. Although the assignment of
Canberra squadrons to RAF Germany was new, the missions flown by these aircraft
changed little. As before, Canberras were tasked with dropping atomic bombs from high
altitudes. The only difference was that instead of attacking targets in the Soviet Union,
they would now attack logistics targets in Eastern Europe. Compared with the United
States Army's contemporaneous adoption of its Pentomic Army concept, designed for
waging tactical nuclear warfare with self-contained battle groups, the British armed
forces' response to the "atomic battlefield" was conservative. Instead of reshaping the
organizational structures and tactics to exploit a new technology, the British armed forces
grafted tactical nuclear weapons onto existing structures and plans.
IV. Atomic Uncertainties, 1964-1970
The new 1958 doctrine became the focus of criticism from the start. British
officers tasked with its execution questioned whether political leaders in the United
Kingdom and the United States would assent to the immediate use of nuclear weapons
and whether their use would succeed in stopping the Warsaw Pact. While doubts rapidly
emerged, it took years for the British Army to develop an alternative doctrine. The
BAOR's next operational concept for combating a Warsaw Pact offensive, which
achieved official status in 1964, involved mounting a conventional defense at the
beginning of a conflict to pressure enemy forces into "killing areas." Once conventional
resistance became impossible, tactical nuclear weapons would be used to annihilate these
concentrated pockets of enemy forces. This change in doctrine was prompted by the
growing influence of a new generation of officers who understood the subtleties of
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nuclear warfare better than their forbearers, whose military experience was heavily
influenced by World War II and imperial policing.
When British military commanders began to question the assumptions underlying
the 1958 military doctrine, they did so discreetly and informally, with a major impetus
coming from the renowned military maverick, Captain Basil Liddell Hart, who had been
a prolific commentator on defense matters since the First World War.60 During the late-
1950s, Hart maintained a correspondence with a number of up-and-coming British
officers and presided over an informal organization known as the Military Commentators
Circle, where political and military thinkers engaged in regular discussion. Two of his
correspondents and occasional participants in the Circle were General John Hackett, then
Commandant of the Royal Military College of Science, and Brigadier Michael Carver,
Director of Plans at the War Office. In the coming years, both attained positions of
influence concerning British doctrine, with Hackett serving as commander of the
BAOR/NORTHAG between 1966 and 1968, and Carver commanding a Brigade in
NORTHAG (1960-1962) before becoming Chief of the General Staff (1971-1973) and
Chief of Defence Staff (1973-1975).61
Within the Commentators' Circle, three broad criticisms emerged about British
and NATO doctrine. First, perhaps the use of nuclear weapons could not be restrained to
the battlefield once initiated or whether any use of tactical nuclear weapons would
escalate to a strategic exchange that would destroy the United Kingdom.62 Secondly,
because the use of tactical nuclear weapons could escalate to a mutually destructive
exchange, Hart and his interlocutors reasoned that the United States' President and the
United Kingdom's Prime Minister would hesitate to authorize their use, and since the
British war plan predicated on immediately launching a tactical nuclear interdiction
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campaign, any delay could be fatal.63 Finally, Hart and his correspondents doubted the
assumption, implicit in British and American military doctrine, that tactical nuclear
weapons strengthened the defense rather than the attacking forces. Previously, Western
planners calculated that attackers must concentrate their forces to break through a
defensive line and that the massed forces preparing for a breakthrough battle offered ideal
targets for tactical nuclear weapons. Hart turned this argument on its head, reasoning
that, if used, tactical nuclear weapons would favor the aggressor. He wrote,
... that limitation [of tactical nuclear weapons] also applies to the
defender-reducing the number of troops that he can safely position in an
area.... The increased dispersion enforced on the defender diminishes the
attacker's need to concentrate-enabling a dispersed attacking force to
infiltrate more easily. And once it had infiltrated into the defender's
position, it exerts the moral effect characteristic of any threat to the
defender's rear, which tends to be largely an effective substitute for
physical weight and effect.64
Developed in publications such as his 1960 book Deterrent or Defense: A Fresh
Look at the West's Military Position, Hart's impact on British military doctrine came
from his personal contact with rising officers.65 But these officers, including Michael
Carver did not accept all of Liddell Hart's ideas, especially his argument that NATO
should unilaterally forsake using tactical nuclear weapons.66 The strategy favored by
them was based on defending conventionally as long as possible before using tactical
nuclear weapons as a last resort.
While the Commentators' Circle attacked the military logic, the tide of
international events soon revealed other flaws in British war plans. Khrushchev's
November 1958 ultimatum, implicitly threatening a new blockade of Berlin, initiated a
frenetic period of military contingency planning that subsided only in late 1962. Until
then British military plans had been based on the Soviet Union initiating hostilities with a
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massive attack on Western Europe. The Berlin Crises raised the possibility that fighting
could erupt from a combination of diplomatic brinkmanship and the threat of force.
Western planners also felt that there could be scenarios where NATO forces would
initiate the use of limited force.
By emphasizing containing fighting at the lowest possible level and combining
military force with diplomatic communications, the military contingency plans elaborated
between 1958 and 1962 differed fundamentally from the British 1st Corps' battle plan.
Whereas the British 1" Corps still planned to initiate a massive atomic air interdiction
campaign from the onset of hostilities, the Berlin contingency plans aimed to "exhaust
the possibility of non-military action first; to exhaust the possibilities of non-nuclear
military intervention before resulting to nuclear weapons; and to avoid threatening Soviet
vital interests such as loss of their satellite empire."68
In this context, the joint staff of American, British and French officers that
elaborated the Berlin contingency plans envisaged the possibility of western allies using
significant force, short of initiating full-scale war, to break a blockade of the city.69
Among the more extreme measures considered was sending a four-division battle group
to fight in Berlin along the line of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn or detonating five
tactical nuclear weapons simultaneously in the upper atmosphere.7 Although allied
planners recognized that brinkmanship could lead to combat between NATO and Warsaw
Pact forces, they hoped that hostilities could be contained short of full-scale war.
Faced with the possibility of hostilities resulting from both sides pursuing limited
objectives, the British Army's plan to use tactical nuclear weapons immediately and
massively was counterproductive. Such disproportionate use of force would provoke the
escalation to the extremes that allied politicians and military planners hoped to avoid. As
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a result of officers' growing doubts, elements in the British Army began to express
discontent with the current doctrine and experiment with alternatives.
In an early challenge to the established doctrine, Lieutenant-General John Cowley
publicly argued in 1959 that the British Army's plan to conduct war with tactical nuclear
weapons was irrational. A year later, Carver used his position as a brigade commander in
BAOR to oppose their immediate use.71 Without openly contradicting official doctrine,
he emphasized training for conventional rather than nuclear combat and informed his
subordinate officers that if the Soviet Union attacked, his brigade would attempt "to
oppose, to seal off and to halt enemy action, while every possible step is taken to prevent
it leading to a global exchange." 72 Carver believed that because war could occur by
accident or miscalculation, it was essential to buy time through conventional operations
in the hope that higher political and military leaders would pull the opposing armed
forces from the brink.73
The exigencies of the Berlin Crisis compelled the BAOR leadership to drift in a
similar direction. During the 1961 Spearpoint Exercise, British troops practiced fighting
conventionally for two days before tactical nuclear weapons were finally "used" on the
third. For its organizers, Spearpoint responded to the need for a flexible option in
response to Soviet moves against Berlin, at a time when British doctrine still anticipated
unleashing a sweeping tactical nuclear interdiction campaign within 12 hours of the start
of hostilities.
Following the Berlin Crisis and the first public critiques of early recourse to
tactical nuclear weapons, elements in the British Army spent the next two years debating
doctrinal options. Meanwhile, specialized studies helped clarify some of the underlying
issues. In 1962, the United Kingdom's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) estimated that
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the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces were approaching the point where they could
inflict unacceptable damage on the United States even if the United States struck first.
The JIC concluded, "We only envisage global or limited war between the Soviet Union
and the West coming about through a process of miscalculation."76 This appreciation
placed a premium on avoiding escalation. In a study the following year, the JIC
concluded that mutually assured destruction rendered the threat of American and British
nuclear reprisals against the Soviet Union unconvincing as a response to conventional
aggression. It postulated: "It is now the fear of global war arising through a process of
escalation which constitutes the deterrent to limited aggression, rather than the fear of
immediate, massive retaliation."77
According to the JIC, "Unless the initial tactical use of nuclear weapons had the
desired effect of immediately causing the other side to disengage without retaliation the
risk of escalation to global war would be very high indeed [emphasis added]." 78
Unfortunately, as the Defense Science Advisor went to great pains to emphasize, most
railway centers were located in the middle of heavily populated cities, while ammunition
dumps and tank parks were close to railway centers.79 Thus, using tactical nuclear
weapons to interdict enemy supply lines would obliterate many Warsaw Pact cities.8 0
Unleashing a nuclear response to what could be a limited conventional assault would
therefore push the Soviets retaliate.8 ' Documents coming to light since the end of the
Cold War confirm that any use of tactical nuclear weapons would have provoked
indiscriminant Soviet retaliation. 82 Thus, should a conflict erupt, NATO's priority must
be to convince the Warsaw Pact that it had underestimated the importance to NATO of its
objectives and negotiate a ceasefire.
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Although neither the JIC nor the office of the Defense Science Advisor had
institutional input into British Army doctrine, military officers participated in their
studies and the higher echelons of the Army were privy to their conclusions. Due to the
experience of the 1958 to 1962 Berlin Crisis, the comments of the military officers
associated with Liddell Hart and the analyses produced by the JIC and the Science
Advisor, a majority of officers became convinced that British doctrine needed to be
changed.
By 1964 the outlines of a new doctrine had emerged. In the event of a Warsaw
Pact attack, the new British plan involved screening their advance with reconnaissance
forces while offering enough resistance to determine whether the attack was a limited,
perhaps local initiative, or a general offensive. Once Warsaw Pact forces pushed through
British screening forces, they would be engaged by the bulk of British forces, which
would force the enemy to gather in dense concentrations, where they would be vulnerable
to tactical nuclear weapons. As described by Major-General Perkins, "Our tactics were to
force the enemy into 'killing zones' where they would be sitting ducks for our tactical
nuclear weapons. In practice, this meant holding hills and important geographic features,
to force the Soviets to concentrate in the lowlands." 83 The use of tactical nuclear
weapons would be necessary when enemy forces broke out of the "killing zones,"
rupturing the defensive integrity of British forces. When this happened, the British Army
would use tactical nuclear rockets and artillery to selectively destroy concentrations of
enemy forces "pressurized" into killing zones.
From 1959 to 1961, the BAOR acquired its first tactical nuclear delivery systems
-- American-built Corporal and Honest John missiles and 8-inch diameter howitzers.84
Initially they played an auxiliary role to the five squadrons of Canberra bombers in RAF
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Germany. However, the new doctrine reversed the priority. Under the "killing zone"
concept, the faster reaction time of the Army's tactical nuclear weapons rendered them
better suited for destroying concentrations of forces. If everything worked as hoped, the
initial selective use of tactical nuclear weapons against Warsaw Pact forces concentrated
into "killing zones" would obliterate the threat posed by the first echelon of Soviet
military forces. A pause in offensive military operations would ensue until Soviet
reinforcements arrived from Belarus, the Baltic Republics and Ukraine. The BOAR
leadership hoped that the pause and fear of further escalation would lead to NATO and
the Warsaw Pact to conclude a ceasefire.
Under the 1964 doctrine, tactical nuclear weapons would create a lull in military
operations and threaten the Soviet Union with escalation. In explaining the doctrine to
the United States in 1964, the British Army claimed that it favored "an initial nonnuclear
delay capability of perhaps a few days followed if necessary by the selective use of up to
200 tactical nuclear weapons per corps as a 'link' if necessary to general war."85 Table II
summarizes the differences between the atomic air interdiction campaign and the nuclear
"killing zone" doctrine.
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Nuclear Vector
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Nuclear Vector
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Table II:
Changes in Tactical Nucle
1958-1971
Atomic Air Interdiction
(1958-1964)
Canberra Bombers
(5 Squadrons)
Rockets and Artillery
Enemy atomic weapons,
logistics hubs and
air bases
Immediate
Defend river lines
(Weser, then Rhine)
Enemy attack will grind to
a halt after their forward
units are isolated from
re-supply and reinforcement
by the interdiction campaign
ir Doctrine
Nuclear "Killing Zones"
(1964-1971)
Rockets and Artillery
(Corporal, Honest John and
8" guns -- five regiments total)
Canberra Bombers
Dense concentrations of enemy
tanks and infantry
After covering force battle
(up to three days into hostilities)
Canalize and pressurize enemy
forces in nuclear "killing zones"
Densely concentrated enemy
breakthrough forces can be
destroyed through the selective
use of tactical nuclear weapons
Although many elements of the new doctrine were present in the Spearpoint
Exercise of 1961, the old doctrine ostensibly remained in vogue in 1964, when the British
Army discussed its new operational concept with its American counterpart, elements of
the "killing zones" doctrine were still being codified five years later. Only in 1969 did
the British Army's publication of "Guidance on the Conduct of Operations of a Battle
Group in North West Europe," define the tactics and strategy underlying the new doctrine
as "canalizing or compressing the enemy into killing zones and using obstacles and
conventional fire to hold him there long enough to destroy him with nuclear weapons."8 6
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Thus, the entire period of 1961 to 1969 can be viewed as a lengthy transformation
between two doctrines.
This transition from one doctrine to another is symptomatic of the decentralized
process by which one concept of operations came to be discredited by a critical mass of
officers, while another became increasingly attractive. Rather than the highest echelons
imposing a fully developed doctrine, British officers discussed doctrinal concepts
informally, experimented with novel tactics in combat formations (Carver's brigade) and
tested new ideas in war games (Spearpoint). Gradually the new operational concept
gained adherents and became codified in the instructional military publications. Nearly
six years had elapsed (1958 to 1964) from the first diagnoses of the problems with the
atomic interdiction plan to the adoption of the new "killing zone" doctrine by the BAOR.
Another five would pass (1964 to 1969) until the "killing zone" doctrine became fully
codified in Army tactical manuals. Although non-military civil servants influenced this
process through studies communicated by the JIC and the Defence Science Advisor, the
elaboration of the new doctrine occurred entirely within the Army.
V. Tank Attrition Through ATGMs, 1970-1981
By the time the nuclear "killing zones" concept was codified in publications,
pressure was accumulating for another revision of British Army doctrine. A growing
conviction that the use of tactical nuclear weapons, even if employed selectively, would
be detrimental to British forces, and the concurrent development of new anti-tank guided
missiles (ATGM), led the Army to reconsider its concept of how to conduct military
operations in Central Europe. The impetus for change came from within the Army's
ranks themselves, where enterprising officers identified technical shortcomings with
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existing doctrines and proposed tactical solutions to them. Under the emerging doctrines,
the British 1 't Corps planned to defend its sector exclusively with conventional weapons,
combined with the defensive firepower of tanks and ATGMs to inflict disproportionate
attrition on an invader. Only when the Warsaw Pact overcame the British Corps'
conventional defense would tactical nuclear weapons be used, in a limited manner, to
communicate the risk of escalation to the Soviet Union.
Although the nuclear "killing zones" concept allowed for a brief period of non-
nuclear operations, that doctrine relied on tactical nuclear weapons to halt Soviet forces
once the battle reached the main British defensive position. However, it was considered
implausible by the mid- 1960s that Soviet armed forces would not respond in kind to
tactical nuclear weapons. Published statements of Soviet strategy and reports of Warsaw
Pact exercises indicated that Soviet military commanders intended to use tactical nuclear
weapons on a massive scale should NATO initiate the process.8 7 The prospect of the
Soviet Union retaliating in kind prompted some British officers to pose the question
whether British troops would be better off if both sides employed tactical nuclear
weapons or if nobody used them at all. In the late 1950s, Hart and Carver concluded that
the defender would not necessarily benefit from using tactical nuclear weapons. But, the
nuclear "killing zone" concept seemed based on a belief that the employment of tactical
nuclear weapons would strengthen the defense. By late 1965, Army studies began to
indicate that if employed by both sides, tactical nuclear weapons would accelerate the
attrition of conventional military forces, reducing the time that an inferior defender could
adequately man a defensive front. On a nuclear battlefield the British 1st Corps' tank
force would diminish 50 percent faster than in a purely conventional combat.
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The British Army moved from 1965 to 1970 to the view that a nuclear battlefield
would disadvantage defending NATO forces against Warsaw Pact attackers, prompting
British military commanders to examine ways to defend conventionally for longer. 89
This was not easy considering the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority and the limited
forces the British 1st Corps possessed. Having entered service in the mid-1950s, but now
in its second-generation, the ATGM appeared to offer improved prospects of halting a
Warsaw Pact armored offensive. 90 ATGMs were comparatively light, could hit tanks at
ranges in excess of 3,000 meters and could penetrate even the thickest steel armored
plate.91 Because they were comparatively inexpensive and could be carried on light
vehicles, ATGMs revitalized the defensive power of infantry vis-a-vis armored
vehicles. 92
Despite their promise, the British Army invested few resources in ATGMs while
the high command believed that the nuclear "killing zone" doctrine offered the best
response to a Warsaw Pact tank offensive. 93 However, with the retirement of Field
Marshal Richard Hull as Chief of the General Staff in 1965, control of the Army passed
to a generation of officers less enamored with tactical nuclear warfare.94 In 1965, an
Army study highlighted, for the first time, the potential strategic impact of ATGMs.
According to this study, the British 1 't Corps could now rely on ATGMs that are "not
expensive compared to the tanks they destroy" to halt the Warsaw Pact's numerically
superior tank forces.95 Several years of experimentation and debate were still necessary
for the Army to exchange dependence on tactical nuclear weapons for the prospect of
conventionally inflicting disproportionate attrition.
An important step occurred when Carver prot6gd Brigadier Edwin Bramall was
assigned the 5'h Air Portable Brigade, an airmobile reserve designed to reinforce NATO's
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Central or Northern Fronts. Until then, the high command considered the lightly
equipped brigade incapable of fighting Soviet tanks. Enthusiastic about the potential of
ATGMs and transport helicopters, Bramall lobbied for an opportunity to prove that new
technologies and appropriate tactics would enable even non-mechanized infantry to halt
enemy tank attacks.
In August 1968, Bramall was permitted to organize Exercise Iron Duke.
Observed by much of the Army's leadership, the 5th Air Portable Brigade faced 60 tanks
on the Army's largest armored training ground in the United Kingdom, the Salisbury
Plain.96 The overall objective was to test whether light infantry, with ATGMs, could
block an armored offensive. In the event, Bramall's force took advantage of natural
chokepoints and long-range vistas to wreak havoc on the opposition's tanks. At the
exercise's climax, he redeployed forces by helicopter to block a tank attack delivered
from an unexpected direction.97 Applying the most realistic criteria possible, Iron Duke
was judged a success. Following this, Bramall's superior officer, Major-General Terence
McMeekin, tasked Bramall and a fellow brigadier with examining how infantry could
fight tanks in NATO's Central Region.
By March 1969 Bramall and his collaborator presented a booklet entitled "The
Killing of Armour," to the Army's Strategic Command. Impressed, but skeptical,
Strategic Command directed Bramall to outline the weapons and tactics a non-
mechanized infantry division should use against a Soviet aggressor possessing tanks,
armored personnel carriers and artillery. Completed in December 1969, the new study,
"Formation Tactics," broke with the traditional disposition of combat brigades, based on
two battalions forward and one in reserve, to advocate a concept centered around a battle
composed of two distinct phases.
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According to Bramall, a non-mechanized infantry division with limited tank
support, employing correct tactics, could defend up to 16-kilometers (10 miles) of front
rather than the 10 (6 miles) that infantry divisions were deemed capable of defending in
the early 1950s. During the first phase, the division's armored reconnaissance regiment,
a motorized infantry battalion and a small detachment of tanks, would fight the "covering
battle" to delay the enemy for 24 to 36 hours and identify the main axes of their advance.
When the covering force ascertained where the enemy would deliver its main blow,
British infantry equipped with ATGMs and the division's few supporting tanks would
deploy themselves to cover gaps between obstacles such as buildings, woods or rivers
where enemy tanks would have to pass. Meanwhile, engineers would sow minefields to
canalize the enemy into the gaps and, within them, to prevent enemy tanks from pushing
through. For Bramall, a division so arrayed could dissipate the tank strength of a superior
enemy, preventing its rapid forward movement. 98
While new concepts based on the defensive firepower of ATGMs offered a way to
combat enemy tanks, the death knell for the doctrine of nuclear "killing zones" was
sounded by Michael Carver's promotion in 1971 to Chief of the General Staff. Carver
quickly imposed his view that, "There is no way that the West can gain by starting to use
tactical nuclear weapons because the Russians have more forces and more forces with
nuclear weapons is even worse than more forces with conventional weapons." 99 Carver's
directive to the BAOR was to fight conventionally until NATO's front collapsed.
Although NATO and British forces should retain tactical nuclear weapons, they should
no longer use them in a tactical role. The functions of tactical nuclear weapons were now
to deter the Soviet Army from using them first and to signal NATO's willingness to
escalate to strategic nuclear warfare.
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Thus, 1971 marks the BAOR's shift from doctrines dependent on tactical nuclear
weapons to one premised on the use of ATGMs, tanks, and other conventional weapons
to inflict disproportionate attrition on enemy armored forces. However, an Army-wide
consensus on the need to fight conventionally did not automatically translate into an
agreement on how this should be done. Between 1971 and 1981, three distinct concepts
for conventional operations, summarized in Table III below, succeeded one another.
Table III:
British Operational Concepts, 1970-1981
Mobile Linear
Defense
(1971-1973)
Two Divisions
Forward
One in Rear
Two Weeks
Separate from
infantry in
counter-attack
groups
British forces could
hold for 6 days if
reinforced (14 day
warning), 2 days if
not
ATGMs would
slow enemy attack,
Warsaw Pact
logistics would
collapse after several
days
Killing Areas
Mobile Defense
(1973-1976)
Two Divisions
Forward
One in Rear
48 hours
Mixed with
infantry, fighting
"hull-down" in
anti-tank role
British forces could
hold 5 days with
only 48 hours
warning
Enemy could be
canalized into anti-
tank "killing areas"
where ATGMs,
mines and hull-
down tanks would
inflict heavy losses
Killing Areas
Forward Defense
(1976-1981)
Four Divisions
Forward
48 hours
Mixed with
infantry, fighting
"hull-down" in
anti-tank role
British forces could
"holdfor a long
week" with 48
hours warning
A higher density of
British forces in
the main battle
area would permit
a better exchange
ratio, of 4 to 5
enemy tanks for
every British tank
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The new doctrine, known as the "mobile linear battle," was predicated on the
assumptions that ATGMs would permit infantry to defend themselves against tanks and
that the Warsaw Pact's logistics system would collapse if Soviet forces were forced to
fight a slowly moving battle of attrition. In the mobile linear battle, the British 1s Corps
would be divided into two echelons that would fight sequentially. The forward echelon
would begin its battle near the border with East Germany, where British infantry would
attempt to maintain an unbroken line, relying heavily on ATGMs and British armored
battle groups.100 When enemy pressure became unbearable, the first echelon would
retreat through the second, comprised of one division. Being smaller than the first, the
second would attempt to delay enemy forces so that the first could reestablish a defensive
position further to the rear.'0 ' In this fashion, the British 1 ' Corps viewed its role as
destroying disproportionate numbers of Soviet tanks and slowing the momentum of
enemy operations in a sequence of linear defensive engagements. Because of Warsaw
Pact divisions' limited logistics means, the British Army calculated that the enemy would
run out of supplies if forced to fight an intensive battle of attrition rather than a
blitzkrieg. 102
Although the mobile linear defense represented the British Army's internal
consensus as to the best recipe for employing new technologies and using the British 1s
Corps' limited means to defend the British sector in West Germany, reflection and new
intelligence on enemy capabilities led the BAOR to further modify its plans. Almost as
soon as they knew the details, many officers doubted whether disengaging an echelon of
British forces and withdrawing it through another echelon would work. Assessments of
Soviet doctrine and war plans provided little reason for confidence. In 1973, British
military intelligence claimed that a Soviet offensive would begin "by a rapid general
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move forward to pin NATO forces, developing in selected areas into deep and
comparatively narrow tank penetrations, paying little heed to losses.... Once penetration
of NATO's main positions had been achieved, the Soviets could operate with little regard
to logistic support." 103 In this way, Warsaw Pact forces would negate many advantages
of the mobile linear defense. Another problem lay in the dependence of the mobile linear
defense on reinforcements from the United Kingdom. Although all BAOR war plans
provided for reinforcements from the United Kingdom, the mobile linear defense was
dependent on their arriving before hostilities began. 104Without 56,000 additional troops,
doubling the size of the BAOR, neither of the two echelons would be strong enough to
hold their fronts.
According to British Army documents, the British 1" Corps could probably hold
for six days of full-scale conventional warfare if reinforced before hostilities began.
Should the Warsaw Pact attack before the BAOR was brought to strength, the Army's
leadership doubted that it could offer resistance for more than two, and effective
reinforcement of the BAOR depended on at least two weeks of warning. 105 Intelligence
raised the specter that the Warsaw Pact could attack NATO without providing the United
Kingdom with sufficient warning to reinforce the BAOR. 106 Because the BAOR's ability
to uncover Soviet war preparations relied on detecting an increase in Soviet divisional
radio communications, the prospect of Warsaw Pact forces attacking under radio silence
and advancing on pre-designated lines raised the specter of their achieving tactical
surprise.'07
Responding to fears of a surprise attack, British commanders set out to devise a
means of resisting a Warsaw Pact offensive if only 48 hours warning were available,
which meant preparing to fight with or without reinforcements.108 The new concept
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largely resulted from the efforts of Brigadier Robin Carnegie, commander of the 1 1 th
Armored Brigade, and his Chief of Staff, Major Peter Inge. Their ideas were promoted
by Bramall, who was promoted to Major-General and given command of the BAOR's 1st
Armoured Division. Bramall developed the concept at the division level and promoted it
to higher echelons of authority. 109
When Bramall assumed command of the 1st Armoured Division in January 1972,
he sensed faults in the "mobile linear" battle concept, including the reliance on
reinforcements, the overly linear nature of the war plan and poor use of tanks. To rectify
these, he drew on the anti-tank tactics he had developed in 1968 and 1969 and concepts
for "mobile defense in depth" developed by Carnegie and Inge. Bramall advocated
drawing enemy armored forces into anti-tank "killing areas" where minefields, infantry
equipped with ATGMs and tanks fighting from hull-down defensive positions would
inflict massive casualties. Bramall's concept differed from the mobile linear defense in
several respects. His emphasis on mobile anti-tank "killing areas" discarded the "mobile
linear" battle's reliance on holding continuous lines. Rather than attempting to defend a
linear position the breadth of the British sector (65 miles), British forces would now
concentrate their efforts along the few routes that Soviet armored spearheads intended to
take. In this way, Bramall planned to exploit what he perceived to be a defect in Soviet
offensive operations-a reliance on small numbers of narrow, fast moving tank thrusts." 0
To execute his concept, Bramall planned to employ his division's 144 tanks
defensively, interspersed with infantry and firing from camouflaged and hull-down
positions. 1'" Although a rupture from existing armored doctrine, which envisioned using
tanks in local counterattacks, Bramall's concept harkened back to traditional British views
on the use of tanks.'2 For most British tank officers, the way to use a tank consisted of
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locating a camouflaged position where the tank could be stationed, exposing the top of
the turret, and snipe at enemy tanks at ranges up to 1500 meters." 3
At the level of British 1" Corps, Bramall's concept of operations called for two
divisions to be deployed forward, with one in reserve. Each of the forward divisions (two
brigades each) would employ one brigade conducting "aggressive delaying actions"
beginning at the border with East Germany, and one brigade mounting a "mobile
defense" to the rear. Bramall envisioned the forward brigades employing small
groupings of ATGMs and tanks to fight a running battle with advancing Soviet armor,
ambushing enemy forces from the back edges of villages and woods. The actions of the
delaying brigade would permit divisional commanders to ascertain which axes enemy
troops were using. Once known, the "mobile defense" brigades would scramble to
establish anti-tank killing areas across their route."4 If the forward two divisions were
breached, the rearward division would be used to counterattack the enemy penetration." 5
Bramall calculated that this doctrine would permit British forces to resist an offensive for
approximately five days, even if the BAOR were given only 48 hours warning and
received no reinforcements before the beginning of hostilities."i6 The new concept of
operations based on "killing areas" and "mobile defense" was gradually applied to the
whole of the BAOR.117
Although the twin concepts of anti-tank "killing areas" and "mobile defense"
would dominate British Army thinking until the 1980s, both the BAOR's structure and
plans underwent one more significant evolution in the 1970s. British planners soon
calculated that the two divisions assigned to the forward defense under the first version of
the "killing areas" concept could probably not achieve the density of forces needed to
resist a Soviet attack and armored officers doubted the rationality of holding a division in
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reserve for a counter-attack. They questioned that if tanks are most effective in the
defensive, why withhold a third of available forces for a counter-attack? 11 The solutions
adopted entailed dedicating all British 1s' Corps' divisions to the "aggressive delaying"
and "mobile defense" actions, leaving virtually none in reserve. By 1975, this re-
distribution of forces from the rear to the forward area in the British 1 " Corps was widely
accepted.119
To better execute the revised "killing areas" doctrine, the British Army
reorganized the 1s' Corps between September 1976 and March 1977, redistributing troops
into four smaller divisions. Permanent brigades were replaced by "task forces,"
consisting of headquarters that could command any grouping of units from the division.
The 1976-1977 reorganization is detailed in Table IV.' 2 0
Table IV:
The Organization of British 1' Corps
Pre-1976 Structure Structure After 1976-1977
Is Division 1st Armoured Division
* 7th Armoured Brigade * TF Alpha
e 1 1 th Armoured Brigade * TF Bravo
2nd Division 2nd Armoured Division
* 4 h Armoured Brigade e TF Charlie
* 12th Mechanized Brigade e TF Delta
4th Division 3rd Armoured Division
* 6 th Armoured Brigade * TF Echo
* 20* Armoured Brigade * TF Foxtrot
4 th Armoured Division
" TF Golf
* TF Hotel
The British 1st Corps' new structure was calculated to better enable it to mount a
powerful defense of the British sector in West Germany. Smaller divisions would permit
divisional commanders to focus on protecting narrower sectors, while flexible task forces
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would enable them to tailor the composition of their units to meet unforeseen
eventualities.
Although playing no role in the further doctrinal changes of 1975 to 1977,
Bramall defended the British 1st Corps' revised concept of operations after being named
Chief of the General Staff in 1979. In a 1982 speech to the Royal United Services
Institute, he likened the BAOR's British doctrine to the battle plan that had permitted the
British 8th Army, under Montgomery, to halt the German-Italian advance into Egypt in
1942.121 Revealing the evolutionary processes of British Army doctrine development, the
experiences of World War II continued to shape the Royal Armoured Corps vision of
warfare. In personal terms, Bramall benefited from Carver's patronage throughout his
career, while Carver, in turn, had been a protdgd of Montgomery.
The theory behind British doctrine was equally constant, based on the assumption
that disproportionate attrition would permit British forces to resist the advance of
numerically superior armies.122 At a strategic level, the purpose of attrition was to buy
time for diplomats to arrange a ceasefire, American or French reinforcements to arrive or
the threat of tactical nuclear escalation to be brandished. 2 3 Although the British battle
plan had undergone significant modifications, the objectives remained virtually identical
to those Carver had articulated to his brigade in 1960 and imposed as Chief of the
General Staff beginning in 1971.124 While evolving through three distinct phases during
the 1970s, the fundamental operational objective remained the same - to prevent an
enemy breakthrough as long as possible using conventional means.
A mixture of continuity and change in British Army doctrine marked the 1970s.
The major transformation marking the beginning of the decade saw the British Army
reject the early use of tactical nuclear weapons. The next ten years saw the Army adopt
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three distinct concepts for how conventional forces, using ATGMs, could resist a Warsaw
Pact assault. Although each individual change was an incremental development, they
were collectively precocious when compared with foreign counterparts. The United
States Army did not modify its doctrine to take advantage of ATGMs to a similar extent
until 1976, after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War dramatically proved their utility. 125 The
Americans and, more particularly, the French continued to believe in the value of tactical
nuclear weapons even while efforts were made by both to raise the nuclear threshold.
Finally, the replacement of brigades with task force headquarters with no permanently
assigned forces was an original, although not wholly successful, attempt to improve the
tactical flexibility of British forces.
Although innovative in its reappraisal of weaponry, the development of British
Army doctrine demonstrates remarkable continuity. Second World War-era beliefs about
tank use were never rigorously reappraised, nor were the slow-moving tempo of warfare
imagined by British officers and their confidence in engaging the enemy on prepared
battlefields. Some new developments were incremental improvements on more recent
doctrines, such as the concept of anti-tank "killing areas," which differs from the earlier
nuclear "killing zones" in that ATGMs, anti-tank minefields and hull-down tanks
replaced tactical nuclear weapons as the means to destroy tank concentrations. Thus,
British developments in the 1970s were the product of a continual evolution from and, at
times, return to the lessons of the Second World War.
The process by which doctrine emerged involved multiple echelons of the Army's
hierarchy and frequently occurred from the bottom up. Reflections and experiments by
brigade commanders underlay two of the three operational concepts, while changes in the
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Army's top leadership permitted all three. Political leaders never once intervened in this
process, which remained too arcane and technical for them to influence.
VI. Victory by Maneuver Warfare, 1981-1989
From 1981 until the end of the Cold War, the British Army in West Germany
underwent another wave of doctrinal change, as emphasis shifted from inflicting attrition
through comparatively static engagements to employing maneuvering armored
formations. Three influences shaped the British Army's evolving doctrine: 1) A better
understanding of Soviet military practice led British officers to conclude that Soviet
operations in the British rear could disrupt a static British defense; 2) British commanders
came to appreciate that the rigidity of Soviet military operations opened the possibility of
seizing the initiative through a well-timed counterattack; and 3) a renewed interest in
military history, particularly the German Army's defensive battles in the Second World
War, promoted a philosophy that a weak-defending force could defeat a more powerful
attacker through operational maneuvers and tactical skill. As with previous doctrinal
developments, the drive for change came from field commanders. The distinguishing
feature of the British Army's adoption of maneuver warfare was the extent to which it
was motivated by a better appreciation of Soviet doctrine.
The Army's embrace of maneuver warfare proceeded through three phases. From
1981 to 1983, the new doctrine was introduced at the level of British 1" Corps, involving
restructuring the corps' divisions, amending its battle plan and preparing officers and
soldiers to execute the new concept. From 1983 to 1985, the commander of the BAOR /
NORTHAG, General Nigel Bagnall, imposed a fully integrated battle plan on the four
national corps of NORTHAG. Following his replacement by General Martin Farndale,
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the aims and timing of the counterattack in the NORTHAG battle plan expanded. From
1985 to 1988, the Army Group's battle plan was based on an early, ambitious counter-
offensive into East Germany.
These changes in British Army doctrine in the 1980s were rooted in an improved
understanding of the tactics and strategy of the Soviet Army. In the United Kingdom, the
armed forces and the Joint Intelligence Committee had long produced competent analyses
of Soviet capabilities, intentions and strategy.126 However, their "Secret" and "Top
Secret" designations prevented their serving as the basis for a broad doctrinal debate.
Consequently, Army doctrine, developing without consideration of Soviet military
doctrine, was influenced primarily by judgments on the value of new technologies,
perceptions of "best military practices," and a rough understanding of enemy military
capabilities, measured in terms of quantities of military equipment and manpower.
The creation of the Soviet Studies Centre at the Royal Military College
(Sandhurst) in 1971 put Soviet military doctrine at the heart of reflections on British
military doctrine. Staffed mainly by academic researchers, the Sandhurst Soviet Studies
Centre concentrated much of the United Kingdom's expertise on the Soviet armed forces
in a single research institute, where debate and discussion improved analysis. Using
unclassified sources, researchers delivered lectures throughout the British armed forces'
educational establishments and published their findings in journals, such as the Journal of
the Royal United Services Institute, Jane's International Defense Review and the United
States' Military Review. Because of the public nature of its work, the Centre's analyses
reached a larger audience than the classified studies. Although it would be an
exaggeration to claim that their articles enjoyed a large readership among the officer
corps, the Centre's impact derived from the influence its work had on officers holding
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important commands and the fact that information tended to "diffuse or trickle down
from the officers who read the articles to their colleagues."1 27
Overall, four themes emerged for how the Soviets intended to defeat NATO's
conventional defenses. First, the Soviets focused on using a fast operational tempo to
overwhelm NATO forces, even if this meant accruing greater casualties.128 Secondly,
they intended to conduct operations simultaneously throughout the BAOR sector, using
airborne and airmobile (helicopter borne) forces, commandos and armored raiding
forces. 129 Although Western armed forces had developed many of the same types of
forces, the Soviet belief in the necessity of attacking deep into the enemy's rear,
regardless of casualties, differed from Western conceptions.' 30 A third lesson was that
the Soviet Army thought about warfare in terms of an intermediate level between tactics
and strategy, referred to as the "operational level of war." This meant that they thought in
terms of larger forces and geographic terms than the British.' 3'
The Soviet Studies Centre also tracked new developments in Soviet doctrine and
force structure. For example, in the early 1980s, the Centre's Christopher Donnelly
revealed the Soviet Army's development of a concept for extremely rapid victory in
Western Europe centered on Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG). Consisting of
reinforced tank divisions, OMGs would advance deep into the rear of NATO forces to
disrupt their command and control facilities and establish blocking positions to prevent
them from reconstituting a defense further to the rear.132
Taken collectively, the new insights into Soviet military doctrine clarified the
problems facing British war planners. The Army's concept of anti-tank "killing areas"
dedicated all four of the British 1" Corps' divisions to the main defensive battle, leaving
the 1 't Corps with no way of dealing with a Soviet force behind the battle area.
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Furthermore, the importance the Soviets attached to tempo and operational maneuver led
British officers to conclude that a Soviet offensive would be "much larger, faster and
more brutal" than expected. 133
The Soviet Studies Centre also educated British officers about deficiencies in the
Soviet Army and its doctrine -- rigid central planning, a lack of individual initiative at
lower echelons of the chain of command, archaic staff procedures and stereotyped
training -- deficiencies that could enable NATO to disrupt a Warsaw Pact offensive.' 34
British officers came to appreciate that Soviet forces would attack aggressively and
intelligently as long as they were able to adhere to detailed plans communicated from
above, but lower level units would have difficulty adjusting to unforeseen eventualities if
cut off from higher level headquarters. Even if the Soviet chain-of-command functioned
flawlessly from a communications perspective, offensive operations could suffer from
substantial command and control problems. Drawing on published Soviet military
debates, Donnelly argued that Soviet staff procedures, communications facilities and
professional preparation were ill suited for the tempo envisioned. 3 5 Finally, Soviet
Studies Centre scholars contrasted the operational excellence of the Soviet Army with
poor lower level tactics and training.136 Because of comparative inexperience and the
small size of their staffs (four officers), Soviet battalions had trouble employing
combined-arms tactics.' 37 They also tended to respond poorly to the stress and
uncertainty engendered by battle or even large-scale exercises.' 38
Besides the Soviet Studies Centre, two complementary intellectual influences also
marked the evolution of British Army doctrine in the 1980s. One of these was a British
military maverick, retired Brigadier Richard Simpkin of the Royal Tank Regiment, whose
books on Western and Soviet philosophies of armored warfare and tank design never
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failed to criticize the British Army, as "addicted to attrition." Implying that British
officers lacked intelligence, Simpkin criticized the Army's tank development policy as
costly and counterproductive.' 39 In 1985, in Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First
Century Warfare, which divided military theory into "attrition" and "maneuver" warfare,
Simpkin argued that only "maneuver warfare" would permit NATO to ward off an
offensive by numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces. Accordingly, NATO needed to
constitute operational reserves and defend in far greater depth than planned. 140 However,
Simpkin highlighted similar defects with Soviet planning and predicted that a Soviet
attack might collapse under the weight of its own complexity.141 Simpkin's writing style,
which described warfare in terms of physics, appealed only to a small proportion of
British officers-a fact probably reinforced by his statements about the British military
establishment.142 But Simpkin's writings appealed to General (later Field Marshal)
Bagnall who became the driving force behind British military doctrine during the 1980s.
The third intellectual influence on British military doctrine emanated from West
Germany. The Second World War-era experiences of the German Army provided an
intriguing model for British officers preoccupied with countering a Soviet armored
offensive, as the German Army repeatedly defeated attacks by overwhelming numbers of
Soviet forces, even when they possessed nothing like the force-to-space ratio considered
necessary to mount an effective defense. To British officers in the 1980s, the secret
behind the last German defensive victories on the Eastern Front was the fact that they not
only defended, but also maneuvered, abandoning territory, and counterattacked when
Soviet movements provided an opening.143
During the early 1980s, West German General Ferdinand von Senger und Etterlin,
NATO's Commander in Chief of the Central Region (CINCENT), vocally espoused the
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relevance of these World War II lessons for NATO's present environment. He argued
that NATO needed centrally controlled reserve forces to counterattack, even if front line
forces suffered as a consequence. For von Senger und Etterlin, these reserves would take
the form of armored forces, as in World War II, or could be created by amalgamating
NATO's scattered helicopter reserves into an airmobile reserve of perhaps eight divisions
and 1,950 helicopters. 144 Although his ideas were controversial with West German
political leaders, von Senger und Etterlin forged a friendship with Bagnall.145 Bagnall, in
turn, popularized German thinking on maneuver warfare within the British Army to the
extent that it became fashionable for British officers to discuss large-scale conventional
warfare using terms such as auftragstaktik (mission-oriented tactics), schwerpunkt (point
of emphasis or center of gravity) and beweglichkeit (mobility).141
The central tenets of the scholarship and arguments advanced by the Soviet
Studies Centre, Brigadier Simpkin and West Germans such as General von Senger und
Etterlin on British Army thinking are summarized in Table V.
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Table V:
Intellectual Influences On British Army Doctrine, 1981-1990
Sandhurst Soviet Studies
Centre
* Soviet offensives will
be deep, massive and
conducted at a fast tempo
* Soviet soldiers lack
initiative, the army has
command-and-control
problems and planning is
rigid
e The Soviet Army is
vulnerable to disruption
should it lose the initiative
Brigadier Richard
Simpkin
* Successful defense is
only possible through
maneuver warfare--taking
calculated risks to exploit
enemy errors
* Maneuver depends on
the interaction of "mass,
time and space"
* Soviet Army incapable
of getting the most out of
its doctrine because of
poor quality officers and
NCOs
* Soviet "deep battle"
theory "unmanageably
complex"
General Ferdinand
von Senger und Etterlin
9 NATO forces need
strong operational
reserves to counter
Soviet Operational
Maneuver Groups
(OMGs) and encirclement
operations
* Armored forces are
best employed en masse
in a counterattack role
* NATO helicopter forces
should be concentrated
into a single reserve force
of 1,950 helicopters in
eight divisions
Intellectual advocacy cannot alone change how an Army plans to fight. 147 For a
change in doctrine to occur, lessons had to be internalized and a new concept of
operations crafted. In this context, the change from the attritional doctrines of the 1970s
to the maneuver warfare doctrines of the 1980s is linked to the promotion of General
Nigel Bagnall to positions where he shaped the Army's plans to fight a third world war.
Throughout the 1980s, Bagnall held every position most critical to the elaboration of
British doctrine, culminating in 1988 with his appointment to Chief of the Defense Staff,
the professional head of the British armed forces. 14 8 Having also commanded an armored
division in West Germany from 1975 until 1978, Bagnall was well placed to know the
strengths and weaknesses of the British Army in West Germany and successively reform
every aspect of its training and doctrine.149
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Fellow officers considered Bagnall atypical both in the British Army and its high
command. He was an intellectual -who wrote histories of the Punic Wars and the
Peloponnesian War after his retirement-in an army that was un-intellectual.15 0 He was
also openly critical of the British Army as an institution. For Kiszely, "He [Bagnall]
certainly didn't tolerate fools and made no effort to pretend otherwise."' 5 1 For Bagnall,
the British Army's heritage of limited and colonial wars constituted an obstacle to its
achieving the intellectual excellence needed for large-scale warfare in Central Europe.'2
To realize their potential, Bagnall believed, the mentality and education of British
officers needed to be transformed.
Despite his belief in the intellectual mediocrity of the British officer corps and his
affinity for informality in dress and protocol, Bagnall was not a maverick struggling
against the system. '3 His career benefited repeatedly from the support of superiors, who
sympathized with his ideas or recognized his skills. Bramall, who served as Chief of the
General Staff from 1979, proved a solid supporter of Bagnall despite the fact that Bagnall
significantly revised doctrinal concepts that Bramall had developed.15 4
Bagnall believed that the British 1s' Corps' concept of operations and the
mentality of the officer corps needed to be changed. From the moment he assumed
control of the Corps in 1981, he reintroduced brigades, annulling the "task force"
organization introduced in 1976 and 1977. He then moved to implement a wide-ranging
series of reforms. Almost immediately, he created an institutional motor, the Tactical
Doctrine Committee, to develop and disseminate his ideas. He invited subordinate
officers sharing compatible views to meet regularly to discuss British Army doctrine and
war plans. 155 Breaking with tradition, Bagnall insisted on informality and called upon
junior officers to give their opinions before their superiors.is6
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From the moment he assumed command, Bagnall tried to imbue the British 1st
Corps with a maneuver warfare philosophy.157 He also emphasized the need for
commanders to give succinct orders that "leave the subordinate commander as much
freedom of execution as possible and should contain only those constraints essential to
cooperation with other units."158 He returned repeatedly to the need for the divisions and
brigades under his command to maneuver in depth, abandoning West German territory
and counterattacking forwards as circumstances dictated.
In 1982, Bagnall wrote Battle Notes for his subordinate commanders, in which he
laid out his concept of "maneuver warfare," later defined as, "a warfighting philosophy
which seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion-his
ability to fight as an effective whole-rather than destroy him physically through
incremental attrition."159 Bagnall reiterated his call for a different type of leadership,
based on decentralized authority and rapid decision-making. Although Battle Notes
presented a rupture with British Army tactics and practice and affected over a third of its
manpower, Bagnall published this document without approval from higher authorities.160
In Battle Notes, Bagnall developed a new battle plan for the British 1st Corps. His
plan differed from its predecessor in that it foresaw fighting in greater depth and led to
the reestablishment of an operational reserve within the corps. It differed from all
preceding doctrines in that the counterattack of the reserve division represented the
culminating point of the corps' defensive battle, rather than an effort to reestablish a
defensive line that had been penetrated. In this context, the entire purpose of the Corps'
battle was to provide the preconditions necessary for an armored counter-stroke to disrupt
a Soviet offensive.
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In Bagnall's eyes, the battle would occur in three phases. First would come the
covering force battle, during which limited reconnaissance and delaying forces would
slow the enemy's offensive and identify the geographic axes they intended to use.
Initially, Bagnall planned for a strong covering force, consisting of two armored
reconnaissance battalions to screen enemy forces and two brigades to fight delaying
actions. With such heavy forces, he hoped that the covering force could buy 24 hours for
the Corps to prepare for the main defensive battle and inflict significant losses on the
enemy in the process.1 61 Later, Bagnall reduced the covering force to two reconnaissance
battalions because the British 1st Corps lacked the resources to commit over two brigades
or 20 percent of its combat power to the covering force.162
After the covering force battle, Warsaw Pact forces would reach the British 1st
Corps' strongest defensive positions, where the main defensive battle would begin.
Unlike the 1970s, rather than defending a line extending across his corps' entire sector,
he planned for the enemy to penetrate the main battle position. Drawing on the tactical
reforms of the early to mid-1970s, Bagnall thought that a combination of mobile and
positional defenses, based on tanks and ATGMs, should defend "vital ground." 16 At first
Bagnall planned to employ four of nine brigades in the main defensive battle, and later,
when he withdrew the two brigades from the covering force battle, he reinforced the force
destined for the main defensive battle to six brigades (two divisions) out of nine (three
divisions).
In the third, final phase of Bagnall's war plan, once enemy forces penetrated the
British 1st Corps' main defensive position, the Corps commander would launch its reserve
division in a counter-stroke against narrow Warsaw Pact columns that emerged from the
battle.164 At minimum, it was calculated that the counter-stroke could destroy a Soviet
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Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) operating in the rear of the main defensive position,
but it was hoped that a well-delivered counter-stroke could end the offensive operations
of the first Soviet echelon.1 65
To achieve the operational tempo needed for surprise, Bagnall planned to abandon
traditional British tank tactics, which emphasized halts and long-range gunnery.'66 He
argued that "The detailed tactics [of the counterstroke] will depend on the situation, but
there should be no stopping unless it is unavoidable. Once in firm range, fire should be
opened while still on the move and the momentum of the assault maintained until the
enemy's penetration has been broken through."167 Through speed and surprise, the
British counter-stroke would seize the initiative from the Soviets.
Bagnall's reforms marked a substantial change in how the British Army intended
to fight in Europe.168 By 1983 when his term as commander of British 1 't Corps ended,
the British concept for fighting in Central Europe had changed to one combining an
elastic defense-in-depth with a well-timed counter-attack to defeating a Soviet attack.
Although new, Bagnall's reforms were evolutionary within the broader context of the
development of British Army doctrine. In its three-phase composition, with a covering
battle, main battle and counter-stroke, Bagnall's plan resembled the "mobile defense /
killing-areas" concept of Major-General Bramall and Brigadier Carnegie in 1972.
Similarities extended to deployment patterns in that Bagnall's 1981 and Bramall's 1972
plans that relied on two divisions forward, one in reserve. Moreover, Bagnall's initial
orders for the covering force battle, involving two brigades, were identical to the
Carnegie concept. Even though there were notable differences, the two concepts were
similar enough for Major-General Michael Tillotson to claim that the earlier doctrine
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"helped to shape the new approach for the defence plan for the Northern Army Group
sector under Field Marshal [then General] Sir Nigel Bagnall."1 69
In 1983 after being promoted to the command of the BAOR and NATO's
Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), Bagnall struggled to apply his "maneuver warfare"
approach to the multi-national army group. However, reforming NORTHAG posed a
greater challenge. Until Bagnall's period of command, the four national army corps
comprising NORTHAG had planned to fight separate battles, employing tactics and
operational concepts adopted by their national armed forces. The Army Group had no
resources of its own and only one of the 11 divisions assigned to NORTHAG was in
reserve under the direct authority of the NORTHAG headquarters. Worse, Bagnall's
predecessors since the mid-1970s had accepted the principle of "forward defense," in
which the Army Groups' strategy hinged on defeating a Warsaw Pact offensive virtually
at the East German border.
In Bagnall's mind, the emphasis on independent "corps battles" and the lack of
Army Group reserves were dangerous. Warsaw Pact forces could focus on delivering an
overwhelming blow to a single corps or attack the juncture between two, where
communications problems and dissimilar battle plans would make a NATO riposte
unlikely.1 70 British intelligence had hypothesized for at least a decade that a major Soviet
thrust would be directed at the British and German corps juncture, while another might be
aimed at the boundary between the British and Belgian corps.' 7 Avoiding specifics,
Bagnall justified the need for an Army Group battle plan on the basis that "Soviet thrusts
are not going to be obligingly directed at individual corps, but will spin over neighboring
ones. And a cursory map study suggests that at least one major soviet thrust will be
directed at an inter-corps boundary." 7 2
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A "forward defense" at the border between the two German states comprised
Bagnall's third concern. If deployed too close to the border, NATO soldiers would be
subjected to a massive artillery barrage at the beginning of war, which Bagnall feared
would incapacitate them before Soviet tanks reached their positions.173 For NORTHAG
to fight effectively, Bagnall promoted creating a reserve of corps strength (three
divisions) under the authority of the Army Group headquarters and obtaining a shift from
"forward defense" to a defense based on greater elasticity and depth. Bagnall then
focused on crafting a war plan whereby NORTHAG would disrupt an enemy offensive
by seizing the initiative early, most probably by an attack into East Germany.
Bagnall succeeded in constituting an Army Group reserve consisting of three
divisions, two West German (the 3rd and 7th Panzer Divisions) and one British (3 rd
Armored Division). This meant depriving the German and British corps in NORTHAG
of their own armored reserves; however, the reallocation of resources from the corps to
the Army Group level gave Bagnall a powerful tool with which to intervene in battle,
either by seizing the initiative with a counter-offensive or countering an overwhelming
Soviet offensive against a single corps or along a boundary between two.17 4
Although he began lobbying for defense in depth when he took command of
NORTHAG, Bagnall knew that the issue would elicit opposition from West Germany.17 5
Securing General von Senger und Etterlin's support at an early date, Bagnall struggled to
revise the "totally unrealistic orders" concerning forward defense. Bringing matters to a
head at the Winter Sale Command Post Exercise of 1983, Bagnall, during a simulated
Warsaw Pact offensive, authorized units to retreat, rather than engage the enemy at the
border. After gaining time by abandoning territory, he used NORTHAG's reserve to
launch a powerful offensive at a weak point in the Soviet dispositions in East Germany.
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Although this counter-stroke disrupted the simulated Soviet offensive and destroyed the
Warsaw Pact's first echelon, Bagnall's tactics elicited sharp criticism from West
Germany.176 However, von Senger und Etterlin's support and the indifference of the
British Government to West German complaints led to the acceptance of Bagnall's
operational concept.177
After Winter Sale, Bagnall's reflections became increasingly offensive in nature.
To achieve maximum results, Bagnall planned to employ NORTHAG's reserve of three
divisions to launch an offensive into East Germany, in the direction of Magdeburg, as
quickly as possible after the start of hostilities, in the hope that the maneuver would
eradicate the Soviet first echelon.' 78 If successful, Bagnall's counter-stroke would create
a pause in operations, as the Warsaw Pact's second echelon advanced to contact. Ideally,
either the Soviets would consider stopping the war or diplomacy would intervene. At the
least, Bagnall hoped that the operational pause would permit American and French troops
to reinforce NORTHAG.
Astonishingly, this potentially most controversial element of Bagnall's doctrine-
his plan to launch a counter-offensive into East Germany was never questioned or,
perhaps, understood by the British government. If gains to be achieved by an early
offensive were substantial, the risks of attacking East Germany were equally great. If
hostilities were the result of an unwanted crisis, an attack in East Germany could catalyze
further escalation. Moreover, in dedicating NORTHAG's reserve to an offensive,
Bagnall deprived the Army Group of reserves needed to counter attacks into West
Germany. Bagnall seems to have recognized the trade-offs inherent in his strategy, but
privileged the militarily expedient solution to the detriment of alternatives that were
superior from a political point of view. 179
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After imposing his "maneuver warfare" plan on NORTHAG, in 1985 Bagnall was
promoted to Chief of the General Staff. The vacancy he left as commander of the BAOR
/ NORTHAG was filled by his handpicked successor, General Martin Farndale. In their
respective offices, Bagnall and Famdale persevered in instilling the British Army and
NORTHAG with an ethos of maneuver warfare, the three most visible manifestations of
which were 1) Bagnall's creation of a Higher Command and Staff Course to teach
planning and maneuver at the operational level; 2) the publication of Designfor Military
Operations in 1989 that codified Bagnall's vision of military operations; and 3)
Farndale's continued development of battle plans for enacting "maneuver warfare" and
an operational counter-stroke at the Army Group level.
As we have seen, Bagnall believed that the British officer corps lacked the
intellectual background needed for fast-paced maneuver-intensive operations.'80 When
appointed Chief of the General Staff, he reformed higher education within the British
Army by presiding in 1988 over the foundation of the Higher Command and Staff
College (HCSC), which provided an additional layer of military education to selected
British officers (colonels and brigadiers) who had completed the Staff College. For In
Bagnall's opinion, the Staff College's time honored pedagogic techniques were ill-suited
to conducting war on the scale that might occur in Central Europe. In Bagnall's opinion,
only the study of military history and theory could compensate for this dearth of relevant
experience. 18 In addition to emphasizing the study of history as a "form of vicarious
experience," Bagnall highlighted "re-discovered" military theoretical classics such as
Clauswitz and Sun Tzu, and required students to read Simpkin's Race to the Swift. 182
Institutionally, it was easier for him to create a new structure, the HCSC, than attempt to
reform the existing Staff College. The year after the HCSC's foundation, the Army
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published Design for Military Operations, which codified Bagnall's philosophy of
military operations and his concept for how the British Army should fight in Central
Europe. Sometimes lauded as the British Army's first formal doctrine, the Design for
Military Operations codified both Bagnall's philosophy of military operations and his
concept for how the British Army should fight in Central Europe.18 3
Meanwhile, General Martin Farndale continued to amend NORTHAG's plan for
war. Like Bagnall, Farndale had commanded a division in British 1st Corps before
following Bagnall as commander of British 1st Corps and NORTHAG. Throughout,
Farndale benefited from Bagnall's support and patronage, and, despite differences in
personality, proved a spiritual successor to Bagnall. While he commanded NORTHAG,
Farndale continued to amend British war plans, particularly when it came to envisioning
how American (the 3rd Corps) or French (the FAR or the 3'd Corps) reinforcements could
be utilized for an attack deep into the Warsaw Pact. 184
By the time the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, Bagnall's effort to impose
"maneuver warfare" on the British Army had born significant fruit. In the course of eight
years he and his collaborators had orchestrated significant changes in British war plans at
the level of the British 1st Corps and NORTHAG and had reformed British higher
military education to produce a new type of officer, steeped in military history and
theory. These accomplishments were crowned in 1989 by the erection of Bagnall's
thoughts, philosophy and concept of operations into a formal military doctrine. His
reforms represent a significant shift in British military practice. By his insistence that
flexibility, quick decision-making and a fast tempo were the keys to military
performance, Bagnall successfully challenged the existing British Army paradigm dating
from the Second World War. His emphasis on the operational counter-stroke also
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clashed with the established "attritional" mindset of the British Army. Perhaps most
dramatically, Bagnall refocused British professional military education from small-scale
interventions overseas to the North German Plain where masses of tanks, artillery and
armored vehicles might clash.
Although an atypical product of the British officer corps, Bagnall was not a
military maverick. He benefited from the support of his superiors who permitted him to
reform doctrine and protected him when his ideas became a focus for West German
criticism, as well as promoted him to positions where he could best implement his ideas.
Bagnall, in turn, enlisted the aid, via the Tactical Doctrine Committee, of middle-ranking
officers he considered to possess the most promising intellects.'85 Finally, he ensured the
longevity of his reforms by lobbying for Farndale to succeed him by creating institutions
(HCSC) and a formal doctrine to perpetuate his operational precepts.
Ironically, the final stages of Bagnall's reforms were implemented in 1988 and
1989, as the Warsaw Pact crumbled and the Cold War ground to a close. The specifics of
his doctrine became irrelevant when the likelihood of large-scale warfare with a
numerically superior opponent faded. However, the institutional structures and
intellectual tools-such as a formal British Army doctrine and the HCSC-have proven
Bagnall's most enduring legacy.
Although frequently hailed as a significant innovation in the British Army's
manner of making war, it is worth posing the question whether Bagnall's reforms
produced a battle plan that was "better" than its predecessors. Some British generals,
including Bagnall's successor as Chief of the General Staff, Field Marshal John Chapple,
have expressed doubts whether it had been feasible to launch an offensive into East
Germany considering the disparity of forces.186 If the counter-stroke had failed to
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produce decisive results, NORTHAG would have found itself fighting defensively
without effective reserves. Moreover, an early counter-stroke delivered into East
Germany could have hastened the use of tactical nuclear weapons, which the Soviet
Union might have employed to avoid defeat.
Bagnall's reforms and, more particularly, their development under Farndale, were
also poorly suited to changing diplomatic circumstances. From the mid to late-1980s,
reformers in the Soviet Union struggled to de-militarize the Cold War by shifting to a
more defensive military doctrine and reducing the size of the Soviet armed forces.187
From an international relations perspective, the British Army's adoption of progressively
more offensive war plans-the outlines of which were publicized through exercises and
in speeches and articles-was not conducive to the efforts of Soviet moderates. The
Soviet Army's initial response to more aggressive NATO doctrines ("Follow On Forces
Attack," the American Air-Land Battle, and British "Maneuver Warfare") was to push for
an increase in the readiness of front-line Warsaw Pact forces and for a more offensive,
preemptive military doctrine.
VII. Conclusion
During the Cold War years, 1958-1989, British Army doctrine went through four
significant shifts. Prior to 1958, the BAOR could have countered only small-scale
infiltrations and served as a tripwire for nuclear retaliation. In 1958 the British armed
forces' first operational concept for the defense of the BAOR's sector relied on a massive
atomic air interdiction campaign launched at the outset of hostilities, with a simultaneous
conventional defense of successive river lines. In 1964 a concept emerged based on
tactical nuclear rockets and artillery fire destroying Warsaw Pact forces pressurized in to
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"killing zones" after a short conventional battle. In the 1970s, new doctrines were
predicated on the use of conventional weapons, including ATGMs, tanks and mines, with
the hope of delaying the use of tactical nuclear weapons still further. In the 1980s, with
the "maneuver warfare" doctrine, the British Army sought to obtain greater military
results by defending elastically, in depth, and launching an offensive counter-stroke at an
appropriate time and location. Although more risky than previous doctrines, "maneuver
warfare" offered the potential of opposing a longer conventional resistance to a Warsaw
Pact offensive and, potentially, inflicting a decisive defeat on enemy forces. Table VI,
below, illustrates the major doctrinal changes and the factors leading to their adoption.
Table VI:
Major Changes in British Doctrine, 1958-1990
Tactical Nuclear Tactical Nuclear Defense
Air Interdiction "Killing Zones" with ATGMs
Maneuver
Warfare
Date of
Introduction
Enabling
Technologies
Nuclear
Threshold
Reactive to
Soviet doctrine
Offensiveness
Major Actors
1958 1964
Nuclear Bombs
Immediate atomic
interdiction
No
Offensive-Defensive
Commanders of
BAOR and RAF
Germany
Tactical Nuclear
Artillery and
Rockets
Up to to 3 days
of non-nuclear
combat
No
Defensive-Defensive
Brigadier Carver,
Gen. Hackett,
B.H. Liddell Hart
1971 1981
ATGMs
5-7 days of
non-nuclear
battle
No
Defensive-Defensive
F.M. Carver,
Brigadier Bramall,
Brigadier Carnegie
Minor (New Tanks
and Infantry
Fighting Vehicles
conventional
victory possible?
Yes
Offensive-Defensive
F.M. Bramall,
Gen. Bagnall,
Gen. Farndale,
R. Simpkin
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The major impetus for these changes was officers' perceptions of the evolution of
weapons technology, the art of war and the relative capabilities of British forces and their
adversaries. The question was how best could a fixed British contingent-the BOAR's
55,000 men-be employed to accomplish the mission of defending a 65-mile long sector
against a Warsaw Pact attack. The answers favored by the British Army changed as the
Army reconsidered new technologies, lessons drawn from military experience and
emerging intelligence. The primary factor behind the adoption of the atomic air
interdiction doctrine was the availability of tactical nuclear weapons and the Canberra
bombers, combined with the armed forces' perceptions about how they should be used.
The doctrine was politically escalatory because the need to launch the air interdiction
campaign from the beginning of hostilities left little opportunity for diplomats to agree to
a ceasefire and increased the likelihood that the Soviet Union would employ strategic
nuclear weapons.
The inflexibility of the atomic air interdiction doctrine, which became evident
during the Berlin Crises of 1958 to 1962, prompted the formation in 1964 of a doctrine
based on tactical nuclear "killing zones." Although new technology, in the form of
tactical nuclear missiles and artillery projectiles, permitted the adoption of the new
concept, the tactical nuclear weapons were grafted onto a force structure that had
undergone only comparatively minor changes.'88
The transition from tactical nuclear "killing zones" to employing ATGMs to
inflict disproportionate attrition on enemy armored forces was driven both by a
fundamental reevaluation of the value of tactical nuclear weapons and the Army's
perception of the potential utility of ATGMs. After years of study and debate, the British
Army collectively changed its mind, concluding that tactical nuclear weapons would
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favor the attacker if used by both sides. In addition, the cost effectiveness of ATGMs
offered a potential alternative that would permit the British Army to resist a Soviet
offensive for a limited time.
The evolution from the "mobile linear" defense to a concept based on
conventional anti-tank "killing areas" was motivated by findings that indicated that
Soviet forces would concentrate on achieving narrow breakthroughs rather than
advancing on a broad front. Also contributing were changing views on whether tanks
should be used to launch local counter-attacks or deployed defensively in anti-tank
gunnery from concealed positions.
Finally, the shift from conventional doctrines based on inflicting attrition on
enemy armored forces to one founded on disrupting an enemy offensive through
"maneuver warfare" was prompted by a better understanding of Soviet military doctrine
and the British Army's own changing vision of the practice of war. Largely through
journal articles and lectures on Soviet military thought, British officers came to consider
their existing military plans as inadequate. Selected writings and a fresh look at military
history convinced them that existing British military practice was tied to an obsolete
attritional model of warfare that was less efficient than the "maneuver warfare" approach
that the German and Soviet armies had developed as early as the 1930s.
The most frequent factor motivating change in British Army doctrine was
changing views of military technology, which underlay doctrinal changes in 1958, 1964,
1971 and the mid-1970s, when a new appreciation of tactical nuclear weapons, ATGMs
and tanks contributed to doctrinal reform. Changing perceptions of enemy capabilities
proved an important ingredient in two cases, the shift to anti-tank "killing areas" in the
mid-1970s and the adoption of "maneuver warfare" during the 1980s. A fundamental
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reassessment of the art of war played a role in one change-the shift to "maneuver
warfare." What all of these motivating factors have in common, save the last, is that they
are exclusively concerned with military efficiency-i.e. employing a fixed set of
resources to the best effect in countering a given threat. Unlike French military doctrine
during the same period, political considerations were almost entirely absent from the
British doctrines.
Changes in British Army doctrine are both evolutionary and radical. On the one
hand, institutional processes shaping British doctrine from 1958 to 1989 were
fundamentally evolutionary, with internal debates leading to doctrinal reforms taking a
decade or more to run their course. This is seen with the arguments that tactical nuclear
weapons would favor an attacker relative to a defender, which were present in the
correspondence between Carver and Hart as early as 1958, validated in Army studies
from 1965, and became the basis for doctrinal change in 1971. Similarly, the Sandhurst
Soviet Studies Centre began informing British officers of how the Soviet Army intended
to fight soon after its foundation in 1971, however British doctrinal change did not follow
until a decade later.
The evolutionary nature of British Army doctrine is also evident in the significant
elements of continuity linking doctrines over time. British conceptions of large-scale
conventional warfare changed incrementally between 1945 and 1981 and were marked by
an exceptionally deliberate, static and attritional mindset. At a micro-level, the concept
of canalizing enemy forces into killing "zones" was recycled for use with both tactical
nuclear weapons (1964-197 1) and conventional weapons (mid-1970s). Likewise, much
of the tactical theory behind how the main battle position would be defended remained
constant throughout the shift from anti-tank attrition to maneuver warfare.
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Although doctrines contained evolutionary components, the concept of how
military means will be employed to accomplish a political end changed radically with
each shift in doctrine. Issues as fundamental as the effect of technologies on warfare, the
crossing of the nuclear threshold and the offensiveness or defensiveness of doctrines
changed dramatically from one doctrine to the next.
In the United Kingdom significant doctrinal change occurred when senior military
leaders chose to impose a new vision and plan for conducting military operations.
However, there were two separate pathways by which senior military leaders could
articulate a vision for change, either when promoted into a key position while already
possessing definite ideas for reform or when endorsing new operational concepts
advanced by lower-level division or brigade commanders. Some key reformers, such as
Carver and Bramall, were promoted to the upper echelons of the British Army's
hierarchy precisely because their superiors recognized a capacity for creative and
independent thought.' 89
In other cases, new operational concepts emerged from below, from brigade and
divisional commanders. The role of brigadiers, such as Bramall and Carnegie, was key in
the elaboration of tactics for employing ATGMs and armor in the late-1960s and early-
1970s. Lower ranked officers contributed to the development of doctrine through studies
of technical matters, such as the potential of new forms of weaponry, and military
mavericks (Hart and Simpkin) contributed to the elaboration of doctrine on two occasions
through their contacts with serving officers.'90 In no case did civilian policymakers
promote or employ maverick officers to shape alternatives to the Army's doctrines.
In sum, professional military officers developed British Army doctrine through a
decentralized process in which various echelons of authority and structures within the
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Army contributed to doctrinal change. In certain cases, such as the Bagnall reforms, a
senior military commander with reformist ideas imposed changes. In others, such as the
development of doctrines based on anti-tank attrition during the 1970s, so many elements
within the Army contributed to doctrinal change that the new doctrines seemed to
organically evolve from their predecessors. In no case did the United Kingdom's elected
leaders intervene in these processes. They, rather, established, negotiated and maintained
the United Kingdom's foreign policy commitments and determined the financial
resources that would be dedicated to these military engagements.
The question remains as to how satisfactory were British military doctrines. Each
successive British military doctrine represented an informal consensus or compromise
within the Army's high command as to the best manner in which a given set of resources
could be employed to counter a Warsaw Pact offensive on West Germany. As such,
however objectively imperfect they may be, British Army doctrines represented the acme
of the state's military expertise at a given moment. Doctrine tended to respond in a
timely and fluid manner to developments in military technology and clear evidence of
new enemy military capabilities.
Although British Army doctrine evolved incrementally, this does not constitute
grounds for criticism. Compared to other great power armies facing similar structural
conditions, the British Army's judgments about doctrinal trends appear sound and,
occasionally, precocious, as seen, for example, in the British Chiefs of Staff accurately
foreseeing the need to rely on massive retaliation and, later, the need to introduce tactical
nuclear weapons in Europe, several years before their American counterparts did. After
precociously forecasting the need for tactical nuclear weapons, the British Army went
further and faster than its American counterpart in discounting their value.
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However, it is possible to level three criticisms at British Army doctrine. Firstly,
because the ultimate authority for authoring reforms was diffuse and belonged to a range
of senior military commanders, changes in British military doctrine timidly challenged
the balance between different combat arms (i.e. infantry, tanks, artillery and engineers).
As a result, reforms that did not benefit an existing combat arm or radically upset the
balance between them were rarely enacted. One example was the British Army's failure
to use helicopters for either tactical mobility or anti-tank combat.
Despite promising experiments, institutional opposition emerged whenever
someone proposed that the British Army should create a large tactical formation (brigade
or division) centered upon helicopters. The Royal Armoured Corps feared that
helicopters would supplant tanks and the Royal Air Force (RAF) was apprehensive lest
the Army use the creation of an airmobile unit as an excuse to seize the RAF's
helicopters. As a consequence, the United Kingdom lagged behind the United States, the
Soviet Union, France and West Germany when it came to employing helicopters in a land
battle.191
A second criticism that can be leveled against British Army doctrine is its lack of
political-military integration. Although political leaders established and periodically
revalidated the United Kingdom's commitment to defending West Germany and provided
certain means for doing so, neither political nor military leaders attempted to elucidate
exactly what political affect British military forces should attempt to achieve in the event
of war. Consequently, the British Army established its own metrics for success. Under
the 1958 doctrine, success was defined by military victory, which depended on the
immediate and massive use of tactical nuclear weapons; by the 1970s, it consisted of
halting Warsaw Pact forces long enough, using conventional force, for diplomacy and
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coercive threats to bring about a ceasefire; in the 1980s, it hoped to win a decisive
military victory against the first echelons of Warsaw Pact forces.
In no case were the political implications of different military doctrines
adequately explored. For example, the objective of stopping an enemy offensive
temporarily-for a long week, to use Bramall's expression-would have only paid
dividends if British or NATO leaders had concrete plans for how they would extend
diplomatic feelers to the Soviet Union and what tactics they would use to threaten further
escalation, yet propose de-escalatory measures. Neither archives nor interviews have
produced any evidence of diplomatic or political planning of this sort, and it is likely that
none took place. Likewise, when "maneuver warfare" was introduced in the 1980s, its
political ramifications were ignored in the United Kingdom. As we have seen,
"maneuver warfare" seemed aggressive to Soviet leaders, could have increased the
likelihood of escalation in the event or war and worried certain political and military
leaders in West Germany. 192
By way of conclusion, the evolution of British Army doctrine was marked by
progressive and continuous improvements in how the British Army intended to fight.
These reforms were developed and approved by the Army's high command and reacted
to changes in military technology, enemy capabilities and tactical practices. The
principle shortcomings of this system were the poor integration of military doctrine with
the states' foreign policy and the bounded nature of doctrinal reforms, which avoided
upsetting existing institutional equilibriums. Given the large discrepancy in conventional
forces, British doctrines also appear more offensive and escalatory than political or,
perhaps, military criteria would warrant.
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End Notes
I Many different definitions of military doctrine have been advanced over time. In
the Soviet Union, Minister of Defense Grechko defined doctrine as "a system of views on
the nature of war and methods of waging it, and on the preparation of the country and
army for war, officially adopted in a given state and its armed forces." The 1993 edition
of the United States' Army's manual FM 100-5 stated that, "Doctrine is the statement of
how America's Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war and operations other
than war. It is the condensed expression of the Army's fundamental approach to fighting,
influencing events in operations other than war, and deterring actions detrimental to
national interests. As an authoritative statement, doctrine must be definitive enough to
guide specific operations, yet remain adaptable enough to address diverse and varied
situations worldwide." The British Army defines doctrine (in the 1996 British Military;
Doctrine) as "Military doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought,
that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of
current and future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the
methods of engaging in them to achieve success."
As should be evident from these three examples, there are both numerous
similarities and differences between definitions of doctrine. The Soviet definition of
doctrine is broader than the Anglo-American definitions in that it refers to preparing the
country and the army for war according to views adopted by the state and the armed
forces. As such, the Soviet definition clearly emphasizes the political as well as the
military nature of doctrine. British and American definitions of doctrine, by way of
contrast, concentrate solely on the role of the armed forces in establishing and executing a
military doctrine.
Drawing on any of these definitions, doctrine is clearly different from strategy,
tactics or war plans, but encompasses elements of each of them and is therefore difficult
to entirely distinguish from these related concepts.
See Department of the Headquarters of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (June
1993), 1-1; and Prepared under the Chief of the General Staff, Design for Military
Operations: the British Military Doctrine (1996), 1-1.
2 Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modem Military
(Ithaca: Cornell, 1991), passim; and Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State
(Cambridge: Harvard, 1957), passim.
3 Rosen, 251-53.
4 The offensive bias of military organizations has been widely documented in the
political science literature on war plans, doctrine and innovation. A number of reasons
have been advanced for this bias. First, the military normatively prefers offensive
operations as being more "manly" or valorizing. Barry Posen best expressed this
motivation in his statement that, "Offense makes soldiers specialists in victory, defense
makes them specialists in attrition, and deterrence makes them specialists in slaughter."
Second, offensive operations permit military organizations to simplify their planning
requirements. Whereas a defensive army must react to enemy initiatives, an offensive
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army can make detailed plans, during peacetime, for its future military operations. Third
and finally, offensive doctrines are organizationally useful when it comes to arguing for
financial and human resources. As Jack Snyder argued, "Offense is difficult and
demands large defense budgets. It is also productive-productive in that decisive
offensive campaigns produce demonstrable returns on the state's investment in military
capability." Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and
the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell, 1984), 15-40; Barry Posen, The Sources of
Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca:
Cornell, 1984); and Richard Ned Lebow, "The Soviet Offensive in Europe: The
Schlieffen Plan Revisited?," in Soviet Military Policy (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1989),
312-46.
5 These include the unification of the Ministry of Defense, the strengthening of
the Chief of Defense Staff vis-a-vis the Chiefs of the separate services and the
restructuring of higher military education along "joint" inter-service lines.
6 As Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary and highest-ranking civil servant in the
United Kingdom, confided to the Prime Minister in 1967, defense policymaking at this
level consisted of "a series of arbitrary and spasmodic responses to recurring economic
crises." PREM 13/2688 Burke Trend to Prime Minister, March 13, 1967.
7 Assistant Chief of the General Staff General William Jackson likened this
process to a two level commodity market, where the Cabinet's Public Expenditure
Review served as a the general market, while the Ministry of Defense "can be looked
upon as a specialized commodity market, in which the three Services and the Defence
scientists bargain for their share of the resources won by the Secretary of State on the
main trading floor during the annual Public Expenditure Review." William Jackson,
Britain's Defence Dilemma: An Inside View (London: Batsford, 1990), 10.
8
'Ibid.
9 In procurement terms, the RAF has received on average 18 percent of the
procurement budget, the Army 17 percent and the Navy 16 percent between 1965 and
1989. Ibid., 16.
10 Interview with Major-General Kenneth Perkins, September 19, 2007.
" John Kiszely, "The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945,"
Journalfor Strategic Studies (December 1996): 185.
1 Established in 1945 as part of a bilateral agreement with Soviet occupying
forces in Eastern Germany, BRIXMIS fulfilled an official espionage role throughout the
Cold War, monitoring the equipment, readiness and standard operating procedures of the
Group of Soviet Forces in East Germany (GFSG) and the Eastern German National
People's Army.
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1 These ratios varied significantly, from two-forward/two-back, to two-
forward/one-back, to four-forward.
14 Interview with Major-General Kenneth Perkins, September 19, 2007.
15 As one division commander relates in a statement that was as much the rule as
the exception in British planning, "I always had it in my mind to alter our positions from
the published ones if the balloon went up.... This would unquestionably land me in
serious trouble with the corps commander but in the light of all of the other troubles at
such a time [the Third World War] I doubted if it would be remembered as important."
John Akehurst, Generally Speaking: 'Then Hurrah for the Life of a Soldier' (Wilby:
Michael Russell, 1999), 177.
16 As General Jackson observed, "When a new government takes office and opens
the Defence books, it expects to find ample room for change and improvement. The new
ministers soon find that there is remarkably little room for manoeuvre.... The whole
structure which the Ministry controls and administers is as closely integrated as that of
modern warships and high-performance aircraft." Jackson, 20.
" After the allied breakout from the Normandy beachheads in 1944, the British
2 1st Army Group and two American Army Groups ( 12 th and 6th) were assigned
operational sectors based on political and logistics considerations. Because advancing
northwards through the low-countries, into Northern Germany permitted British forces to
remain comparatively close to their supply bases in the United Kingdom, it made sense to
direct the 2 1st British Army Group to attack in a northeasterly direction, as opposed to
directly eastwards or in a southeasterly direction. Once Germany began launching
missile attacks on the United Kingdom, it became politically important for British forces
to evict German missile forces from launch zones in Northern France and the
Netherlands.
18 This comprised the territory from the Danish Border in the north to the city of
Cologne in the south.
19 After the end of hostilities, the British Army rapidly drew-down its forces in
Northern Europe both as a response to the need to demobilize its large wartime army and
meet colonial and overseas obligations. As a result, the 14 divisions and 835,000 men
that comprised 2 1st Army Group at the end of hostilities quickly withered to four
divisions in 1946, before reaching a nadir of two divisions by 1947. Jean Bouchery, The
British Soldier from D-Day to VE-Day: Volume 2, Organization, Armament, Tanks and
Vehicles (Paris: Histoire et Collections, 1999), 8-24; and Graham Watson and Richard
Rinaldi, The British Army in Germany (BA OR and After): An Organizational History,
1947-2004 (United States: Tiger Lily Publications for Orbat.com, 2005), 3-17.
2 Their limited forces in Germany were more to assist the occupying authorities
to maintain order and prevent an outbreak of German revisionism than to deter a Soviet
invasion. In fact, when a team of Anglo-American planners examined the strategic
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situation in 1947, they concluded that all existing allied forces in Western Europe must be
evacuated to the United Kingdom as quickly as possible in the event of war with the
Soviet Union. In a not-so-subtle reference to the withdrawal of British forces from the
continent in 1940, the joint Anglo-American plan was code-named "Dunkirk." Sean
Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, 1945-91 (London: Macmillan, 2000), 57.
21 Michael Carver, Out of Step: The Memoirs of Field Marshal Lord Carver
(London: Hutchinson, 1989), 240-42.
22 As Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin told the Cabinet in January 1948, "he would
be embarrassed in his dealings with Britain's potential European allies if planning were
based on the assumption that an army was not to be sent." Greenwood, 61.
2 Though several previously planned dissolutions occurred as scheduled, the
BAOR's troop numbers finally bottomed-out at 24 combat battalions in late 1948,
compared to 25 battalions at the beginning of the year. Watson and Rinaldi, 4.
2 Despite the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
1949, the United Kingdom did not immediately envision a larger commitment to
continental Europe. In December 1949, the British government informed its NATO allies
that its contribution to the alliance would lay in strategic air power, defending oceanic
lines of communication and guaranteeing the security of the Middle East.
The true transition in the BAOR's mission to an operational military structure
occurred a year later, in 1950 after North Korea invaded South Korea. Although it did
not result in an immediate increase of British troops in Western Europe, the British
Cabinet's Defence Committee agreed in March 1950 (i.e. before the outbreak of the
Korean War in June) that the United Kingdom should provide an army corps of two
infantry divisions in the event of war. This decision reversed the earlier policy of not
reinforcing Western Europe in the event of war. The decision was explained in terms of
Cabinet now holding that it was a fundamental interest to hold the Russians East of the
Rhine. While not sharing the worries of American policymakers that the war in Korea
was a possible prelude to an attack in Western Europe, British decision-makers were
convinced that a stronger allied military presence in Western Europe was necessary.
The British decision to reinforce its forces in Western Europe was followed by a
similar American decision, in September 1950 to send four to six additional divisions to
Western Europe. Saki Dockrill, "Retreat from the Continent? Britain's Motives for
Troop Reductions in West Germany, 1955-1958," The Journal of Strategic Studies 20,
no. 3 (September 1997): 48; John Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical
Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford, University
Press, 1982), 114; and Greenwood, 49.
25 At the Lisbon Conference of 1952, NATO's member states accepted the goal of
building-up a total force of 96 divisions by 1955, which was what American military
planners considered necessary.
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26 Given the United Kingdom's limited resources and extensive commitments
elsewhere, British policymakers hoped that most of the additional forces required for
Europe's defense would be provided by a large-scale commitment of American combat
forces to Western Europe and the rearmament of West Germany. Percy Cradock, Know
Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London: John
Murray, 2001), 94.
2 France pledged 15 to 20 divisions and West Germany 12. PRO CAB 21/3585
Report by the Chiefs of Staff: Defence Policy and Global Strategy, June 17, 1952; and
Dockrill, 51.
28 In June of 1952, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee predicted that the Lisbon
goals would not be met because, "The continental Allies cannot, however, meet their
share of the rearmament programme without increasing and continuing American aid,
which there seems no reason to suppose will be forthcoming." Within several months,
the British Chiefs of Staff's analysis proved prescient when France informed its NATO
partners that the ongoing war in Indochina prevented it from maintaining more than 10
divisions in Western Europe. PRO CAB 21/3585 Report by the Chiefs of Staff: Defence
Policy and Global Strategy, June 17, 1952; and Dockrill.
29 It consisted of 52,000 soldiers, or 12 percent of the total force of 434,000 men
in late 1950.
30 According to the Chiefs of Staff, "The road to Paris might well be via Peking
and Delhi. Communism is already in Peking and, unless action is concerted against it,
may soon be in Delhi and well on the road to the Mediterranean and Africa," and, "The
stabilization of the Middle East States within the Western orbit by international action is
an essential measure in the Cold War, and any excessive reduction-let alone complete
withdrawal-of British military forces would result in the rapid spread of Russian
influence throughout the area."
Partially due to their 1952 examination of British strategy, leading to the Top
Secret report to the Cabinet on "Defence Policy and Global Strategy," the British Chiefs
of Staff also argued that providing an adequate conventional defense for Western Europe
would be financially ruinous. They argued that, "Over-expenditure on rearmament,
leading to the ruin of the economy of Western Europe, would be to play the Communist
game and to present Russia with a bloodless victory gained at the sole cost of playing
upon the nerves of the Free World." PRO CAB 21/3585 Report by the Chiefs of Staff:
Defence Policy and Global Strategy, June 17, 1952.
31 There was a political limit to the extent that the United Kingdom could
economize in Western Europe. They would not jeopardize the integrity of NATO and
thus lose the Cold War. The Chiefs of Staff Committee articulated their dilemma very
succinctly, "A substantial reduction of existing peace-time forces maintained by the
United Kingdom in Europe would produce the biggest saving in overseas military
expenditure. But the one thing that would inevitably lose the Cold War would be to bring
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about the disruption of N.A.T.O. by the withdrawal of United Kingdom forces from the
Continent." Ibid.
32 Dockrill, 53.
33 In a comprehensive 1975 study of the different options available to the Warsaw
Pact, NORTHAG's headquarters concluded that the British 1 't Corps was likely to bear
the brunt of between 44 and 46 percent of the enemy divisions assigned to attack
NORTHAG. Given that the British sector counted only a third of NORTHAG's active
divisions, it was expected to suffer disproportionately in an enemy attack. Even worse,
one contingency consisted of over half of the Warsaw Pact's effort against NORTHAG
being directed in the British sector. PRO DEFE 48/769 Major P.M. Will, DOAE Study
No. D7504, Warsaw Pact Land Threat, October 1975.
Although later documents are unavailable, considerable evidence indicates that
British military leaders continued to believe that massive and disproportionate Warsaw
Pact forces would attack the 65-miles of front that the British Army was supposed to
defend in the event of war. Both of the fictional works dated from 1978, written by well-
informed retired British generals, involved massive attacks on the British sector.
NORTHAG's commander, General Nigel Bagnall, reiterated the same theme in 1984.
See Hackett et al., 159-86; Bidwell et al., 208-25, and Imperial War Museum Oral
History Archive, Document 16197, Nigel Bagnall, "Concepts of Land-Air Operations in
the Central Region: A British Perspective," May 25, 1984.
3 The Belgians were to defend the Harz Mountains and the Dutch a low-lying
region congested by numerous waterways. Broadly speaking, the North German Plain
consists of a broad, flat geographic corridor, delineated by Bremen in the north and the
Harz Mountains in the south. In terms of length, it is difficult to say exactly where the
North German Plain ends. An army advancing along the plain can march through
Northern Germany, the Southern Netherlands, Belgium and Northern France before
encountering a strategically significant geographic obstacle in the form of France's
Massif Central.
3 Although tanks and other tracked armored vehicles can move across open
countryside, the many wheeled logistics vehicles comprising late-twentieth century
armies needed dense road networks to sustain the units in combat. The autobahn running
from Berlin, to Magdeburg and Hannover, before forking into two routes after passing the
Wesser River south of Minden, provided a seemingly ideal invasion route, which ran
directly through the center of the British defensive sector. Further to the north, the
autobahn running from Verden to Bremen and Oldenburg provided the axis for another
large-scale attack. Although an offensive in this sector would be more difficult to exploit
strategically, it had the advantage of enabling Warsaw Pact forces to strike the juncture
between the British 1s' Corps and the West German Ist Corps.
36 As Major-General Kenneth Perkins confessed, "We [the British Army] were
always conscious that being on the North German Plain we were sitting astride the
obvious route for a Soviet offensive." Until the end of the Cold War, analyses continued
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to highlight the danger to NORTHAG and the British 1s' Corps in particular. General
John Hackett, who served as commander of the BAOR and NORTHAG from 1966 to
1968, emphasized that, from a Soviet perspective, "NORTHAG continues to offer the
most attractive point of decisive entry." In a fictional work from 1978, British Brigadier
Shelford Bidwell envisaged the main Soviet offensive crushing NORTHAG within three
days, while American and West Germany troops in the CENTAG sector stymied the
Soviet advance in their own sectors.
Bidwell and Hackett both led teams of experts in writing fictional accounts of a
Third World War. In Hackett's book, NATO eventually manages to halt the Warsaw
Pact offensive, largely because of increased defense spending prior to the beginning of
the scenario. Bidwell's book involves the collapse of NATO after a relatively short war.
However, in both cases NORTHAG is presented as the favored area for the Warsaw Pact
assault. Interview with Major-General Kenneth Perkins, September 19, 2007; John
Hackett et al. The Third World War: August 1985 (New York: Macmillan, 1978), 108;
and Shelford Bidwell et al. World War 3: A Terrifying Military Projection Founded on
Today's Facts (Feltham, the United Kingdom: Hamlyn, 1978), 208-25.
3 The military readiness of the Belgian corps suffered further from the state's
modest defense budget, the lowest as a percentage of GNP of any of the European states
committed to the Central Front, and the shortest period of military service, which
declined to eight months for forces assigned to West Germany. Obligatory military
service in Belgium declined from a maximum of 20 months in 1950 to 12 months by the
end of the decade. Eventually, terms of service were reduced further, to 10 months for
soldiers assigned to Belgium and eight for those based in West Germany. The repeated
reductions in Belgian terms of conscription elicited complaint from NATO allies, but to
no avail. Perhaps surprisingly given the short terms of military service, Belgian units
performed well at NATO's bi-annually tank gunnery competition, the Canadian Army
Trophy contest.
Because of Belgian and Dutch deficiencies, American assessments continually
viewed NORTHAG as highly vulnerable. In a blunt Top Secret assessment from 1964,
the American Department of Defense judged the forces guarding NORTHAG as "weak."
The theme of NORTHAG's comparatively low-readiness was later repeated in secret
NATO analyses and published studies of the Central Front. Of the latter, a 1977 work by
a Belgian general asserted that NORTHAG could be defeated in a surprise attack before
allied forces could reach their defensive positions. Writing along the same general lines,
Brigadier Bidwell lamented in his 1978 that, "The accident of history had placed the
strongest foreign contingent, the Americans, well to the south of the most dangerous
Soviet thrust line [NORTHAG]." See Yves Debay, Leopard 1 (Paris: Histoire et
Collections, 2005), 54-57; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance, 1980-1981 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1980), 21; Frank Camm, OASD,
The Role of Tactical Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy, NATO Ministerial Meeting,
Paris, France, December 1964; General Close, Europe sans defense? (Brussels: Arts et
Voyages, 1977); and Bidwell et al., 213.
38 The table below illustrates average annual defense expenditures as a percentage
of GNP.
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Western Europe and the Central Front:
Average Annual Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP
Country 1962-64 1966-69 1971-74 1979-80
Belgium 3.7 3.0 2.8 3.3
Netherlands 4.9 3.7 3.4 3.3
West Germany 5.7 3.9 3.4 3.3
France 6.9 4.8 3.6 4.0
The United Kingdom 7.1 5.5 5.1 5.0
See The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1965-1966 (London: The
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), 42; The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance, 1970-1971 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), 110;
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1975-1976
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1975), 76; The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance, 1980-1981 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1980), 96;
and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1985-1986
(London: Arms and Armour Press, 1980), 170.
39 The Belgian and Dutch army corps were assigned to NORTHAG's sector for
logistical, political and economic reasons. In the Belgian case, one division (60 percent)
out of the two comprising the Belgian corps was forward deployed in peacetime, while
the other remained based in Belgium. In the Dutch case, only one brigade was deployed
on German territory out of a total force of two active divisions and one reserve division.
4 French studies from 1959, 1966 and 1970 all anticipated that the main threat to
NORTHAG would come in the British sector. Providing more details, a West German
assessment from 1969 independently concluded that the Warsaw Pact would concentrate
its attacking forces against NORTHAG in three locations. The main offensive blow
would be delivered in the north of the British 1st Corps sector, at the juncture between
British and West German forces. A second thrust would be directed at the center of the
British sector, along the line of autobahn running from Magdeburg to Hannover. Finally,
the third Warsaw Pact assault would be directed at the southern area of the British
sector-between Hannoversch-Mtnder and H6xter-at the juncture of 1s' British Corps
and the Belgian forces further to the southThe main thrust was described as coming from
the area of Wittenberge-Stendal via the Wesser crossings between Bremen and Verden,
with the aim of crossing the Rhine between Nijmegen and Wesel. The first supporting
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thrust was described as coming from the region of Magdeburg and the Letzlinger Heide
in the direction of the Weser crossings on either side of Minden (known as the
"Westphalian Gates"), before advancing south westwards in the direction of the Ruhr
region. The third attack was described as coming from the area around Nordhausen, in
the direction of the Weser crossings near Hannoversch-Mtinder and H6xter, before
advancing westwards towards Paderborn. See "Fighting for the Heart of Germany: The I
(GE) Corps and the NATO-planned Defense of North German Plain in the 1960s." and
Sarmat and Mercier, 113-19.
41 The British government began to argue in April 1955 that NATO should not
sustain more forces than necessary in Western Europe for countering "local infiltration, to
prevent external intimidation and to enable aggression to be identified as such." For
British planners, the BAOR was larger than warranted for these limited tasks and there
was neither the need nor the likelihood of the United Kingdom, the United States or
European states bearing the costs to provide the scale of conventional forces needed to
defend Western Europe. Andreas Wegner, "The Politics of Military Planning: Evolution
of NATO's Strategy," War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in
the East and West (London: Routledge, 2006), 170.
42 While the United States shared the United Kingdom's ambition of reducing its
troop contribution, American military planners feared a British cutback would lead to
greater dependence on American nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, British and American
efforts to reduce their contributions to NATO prompted the West Germans to slow down
their rearmament, to curtain the financial support they were providing for NATO troops
on West German territory. Belgian, Dutch and French political leaders saw the presence
of large numbers of British troops as a guarantee against recidivism.
As already mentioned, West Germany's planned contribution to NATO was
originally 12 divisions, comprising a total of 500,000 men. These forces were supposed
to be operational by 1958. The unpopularity of rearmament led the Bundestag to approve
conscription for only 12 months in September 1956, as opposed to the 18 months
believed necessary. One of the reasons for the Bundestag's decision was the leak to the
New York Times of the so-called Radford Plan (named after the Chairman of the
American Joint Chiefs of Staff), which argued for a reduction in American military
personnel of 800,000, including significant forces in Europe. By October 1956, the West
German government revised the timetable for its own rearmament to providing 360,000
troops by 1960. By the end of 1956, only 70,000 troops were available out of the 96,000
West Germany had promised. See Dockrill, 52-58.
43 Throughout the Berlin Crises (1958-61) the United Kingdom's behavior was in
fact the least resolute of the three occupying powers. Whereas American Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles argued that Khrushchev was bluffing and that the allied powers
should not respond to his threats. French President Charles de Gaulle was dismissive of
Khrushchev's threats. As a firm believer in nuclear deterrence, de Gaulle did not believe
that Khrushchev was willing to initiate acts that could lead to war. Showing defiance in
the face of Khrushchev's threats therefore became a means of developing France's
alliance with West Germany, whose government feared Western concessions over Berlin.
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By way of contrast, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson favored a policy of nearly
continuous summit meetings and considered a variety of concessions, including dealing
with the East German government over access to Berlin and accepting Polish Foreign
Minister Adam Rapacki's proposal to disarm Central Europe. See Craddock, 142-47.
NATO's Supreme Commander of Allied Forces Europe (SACEUR), General
Lauris Norstad, went so far as to tell the British Foreign Minister in June 1959 that if the
United Kingdom withdrew any more troops "he would throw his hand in." Ibid., 61.
44 Contrary to expectations, the Berlin Crisis lingered, with fears expressed about
further Soviet initiatives until well after the construction of the Berlin Wall in August
1961, and even after the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. By the
time the Berlin question finally retreated into the background, the Kennedy
Administration had replaced the Eisenhower Administration in the United States. The
new American government wanted to shift NATO's strategic from one of instant nuclear
retaliation to one based on mounting a flexible response to aggression. Because this
entailed greater reliance on conventional forces, there was even less hope for the United
Kingdom to negotiate further troop withdrawals from West Germany.
45 Although British forces would be reorganized several times, the Army's
commitment to the defense of West Germany remained a constant 55,000 until 1990; thus
as the overall size of the British Army declined, the percentage of troops assigned to
West Germany increased, from 20 percent in 1957 to a third of the total. The 77,000
British troops committed to NATO's Central Region in 1957 constituted 20 percent of a
British Army possessing 380,000 troops; the 55,000 troops present in 1960 comprised 21
percent of a British Army of 264,000 troops; and as the BAOR retained a constant
strength of 55,000, yet the British Army eventually shrunk to 180,000 and, finally,
165,000 personnel, the percentage of British Army manpower committed to Germany
comprised a third of the total.
46 The British Joint Intelligence Committee evaluated the threat as 170 divisions
in 1947. The Joint War Plans Committee of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff produced
an estimate of 175 divisions the next year. Both British and American estimates appear
not to have substantially changed until Khrushchev announced significant reductions in
the size of the armed forces in .... It is now known that only a small proportion of the
Soviet divisions mentioned were combat ready. Perhaps half of the Soviet divisions were
of no more than cadre strength, possessing 10 percent of their theoretical allocation of
manpower. See Matthew Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised,"
International Security 7, no. 3 (Winter 1982/1983); and Craddock, 52.
The 96 division objective, enshrined in the Lisbon force goals of 1952, was based
on two calculations: 1) the quantity of forces needed to achieve a force-to-space ratio
sufficient to prevent enemy forces from brushing by allied forces too thinly deployed on
the ground, and 2) the number of forces needed to compensate for the enemy's military
strength.
Raoul Castex, "Toujours 'La Revanche du Bareme,"' Revue de Difense
Nationale 7 (June 1951): 696-699.
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In theory, a division defending a front of this length could halt a more numerous
adversary until attrition gradually forced it to give way. However, if a division had to
defend a front much longer than this, enemy forces could infiltrate between its positions
or brush through its defenses without undo difficulty. Using this metric, it would take
approximately 63 allied divisions to defend the 440 miles (700 kilometers) of NATO's
Central European border with the Warsaw Pact. supported by a reserve capable of
intervening where problems arise, additional forces were necessary beyond those needed
to populate a sufficiently dense front-line. A frequent, although rarely attained ideal, in
the defensive is to possess one division in reserve for every two on the front-line. Taking
this logic and applying it to the situation in Central Europe led NATO's planners to
conclude in 1952 that NATO needed 96 to provide adequate reserves as well as man the
front line.
Because standard military practice holds that units defending a front must be
supported by a reserve capable of intervening where problems arise, additional forces
were necessary beyond those needed to populate a sufficiently dense front-line. A
frequent, although rarely attained ideal, in the defensive is to possess one division in
reserve for every two on the front-line. Taking this logic and applying it to the situation
in Central Europe led NATO's planners to conclude in 1952 that NATO needed 96 to
provide adequate reserves as well as man the front line.
48 Two years later, American President Dwight Eisenhower rallied to the
argument that the threat of nuclear reprisals could deter the Soviet Union from using its
preponderant conventional forces against vital western interests. PRO CAB 21/3585
Report by the Chiefs of Staff: Defence Policy and Global Strategy, June 17, 1952.
49 Whereas much of the British Army consisted of infantry forces that were
comparatively lightly equipped and assigned to duties within what was still a far-flung
British Empire, the BAOR contained a significant proportion of heavier forces, including
tanks and artillery. Between the 1950 buildup and the troop withdrawals completed in
1958, the BAOR comprised two to three armored divisions, out of a total of four
divisions. Besides the BAOR, the United Kingdom's only other substantial concentration
of armored forces was an armored division in Libya. Watson and Rinaldi, 31-62.
50 Following the BAOR's first large-scale exercises, staged in October 1949, a
military correspondent highlighted the spirit of the BAOR's revival, "The large-scale
exercises 'Agility One and Two,' staged by the B.A.O.R. last October, did much to
disabuse the general civilian impression over here that our troops in Germany were
simply having a good time. These very strenuous manoeuvres, involving some 50,000
troops, were not isolated outbursts of energy, but the culmination of a summer's work in
which many regiments and battalions had been out on training away from their barracks
continuously for months or more." Special Correspondent, "A Visit to the B.A.O.R.,"
The Fighting Forces: Service Notes and Articles 26, no. 5 (January 1950): 221.
5 One author characterized this process as one in where the "hallowed battle drills
of the Twenty-first Army Group were brought out, polished lovingly and put to work
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again." Alun Gwyn Jones, cited in John Stone, The Tank Debate: Armour and the Anglo-
American Military Tradition (Amsterdam: Harwood, 2000), 42.
5 The British Army's art of war during the Second World War has frequently
been characterized as deliberate, static and attritional. During its later campaigns in
North Africa and North-West Europe, the British Army achieved high force-to-space
ratios in both the attack and the defense, employed overwhelming concentrations of tanks
and artillery when offensive action was necessary, and benefited from the Allies' massive
air superiority. These practices, exemplified in Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery's
philosophy that victory was achievable through a well-trained "teed up" army, fighting
according to a rigid master plan on a "tidy battlefield," were of questionable utility to
thinly-spread British troops tasked with combating a massive Soviet offensive. Kiszely,
"The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945," 183.
53 During exercises in 1947, BAOR divisions emphasized the construction of field
fortifications and did not defend sectors exceeding six to seven miles. This chasm
between British Army tactics and their operational mission led French Field Marshal Jean
de Lattre de Tassigny to remark that, "We [the British Army] were wrong to stage an
exercise in which a Division was covering a front of only about six or seven miles.... At
the start of another war our Divisions would have to cover very much more, and that we
should therefore practice delaying actions over a wide front." Marshal de Lattre de
Tassigny was the Commander-in-Chief of Western Union Land Forces and commented in
this capacity. Emerging from the Brussels Treaty, concluded in 1948, the Western Union
preceded NATO by one year. Special Correspondent, "A Visit to the B.A.O.R.," 222.
5 Rob Griffin, Conqueror (Ramsbury, the United Kingdom: Crowood, 1999), 7-
40; and Richard Ogorkiewicz, "Armoured Fighting Vehicles," Cold War, Hot Science:
Applied Research in Britain's Defence Laboratories, 1945-1990 (Harwood: Amsterdam,
1999), 119-28.
ss The largest up to that time had been the French FCM 2C, which weighed 70
tons. Destined for the offensives of 1919, only 10 FCM 2Cs were produced after the end
of the First World War. Besides the FCM 2C, the next heaviest tank was the German
King Tiger of the Second World War, which weighed 68 tons. At 66 tons, the Conqueror
was the heaviest tank manufactured during the Cold War. Only since the end of the Cold
War have some tanks, notably the American M1 A2 (with depleted-uranium armor)
approached the Conqueror's weight.
56 With the help of Conqueror, the distribution was at a ratio of one troop of
Conquerors per squadron of medium tanks. Conqueror reinforced the static and
attritional bent of British Army tactics, which was already considered a comparative
weakness of British forces. Since the beginning of the Cold War, a number of military
officers argued that greater mobility was needed to compensate for Soviet numbers. The
military correspondent who wrote on the BAOR exercises of 1949, observed that, "If our
divisions are to hold wider fronts, they will surely have to be remodeled to provide fire-
power and mobility." In a 1951, the former commander of the Royal Armoured Corps
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pleaded that, "The way to take on the Russians, if we should have to fight them in Europe
or the Middle East, is by making use of highly skilled mobile armoured forces operating
from firm bases. In this role mobility must have top priority. It replaces the numerical
strength of the Russian masses.... They [British forces] must be able to move rapidly
between enemy columns or round their flanks or to attack them in rear, and they must be
prepared to spend a week behind enemy lines." See Special Correspondent, "A Visit to
the B.A.O.R.," 222; Watson and Rinaldi, 21; and Giffard Martel, "Tank Policy," Journal
of the Royal United Services Institute 95, no. 3 (August 1951): 450.
5 PRO CAB 21/3585 Report by the Chiefs of Staff: Defence Policy and Global
Strategy, June 17, 1952.
58 As Britain's first jet-powered bomber, Canberras had been the delivery means
for the United Kingdom's national nuclear deterrent until production of the more
sophisticated V-Bombers (Valiant, Victor and Vulcan) rendered the Canberras
superfluous for dropping atomic bombs on Soviet cities and making them available for
tactical nuclear missions.
59 Rapidly, the Canberra became RAF Germany's principal aircraft, equipping
seven out of 18 squadrons by the end of 1958. Bill Taylor, Royal Air Force Germany
Since 1945 (Hinckley, the United Kingdom: Midland, 2003), 76-89.
60 Michael Carver, The Apostles of Mobility: The Theory and Practice of
Armoured Warfare (New York: Lees Knowles, 1979), 40-54.
61 Roy Fullick, Shan Hackett: In Pursuit of Exactitude (Barnsley, the United
Kingdom: Leo Cooper, 2003), 177-78; and Michael Carver, Out of Step: The Memoirs of
Field Marshal Lord Carver (London: Hutchinson, 1989), 292-95.
6 According to Carver, "Tactical [nuclear] weapons were not only unnecessary...
but positively dangerous, because, if deterrence did fail, their use would mean the
destruction of Europe." Carver, Out of Step: The Memoirs of Field Marshal Lord Carver,
294.
63 For example, if their use were postponed until Soviet forces crossed the Weser,
authorization for an interdiction campaign would be too late. The British 1st Corps would
probably fail to reconstitute itself and with radio navigation aids lost, few Canberras
would hit their targets in Eastern Europe. A late decision to launch the atomic
interdiction campaign would raise the possibility of escalation to targeting population
centers, while failing to prevent the Soviet occupation of Western Europe.
64 B.H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense: A Fresh Look at the West's Military
Position (New York: Praeger, 1960), 79-80.
65 Liddell Hart's book had a relatively limited readership amongst the British
officer corps. In an interview, Major-General Kenneth Perkins observed that few officers
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read Liddell Hart, who was considered old and excessively theoretical. Interview with
Major-General Kenneth Perkins, September 19, 2007.
Michael Carver claimed that, "The development of my views... owed much to an
almost continuous correspondence with Basil Liddell Hart, punctuated by occasional
meetings." Carver, Out of Step: The Memoirs of Field Marshal Lord Carver, 292.
66 6
For Carver, "If we did not have the ability to use tactical nuclear weapons, the
Russians, playing on the reluctance of the West to unleash global nuclear war, would I
believe be tempted to use force to solve the German problem." Carver reasoned that any
use of tactical nuclear weapons could bring about the danger of a global nuclear exchange
via escalation. Because NATO would likely respond to a conventional attack with
tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would have to incorporate into its calculations
the possibility that conventional aggression would produce nuclear escalation. Ibid., 295.
67 Retrospectively, the Berlin Crisis is considered to have begun in November
1958 with Khrushchev's ultimatum and ended in August 1961 with the construction of
the Berlin Wall. However, British and American policymakers remained nervous
throughout 1962 that Khrushchev would make further efforts to change Berlin's status.
As a result, when the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted in October 1962, many decision-
makers were convinced that the installation of missiles in Cuba was a means of applying
pressure on Berlin.
68 PRO CAB 158/47 Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Committee, Soviet Reactions to
Military Measures Foreseen in Berlin Contingency Planning, December 6, 1962.
69Because the status of Berlin resulted from agreements amongst the occupying
powers at the end of the Second World War, the 1958-62 crisis over the city's status
involved a significant amount of direct negotiation between the Soviet Union, the United
States, the United Kingdom and France. The two German states were in odd situation
that their territory and populations were at stake, yet they were not recognized
internationally as having a stake in the matter.
70 The three-power Berlin contingency plans grouped options into four phases.
Phase three included significant conventional options "to demonstrate the determination
of the Allies not to accept the blocking of access." Phase Three Plans included four
scenarios under which large NATO forces would conduct limited conventional offensives
against the Warsaw Pact. These included: 1) the use of a reinforced division to attack
towards Berlin along the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn; 2) an attack by a corps of four
divisions along the same itinerary; 3) a two division attack to pinch off and hold the
salient East of Kassel; and 4) a corps attack of four divisions to seize the high ground in
the Thuringer Wald. Phase Four Plans included those where "nuclear weapons are used,
either in implementation of nuclear support for Phase 3 operations or in the form of
nuclear demonstrations intended to ensure that the Russians are aware that the Alliance
stands ready for nuclear action." There were two Phase Four plans, which included using
nuclear weapons over East Germany either in desolate regions as a pure demonstration or
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against isolated military targets away from population centers. PRO CAB 158/47
Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Committee, Summary of Berlin Contingency Plans.
71 Given his opposition to the immediate use of tactical nuclear weapons, Carver
recollected, "I found myself in the position of having to train my brigade for operations in
which I did not believe." Carver, Out of Step: The Memoirs of Field Marshal Lord
Carver, 298.
72 Ibid., 299.
73 Carver applied his vision at the comparatively modest level of the brigade he
commanded. The brigade comprised only one seventh of the British First Corps' front
line strength.
74 Stone, 45.
7 It is interesting to contrast this war game with the Buria (Storm) command post
exercise conducted by the Warsaw Pact between September 28 and October 10, 1961. In
the Warsaw Pact exercise, the scenario begins with the Soviet Union handing over
control to East Germany for the access routes to Berlin. In response to this act, an United
States Army division attempted to push its way to Berlin along the Helmstedt-Berlin
autobahn (an action that actually figured in the allied contingency plans). When Soviet
and East German forces resisted the movements of the American division, NATO began
using tactical nuclear weapons. The Warsaw Pact then responded massively with nuclear
weapons and invaded Western Europe, crushing most NATO forces and occupying a
substantial portion of the Benelux countries and France by the fifth day of operations.
Faced with the arguments over doctrine, the British high command had difficulty
making up its mind. Throughout 1958 to 1961, Chief of the General Staff Frankie
Festing left the issue entirely to subordinates in the command structure. Matthias Uhl,
"Storming on to Paris: The 1961 Buria exercise and the planned solution of the Berlin
crisis," War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and
West (London: Routledge, 2006), 52-58.
76 The JIC report states, more fully: "We only envisage global or limited war
between the Soviet Union and the West coming about through a process of
miscalculation.... We believe that it is most improbable that general nuclear war could
come about through miscalculation without being proceeded by a period of limited
hostilities.... During this period, with the dangers of miscalculation very much in mind,
will strive to impress the other with its determination, and at the same time to leave the
door open to negotiation so that neither gets into the position of being unable to withdraw
without loss of face." PRO CAB 158/47 Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Committee,
Likelihood of War with Russia up to 1967, December 6, 1962.
77 PRO CAB 158/47 Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Committee, Escalation, February
19, 1963.
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78 Ibid.
79 Solly Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles: An Autobiography 1946-1988
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), 279.
80 Warsaw Pact war games from this period never specified that Warsaw Pact
forces would use tactical nuclear weapons first. Rather, Warsaw Pact forces used tactical
nuclear weapons after either NATO forces had employed them, or firm intelligence was
available that there were imminently going to do so. However, if NATO initiated the use
of tactical nuclear weapons, the Warsaw Pact planned to respond massively. Uhl, 46-65.
81 As Defense Science Advisor Solly Zuckerman emphasized, most railway
centers were located in the middle of heavily populated cities and ammunition dumps and
tank parks were close to railway centers. Solly Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles:
An Autobiography 1946-1988 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), 279.
82 Warsaw Pact war games from this period never specified that Warsaw Pact
forces would use tactical nuclear weapons first. Rather, Warsaw Pact forces used tactical
nuclear weapons after either NATO forces had employed them, or firm intelligence was
available that there were imminently going to do so. However, if NATO initiated the use
of tactical nuclear weapons, the Warsaw Pact planned to respond massively. Uhl, 46-65.
83 Interview with Major-General Kenneth Perkins, September 19, 2007.
84 With all three of these weapons, the United Kingdom purchased the delivery
systems (i.e. the missiles, launch vehicles and, in the case of the 8-inch howitzer, the gun
itself), but the United States retained control of the warheads. If war erupted, it required
the authorization of both the American President and the British Prime Minister to use the
weapons. When the United States President gave his approval, an American warhead
custodial unit would transport the nuclear warheads to the British artillery battalion (the
Army's nuclear weapons were assigned to the artillery) that possessed the launchers.
Once the warheads turned over to British authority, the BAOR could determine how they
would be used, provided the Prime Minister did not object to their employment. Shaun
Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO: Nuclear Weapons Operations and
the Strategy of Flexible Response (London: Macmillan, 1996), 103-29; and Watson and
Rinaldi, 19-53.
85 Colonel Frank Camm, OASD Systems Analysis, NATO Ministerial Meeting,
Paris, France - December 1964, The Role of Tactical Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy
(Defense Background Brief), December 4, 1964, in Parallel History Project of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact.
86 Kiszely, 187.
87 Both in Soviet statements from the period and subsequent revelations from
Warsaw Pact archives, it is impossible to ascertain for certain whether Soviet officers
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intended to use tactical nuclear weapons first, or only to respond in kind to any Western
use. In many exercises, the Soviet organizers obscured the issue of first use of tactical
nuclear weapons with the conceptual device of the "converging strike," which consisted
of the Warsaw Pact using tactical nuclear weapons when they possessed solid intelligence
that NATO was preparing to do the same. Thus, each side was postulated to conduct its
first tactical nuclear strikes at precisely the same moment. Because of the confusion
generated by the "converging strike" concept, it is difficult to ascertain whether and for
how long the Soviet armed forces planned to use tactical nuclear weapons first. Some
authors have suggested that first use of tactical nuclear weapons constituted official
doctrine until 1966, others 1968, while some analysts suggest dates still later. What is
clear is that Soviet military leaders had no intention to continue fighting conventionally if
NATO employed tactical nuclear weapons. Vojtech Mastny, "Imagining War in Europe:
Soviet Strategic Planning," War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions
in the East and West (London: Routledge, 2006), 25-37.
88 A December 1965 study on tank wastage concluded that the British 1 't Corps
would probably lose between 15 and 32 percent of its tanks in one day in a purely
conventional battle. But if tactical nuclear weapons were used, tank loses would rise to
29 to 42 percent of British tanks. PRO DEFE 48/33 Ministry of Defence: Defence
Operational Research Establishment, Memorandum No. 10/65, A.J. White, An Estimate
of Tank Wastage in the Land Battle for North-West Europe, 1968-73, December 1965.
89 In 1970, the Prime Minister was briefed that, "The outcome of a tactical nuclear
exchange was likely to leave the Warsaw Pact at a still greater advantage than before the
battle commenced." PRO PREM 15/037 Summary of Discussion Following the Defence
Secretary's Presentation of NATO Strategy to the Prime Minister on Wednesday 25th
November 1970.
The next year, an armed forces report stated, "The analysis confirms existing
assessments... that the firepower of their tanks; and that an exchange of tactical nuclear
weapons - with about equal numbers being used on the two sides - although causing
roughly the same level of casualties on the two sides moves theforce ratio to NATO's
disadvantage [emphasis added]." PRO DEFE 25/299 DPS Central Region Study/DOAE
Project 147, June 30, 1971.
90 Based on German designs from the Second World War, France began
producing the first anti-tank guided missile, the SS-10, in 1953.
91 ATGMs were propelled by a small rocket motor and guided by signals
transmitted to the missile via a trailing wire from a control panel; they also employed
shaped-charge warheads. They were introduced at a time when traditional anti-tank guns
were becoming unwieldy. Although towed anti-tank guns had grown in caliber from
between 35 and 47 millimeters in 1940 to between 90 and 100 millimeters in the
immediate post-war period, the weight of anti-tank guns grew disproportionately.
Whereas the American 37-millimeter anti-tank gun standard at the beginning of the
Second World War weighed 950 lbs (430 kilograms), the 90-millimeter gun put into
service after the war weighed 7,750 lbs (3,500 kilograms), an eightfold increase. The
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British equivalent to the American 90-millimeter anti-tank gun was the 32-pounder.
However, this system never entered service because the Second World War ended before
it entered production.
Because of their weight, towed anti-tank guns became too cumbersome for
infantry to employ in battle and most European armies abandoned their further
development after the Second World War. This left infantry with only comparatively
short-range and inaccurate recoilless rifles and unguided anti-tank rockets with which to
repel enemy tanks. In the competition between tanks and the weapons designed to
destroy them, the period following the Second World War saw the technical balance shift
decisively in favor of the tank. For a certain time, only tanks possessed the requisite
mobility and firepower to combat a tank offensive.
See Steve Zaloga, US Anti-tank Artillery, 1941-45 (London: Osprey, 2005), 43;
Chris Henry, British Anti-tank Artillery, 1939-45 (London: Osprey, 2004); and R. M.
Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Company, 1968), 68-69.
92 The weight was between 25 lbs (11 kilograms) and 216 lbs (98 kilograms) for
the first generation systems. The lightest of the early systems was the Swiss Mosquito,
while the heaviest was the Malkara, jointly developed by Australia and the United
Kingdom. Needless to say, ATGMs cost much less than the tanks they were designed to
destroy. PRO DEFE 15/2220 A I Branch, RARDE, Tank and Anti-Tank Armament
1970/85: a discussion of present and future problems in the field of Armoured Warfare,
n.d. (1965).
93 In fact, the first two British ATGMs were not the product of published Army
requirements or government funded research. Rather, the Malkara missile had begun as
an Australian Army project, while the Vigilant missile was originally a private venture by
the Vickers Corporation.
94 Zuckerman, 291.
95 The cost and effectiveness of ATGMs suggested that, "The doctrine of the tank
as the primary anti-tank weapon needs serious re-examination in view of some of the
weapon developments previously mentioned. The tank, like all other arms, must be able
to contribute its fire-power to the purely armoured battle, but there are other and
probably better ways of carrying out the purely defensive anti-tank task [emphasis
added]". PRO DEFE 15/2220 Al Branch, RARDE, Tank and Anti-Tank Armament
1970/85: a discussion of present and future problems in the field of Armoured Warfare,
n.d. (1965).
96 Because the vast majority of British tanks were stationed in the BAOR, the
sixty tanks employed for Exercise Iron Duke represented the largest armored force that
could be assembled for maneuvers in the United Kingdom.
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97 Michael Tillotson, Dwin Bramall: The Authorised Biography of Field Marshal
the Lord Bramall (Stroud, the United Kingdom: Sutton, 2005), 99-101.
98 Ibid., 105-07.
99 Healy stated that elements in the British Army felt that "If you wait until you
lost the conventional battle, then the advantages [of using tactical nuclear weapons]
would be lost." Denis Healey, interview, cited in Christoph Bluth, Britain, Germany and
Western Nuclear Strategy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 190.
100 During this period, the BAOR did not possess distinct armored and infantry
divisions or brigades. Rather, each division was identically composed of two brigades.
These brigades, in turn, combined tanks and infantry. See Watson and Rinaldi, 74-85.
101 Much of this description of "mobile linear" battle is based on Colin McInnes'
research. However, fragmentary archival evidence tends to challenge some of McInnes'
assertions. A 1971 document on NATO strategy postulated that the main battle would
begin 100 kilometers to the west of the demarcation line with East Germany, rather than
at the demarcation line as claimed by McInnes. A 1973 study of Warsaw Pact air
operations against British 1st Corps claims that the mobile defense would occur over a
depth of 30 kilometers and, when the main defensive position was penetrated, the reserve
division would counterattack the penetration, rather than hold a defensive line to the rear
as claimed by McInnes. What explains these apparent discrepancies? Because the 1971
document describes strategy at the beginning of the period, it is possible that British
policy subsequently changed to true forward defense. As for the discrepancies between
McInnes and the 1973 study, it is likely that the belief in leap-frogging echelons
backwards had already been discarded. See Colin McInnes, Hot War, Cold War: The
British Army's Way in Warfare, 1945-95 (London: Brassey's, 1996), 56-57; PRO DEFE
31/153 DOAE Project 147.5, R.F. Conyers, A Comparison of Air Support at Various
Depths from the FEBA for Warsaw Pact Aircraft v I BR Corps, October 1973; and PRO
DEFE 25/299 DPS Central Region Study/DOAE Project 147, June 30, 1971.
102 According to a June 1971 analysis, "The WP [Warsaw Pact] forces could be
faced by logistic difficulties in resupply if the conventional action lasted for more than a
couple of days and if NATO's air attacks were successful in limiting WP resupply to the
hours of darkness alone.... WP planners, in deploying a higher proportion of available
manpower in the teeth formations, may be running some risks in their re-supply
organization." PRO DEFE 25/299 DPS Central Region Study/DOAE Project 147, June
30, 1971.
103 PRO DEFE 31/153 Increase in the Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose
Ground and Air Forces 1967-72, July 18, 1973.
104 The reinforcements designated for the BAOR were of many different types,
including both active military formations and mobilized reservists. Of the former, the 23
Special Air Service Regiment would be flown to Padeborn to provide intelligence behind
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enemy lines. The United Kingdom's strategic reserve (the 3 Division) could be sent to
the BAOR, if not committed to one of NATO's flanks. Troops would also be withdrawn
from Northern Ireland if time was available. Finally, Territorial Army formations would
be mobilized.
105 PRO CAB 148/130 Cabinet, Defence and Oversea Policy Committee,
Programme Analysis and Review 1972: Reserve Forces, Memorandum by the Central
Policy Review Staff, January 11, 1973.
106 The BOAR's intelligence included the British Military Liaison Mission
(BRIXMIS) in East Germany and the British 225 Signals Squadron. According to Major
General Peter Williams, "In the DDR every unit had its own designated and fully
prepared wartime deployment areas some kilometers from its peacetime location, from
which it could be launched in a period of transition to war.... Another feature of many
deployment areas tended to be a command bunker. These varied in their sophistication
and size from small unguarded buried concrete structures... up to extensive and
permanently manner high level bunker complexes with their own communications arrays
and intruder alarms. The thing that all the bunkers had in common was that they were
wired into the Soviet field telephone system. This allowed the occupants to deployfrom
barracks on 'radio silence' and then communicate securely by telephone in a time of
crisis without giving away their positions to listening Allied signals intercept units."
The 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia provided a poignant warning.
Although British and American intelligence detected most troop movements, the Soviets
used repeated military exercises to confused and desensitize Western observers and,
thereby, surprise them with the timing of the invasion. The British Army later drew a
similar lesson from the surprise Egypt and Syria achieved in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
Richard. Aldrich, "Waiting to be Kissed?: NATO, NORTHAG and Intelligence,"
(unpublished paper, 2007), 16; and Peter Williams, BRIXMIS in the 1980s: The Cold
War's "Great Game": Memoires of Liaising with the Soviet Army in East Germany,
Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, www.php.isn.ethz.ch, accessed on 3
July 2007.
107 On several occasions, BRIXMIS patrols spotted Soviet "break-out drills"
wherein entire divisions rapidly exited their barracks and deployed to combat zones under
conditions of radio silence. Aldrich, 9.
During the 1968 Czechoslovakia Crisis, an entire Soviet tank division was even
moved by rail from the Murmansk Military District, north of Leningrad, to the Czech
border without using radio communications and thereby advertising its presence to
Western intelligence. Tillotson, 139.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., 141.
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110 PRO DEFE 31/153 Increase in the Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose
Ground and Air Forces 1967-72, July 18, 1973.
m As Major-General Michael Tillotson succinctly put it, "The most effective use
of armour was not to charge at the opposition... but to position one's own armour on
ground where the enemy would be forced to attack." Manned by professional soldiers, as
opposed to conscripts, the Royal Armoured Corps believed that its tanks would be able to
outmatch more numerous enemy tanks provided they were employed correctly.
Tillotson's tactical views echoed British tank design philosophy. For historical and
institutional reasons, British tank design philosophy favored the production of heavily
armored tanks armed with large caliber guns, rather than the lighter, more mobile
vehicles favored by other powers. The historical and institutional reasons for British tank
design philosophy dated from the Second World War.
The principal British tank of the period discussed here was the Chieftain, which
entered service in 1966. It was armed with the rifled 120 mm Ll 1 gun, which remained
the most potent NATO tank gun until the 1980s and outclassed the 100mm and 115mm
guns equipping contemporary Soviet tanks. Because of its comparatively heavy weight
(55 tons) and remarkably effective ballistic configuration, the Chieftain was also the best
armored tank in the world until the 1980s. For example, the front glacis plate of the
Chieftain provided the equivalent of 388 mm of armored protection against a horizontal
shot (which was more than the 258 mm provided by the heavier Conqueror). In fact, the
Chieftain's a real density of armor, 3 tons per square meter, has never been surpassed.
On the negative side, the Chieftain was expensive and equipped with an extremely
unreliable engine. Although there were undeniable trade-offs to the practice, the British
Army considered that the superior armor and firepower of its tanks would pay dividends
in battle. According to an intelligence assessment of the performance of the most
numerous Warsaw Pact tank, the T-54/55, against British built Centurions, "T-54 tanks
were no match for modern Western tanks with better guns, thicker armour and gun
stabilization." Tillotson, 140; Richard Ogorkiewicz, "Armoured Fighting Vehicles,"
Cold War, Hot Science: Applied Research in Britain's Defence Laboratories, 1945-1990
(Amsterdam: Harwood, 1999), 118-32; and PRO DEFE 31/153 Increase in the
Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Ground and Air Forces 1967-72, July 18, 1973.
m In shifting from counter-attacks delivered by armored battle groups to one
based on employing tanks defensively in the anti-tank role, Bramall adapted the British
war plan to the tactical consensus of the Armoured Corps. Numerous writings from this
period highlight the exceptionally defensive nature of British thinking about the use of
tanks. According Major R.S. Evans, who played a major role in the 1975-1976
restructuring of BAOR, "We have seen in it [the tank] the only chance of destroying
sufficient enemy armour to effect a check on their advance: this has led us to spread our
tank units across the front tied to largely static fire positions: here the tanks will fight
with small opportunity for maneuver until, by sheer weight of enemy numbers, they are
forces to withdraw or risk being overrun." In a similar vein, Carnegie argued, "There are
two methods of producing Shock Action:
(a) By the fear induced by the sight of being borne down upon by enemy tanks.
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(b) By surprise fire: from an unexpected direction, at an unexpected time and with
an unexpectedly heavy volume.
We cannot afford to accept the ratio of casualties likely in the first method when
fighting other enemy tanks. Instead we must concentrate on the second method." See
R.S. Evans, "The Need for Offensive Operations on Land," The RUSI Journal 121, no. 3
(September 1976): 30-33.
113 Described by Lieutenant-General Allan Taylor in 1971, the Royal Armoured
Corps' vision of tank tactics conflicted with those prescribed in the mobile linear defense
and practiced by other armies, "There is a feeling abroad that by swanning round the
place continually and at great speed, the tank is imbued with a magical new property that
it did not have before, and is thus able to defeat a numerically superior enemy.... Any
firepower element whether tanks, infantry or guns is relatively useless while on the
move.... It follows therefore that mobility means only one thing, the ability to move from
one good battle position to another. In the first and second position something can be
done; the time in between is wasted.... It is sometimes thought that an effective counter
attack can be mounting by charging into an unprotected flank of the enemy and
destroying him on the move. This is nonsense." Allan Taylor, quoted in Patrick
Cordingly, "Armoured Forces and the Counter Stroke," The British Army and the
Operational Level of War (London: Tri-Service Press, 1989), 103.
114 Tillotson, 140-41.
"s PRO DEFE 31/153 DOAE Project 147.5, R.F. Conyers, A Comparison of Air
Support at Various Depths from the FEBA for Warsaw Pact Aircraft v 1 BR Corps,
October 1973; and R.S. Evans, 29-30.
116 Tillotson, 134.
117 An official British Army study of armored battles in both the Second World
War and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War accelerated the process, convincing a critical
mass of planners and higher echelon commanders about the merits of the concepts
developed by Bramall, Carnegie and Inge. The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War
confirmed the validity of much of the new British doctrinal thinking. In the initial period
of the war, ATGMs in Egyptian hands proved extremely effective in disrupting poorly
coordinated Israeli tank attacks in the Sinai. Meanwhile, in the Golan Heights, two
Israeli armored brigades using British materiel (Centurion tanks) and employing similar
defensive tactics (tanks fighting hull-down), succeeded in repelling the attacks of five
Syrian divisions, which possessed an enormous numeric superiority (900 Soviet-built
tanks). Tillotson, 140.
118 Evans, 30-32.
119 Ibid.
120 Watson and Rinaldi, 75.
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121 For Bramall, "We do have in mind something in the nature of an Alam Halfa
type battle in which the enemy armour and armoured personnel carriers were encouraged
to run on to our own tanks and guided weapons, all firing at realistic ranges from
carefully selected and concealed fire positions with as much depth and mobility as we can
afford in relation to our allies on the flanks." Edwin Bramall, "British Land Forces: The
Future," The RUSI Journal 127 no. 2 (June 1982): 18.
122 As Bramall put it, "If every one of our tanks... were to take out four or five
enemy with them before succumbing, we would have triumphantly accomplished, or
rather be able to accomplish, the job we are put there to do; and I see no reason why this
should not be the case." Ibid.
In his depiction of the Third World War, former NORTHAG commander, General
Hackett, painted a similar picture. In Hackett's fictional battle, "Its [the British Ist
Corps'] anti-tank defences had been its salvation.... Small infantry detachments manning
ATGW [anti-tank guided weapons, another term for ATGM] were still lying up in built-
up or hilly country, waiting for the vulnerable flank.... One guided missile could destroy
one tank." Hackett et al., 180.
123 The only major difference between the strategic objectives defined by Carver
in 1960 and supported by Bramall in 1982 was the prospective of allied conventional
reinforcements. In 1960, there was little prospect of NORTHAG receiving additional
combat units once a war had begun. However, by the late 1970s, there had emerged the
possibility of either French or American forces being sent to NORTHAG. In 1979, the
French Army created the 3rd Army Corps, based near Paris at Saint-Germain-en-Laye,
with the mission of intervening against a Soviet breakthrough in the NORTHAG sector.
In the late-1970s, the United States Army also laid plans to transport its 3rd Corps (not to
be confused with the French 3rd Corps just mentioned) to NORTHAG. The corps'
combat equipment was pre-positioned in Europe, so that only the personnel would have
to be flown out from the United States. One of the corps' combat brigades was also
permanently deployed to Europe. Thus, if NORTHAG managed to hold out for at least a
week and the proper political and logistic decisions were made in time, NORTHAG
could hope for substantial reinforcements from American or French troops.
124
. According to Bramall, British operational goals were that, "There can be no
opportunity for him [the Soviet Union] to win the prizes he wants by a conventional
blitzkrieg before a realistic, considered decision on nuclear weapons could and might be
taken by the West, to his irreparable disadvantage. That means having the capacity in the
course of, perhaps, a long week to stop and hold the first echelon force of the Warsaw
Pact. After which American and French reinforcements, the imminent threat of nuclear
escalation and many extraneous factors might persuade wiser counsels to prevail all
round and the warring powers, even at that late hour, to pull back from the brink, if they
were not to blow themselves to pieces [emphasis added]." Bramall, "British Land
Forces: The Future," 17.
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125 Robert Citno, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational
Warfare (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2004), 254-64.
126 For example, see PRO DEFE 31/153 Increase in the Capabilities of Soviet
General Purpose Ground and Air Forces 1967-72, July 18, 1973; and PRO CAB 186/17
Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Committee, Soviet Defence Policy and Strategy, May 17,
1974.
127 Interview with General John Kiszely, July 14, 2006.
128 As one research associate at the Soviet Studies Centre put it, "There must be
no letup in the attack or later in the pursuit.... Momentum is maintained by accepting
heavy casualties where necessary-the loss of men and equipment is more acceptable
than the loss of time-and by organizing the attack in-depth.... Such pressure is
confidently expected... to destroy an overextended defense lacking strong reserves."
Charles Dick, "Soviet Operational Concepts: Part 1," Military Review 65, no. 9
(September 1985): 37-38.
129 The Soviet concept of operations in the enemy rear was far from new when
discovered by Western professional officers. The Soviet equivalent to blitzkrieg was
developed in the 1930s and revealing termed "deep battle."
130 Explaining this difference, Christopher Donnelly of the Soviet Studies Centre
wrote that, "The [Soviet] term desant [meaning delivering troops to the enemy rear]
embraces an entire concept of tactical and strategic thinking that does not exist in the
West.... The confusion and effect on morale of fighting in the rear, the Russians love to
point out, is of exceptional value."
The United States, the United Kingdom and West Germany all had airborne
forces and the British and Americans maintained amphibious units. However, they did
not intend to use these forces for opposed landings in a major war. For the Soviets, the
psychological impact of operations in the enemy rear outweighed the danger to the forces
employed for such purposes. C.L. Donnelly, "The Soviet Concept of the Desant," The
RUSI Journal 116, no. 3 (September 1973): 52.
131 Explaining Soviet successes in the Second World War, Charles Dick asserted,
"The Soviets made the correct strategic and operational decisions.... Tactically
successful German units and formations were simply swallowed up in operational
catastrophes such as the giant encirclements in Byelorussia (28 divisions) or Jassy
Kishinev (21 divisions)." According to General Kiszely, "We realized that we were
thinking very small. For British officers, a brigade was a large unit and its movement
constituted a major maneuver. When we learned that the Soviets thought in terms of
corps and armies, and massive movements, it shook our confidence in the way we
fought." Dick, 31; and Interview with General John Kiszely, July 14, 2006.
132 The OMG revelation generated a large number of articles on the subject and
significant high-level attention. Days after the appearance of Donnelly's article, the
333
Supreme Commander of Allied Forces Europe (SACEUR) General Bernard Rogers made
a speech confirming its content. As a result, mainstream Western media soon brought
abbreviated analyses of OMGs far larger publics. Christopher Donnelly, "The Soviet
Operational Manoeuvre Group - A New Challenge for NATO," International Defense
Review no. 9 (1982): 1177-1186; C.J. Dick, "Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups: A
Closer Look," International Defense Review no. 6 (1983): 769-776; and John Hines and
Phillip Peterson, "The Warsaw Pact Strategic Offensive: The OMG in Context,"
International Defense Review no. 10 (1983): 1391-95.
133 It is debatable whether German Army and SS units were still operationally
more skillful than their Red Army equivalents during the later stages of the Second
World War. Soviet units, especially the armored and motorized forces, improved
dramatically over the course of the war as a result of experience and the emergence of
competent officers. Meanwhile, attrition led the Wehrmacht to call upon less-than-ideal
classes of military manpower, such as older and younger men, and individuals with
physical problems. For example, an entire division was formed from individuals with
stomach ailments. However, until the end of the Cold War, much of what was known in
the West about the Eastern Front was came from biased German accounts of the fighting.
Interview with General John Kiszely, July 14, 2006.
134 Speaking of the perceived lack of individual initiative within Soviet Army,
Donnelly informed his audience that, "One of the main problems is the Russians'
tendency to sit and do nothing until an order is given. Making preparations in advance of
an order is just not generally done.... The problem of initiative is a thorny one; but a
traditional lack of it in Soviet life at any level other than the very top certainly increases
adherence to stereotype and to rules, and increases dependence on contact with a senior
commander." C.N. Donnelly, "Tactical Problems Facing the Soviet Army: Recent
Debates in the Soviet Military Press," International Defense Review no. 9 (1978): 1410.
135 Donnelly commented that within Soviet headquarters, "Too much time is spent
trying to reach a decision; and too much time is spent in the drawing up and conveyance
of orders. Furthermore, orders are often imprecise and confusing." According to him,
"The increase in troop mobility and the effectiveness of weapons will result in frequent,
rapid and radical changes in battle situations.... Commanders and staffs will have to do a
lot more work in a lot less time." Ibid., 1409.
136 More than 60 percent of the commanders of Soviet armored battalions were
under 30 years old, whereas their NATO counterparts attained similar responsibilities in
their late thirties.
137 Combined arms tactics have, since the First World War, been a major factor in
the success or failure of armies at the tactical level. Combined arms tactics means the
ability to combine different types of units, such as infantry, armor and artillery, or
weapons.
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138 Accordingly to Charles Dick, "They [regimental and battalion commanders]
tend to adhere rigidly to the scheme of manoeuvre laid down by their superiors even
when the development of battle has rendered it inappropriate. Alternatively, they will
often refer their problems upwards and wait passively for fresh orders." C.J. Dick,
"Soviet Battle Drills: Vulnerability or Strength?," International Defense Review no. 5
(1985): 665.
139 Richard Simpkin, "The Last Decades of the Dinosaurs," Weapons and
Warfare: Conventional Weapons and their Roles in Battle (London: Brassey's, 1987),
169; and Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare
(London: Brassey's, 1985), 20.
4 Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, 297-
309.
141 Ibid., 159-61.
142 According to General Kiszely, "Among many British Army officers it
[Simpkin's Race to the Swift] has gained for manoeuvre theory a reputation as being
impenetrably obscure." Kiszely, "The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since
1945," 193.
143 The 1943 Dnieper Bend (Kharkov) counter attack and the crushing of the 1944
Soviet thrust into Romania therefore became illustrations of how outnumbered, but better
trained British forces could triumph over the superior numbers of the Soviet Army.
According to Stone, Bagnall made a personal study of the Eastern Front before assuming
command. Stone, 118.
144 Diego Ruiz Palmer, "Countering Soviet Encirclement Operations: Emerging
NATO Concepts," International Defense Review no. 11 (1988): 1413-14.
145 Interview with General John Kiszely, July 14, 2006.
146 Kiszely makes the argument that the British Army lacked terms in English
capable of describing the phenomena encapsulated in these German terms. However, the
German terms were "bandied about... with little understanding of their underlying
meaning or implications." Kiszely, "The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since
1945," 198.
147 The criticisms and arguments made in the 1970s and 1980s were not entirely
new and had been previously advanced by other authors. Second World War veterans of
the German Army had long argued for basing NATO's defense on a mobile defense,
conducted by armored divisions, in a number of treatises and memoirs. For example,
General F.W. von Mellenthin argued as far back as 1956 that, "It would be wrong to
regard them [the Soviets] as invincible as long as the strength ratio is not fantastically
unequal.... The Germans fought successful actions with a strength ratio of 1:5, as long as
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formations remained more or less intact and adequately equipped." For von Mellenthin,
strong armored reserves and solid infantry were the key to achieving such results. Liddell
Hart argued along similar lines in 1960 that, "The Germans often achieved an amazingly
prolonged resistance against much superior numbers with armored divisions that were
flexibly spread over a wide frontage.... The decisiveness of the Panzer thrusts of
Guderian lay in producing paralysis after penetration, not in producing destruction of the
enemy's forces in battle."
As early as 1951, Michael Carver, then a lieutenant-colonel, had argued for
greater speed and flexibility in the British Army's use of armor. He affirmed that, "The
Germans and Americans both rightly accuse us of being ponderous in action." Carver
went on to contend that, "Success in these [armored] operations depends very much on
speed, for it is only by superior speed that the initiative can be seized and maintained....
Speed on the battlefield is not solely, nor even primarily, dependent on the actual M.P.H.
which tanks or other vehicles can achieve. It depends most of all on speed in acquiring
and disseminating information, making decisions, issuing and transmitting orders and,
most important of all, in translating them into action."
F.W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles (New York: Ballantine, 1971, originally
1956), 365-66; Liddell Hart, 183-84; and Michael Carver, "Tanks and Infantry-The
Need for Speed," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 95, no. 3 (August
1951): 452-56.
148 From 1981 until 1983, he commanded the British 1s' Corps in West Germany.
Immediately following this command, he assumed command of the BAOR and
NORTHAG between 1983 and 1985, after which he became Chief of the General Staff
from 1985 until 1988. In the post-war British Army, Bagnall was the first officer to
successively occupy the positions of commander of British 1s' Corps and commander of
the BAOR / NORTHAG, and only the second officer to occupy both positions.148 He
was the fifth to progress from commander of BAOR / NORTHAG to Chief of the
General Staff (out of 17) and the third commander of British 1s' Corps (out of 16) to
become Chief of the General Staff. The officers who had become CGS after
commanding the BAOR / NORTHAG were Bernard Montgomery, John Harding, James
Cassels and Peter Hunt. The officers to eventually accede to CGS after commanding 1s
Corps were James Cassels and Roland Gibbs. Watson and Rinaldi, 143-44; and Bill
Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff
(London: Brassey's, 1992).
149 This is especially true if it is considered that other significant reformers had
only held commands in the BAOR for comparatively short durations. Bramall, for
example, had never served in the BAOR before being given command of an armored
division. Carver's experience was likewise limited. He served on Montgomery's staff
when the latter was CINCENT in the early 1950s and later commanded a brigade in the
early 1960s. Neither Carver nor Bramall served as commander-in-chief of the British 1s'
Corps or the BAOR / NORTHAG, although both eventually became CGS.
150 The highest ranks in the British Army produced several individuals of
outstanding intellectual credentials before Bagnall. Besides Bagnall, General John
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Hackett was a classical scholar and edited a book on ancient warfare. Field Marshal
Bernard Montgomery considered himself an intellectual and wrote both personal
memoirs and a history of warfare. Field Marshal Michael Carver was an accomplished
writer, who left excellent two excellent histories of the Desert War, memoirs, a book on
British defense politics and several edited volumes on British military history. General
Frank Kitson wrote several important works on counterinsurgency. Despite these
counter-examples, most British officers consider the officer corps as a whole to be un-
intellectual and relatively poorly read about military history or theory. It is not clear to
this writer whether the British officer corps was in fact less intellectual than foreign
counterparts during the Cold War, or whether it merely viewed itself in this fashion,
perhaps as an extension of the so-called British amateur tradition. Interview with General
John Kiszely, July 14, 2006; and Interview with Major-General Kenneth Perkins,
September 19, 2007.
Other would-be reformers frequently criticized the British Army for precisely this
shortcoming. Brigadier Richard Simpkin acerbically remarked that, "Soldiers' blood and
courage have proven more readily available [in the British Army] than generals' brains,"
while Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, claimed that "British officers are not much given to
philosophizing" and only those few "eccentric enough to study their profession" read
Clauswitz or Jomini." Shelford Bidwell, Modern Warfare (London: Allen Lane, 1973),
105, 193; and Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century, 20.
1 In a passage on the Carthaginian Army on the eve of the First Punic War,
Bagnall revealed his thoughts about the British Army of his own era. According to
Bagnall, "The peacetime officer corps training cannot have been well founded or
rigorous. One suspects that they may have been more concerned with low-level colonial
wars against a relatively unsophisticated enemy, than studying for a longer and more
complex conflict-an Imperial situation not unknown to the British Army during the 2 0t
Century [emphasis added]." General Kiszely is categorical that this statement
encapsulates Bagnall's view of the Cold War British Army.
Nigel Bagnall, The Punic Wars: Rome, Carthage and the Struggle for the
Mediterranean (London: Pimlico, 1990), 99; and Interview with General John Kiszely,
July 14, 2006.
1 In a passage on the Carthaginian Army on the eve of the First Punic War,
Bagnall revealed his thoughts about the British Army of his own era. According to
Bagnall,
The peacetime officer corps training cannot have been well founded or
rigorous. One suspects that they may have been more concerned with
low-level colonial wars against a relatively unsophisticated enemy, than
studying for a longer and more complex conflict-an Imperial situation
not unknown to the British Army during the 2 0 th Century [emphasis
added].
General Kiszely is categorical that this statement encapsulates Bagnall's view of the Cold
War British Army. Nigel Bagnall, The Punic Wars: Rome, Carthage and the Struggle for
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the Mediterranean (London: Pimlico, 1990), 99; and Interview with General John
Kiszely, July 14, 2006.
153 Akehurst, Generally Speaking: 'Then Hurrahfor the Life of a Soldier,' 180.
154 Bagnall's views on armored operations bore similarities to criticisms Carver
had made in 1951 about the ponderousness of British tactics and the need for a faster
pace of operations. Tillotson, 140-41; Jackson and Bramall, 434; and Carver, "Tanks and
Infantry-The Need for Speed."
155 Quickly, Bagnall's collection of interlocutors referred to themselves as the
"Tactical Doctrine Committee," but soon became known as the "Ginger Group," after the
color of Bagnall's hair. Markus Mader, In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence: The
Evolution of British Military-Strategic Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era, 1989-2002
(Brussels: Peter Lang, 2004), 87; and Interview with General John Kiszely, July 14,
2006.
156 Interview with General John Kiszely, July 14, 2006.
157 According to Kiszely, "At Barnall's corps conferences, briefings and post-
exercise wash-ups a lot of these maneuver warfare ideas came out, which were then
written down and formalized in his Corps doctrine." Interview with General John
Kiszely, July 14, 2006.
158 Kiszely, "The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945," 199.
159 This is the definition approved by the Army Command and Staff Course in
1994. However, Bagnall introduced the concept of maneuver warfare into the Army and
created the Army Command and Staff Course. According to General Kiszely, the 1994
definition of maneuver warfare accurately reflects Bagnall's thoughts on the subject.
Kiszely, "The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945," 199.
160 Interview with General John Kiszely, July 14, 2006.
161 Kiszely, who served with a covering force brigade, recalls that, "It was fully
accepted that our battle would only delay, maybe 24 hours, before the [Soviet] 3 rd Shock
Army reached the main defensive position." Interview with General John Kiszely, July
14, 2006.
162 C.J. McInnes, "BAOR in the 1980s: Changes in Doctrine and Organization,"
Defense Analysis 4, no. 4 (1988): 384.
163 According to General Kiszely, who was a member of the Tactical Doctrine
Committee, "The main defensive position would not be entirely static, but prepared to
maneuver-what the Germans call beweglichkeit, maneuverability." Interview with
General John Kiszely, July 14, 2006; and McInnes, 385.
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164 In theory, the counter-stroke should have involved a whole armored division.
However, one of its constituent brigades was involved in airmobile experiments until
1988. In practice, Bagnall's counter-stroke would have therefore probably consisted of a
more modest two brigades. McInnes, "BAOR in the 1980s: Changes in Doctrine and
Organization," 385.
165 Bagnall described the purpose of this mobile strike as disrupting, dislocating
and, eventually, destroying the enemy. According to the Tactical Doctrine Note about
the counter-stroke, "Timing is the key. Whenever possible the counter-stroke should be
launched when the enemy is fully extended presenting an exposed flank." Cordingly,
"Armoured Forces and the Counter Stroke," 99.
166 The more traditional views of the Royal Armoured Corps are detailed in the
section on doctrine during the 1970s. For a simple comparison in tactics, "Mobility
means only one thing, the ability to move from one good battle position to another. In the
first and second position something can be done; the time in between is wasted.... It is
sometimes thought that an effective counter attack can be mounting by charging into an
unprotected flank of the enemy and destroying him on the move. This is nonsense."
Allan Taylor, quoted in Cordingly, "Armoured Forces and the Counter Stroke," 103.
167 Cordingly, "Armoured Forces and the Counter Stroke," 101.
168According to General Kiszely, doctrine before Bagnall was, "Very defensive,
very static and very ground-orientated, with no depth and with no maneuver above the
tactical level, and no real consideration of anything between tactical and strategy."
Interview with General John Kiszely, July 14, 2006.
169 Tillotson, 141.
170 In a 1984 speech before the Royal United Services Institute, Bagnall
highlighted precisely these dangers. According to Bagnall, "To adopt a static defense
requires an approximately even dispersal of strength along the Army Group front,
whereas the Soviets can concentrate to attack at selected points, and you do not have to
be a military genius to see the likely consequences." Imperial War Museum Oral History
Archive, Document 16197, Nigel Bagnall, "Concepts of Land-Air Operations in the
Central Region: A British Perspective," May 25, 1984.
171 PRO DEFE 48/769 Major P.M. Will, DOAE Study No. D7504, Warsaw Pact
Land Threat, October 1975.
172 Imperial War Museum Oral History Archive, Document 16197, Nigel Bagnall,
"Concepts of Land-Air Operations in the Central Region: A British Perspective," May
25, 1984.
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173 Bagnall was not the only general to recognize the danger posed by artillery to
British units deployed far forward. General John Akehurst recalls that he feared in 1979
that, "One of the Soviet Forces' strengths was their artillery and with our deployment so
close to the border they could employ this with potentially devastating effect before even
leaving their own territory. Add to this my conviction that there were so many
opportunities for their efficient espionage system to obtain details of our planned
deployment that it was very likely to be compromised, thus pinpointing our every
position." See Akehurst, Generally Speaking: 'Then Hurrahfor the Life of a Soldier',
173.
To illustrate this point to subordinates and audiences, Bagnall used a slide and
handouts demonstrating that the Soviet divisions facing NORTHAG could produce an
artillery barrage several times as dense as that delivered by the nearly 900 canons of the
British 8 th Army at the beginning of El Alamein against an enemy front only 65
kilometers long." Imperial War Museum Oral History Archive, Document 16197, Nigel
Bagnall, "Concepts of Land-Air Operations in the Central Region: A British
Perspective," May 25, 1984.
174 McInnes, Hot War, Cold War: The British Army's Way in Warfare, 1945-95,
67.
175 According to Kiszely, "People said to him [Bagnall] that it's [forward defense]
is impossible to change. But he was not the type of person who would take that as an
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Chapter V:
Weapons Procurement in France
I. Introduction
In peacetime, arms procurement is the facet of defense policy most subject to political
pressure. By expending large sums of money on high technology products, armed forces play a role
in the economy. Decisions about weapons acquisition impact employment, technological
development and the health of industries, prompting political leaders to intervene. Armed forces
seek to both buy the most military power possible and advance the narrow institutional agendas of
important platform communities. In any procurement decision, purely economic considerations
conflict with military desiderata.
Striking the wrong balance between military and economic arguments can be disastrous. A
military dominated "garrison state" can consume excessive quantities of a state's financial resources,
scientists and engineers, draining the civilian economy of its vitality. Should the armed forces of
such a state favor importing weaponry, then an exodus of foreign exchange and dependence on
another state will follow. At the opposite extreme, armies equipped with weapons produced merely
to keep factories open and develop dual-use technologies will fail at war.
Added to the military and economic arguments, a third, diplomatic, dimension intrudes into
most procurement decisions. Choosing to import a weapon implies dependence on the exporting
state for spare parts and equipment modernization. Opting to build a weapon nationally implies
striving for arms exports, to extend production runs and amortize development costs. The third
possibility, developing a weapon in collaboration entails a long term relationship with partner
countries. In some cases, collaboration can be considered a good in and of itself, as collaboration
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amongst European states is sometimes seen. When today's partners are unreliable or may be
tomorrow's competitors, the advantages of collaborations must be weighed against the risks.
Three distinct groups are involved in weapons procurement. Armed forces will ultimately
use the weapon acquired and, therefore, strive to define the quantity and technical characteristics of
the system in question. Civilian governments allocate funds to procurement programs and decide
whether weapons will be produced domestically, collaboratively or imported. Finally, industry must
develop weaponry and produce it at a profit.
Research indicates that the relative influence wielded by each these groups shapes the
characteristics of the weapons a state acquires. Military professionals believe that they need
weapons individually superior to those of their opponents. Each armed service concentrates
disproportionate efforts acquiring weapons considered vital to the dominant platform community,
such as fighter aircraft for air forces, aircraft carriers for navies and tanks for armies. When they are
cheaper or more capable, military professionals prefer foreign imports to their domestic equivalents.
While military commanders favor acquiring sophisticated weapons regardless of their origin,
civilian leaders face a wider set of constraints. Whereas professional soldiers underline the need for
technical military superiority in the rare event of war, political leaders are responsible for the
economic viability and technological independence of at state during the much longer intervals of
peace. This leads them to "satisfice" in terms of military capabilities and keep procurement
expenditures within national boundaries, but prefer international collaboration to importing
weaponry. Arguments about potential technological "spin-offs" from military procurement
programs to the civilian economy also have more sway over civilian than military authorities.
Arms manufacturers obey the concrete logic of economic survival. The primary objectives
of arms producers are maximizing current profits and long-term competitiveness. They must
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acquire contracts, and then develop and produce weapons at a profit. To retain qualified personnel
and remain commercially competitive, military industries also need to sustain a constant degree of
design and manufacturing activity. Profitability and sustaining production runs pushes
manufacturers to favor weapons sales and developing arms that are exportable. When possible,
private industries attempt to limit the technological risk they assume and which may rebound,
damaging their future competitiveness.
In short, military officers demand cutting-edge weaponry from whichever supplier can
provide the most combat power at the least cost, civilian leaders use defense procurement as a
means of advancing economic and employment objectives, and industrialists oppose importing
weaponry and favor producing arms that are exportable. Table I, below, illustrates the differences
between military, political and industrial views on procurement.
Table I:
Civilian, Military and Industrial Preferences
Civilian Leaders Military Commanders Defense Industries
Sustain national manufacturing Maximize combat power Maximize profitability
base
Maximize technological spin-offs Pursue cutting-edge technology Minimize technical risk
Protect employment Acquire most combat power Sustain activity of design
for money bureaus and production lines
Export to allies and cooperate Privilege weapons dear to Maximize exports
with strategic partners dominant platform community
Because soldiers, civilians and industrialists view defense procurement differently, their relative
power shapes the weapons states acquire.
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Until the Fifth Republic, armed forces dominated the weapons development process. Each
armed service possessed its own technical department that either directly designed or managed the
procurement of the weapons requested by the high command. This system functioned adequately,
albeit imperfectly, until the First World War, when deficiencies became apparent. The absence of
heavy artillery at the outbreak of the First World War was imputed to a high command deficient in
technical judgment and imbibed with an ethos favoring the infantry offensive, which only field guns
could support. Thereafter, traditional branches (infantry and cavalry) bent French tank development
to their own agendas, leading to a dispersion of effort and the creation of distinct "infantry" and
"cavalry" tanks. After the Second World War, the military-controlled technical departments
accorded scant attention to nuclear weapons or their delivery mechanisms, despite the priority
successive French governments accorded them.
After civil-military crises destroyed the Fourth Republic in 1958 and the armed forces
resisted the new government's emphasis on nuclear deterrence, de Gaulle divested the armed
services of their procurement role and vested authority in a new technocratic structure directly
subordinate to the Defense Minister.' De Gaulle and his contemporaries were disenchanted with the
armed services' dubious loyalty, conservative judgment and a doubtful technical track record. As de
Gaulle confided to his son, "[The military] always seeks to perpetuate its existing fighting order....
Everything that one day modified the nature of warfare, all new ideas, came from outside and if they
came from inside, they were just as quickly criticized or combated by the high command." 2
De Gaulle's solution was the Ministerial Delegation for Armament (DMA, renamed the
DGA in 1977), which he created in the Spring of 1961. Initially concentrating the armed services'
technical directorates under a new central authority, the DMA/DGA gradually merged into a
cohesive ensemble, motivated by a technocratic ethos and bereft of residual service loyalties. The
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balance of power between technocrats and operational commanders shifted further with the creation
of a distinct professional group of "armament engineers" to manage the DMA/DGA. Because of
their comparatively small numbers--between 1,500 and 2,200--and their recruitment from France's
premier engineering school (Ecole Polytechnique), armament engineers are homogeneous and
cohesive. In their dealings with the armed services, armament engineers benefit from military rank
and an accelerated promotions, with over 10 percent holding the rank of general. 3
Concretely, the DMA/DGA derives its authority from its direct access to the Defense
Minister, its control over every stage of the weapons development process from basic research to
series production, and its custodianship over France's state arsenals and research facilities, which
employed 50,000 at the time of the DMA's creation.4 On detached service, DMA/DGA personnel
play a major role managing private defense contractors as well. For example, Dassault Aviation, a
private family-owned enterprise, featured 16 armament engineers occupying key posts in 1990 and
had drawn its last two Directors of International Affairs (i.e. exports) from the DGA.5
Because of the DMA/DGA's custodial role over defense industries, its technocratic
"engineering" culture and its direct relationship with the Defense Minister, it can be expected to
privilege industrial and political concerns, over military considerations. Given this balance of
authority, one expects French procurement policy to favor national military-industrial autonomy,
arms exports and technological spin-offs. Purely military considerations, such as pursuing cutting-
edge military technology, catering to dominant platform communities and importing arms, if
necessary, are likely to receive short shrift.
The remainder of this chapter will test these hypotheses on the record of French combat
aircraft procurement. Of France's many programs, this chapter will examine three specific cases--
upgrades to the Mirage III, and the development of the Mirage Fl and Mirage 2000. These cases
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embrace French combat aircraft activities from the creation of the DMA until the end of the Cold
War, stretching over the administrations of four presidents. The combat aircraft sector was chosen
to examine because it poses particularly acute technological challenges and civil-military dilemmas.
Developing combat aircraft is one of the most expensive and technically demanding tasks facing
states and air combat is one of the domains of warfare most sensitive to the relative capabilities of
opposing hardware. Because of perceived spin-offs from the combat aircraft sector to civil aviation
industries, the combat aircraft sector is also subjected to greater industrial pressures than other
sectors.
II. Improving the Mirage III
In many respects, the Mirage III's operational debut in 1960 marks a watershed in French
aviation history. For the first time since the defeat of 1940, France had developed a world-class
fighter aircraft. With a solid design, innovatively blending foreign technologies--the delta wing and
"area rule" fuselage--the Mirage III was set for the burgeoning lightweight fighter market.
However, the Mirage III was handicapped by poor French subsystems, including its radar, missiles
and jet engine. If only the French aircraft could be built with superior British or American
subsystems, the French Air Force and Dassault Aviation reasoned that it would be the premier
aircraft of its genre. However, in one of its first acts, the new Ministerial Delegation for Armaments
(DMA) blocked efforts to marry the Mirage III's superlative airframe with the best engines, radars
and missiles available. The DMA's policy sacrificed French combat power and Dassault's sales in
order to protect France's engine (SNECMA), radar (Thompson CSF) and missile (MATRA)
manufacturers.
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First flying in 1956, the Mirage III prototype heralded a new age in French aviation.
Although the arrowhead-shaped fighter drew heavily on technology already in service aboard
American and British aircraft, the Dassault company did a sublime job improving and integrating
delta wings, an "area rule" fuselage and transonic shock-cones into a bi-sonic lightweight fighter.
Almost miraculously, the French Air Force acquired the Mirage, despite its preference for more
exotic aircraft, after two prototypes of its favored Trident fighter crashed or exploded in mid-air.6
From the outset, French and international and international experts lauded the Mirage III's
basic characteristics. A British mission (rarely flattering to French aircraft) reported back to London
in 1960 that the Mirage III was "extremely impressive," "virtually foolproof and delightful to fly,"
"easy to fly and viceless," and destined "to be one of the leading supersonic fighters. "7 For the
British as well as other foreign observers, the Mirage III's basic aerodynamics were simply
unrivalled.
For a variety of reasons, the Mirage III commercially debuted at an ideal moment. Falsely
optimistic about beyond visual range engagements and collision-course interceptions, the United
States and the United Kingdom had invested their resources in heavy, expensive and sophisticated
fighters, such as the F-4 Phantom II and Lightning. Because British and American fighters were too
costly and technically arduous, the Mirage III was the only counter to Soviet MiGs that most
countries could afford. Only two American private ventures--the Lockheed F-104 and Northrop F-
5--provided any competition in the lightweight fighter market.
Unfortunately, while the Mirage III's overall design was world-class, the same could not be
said for its subsystems and, in particular, its engine, radar and air-to-air missile. Despite enormous
efforts, French subsystems manufacturers had not recovered from the technological lag their country
accumulated after its defeat in 1940. France's best engine, the SNECMA built ATAR 9B--was still
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a direct development of the Second World War German BMW 003. Although improved by French
and German engineers, the ATAR was still old technology and approximately 25 percent less
powerful and fuel-efficient than newer British and American designs. French radars were even
worse, with the Cyrano Ibis prone to frequent technical failures. Perhaps worst of all, the Mirage
III's only missile--the Matra R.530--barely ever worked, leading French pilots to nickname it "good
for what." Even the meticulous Israelis, who shot down over 282 Arab aircraft with their Mirage
Ills, only claimed a single kill (0.3 percent) with the R.530.10
Clearly, the French subsystems limited both the Mirage III's combat power and commercial
prospects. Dassault and the French Air Force longed to equip the Mirage III with better foreign
subsystems; the Air Force to improve its military potential and Dassault to enhance its commercial
attractiveness. Dassault and the Air Force approached the United Kingdom, whose radars and
engines were superior, but which lacked an indigenous lightweight fighter on the market and in
competition with the Mirage III.
Discreet discussions revealed that the Ferranti Airpass Mk2C radar and Rolls Royce Avon
RB. 146 turbojet could be substituted for their French equivalents, drastically increasing the Mirage
III's combat potential. Without a lightweight fighter of their own to market, the British were
enthusiastic about a match that could only benefit their sales. Dassault, too, hoped that an anglicized
Mirage III could win the enormous European lightweight fighter competition looming on the
horizon. In one of the most important fighter competitions in history, the Mirage III would square
off against the Lockheed F- 104 for a grand total of 1,300 aircraft orders from West Germany,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. Political and technical criteria would determine victory or
defeat, and Dassault hoped that an anglicized Mirage III would have superior performance to the
French version and could be presented as a Franco-British alternative to American aircraft. Table II,
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below, compares the Mirage III's original French subsystems with the British alternatives discussed
in 1961, and later variants demanded or produced by export customers.
Subsystem
Table II:
Proposed and Implemented Mirage III Improvements
Original French Proposed (1960s) Later
Sub-System British Alternatives Improve nents
Cyrano Ibis
ATAR 9B and C
Ferranti Airpass
Rolls-Royce Avon
Matra R.530
Hughes TARAN(for Swiss)
No Radar (Israel)
Elta 2001 and 2032
(for Israel and S. Africa)
Cyrano II (from 1965)
Cyrano IV (from 1979)
General Electric J79
(for Israeli Kfir)
ATAR 9K50 (from 1979)
Falcon (for Swiss)
The DMA saw matters differently from Dassault or the Air Force. Being responsible for
France's defense industries, the DMA feared that incorporating foreign subsystems into the Mirage
III would cripple French manufacturers. Jet engines, radars and missiles were strategic industries
with both defense and civilian economic ramifications and whose importance would grow over the
long term. Choosing foreign over French subsystems would deny French manufacturers critical
orders and shatter the reputation of French engines and radars. Therefore, the DMA categorically
refused improving the Mirage's performance with foreign subsystems.
When the Mirage III entered the lightweight fighter competition with its French subsystems,
it predictably lost. As a consequence, Lockheed, rather than Dassault, received Europe's largest
combat aircraft contract of the 1960s.
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Radar
Jet Engine
Missile
Subs stem
If not for the Mirage's French subsystems, there are strong reasons for believing that it might
have won. West Germany explicitly cited the Mirage's inferior radar as the reason for its rejection,
while Belgium and the Netherlands judged the aircraft's technical characteristics lacking. Besides
compromising the technical quality of the subsystems, the DMA's choice penalized the Mirage III
politically. An all-French Mirage had poorer chances of defeating an American fighter for NATO
orders than a Franco-British aircraft, which would have greater appeal as a "European" fighter.
Otherwise, the Mirage III came closer to meeting European requirements for a multi-role aircraft
than the F-104, which was a dedicated interceptor. Used in the air-to-ground mode, West Germany
lost 270 F-104s to accidents, winning the aircraft the dubious nickname of "the widow-maker."' 2
Dissatisfied with their F-104s, Belgium purchased a Mirage III variant (the Mirage V) seven years
after ordering F-104s and continued flying them more than a decade after scrapping its last F-104s.
Loosing the European lightweight fighter competition robbed Dassault of the opportunity to
establish itself as Europe's dominant aircraft manufacturer and guarantee the Mirage's place as the
world's premier export fighter. Nevertheless, the Mirage's sound basic design attracted many
buyers. Ultimately, France sold 950 Mirage Ills and derivatives (Mirage 5 and 50) to 19 foreign
clients. Although most Mirage clients were small and fewer aircraft were exported than either the
American F-4 or F- 104, the Mirage III served in more foreign air forces (19 for the Mirage III
versus 14 for the F-104 and 11 for the F-4) and a higher percentage of the production run was
exported (66 percent) than any contemporary fighter, save the F-104.14
Throughout its commercial life, poor or unreliable subsystems dogged the Mirage III. To
compete against the F-104 in Australia, the DMA exceptionally permitted Dassault to offer the
aircraft with a Rolls-Royce Avon engine.' 5 Later, at Swiss insistence, France presented the Mirage
III with an American Hughes radar and Falcon missile. Unfortunately, integrating entirely new
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subsystems into an existing aircraft is a costly affair if undertaken over a small production run.
Australia opted for the original French engines rather than bear these added costs, while
Switzerland's insistence on superior American radars and missiles led to massive cost overruns, as
the Swiss struggled with systems integration.'6
Other customers with less market clout were obliged to make due with French subsystems.
Particularly dissatisfied with French radars, the Israeli Air Force removed many Mirage III radars
and replaced them with concrete ballast. 17 When it came time to procure more aircraft, the Israelis
demanded a radar-less Mirage, which would carry more fuel in place of the aircraft's worthless air-
to-air radar. Surprised at this request, the DMA approved Israel's demand. 8
Ready by 1967, the radar-less Mirage (termed the Mirage 5) became an instant success.
Without the Mirage III's unreliable but costly radar, the Mirage 5 was cheaper than its forbearer and
could carry 57 percent more fuel. As a testament to the prowess of the basic Mirage design and
poor capacity of its radar-equipped Mirage III. Ultimately, France sold 531 Mirage 5s to 13 states,
making it the most successful variant ever. Israel also manufactured 68 Mirage 5 copies, of which it
sold some to Argentina.19
That so many states opted for a radar-less aircraft highlights the paucity of good alternatives.
If offered with a better radar and weapons system, the Mirage III family would have won many
more sales. Unwilling to produce a standardized Mirage with foreign subsystems, the DMA
sacrificed this opportunity. Dassault was only able to market improved Mirage Ills once French
manufacturers had developed a new generation of radars and engines. However, by this time it was
too late for the Mirage III to dominate the market the way it might have, had it been allowed to have
recourse to imported components. When Dassault finally offered a Mirage III variant--the Mirage
50--with an improved engine (ATAR 9K50) and radar (Cyrano IV or Agave) the basic design was
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nearly 20 years old and no longer as remarkable as it once had been. Introduced in 1979 (versus
1960 for the Mirage III) Colombia and Venezuela nevertheless purchased the Mirage 50, which
continues to serve to this day.20
Meanwhile, several states tried to improve the Mirage on their own. One major Mirage user,
Israel, developed a derivative, the Kfir, powered by the J79 engine that powered the American F-
104.2 Later, South Africa rebuilt its Mirage Ills with Israeli radars and newer French engines
(ATAR 9K50). With its last converted Mirage Ills, named Cheetahs, assembled in the mid-1990s,
the South Africans introduced the ultimate evolution of the Mirage III design more than three
22decades after its forbearer entered service. Table III below details the late Mirage III variants and
derivatives, produced between 1975 and 1995.
Table III:
Late Mirage III Variants and Derivatives, 1975-1995
Country
of Orig~in Designationl Clients
Israel Kfir (1975)
France
South Africa
(with Israel)
Chile
(with Israel)
Mirage 50 (1979)
Cheetah
(1986, 1993 for
Cheetah C)
Pantera 50C
(1993, upgrade
of Mirage 50)
J79 Jet Engine (USA)
EL 2021 / 2032 (Israel)
ATAR 9K50 Jet Engine
Cyrano IV or Agave Radar
ATAR 9K50
EL 2001 / 2032 (Israel)
Israeli Heads-Up-Display
EL 2001 (Israel)
Israeli Avionics
Israel
Colombia
Ecuador
Sri Lanka
US Navy
Chile
Venezuela
South Africa
Chile
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That countries were still rebuilding or purchasing Mirage III variants two to three decades
after the series debuted bears testimony to the aircraft's phenomenal design. The Mirage III's
longtime rival, the Lockheed F-104, ended production and was withdrawn from service long before
its long career, the Mirage's strong design was counterbalanced by its faulty subsystems. Viable
alternatives existed all along, but the DMA limited Dassault's ability to offer foreign subsystems on
export Mirages and prohibited the French Air Force from using them on its own aircraft. As a
result, the Mirage III never achieved its operational or commercial potential. Instead of dominating
contemporary lightweight fighters in sales and air combat, the Mirage III was reduced to a form of
parity, wherein a superior airframe was compromised by inferior engines, armaments and avionics.
However, the DMA accomplished its primary goal of fostering a broad-based defense
industry and guaranteeing France's military-industrial autonomy. Sacrificing significant export
orders, dominance in the airframe sector and better combat aircraft, the DMA provided a significant
boost to French producers to jet engines, radars and missiles. Hitherto a minor engine manufacturer,
building only 1,778 turbojets between 1945 and 1960, engine production for the Mirage III provided
SNECMA with 2,090 turbojet orders (ATAR 9B and C).23 This windfall in engine production
permitted SNECMA to expand from a second-rate engine producer, with unprofitable production
runs and obsolete technology, to the free world's fourth jet engine producer. As a direct result of
Mirage III engine production, SNECMA financed its first indigenous (i.e. not based on the German
technology) engine development program beginning in 1966 and established a strategic alliance
with General Electric to build commercial jet engines in 1971. 24
France's radar and missile manufacturers also used the Mirage III program to advance from
their previous status as struggling industries to established, albeit second-tier, arms producers.
Building 184 Cyrano Ibis radars for the Mirage III between 1960 and 1965, Thompson CSF drew on
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its growing experience and reinvested its profits to develop the improved Cyrano II from 1965.
Equipping a further 487 Mirage Ills with the Cyrano II, Thompson CSF continued its technological
apprenticeship, gradually filling the technological gap separating it from first-order radar
producers. 25 Like SNECMA and Thompson CSF, France's air-to-air missile producer, Matra, rode
the Mirage III's coattails to technical respectability. The existence of a large Mirage III fleet
provided a captive market for Matra to supply with improved missiles. Fielding the Matra Magic
550 from 1972 and the Super 530 from 1979, France could finally offer viable air-to-air missiles
over a decade after the Mirage III debuted with the useless R.530.26
In short, the DMA fostered a broad-based defense industrial base at the expense of achieving
commercial dominance in the airframe sector, equipping the Air Force with improved aircraft and
earning even greater revenues on aircraft exports. Table IV, below, illustrates the trade-offs
imposed by the DMA.
2,090 turbo jets produced
- financed SNECMA's development of
next generation engine from 1966
- provided basis for SNECMA to
conclude strategic partnership with
General Electric
671 radars produced
- gave Thompson CSF experience
- permitted development to Cyrano II
and, later, the Cyrano IV
Continued development of French missiles
Dassault's market position compromised
- lost European lightweight fighter
competition (for 1,300 aircraft)
- lost other export orders as well
French combat power sacrificed
- French Air Force does not possess a viable
air-to-air missile until 1972 and a capable
radar guided missile until 1979
- Radars, especially the Cyrano Ibis, virtually
worthless
- Engines inefficient (25% less than
competition)
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Advantages
Table IV:
Advantages and Disadvantages of DMA Policy Towards Mirage III
Disadvantages
As may be seen, apparently technical choices were weighty in consequences for both French combat
power and the future of France's and Europe's aircraft industries. The French Air Force was obliged
to make do with inefficient fuel-guzzling engines, unreliable radars and without a viable air-to-air
missile until the 1970s. On the industrial side, France sacrificed an opportunity to establish Dassault
as Europe's premier military airframe manufacturer in order to develop a broader-based autonomous
military-industrial complex.
III: The Mirage F1
After acquiring a remarkable, but basic lightweight fighter in the Mirage III, the French Air
Force longed for something more. New roles, such as long-range interception and low-altitude
bombing, required larger aircraft with sophisticated electronics. The Air Force also pushed for
investment in emerging technologies, such as vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) and variable
geometry wings. The DMA and French manufacturers opposed the Air Force's projects. The export
craved more lightweight fighters, rather than the expensive, complicated and specialized aircraft that
military professionals considered necessary in Europe. Moreover, many of the Air Force's schemes
would have relied on foreign partners or components, undercutting the DMA's strategy of fostering a
broadly based defense industrial base, which would partly fund itself through exports or spin-offs.
After prolonged bureaucratic battles, the DMA and industry imposed another lightweight fighter on
the Air Force. Unwanted by the Air Force, the Mirage F1 permitted the expansion of France's
aviation industry.
One weakness of the Mirage III was its requirement for runways much longer (1,850m) than
other fighters to take-off.2 Because French planners predicted that the Soviet Union would begin a
war with massive attacks against airfields, the long distances needed to take-off raised concerns lest
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the French Air Force be grounded on damaged airfields.28 The Air Force therefore wanted its next
aircraft to take-off from short runways or dispense with runways altogether.
The French Air Force also wanted its next acquisition to penetrate enemy air defenses with
nuclear and conventional bombs. Conventional wisdom in the early 1960s dictated that a tactical
bomber should be capable of flying fast (high transonic speeds), at low level, and for substantial
distances. The French Air Force's performance goals were 300 nm (345 miles), at low level, with
the final 80 nm (93 miles) flown at Mach 0.9.29 Meeting the Air Force's range and payload goal
demanded an aircraft much larger than the Mirage 111.30
Finally, although the French Air Force wanted an aircraft that could carry a tactical nuclear
weapon or a large conventional payload, it also wanted its next combat jet to function as a long-
range interceptor. The Mirage III's limited endurance and poor radar limited its ability to roam the
battlefield destroying enemy aircraft. For this reason, the Air Force demanded that its new aircraft
should be optimized to employ "collision-course" (i.e. forward sector) radar guided air-to-air
missiles.
After the Mirage III's debut, the French Air Force issued a requirement for an aircraft
capable of all of these feats. The aircraft's primary mission was specified as interception, however
it should also be capable of penetrating enemy air defenses at high speeds and low altitudes to
deliver nuclear and conventional bombs on well-defended targets. Finally, the new aircraft should
be able to take off and land either vertically or at least using short runways.
Two revolutionary new technologies appeared to solve the technical problem of operating
from short runways. Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) emerged from the efforts of designers
in the United States, the United Kingdom and West Germany to develop a jet combat aircraft that
could take-off and land vertically, without a runway. At almost the same time as VTOL, variable
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geometry wings also matured technologically. Variable geometry developed as a response to the
conflicting aerodynamic requirements of low speed and high speed (transonic and supersonic) flight.
Simply put, straight wings are needed to take off from short runways and carry heavy payloads over
maximum distances, but swept wings are required for aircraft to achieve transonic and supersonic
speeds. By pivoting an aircraft's wings around a joint, it would be possible to change from one
configuration to the other.
During the early 1960s, the French Air Force was attracted to both new technologies, but did
not know which one would prove more valuable. Therefore, it demanded either VTOL or variable
geometry on its next aircraft.
NATO's decision to launch a VTOL competition in June 1961 preempted the French
technological debate. The hope of winning large NATO orders encouraged the DMA to favour
VTOL over variable geometry.31 In 1961, the DMA examined proposals from French
manufacturers for a VTOL aircraft, accepting Dassault's to adapt its successful Mirage III design by
adding eight Rolls-Royce lift jets under fuselage. 32
Because Dassault's proposal relied on existing technology, it alone would permit France
compensate for its late entry in the VTOL field and offer NATO a credible design. Dassault swiftly
transitioned from a design proposal to assembling a prototype, modifying the first Mirage III
prototype for vertical flight barely 16 months after NATO announced its VTOL competition. The
French VTOL prototype's rapid development from paper design to flying prototype attracted
considerable support, worrying the British Defense Minister that Western European states were
rallying to Dassault's design, despite the United Kingdom's significant lead in VTOL technology.3 3
Moreover, Dassault was already working on an improved version of the VTOL Balzac. For its next
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prototypes, Dassault added lift jets to two production Mirage Ills, creating the Mirage III-V (V for
VTOL).
Despite Dassault's success in assembling prototypes, France's VTOL ambitions began to
unravel. It appeared increasingly unlikely that NATO member states would procure the winner of
the international competition, but each would buy national aircraft instead.34 Moreover, the costs of
giving an aircraft VTOL capability proved increasingly prohibitive, leading Dassault Vice-President
Bruno Revellin-Falcoz to conclude, "A vertical take-off aircraft is really very specialized and that
other more conventional configurations are better suited to the budgets of our customers."35 Since
the prospect of large international orders was the reason France gave a high priority to VTOL, the
shattering of this hope led the DMA and the Air Force to reevaluate their options.36
Faced with the high costs and technical problems afflicting Dassault's VTOL projects, the
DMA shifted research efforts to variable geometry wings in the autumn of 1964. Because Dassault
Aviation's design bureau was occupied with VTOL, the DMA confided feasibility studies to two
competitors. Upon learning of this shift in focus, Dassault Aviation also formed a variable geometry
design team. As with its VTOL experiments, Dassault limited the costs and risks of new technology
by employing as many existing components as possible. This meant retaining the Mirage III's
overall aerodynamic configuration and concentrating design efforts on the wing and mechanisms
permitting it to pivot. Dassault's approach paid off and the DMA designated it prime contractor for
a national variable geometry aircraft, the Mirage G.37
Because of the heavy costs of producing a variable geometry aircraft, the French government
decided to collaborate with the United Kingdom. On 17 May 1965, the two governments agreed to
develop an Anglo-French Variable Geometry Aircraft (AFVG).38 Although SNECMA, Dassault,
Rolls-Royce and the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) were identified as the airframe and engine
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companies that would collaborate on the AFVG, the industrial division of labor was not specified at
the outset, permitting both airframe manufacturers to independently study their options, while the
two air forces harmonized their requirements.
This arrangement disturbed the DMA. Producing an aircraft with the United Kingdom
meant that one of France's national champions-SNECMA or Dassault Aviation-would be denied
prime contractor status. To sabotage collaboration with the United Kingdom, the DMA charged
Dassault in October 1965 with developing an entirely French variable geometry aircraft that would
be powered by a license-built American (Pratt and Whitney TF-306) engine, which SNECMA could
manufacture under license.39 By encouraging this parallel variable geometry project, the DMA
worked at cross-purposes to French political leaders, who wanted to build an aircraft in
collaboration with the United Kingdom.
In addition, the DMA pressured the Air Force to accept a conventional aircraft, without
variable geometry wings, but employing a similar fuselage and using the same license-built engine
as France's national variable geometry project.40 The new project, entitled the Mirage F2, was
launched in mid-1965 and was designed to meet less exacting standards than the variable geometry
aircraft.41 However, to meet the Air Force's long-range strike mission, the Mirage F2 would still be
substantially larger than the Mirage III, with an empty weight fifty-percent heavier than its
42predecessor and carrying a two man crew.
Meanwhile, Marcel Dassault doubted the commercial viability of both variable geometry
aircraft and large conventional designs, which would be too costly and complicated for foreign
customers. At the end of 1965, Marcel Dassault came to the conclusion that France's new aircraft
had to be in the same weight class as the Mirage III and should rely on proven technologies, but
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would need to perform better than its predecessor.43 By undertaking the Mirage F1 as a private
venture, Dassault prevented the armed forces from monitoring the program.
Thus, in late 1965 Dassault was involved in four distinct projects, illustrated in Table V
below, to provide the French Air Force with its next combat aircraft.
Table V:
French Aircraft Projects Post-Mirage III-V
Max
Project Characteristics Date Initiated Prototype Weight (kg)
AFVG variable geometry May 1965 none 17,285
French VG variable geometry October 1965 November 1967
Mirage F2 swept wings mid-1965 June 1966 18,300
Mirage F1 swept wings late-1965 December 1966 14,900
One program, the AFVG, responded to the French government's preference for a joint
program with the United Kingdom. Two programs, the AFVG and the national variable geometry
aircraft, met the Air Force's initial demand for either variable geometry or VTOL. Two other
programs, France's national variable geometry aircraft and the Mirage F2, were favored by the
DMA because they would fulfill the French Air Forces revised requirements with entirely French-
built aircraft. Finally, Dassault Aviation initiated the Mirage F1 to sell to states that had already
purchased its predecessor, the Mirage III, but lacked the financial resources to acquire the Mirage F2
or any of the variable geometry designs. Table VI below depicts the institutional actors and
44preferences involved in France's future combat aircraft program.
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Table VI:
Actors and Preferences
P li P f s
Air Force Large sophisticated multi-mission aircraft
incorporating variable geometry or VTOL
Dassault Retain prime-contractor role
Produce aircraft with export appeal
SNECMA Retain role developing engines
Government
DMA
Support European collaboration
Support broad-based defense industry
PrnoraTn O ninins
favored: AFVG, Mirage G
opposed: Mirage F1
favored: Mirage F1
opposed: AFVG
favored: Mirage Fl, AFVG
opposed: Mirage G, Mirage F2
favored: AFVG
opposed: AFVG
The first program to encounter serious problems was the Anglo-French Variable Geometry
(AFVG) aircraft that both Dassault and the DMA opposed, but which French political leaders
considered vital for Europe's long-term ability to compete with the United States.45 The AFVG's
development progressed glacially because of divergent air force requirements, and continuing
negotiations over the division of labor.4 6 Only on 8 May 1967, did the British and French Air Staffs
agree on a definitive set of performance specifications. However, this agreement on requirements
coincided with a deal whereby the British (BAC) were prime contractors for the airframe and the
French (SNECMA) for the engine. Dassault Aviation and Bristol Engines would serve in subsidiary
roles on the airframe and engine.
Dassault's leadership viewed a subordinate position as disastrous and decided to sabotage
the AFVG project.47 To convince the French government to cancel the AFVG, Dassault attempted
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to prove that it could produce a cheaper and better variable geometry aircraft alone. With DMA
approval, Dasault built a prototype of a national variable geometry aircraft, without reference to the
Air Force. By employing as many existing components as possible and concentrating most
engineering efforts on the wing's pivoting mechanism, Dassault produced a variable geometry
prototype, entitled the Mirage G, in 16 months and at the low cost of $35 million.4 8
On 28 May 1967, less than three weeks after the United Kingdom and France signed the
agreement on AFVG collaboration, Dassault unveiled the Mirage G prototype. Flying at the Paris
Air Show, the Mirage G disrupted the AFVG, exciting the French press and outraging the British.49
Political leaders were impressed by Dassault's ability to deliver a prototype in less time than it took
France and the United Kingdom to agree on requirements and a division of labor. Swayed by the
Mirage G prototype and lobbying by the DMA, the French government withdrew from the AFVG
on 22 June 1967.
By November 1967, the Mirage G was ready for flight testing. Meanwhile, at the same time
as the French Air Force and elected leaders followed the progress of the two variable geometry
projects (the AFVG and Mirage G), Dassault proceeded with work on the two conventional swept-
wing projects, the DMA sponsored Mirage F2 and the privately funded Mirage Fl. Employing the
same fuselage and engine as the Mirage G, the Mirage F2 prototype debuted on 12 June 1966,
approximately one year before its more sophisticated variable geometry cousin. Flight tests
demonstrated that the Mirage F2's swept wings delivered better take-off and low-level performance
than the Mirage III's delta wings.
By December 1966, the Mirage F1 prototype was also ready for flight testing. To produce a
cheaper aircraft, Dassault designed the Mirage F1 to be 25 percent lighter than the Mirage F2.
Because its fuselage had similar dimensions to that of the Mirage III, the prototype Mirage F1 was
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fitted with Mirage IIE avionics and a SNECMA ATAR 9K engine, the latest refinement of the
ATAR 9B and C employed on Mirage IIIs.52
The only significant new technology incorporated into the Mirage F1 was its thin wing.
American aircraft manufacturers introduced thin wings for supersonic flight in the early 1960s.
Examining recently introduced technologies, Dassault engineers focused their efforts on perfecting
thin "honeycombed" wings and the welding techniques needed to attach them to a Mirage III-style
fuselage. Although a private Dassault venture, the DMA facilitated its development with scientific
advice and testing facilities.5 3
When the Mirage F1 prototype flew on 23 December 1966, SNECMA rallied to its cause. In
contrast to both the Mirage G and the Mirage F2, which were powered by an American engine, the
Mirage F1 featured a SNECMA ATAR." SNECMA's desire to continue developing its own jet
engines clashed with the Air Force's desire for larger aircraft. 5 SNECMA therefore preferred the
two programs-the Mirage F1 and the AFVG-that gave it a significant role, over the two
programs-the Mirage F2 and Mirage G-that relied on American motors.
Because the Mirage F1 was the only aircraft project to fulfill the needs of both Dassault and
SNECMA, the DMA lobbied elected leaders to procure it.56  Convinced by the DMA, the
government decided to purchase 100 Mirage Fis in June 1967.57 When the Air Force argued that
the Mirage F1 did not respond to its requirements and was not needed because it already possessed a
large fleet of Mirage Ills, the Defense Minister countered by rewriting the Air Force's requirements
around the Mirage F1 prototype. 58 A government order for three Mirage F1 prototypes followed in
September 1967 and the aircraft became France's next combat aircraft despite the Air Force's
objections.59 Thus, the DMA saddled the Air Force with another lightweight fighter despite military
officers' demands for something larger and different.
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The Mirage F1 was an evolutionary development of the Mirage III, but improvements to
each of its major subsystems meant that the aircraft was significantly enhanced. It mounted an
engine and radar that were incremental advances on their predecessors. By substituting more
efficient cast turbine blades for the previous models' forged blades and incorporated electronic
systems designed to regulate the engine's performance, the ATAR 9K50 was 14 percent more
powerful without afterburner and 20 percent more powerful with afterburner than its predecessor,
the 9C.60 Likewise, the Thompson-CSF Cyrano IV radar was a development of the Mirage III's
Cyrano II. Lacking the look-down capabilities of contemporary pulse-doppler radars, it at least
achieved an acceptable level of reliability through integrated circuitry and revised cooling
arrangements. 61
The Mirage Fl's layout likewise benefited from the Mirage III's decade of operational
service. Lessons communicated by Israeli pilots following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War prompted
Dassault Aviation to re-design the Mirage Fl's cockpit in order to lighten and rationalize pilots'
workloads.62 The Mirage Fl's fuselage also incorporated integral construction techniques for the
first time in French aviation history. By machining airframes from solid slabs of metal, integral
construction permits the fabrication of lighter airframes that are less prone to drag and fatigue.63 For
the Mirage Fl, this permitted the aircraft to carry 43 percent more fuel than the Mirage IIIE at a cost
of increasing the aircraft's empty weight by only five percent.64
Finally, perhaps the most dramatic changes in the Mirage Fl's performance vis-a-vis the
Mirage III were a result of its thin swept wing. The Mirage Fl's swept wings permitted it to take-
off and land at lower speeds and therefore using shorter runways. For the French Air Force, which
worried about Soviet attacks on its airfields, this ability to operate from 23 percent shorter runways
could be crucial during a war.65 the aircraft's thin swept wings also enhanced its sustained turn rate.
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One disadvantage of the Mirage III's tailless delta wings was rapid deceleration when engaged in
sustained turns. By adopting thin swept wings, the Mirage Fl's designers enhanced its sustained
turn rate by 80 percent. Nevertheless, by abandoning delta wings, the Mirage F1 increased wing
loading vis-a-vis the Mirage III by 54 percent, decreasing the aircraft's instantaneous turn rate and
diminishing its low-speed combat capabilities. 67
Together incremental improvements rendered the Mirage F1 more capable than the Mirage
III. Table VII below illustrates the Mirage Fl's many advances over its predecessor.
Table VII:
Evolutionary Development from the Mirage III to Mirage F1
Mirage F1 Developments Performance Improvements
ATAR 9K50 Turbo Jet Engine 14 percent more powerful without afterburner
20 percent more powerful with afterburner
Integral Construction 43 percent more fuel for 5 percent more weight
Cyrano IV Radar Reliable
Thin Swept-Wings 23 percent shorter take-offs
80 percent better sustained turn rates
Although the combat value of an aircraft is notoriously difficult to measure, the South African Air
Force (SAAF) conducted extensive one-on-one dogfight simulations between its Mirage III and
Mirage F1 squadrons in 1977. The result of these simulations was a 7-to-i exchange rate in favor of
the Mirage Fl, with 58 Mirage F1 victories declared against eight Mirage III victories.68
With greatly improved air combat performance and a fifty-percent greater range than the
Mirage III, the Mirage Fl cost only 20 percent more than the latest Mirage III variants.69 As a
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result, the Mirage F1 proved a success on the international market, as Dassault intended.
Ultimately, 480 Mirage Fls were exported to ten states. From an industrial point of view, the
Mirage Fls export success was crucial for the French aviation industry, with foreign orders
accounting for 65 percent of Mirage FIs produced. 70 Nevertheless, the Mirage Fl failed to achieve
the same international success as the Mirage III, whose export figures in terms of both aircraft sold
(950) and clients (19) were nearly double those of the Mirage Fl.
The explanation for the Mirage Fl's moderate success vis-a'-vis its predecessor lay with the
international environment rather than with the aircraft's intrinsic characteristics. Whereas the
Mirage III was exported in an environment largely devoid of American competition, the Mirage F1
competed against a dedicated light-weight fighter, the General Dynamics F-16. Designed to a
similar weight and cost as the Mirage Fl, the F-16 incorporated revolutionary technologies,
including fly-by-wire avionics, variable camber wings and an all-glass bubble canopy. 7 1 The F-16's
jet turbofan likewise gave the aircraft better performance in the vertical maneuvers and a lower rate
of fuel consumption than the Mirage Fl.7 2  Although it had known about the F-16, Dassault
anticipated that technical problems would derail the American program.7 3
From the moment the F-16 appeared on the international market, the Mirage F1 lost almost
every export contract where it competed directly with the American aircraft. When the F-16
competed with an improved version of the Mirage F1 for a contract to sell 348 combat aircraft to
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway in 1974, the technological gap between the two
aircraft became apparent.74 Even retired French Air Force Chief of Staff General Paul Stehlin felt
obliged to inform French ministers in writing that the F- 16 was superior to the Mirage F 1 in almost
every performance category.7 5 Following the Mirage Fl's loss to the F-16 in this multi-national
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competition, the Mirage F1 capitalised on the United States' reticence to sell high performance
combat aircraft to Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Ecuador and Greece.76
Once exposed to battle, the Mirage F1 proved an operational as well as commercial
success. 77 The Mirage F1 outclassed the most recent Soviet single-engine fighter, the MiG-23
Flogger, in almost every category, except sheer speed and acceleration. Compared to the Mirage Fl,
the MiG-23 was twice as heavy, had a miserable turn rate and suffered from mechanical defects,
including a wing box that was prone to cracks. 78 The Iraqi Air Force, which operated both aircraft
in equal numbers, scored twice as many air-to-air victories with the Mirage F1 and preferred it for
ground attack missions as well. 79 Besides outperforming the MiG-23, the Mirage F1 was also
superior to its predecessor, the MiG-21. During air combat over Angola, South African Mirage Fis
shot down three Cuban MiG-21s, discouraging Cuban aircraft from interfering with ground attack
missions, and escorted South African bombers deep into Angola. 80
Although Mirage Fls proved their air combat value in peripheral conflicts, the aircraft
gained even greater notoriety for its employment in ground attack and strike missions. Because of
its comparatively small thin wings, the Mirage F1 quickly proved apt at high-speed low-level
penetration missions. 81 From 1985 onwards, Iraqi Mirage Fls employed Exocet anti-ship missiles
to attack merchant shipping and oil rigs in the Persian Gulf, inflicting grievous loss on Iranian oil
exports. 82 From March 1986, laser-guided air-to-ground missiles complemented the Exocets,
permitting Iraqi Mirage Fls to precisely attack high-value Iranian targets.83 In another theater and
using more conventional munitions, South African Mirage Fls carried 22 bombs apiece on ground
attack missions, virtually annihilating two Angolan brigades in 1985.84
Although the French Air Force did not want the Mirage Fl, the French Air Force
nevertheless came to appreciate it. According to General Pascal de Chassey, multi-mission
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capabilities, a reliable radar and sufficient fuel meant that, "The Mirage FlC was really the aircraft
that we did not hesitate to send on the most difficult missions and when weather was awful." 85 Over
time, the French Air Force employed its 246 Mirage Fls in air superiority, photographic
reconnaissance and conventional ground attack missions. During the 1980s, the aircraft proved
especially valuable for France's exterior interventions, where multi-mission capabilities, long range
and high serviceability were crucial.
As the South African Air Force proved with its long-range missions over Angola, the Mirage
F1 had "fuel for Africa."86 During France's interventions in Chad, this increased autonomy
compared to the Mirage III was crucial. Because France's logistic effort in Chad depended heavily
on transport aircraft, which were themselves vulnerable to Libyan fighters, the French government
decided in August 1983 to base Mirage Fis in Chad-the only aircraft in the French arsenal with
both the range needed to escort transports over Chad's long distances and the ability to defeat
Libyan fighters in air combat. 87 After successful service in Chad, Mirage Fls were also dispatched
to Djibouti to counter the spread of Soviet fighters to Ethiopia and South Yemen.
Despite its operational and commercial successes, the Air Force's leadership doubted
whether the Mirage Fl fulfilled its needs. With most of its assets dedicated to preparing for war in
Europe, Air Force commanders worried about the particular requirements for fighting in this
challenging theatre. Although capable of operating from slightly shorter runways than the Mirage
III, the Mirage F1 still lacked the ability to use the extremely short airfields and improvised runways
that would permit France to keep fighting after its airbases were damaged. As a one-man
lightweight fighter, the Mirage Fl was also wholly inadequate for the challenging mission of
penetrating enemy air defenses to deliver tactical nuclear weapons, leading one general to remark,
"Our [French] losses will be heavy and the results of our attacks uncertain." 88 Without a specially
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designed low-level attack aircraft, the air force would continue to use modified Mirage IIIE variants
for strikes and air defense suppression until the early 1990s. Unsuited for either role, Mirage
variants were particularly handicapped in air defense suppression, where they "set a record for
overloading a pilot" whose "tasks were at the limit of the humanly possible."8 9
Industrially, however, the Mirage F1 fulfilled the DMA's objectives. With 731 produced and
the majority exported, the aircraft filled Dassault's order books and permitted the company to invest
in its increasingly popular line of business jets and next generation combat aircraft technology.
Likewise, producing the Mirage Fl's engine (the ATAR 9K50) fueled SNECMA's assembly lines
and financed its design bureau in the critical decade between SNECMA's concluding a strategic
partnership with General Electric (1971) and the first deliveries of their jointly-built commercial
engine (1979). Furthermore, almost all clients purchased the standard version of the Mirage F1 with
the Cyrano IV radar, rather than roughly half of the Mirage III's customers, meaning that Thompson
CSF actually built more radars for Mirage Fls than Mirage Ills (683 versus 671).90
Improving the Mirage Fl's capabilities provided even greater impetus to French weapons
systems producers. The large captive market of Mirage Fl users spurred Matra to improve on its
air-to-air missiles. Based on lessons drawn from the Mirage III's failed R.530 and demand from
Mirage F1 users, Matra unveiled its first successful radar-guided missile, the Super 530, in 1979.
Unlike its forbearer, which scored only one kill during its long combat career (involving at least
seven wars and hundreds of engagements), the Super 530 proved deadly and reliable. During the
Iran-Iraq War, the Super 530 revealed itself to be the best air-to-air missile in the Iraqi inventory,
scoring 35 kills out of 100 missile launches.91 Requirements to attack ground and maritime targets
drove sales of French guided weapons. Iraq alone purchased over 770 Exocet anti-ship missiles
during the Iran-Iraq War, mostly for use by Mirage Fls. France also exported large numbers of AS-
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30L missiles for use with Iraqi Mirages, while French technical teams gained invaluable experience
modifying South African and Iraqi aircraft to use a variety of foreign armaments. 92
In short, the DMA guided the procurement process such that France produced another
lightweight fighter, in the same category as the Mirage III. Equipped entirely with French
subsystems and destined for a broad export market, the Mirage F1 fueled the continued expansion
and independence of France's defense industrial base. While the Mirage F1 did not represent the
same windfall for Dassault as its predecessor, it critically permitted French subsystems producers to
transition from being substandard state-supported industries to increasingly dynamic, competitive
and profitable producers of high technology products. True profitability for SNECMA began with
the joint-venture CFM56 and Matra's missile business became respectable with the Super 530.
Introduced in 1979, both developments owed much to the Mirage Fl. The major loser in this
process was the Air Force, whose operational requirements were ignored. As the Air Force's
embittered Chief of Staff reflected, French procurement "was more often than not motivated by the
desire to create and support an important industry rather than concern for the operational value of
weaponry." The DMA and Dassault also manipulated political leaders into renouncing their
ambition to create a European arms industry through Franco-British collaboration. 93
IV. The Mirage 2000
The institutional demands and posturing so characteristic of the Mirage F1 procurement
process repeated themselves during the debate about France's next combat aircraft. Having
reluctantly acquired the Mirage F1, the French Air Force still lacked the mixture of aircraft
considered necessary for a European war. It therefore demanded an aircraft twice as large as its
current lightweight fighters and capable of technological prowess such as low-level penetration,
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long-range interception and much higher speeds (Mach 2.5) than existing French aircraft. If France
could not produce such an aircraft, Air Force officers favored importing one from the United States
or the European Panavia consortium. Struggling to support France's defense industries, the DMA
(renamed the DGA in 1977) thwarted efforts to import a foreign aircraft and opposed technical
requirements judged too costly. With Dassault's complicity, the DMA imposed yet another
lightweight fighter--the Mirage 2000--because this category of aircraft corresponded to the
desiderata of the largest number of export customers. The choice proved judicious from an
industrial perspective, permitting French manufacturers to spin technologies off into the civilian
market and improve their profit margins through exports. However, the French Air Force was once
again denied the type of aircraft it considered necessary.
As was the case prior to the Mirage F1 procurement decision, the Air Force believed it
needed a comparatively heavy aircraft capable of either intercepting enemy aircraft at long ranges or
penetrating enemy airspace at low level to precisely deliver conventional and nuclear munitions. As
before, the Air Force also believed that only the latest cutting-edge technologies would give French
pilots a reasonable chance of survival against numerically superior Warsaw Pact aircraft.
Conscious of how it lost control over France's last aircraft procurement decisions, the Air
Force hoped to prevent the proliferation of officially sanctioned programs and the resultant
uncertainty over procurement goals by specifying its technological objectives from the outset and
overseeing aircraft development via officers integrated into program management teams. If all
worked according to plan, the Air Force would shape the procurement process and obtain the cutting
edge aircraft it deemed necessary for the 1980s.
The Air Force's high command still remained convinced that variable geometry was the
technology of the future and reiterated its need for a variable geometry aircraft capable of long-
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range interception and low-level ground attack. Having learnt from experience with the Mirage G
and Mirage F2 that SNECMA would oppose any engine it had not developed, the Air Force
specified that the new variable geometry project should be powered by SNECMA-designed French
engines. Unfortunately, SNECMA lacked an equivalent to the Pratt and Whitney engine and two
SNECMA engines and more fuel were needed to replace the Mirage G's TF-30.94 This meant that a
SNECMA-powered variable geometry aircraft would be larger and more expensive.
To meet the Air Force's new requirement, the DMA commissioned Dassault Aviation to
build two prototypes, which were developed rapidly despite Dassault Aviation's simultaneous
commitment to the Mirage Fl's full-scale development. However, while the Air Force's variable
geometry prototypes took form, the project was undermined by developments both within and
outside the scope of the program. Economically, the high costs of developing a variable geometry
aircraft larger than the Mirage G, which was itself considered too expensive, raised serious doubts
within the DMA.95 The Air Force also came to doubt its military value after American General Otto
Glasser the next American aircraft (the F- 15) would mount a conventional wing.96
In 1969, French Air Force Chief of Staff General Gabriel Gauthier began to elaborate new
aircraft requirements with the assistance of the DMA. Although it took time to determine exactly
what characteristics future French warplanes must have, Gauthier and the DMA favored
increasingly conventional layouts.97 The Air Force's new aircraft requirement, entitled the Avion de
Combat du Futur (ACF or Combat Aircraft of the Future), was transmitted to the DMA and Dassault
on 1 July 1972. Although the ACF program was designed to generate an aircraft cheaper than the
two-engine variable geometry aircraft previously explored, the Air Force's requirements remained
technically formidable. 98
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The Air Force demanded a two-engine aircraft capable of dog-fighting, yet able to conduct
long combat air patrols. For longer range engagements, the ACF needed a much larger radar than
any previous French aircraft. Because it was also supposed to deliver precise air strikes at low
altitudes and in all weather conditions, the ACF needed specialized avionics. In terms of
performance, the Air Force demanded that the ACF rival the world's fastest fighter with a maximum
speed of Mach 2.5 and a high degree of maneuverability. At the same time, the aircraft had to use
the same airfields as the Mirage Fl, and therefore needed to be able to land at speeds not exceeding
150 knots. To achieve these impressive performance objectives, the Air Force specified that two
new SNECMA M53 engines should power the new aircraft.
After receiving the Air Force's new requirements, a design team at Dassault Aviation began
work. As development work progressed, it quickly became apparent that the ACF would
necessarily be heavy and expensive. 99 Because the temperature caused by skin-friction on an
aircraft's leading edges is a function of the square of an aircraft's Mach number, the heat that would
be inflicted on the ACF at Mach 2.5 would be significantly higher than the those experienced by
either the Mirage III or F1 at March 2.2. The economic aluminum alloys employed on previous
French aircraft would not suffice and significant portions of the ACF had to be built of titanium
alloys, which cost 10 to 20 times more.100
While titanium components and their fabrication contributed to the ACF's cost, Dassault
engineers discovered that achieving the ACF's range and payload objectives would only be possible
it the aircraft was exceptionally large. According to Dassault calculations, the ACF would weigh
14,187 kilograms empty, or 16 percent heavier than the American F-15 Eagle making it the world's
heaviest air superiority fighter.101 102 Because the mass of an aircraft is a significant factor in its
cost, the French National Assembly's Defense Commission likewise concluded that, "From a
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financial point of view, it [the ACF] is very onerous.... Either the Air Force will have to forgo
replacing other aircraft or its budget must be increased."103
In response to the ACF's growing cost and the inability of potential customers to afford the
aircraft, Dassault Aviation launched two less ambitious aircraft programs on its proper initiative in
1974. Dassault's new programs were designed to respond to the demands of what the company
perceived to be two distinct warplane markets-a high-end market for two-engine multi-role aircraft
and a middle market for single engine combat aircraft to replace existing Mirages and F-104
Starfighters.104 Having exported large numbers of lightweight fighters, Dassault's leadership feared
that the ACF would prove too costly for its traditional customers. 105 Although Dassault would
prefer to build an economical single-engine aircraft, a two-engine aircraft went further to meeting
the Air Force's desiderata and might find export clients in the oil-rich Middle East. Although the
DMA did not directly subsidize Dassault Aviation's private ventures, it arranged for SNECMA to
"loan" Dassault the engines needed for prototypes.106
To render its two new aircraft more affordable, Dassault Aviation reduced speed
requirements from Mach 2.5 to Mach 2.2, eliminating the need for titanium, and returned to its
practice of building aircraft with delta wings.107 Although Dassault's new aircraft drew heavily on
previous Dassault designs, the company incorporated Active Control Technology (ACT), which had
been the secret of the F-16s victory over the Mirage F1 in the 1975 "competition of the century."10 8
ACT technology impressed Dassault engineers so much that they determined that French aircraft
needed to incorporate the new technology as quickly as possible if they were to remain
commercially viable.
As French engineers knew from prior development projects, the easiest way to rapidly
master a technology was to integrate it into a proven airframe. The Mirage 1000 program, later
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renamed Mirage 2000, incorporated ACT technology into an airframe aerodynamically identical to
the Mirage III. The larger Mirage 4000 program, which also featured ACT, employed an enlarged
but similar airframe and featured maneuverable canards mounted forward of the aircraft's delta
wing.
By 1975, mounting costs threatened the ACF program. Despite planned increases in the Air
Force's budget, the ACF was simply too expensive.109 The prospect of the ACF's cancellation
prompted the Air Force's high command to explore purchasing the American F-15 or the Anglo-
West German Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA, renamed Tornado). Preferring a European
solution, French political leaders favored arrangements whereby France would either join the
MRCA consortium or purchase MRCA's in exchange for the United Kingdom importing French
lightweight fighters.110 Thus, by 1975, the French government was facing a choice between five
aircraft, which are detailed in the Table below.
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Table VIII:
Competing Aircraft Under Evaluation in 1975
Description Reaction of Actors
Domestic, two-engines and most expensive
program
Domestic, two-engines and cheaper than
ACF (slower speed and delta wings)
Domestic lightweight fighter, single-engine
(cheapest option of all)
American import, two-engines
Comparable to ACF but cheaper
Tornado European import or collaboration
two-engines
Favored by Air Force
Opposed by DMA and Dassault
Favored by Dassault
Favorite Dassault option
Opposed by Air Force
Favorite Air Force option
Opposed by DMA, government
and Dassault
Favored by government provided
exchange or participation could be
negotiated
To head off the undesireable alternatives, the DMA persuaded President Valerie Giscard
d'Estaing to replace the costly ACF with the Mirage 1000, renamed the Mirage 2000.111 From the
DMA's perspective, importing an aircraft would destroy decades of patient work rebuilding France's
defense industries. In the eyes of the DMA, only a single-engine aircraft could be procured and
exported in sufficient numbers for French aircraft production lines to achieve adequate economies of
scale.12 Once again, the DMA and Dassault Aviation succeeded in imposing an aircraft on the
French Air Force that was designed to maximize the French aviation industry's financial dynamism
rather than meet the armed forces' operational requirements.
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Aircraft
ACF
Mirage 4000
Mirage 2000
F-15
Reaction of Actors
Even after Giscard approved the Mirage 2000's development, the Air Force wanted a larger
and more sophisticated aircraft. In April 1976, the French Air Force dispatched a delegation to
discuss purchasing American F-15s.113 However, the DMA and industry joined forces to rapidly
quash the Air Force's hopes of procuring F-15s. The first Mirage 2000 prototype successfully flew
in 1978 and series production began thereafter, the aircraft entering operational service with the
French Air Force in 1984. In many respects, the Mirage 2000 borrowed heavily from previous
Dassault aircraft. The Mirage 2000 featured a similar wing planform and fuselage to the Mirage III,
including the latter aircraft's distinctive delta wings and area-rule fuselage. However, introduction
of computer assisted design (CAD) technology permitted Dassault's engineers to improve the
aircraft's aerodynamics, slightly shortening the fuselage and increasing the surface area of the
aircraft's wings." 4 The integral construction techniques of the Mirage F1 were also used to lighten
Mirage 2000's airframe.
Although the Mirage 2000 showed remarkable design continuity with Dassault's earlier
aircraft and bore a strong resemblance to the Mirage III, the aircraft's performance was dramatically
improved. Dassault's significant investment in ACT paid off in terms of effective flight controls.
With the Mirage 2000 Dassault went further than General Dynamics had in exploiting the potential
of ACT for designing an aircraft that would otherwise be unstable. 1s As a result of ACT, the
Mirage 2000 is twice as maneuverable as the Mirage III and can maintain speeds 25 percent faster at
low levels, yet has the same take-off and landing characteristics as the Mirage F1.116
The aircraft benefited from many other improvements as well. By mounting the SNECMA
M53 jet engine, the Mirage 2000 benefited from 31 percent more thrust than the Mirage Fl and 49
percent more thrust than the Mirage 111.117 Because the M53 engine was also lighter than its
predecessors, the Mirage 2000 featured a greatly improved thrust-to-weight ration of 0.87.118
379
Moreover, greater fuel reserves due to integral construction and an efficient engine enable the
Mirage 2000 to remain airborne for three times the duration of a Mirage III and longer than a
Mirage Fl.119 Besides its new motor, the Mirage 2000 also witnessed Dassault Aviation's first use
of Carbon Fiber Composite (CFC) materials, permitting elements of the airframe to be built 20
percent lighter.' 2 0
By incorporating selected new technologies while retaining a maximum number of existing
design features, Dassault Aviation managed to economically develop a new fighter aircraft with
improved capabilities. The Mirage 2000's many technical improvements over its predecessors are
detailed in Table IX below.
Table IX:
Improvements of Mirage 2000 over Earlier Mirages
Ch iane
Active Control Technology (ACT)
SNECMA M53 Jet Engine
Carbon Fiber Construction (CFC)
Computer Assisted Design (CAD)
Twice as maneuverable as Mirage III
Same take-off and landing characteristics as Mirage F1
31% more thrust than Mirage Fl's ATAR 9K50
49% more thrust than Mirage III's ATAR 9C
25% faster at low levels than Mirage F1
Better thrust to weight ratio made Mirage 2000 more
maneuverable
Components 20% lighter than predecessors
Improved aerodynamics and maneuverability
Options that would have added significantly to the Mirage 2000s cost, such as variable geometry,
two-engines and a speed of Mach 2.5 were excluded during the design process. As intended, the
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Mirage 2000 remained within the budgets of foreign clients and became an export success, with
approximately 321 aircraft-over half of the aircraft produced--eventually exported to eight foreign
air forces.
Although the Mirage 2000's commercial success fell short of its predecessors, it competed in
a more challenging market. Despite its being designed for low cost, the Mirage 2000 never
benefited from the same economies of scale as its primary commercial rival during the 1980s, the
American F-16. While the United States Air Force's procured an average of 133 F-16s per year
between 1988 and 1992, the French Air Force's procurement of Mirage 2000s averaged 29 orders
per year.' 2 ' This significant difference in economies of scale was reflected in the export costs of
each aircraft, with the Mirage 2000 systematically selling for a third more than an equivalent F-
16.122 Although more expensive, the Northrop F-18 also beat the Mirage 2000 in Swiss and Spanish
competitions.
Compared to their American rivals, early production Mirage 2000s also suffered from
inadequate radars. The first Mirage 2000s relied on the Thompson RDM radar-France's first
mass-produced pulse doppler radar-which was obsolescent by American standards when it entered
service in 1984. The Greek Air Force was so dissatisfied with the RDMs on its early Mirage 2000s
that it suspended deliveries after 28 aircraft had been delivered out of an order for 40.123 Other
potential clients viewed the RDM radar as a positive disincentive to purchasing the aircraft.124 Only
in 1987, four years after Mirage 2000 deliveries began, did newly produced Mirage 2000s receive an
up-to-date radar, the RDI.
However, almost as soon as an improved RDI radar was available, the aircraft was forced to
contend with even greater competition. Whereas the superpowers had been reticent to export
sophisticated combat aircraft to states other than politically important allies, the end of the Cold War
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in 1989 loosened their inhibitions. The United States abandoned its traditional policy of restricting
arms exports to South America and the Persian Gulf. Faced with bankruptcy, Russia's aviation
industries were forced to take even more desperate measures and soon attempted to sell combat
aircraft to virtually any state with currency available.126 MiG-29 Fulcrums and Su-27 Flankers soon
became available at discount prices to states that never before purchased Soviet aircraft. 2 7 To make
matters worse, three traditional Mirage customers, South Africa, Libya and Iraq, became
international pariahs and suffered from arms embargos, preventing them from purchasing French
aircraft.
That Dassault managed to export over 300 Mirage 2000s between 1984 and 2006 is a
remarkable testimony to the soundness of technical choices in the mid-1970s. Crucially, Dassault's
prescience in embracing ACT and incorporating it into an airframe with familiar aerodynamic
characteristics ensured that the Mirage 2000 became the world's third production aircraft featuring
electronic flight controls and artificial stability, leading its Soviet competitors by a decade and other
European states by two. Because of its comparatively reasonable price and its precocious
integration of ACT, the Mirage 2000 proved more commercially successful than rival non-
superpower fighters.
By way of comparison, the variable geometry Anglo-German-Italian Tornado was more
complicated and expensive than the Mirage 2000. Only 72 Tornados were exported and all of these
went to a single client-Saudi Arabia. Although designed to be cheaper than the Mirage 2000, the
Italo-Brazilian AMX was only exported to a single state, Venezuela, which purchased 12.
Meanwhile, Sweden utterly failed to sell its Viggen. If Mirage 2000 exports failed to match those of
previous Dassault aircraft, the aircraft was exported in larger numbers and served in more foreign air
forces than all other contemporaneous non-superpower combat aircraft put together.
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Although French defense industries had developed profitable non-military products, the
Mirage 2000 nonetheless remained vital to their continued viability. Because of reductions in
domestic defense expenditures and the vagaries of the business jet market, Dassault only avoided
bankruptcy in the 1990s because of its Mirage 2000 exports to Taiwan and India. Later,
technologies mastered during the Mirage 2000 program--such as Computer Assisted Design (CAD)
and Active Control Technology (ACT)--proved crucial to Dassault's return to a high degree of
profitability in the business jet market. For SNECMA, development of military engines funded the
company's design activities, while production of the commercial CFM 56 filled its order book and
underwrote its capital expenses. Meanwhile, providing better capabilities and armaments for
Mirage 2000 customers drove French radar and weapons system developments.
V. Military Exports and Commercial Spin-Offs
At the onset of the French Fifth Republic, France's aviation industries lagged behind their
British counterparts in terms of the size of their labor force and the quality of their technology.
British factories had three times the capacity of their French counterparts and British products were
firmly ensconced in foreign markets. While Vickers Viscounts dominated commercial transport
markets and the Hawker Hunter became perhaps the most commercially successful combat aircraft
of the late 1950s, French designers struggled to produce a commercially viable civil or military
aircraft. British firms led in most technological domains as well. They developed functioning jet
engines prior to the Second World, introduced the world's first jet airliner in 1952 and pioneered
VTOL, swing-wings and delta wings in the 1950s. British engines and radars were light-years
ahead of their French counterparts, which still suffered from the defeat of 1940. By the late 1950s,
all indicators pointed to the United Kingdom remaining Europe's premier aircraft producer.
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However, this situation changed rapidly after the creation of the DMA. Although the United
Kingdom retains a sizeable and technologically innovative aviation industry, French firms have
overtaken them. By the end of the Cold War, France's aviation sector was larger than its British
counterpart and French exports of combat aircraft dwarfed their British counterparts. The
resurgence of France's aviation sector was stimulated by combat aircraft exports. As the Table
below illustrates, France exported 60 percent of the aircraft it produced under the Fifth Republic to a
total of 26 foreign states, while British combat aircraft exports amounted to only 14 percent of the
French total.128
1 Table X:
Combat Aircraft Production and Exports
Year Total Total
Operational Produced Exported
Mirage 111/5/50
Mirage IV
Mirage F1
Mirage 2000
Total
Comparison with United Kingdom
Aircraft
1961
1963
1974
1984
1412
62
731
636
2841
1221
939 (66%)
0 (0%)
457(63%)
321 (50%)~
1717 (60%)
246 (20%)
Ultimately, France became the world's third largest exporter of combat aircraft, trailing only the
superpowers, and managed to sell a larger proportion of the aircraft it produced to foreign clients
than any other state. During certain years, combat aircraft exports accounted for two-thirds of
Dassault's cash flow as the prime contractor for French combat aircraft. 129
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321(50%)
Foreign
Clients
The primary factors contributing to the international success of French combat aircraft were
the intrinsic characteristics of the aircraft themselves. The vast majority of states demanded
lightweight multipurpose aircraft that they could afford to both acquire and maintain. Three
successive generations of French combat aircraft, the Mirage 11115, the Mirage F1 and the Mirage
2000, fit this description, while none of their British competitors did. British aircraft were either too
large and expensive, such as the English Electric Lightning and Panavia Tornado, or too reliant on
niche capabilities, such as the subsonic VTOL Harrier.
The DMA played a critical role in ensuring that the aircraft designs ultimately produced
fulfilled the requirements of potential foreign customers. In each case, the DMA undermined Air
Force efforts to procure larger and more sophisticated, yet less marketable aircraft. As Table XI
below illustrates, the aircraft France actually produced were substantially smaller and cheaper than
the ones the Air Force demanded.
Table XI:
Aircraft Procured Versus Initial Air Force Projects
Aircraft Empty Air Force Empty
Procured Weight Project Weight
Mirage F1 7,400 kg AFVG approx. 9,000 kg
Mirage F2 9,800 kg
Mirage 2000 7,500 kg ACF 14,187 kg
MRCA (Tornado) 15,000 kg
Although French aircraft manufacturers, particularly Dassault Aviation, lobbied to produce
lightweight fighters that could be easily exported, it is doubtful whether aircraft producers would
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have gotten their way had the DMA/DGA not existed to argue their case and support their
initiatives. British aircraft companies understood the same market realities as their French
counterparts and bombarded the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense with proposals to build
economic lightweight combat aircraft. However, the Royal Air Force's incessant demands for large
and sophisticated aircraft trumped commercial lobbying. The difference between the French and
British cases lies in the existence of a powerful mediating organization, the DMA/DGA, that shifted
the balance in favor of affordable aircraft in France. Product architecture therefore played the
preponderant role in the comparative success of French combat aircraft on international markets
rather than any supposedly greater willingness of French governments to export sophisticated
military hardware.
At the DMA's insistence, French aircraft also incorporated exclusively French subsystems,
even when the latter were substandard compared with foreign alternatives. The DMA opposed
attempts to power the Mirage IV with a Pratt and Whitney engine, blocked the incorporation of
Rolls-Royce turbojets into export Mirage Ills and combated attempts to produce a French aircraft
incorporating a license-built Pratt and Whitney TF-30 engine. As a consequence, France's jet
engine manufacturer, SNECMA, was able to improve the capabilities of its design bureau and
enhance its manufacturing skills by developing and producing engines for French combat aircraft.
As the table below demonstrates, France's captive domestic combat aircraft market provided
SNECMA with a large number of orders, which its commercially uncompetitive engines would not
otherwise have won.1
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Table XII:
SNECMA Engines and Dassault Aircraft
Engine Year Introduced Number Produced Aircraft
ATAR 9B 1959 419 Mirage IIIB/C
ATAR 9C 1960 1671 Mirage IIIE/V
ATAR 9K 1962 256 Mirage IV
ATAR 9K50 1969 1020 Mirage F1/50
M53-P2 1981 650 Mirage 2000
Considering that SNECMA's first successes in producing jet engines for commercial aircraft came
in the 1970s, with the company establishing itself as a significant non-military jet engine producer in
the 1980s, the development and production of jet engines to accompany Dassault combat aircraft
was essential to France's acquiring the capacity to compete in the market for commercial jet
engines. Without the DMA's intervention, Dassault and the French Air Force would have happily
substituted better American and British engines for inferior French ones, which Dassault judged 20
percent less capable. 3 1
Because of its success in the combat aircraft market, Dassault Aviation and SNECMA both
managed to spin products off into the commercial sector. Prior to their successes in the military
sphere, neither company was present in the non-military aviation sector. However, by the 1980s
each had developed profitable commercial activities. Since the end of the Cold War and the
concomitant decline in French defense budgets, non-military sales have provided greater revenues to
both Dassault Aviation and SNECMA than their traditional defense activities.
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For Dassault, the process of spinning off technologies and design expertise began in early
1962. With the Mirage III in full production, Marcel Dassault decided to invest a portion of the
firm's profits to develop a commercial business jet. Employing engineers freed from Mirage III
development, Dassault Aviation elaborated a plan for a business jet capable of carrying ten
passengers and powered by two Pratt and Whitney JT-12 jet engines. Technology and expertise
developed for Mirage fighters, notably the firm's aerodynamic experience with transonic flight and
its production of state-of-the-art servomotors to power control surfaces, contributed directly to
Dassault's ability to enter the emerging business jet market with a formidable product. 33
With exceptional rapidity, Dassault engineers constructed a prototype business jet, called the
Mystere 20, which flew in May 1963. After Charles Lindbergh, as an advisor to Pan Am Airlines,
visited Dassault Aviation that same year, Marcel Dassault signed a contract to deliver 40 of his new
Mystere 20s to Pan Am, with an option for a further 120 at an agreed price. At Lindbergh's
suggestion, Dassault Aviation adopted a General Electric engine and renamed the aircraft Falcon 20
to enhance its marketing potential with American audiences. Dassault Aviation then drew on its
contacts with Boeing, developed when Boeing attempted to license produce the Mirage III, to get
the Falcon 20 certified for the United States civil aviation market in record time.134 Soon four
aircraft rolled off Dassault's production line every month.
Although business jets remained a complementary activity to Dassault's primary occupation
of building combat aircraft, the business jet market remained significantly lucrative for Dassault
Aviation to continually elaborate new models-the Falcon 10, Falcon 50, Falcon 900, Falcon 2000
and Falcon 7X. Dassault methodically applied technologies and processes recently acquired for
combat aircraft programs to each successive generation of business jet. For example, after Dassault
made its first investment in computer assisted design (CAD) technologies in 1965 to assist with the
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company's two variable geometry combat aircraft programs, CAD was next used on Dassault's
abortive Mercure regional jet and the successful Falcon 10 business jet.135 After even greater
investments in CAD to develop the Mirage 2000 and Rafale fighters, Dassault engineers employed
their CATIA design software to render the Falcon 2000 the world's first aircraft to enter mass
production without passing through a prototype phase. Approved for the American market on 2
February 1995, Dassault was able to deliver a production aircraft to the first Falcon 2000 client on
16 February.136 Table XIII, below, details the many technologies Dassault spun-off from its
lightweight fighters to business jets.
Over time, Dassault acquired a commanding 50 percent of the world business jet market.
After the end of the Cold War, this once complementary activity became vital for Dassault's
survival. Dassault's defense activities plummeted in the late-1990s, during the interval between the
French Air Force's last Mirage 2000 orders and its first Rafale deliveries. For these years, business
389
jets provided the majority of Dassault's revenues, representing 45 percent of Dassault earnings in
1996, 68 percent in 1999, 71 percent in 2000 and 76 percent in 2001.117 By 2005, with Rafale
deliveries in full swing, defense activities once again contributed 52 percent of Dassault's
earnings.138 In Dassault's case, a combat aircraft producer, with no prior experience in civil
aviation, entered and eventually dominated a niche commercial aviation sector, the business jet
market, using technologies acquired through combat aircraft programs. In due course, Dassault's
commercial and military activities proved complementary, as recessions in one market were
counterbalanced by growth in the other.
Besides its conquest of the business jet market, Dassault has profited from another major
spin off of military technology into the commercial marketplace. While struggling to design the
airframes of the Mirage 2000 and the cancelled Mirage 4000, Dassault Aviation charged a small
team of engineers in 1977 with developing an improved CAD software program. The new software,
named CATIA (an acronym for interactive three dimensional design assistant), was the first
computer program in the world to permit designs to be rotated and modified in three dimensions.
After assisting in the design of the Mirage 2000, Dassault Aviation formed a joint venture with IBM
to market CATIA. The Dassault subsidiary charged with improving and marketing CATIA,
Dassault Systems, has expanded considerably since its creation with a staff of ten engineers in 1981.
By the mid-1990s, CATIA dominated the CAD market and Dassault Systems employed 1,000
personnel. CATIA has been sold to Boeing, Lockheed, BMW, Fiat, Volkswagen, Rover and
Chrysler, bringing Dassault Systems regular profit margins in excess of 20 percent.139
At the same time as Dassault spun Falcon business jets and CATIA software off into
commercial markets, SNECMA accomplished an even more spectacular transformation from a
substandard producer of military jet engines to a world class manufacturer of commercial jet
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engines. In order to improve the performance of the ATAR turbojets that powered French combat
aircraft prior to the Mirage 2000, SNECMA engineers continually attempted to develop lighter,
cheaper and sturdier turbine and compressor blades. After developing hollow and solid, titanium
and aluminum alloy, forged and cast turbine and compressor blades to eek increased power out of a
fundamentally obsolete design, SNECMA had acquired an undeniable expertise in the design and
construction of turbines and compressors.140 Thanks to the comparatively larger number of engines
produced to power Mirage fighters, SNECMA also built-up the manufacturing facilities and labor
force needed to mass-produce engines.
In view of these resources and its earnings from military turbojet production, SNECMA had
the capacity to negotiate with both General Electric and Pratt and Whitney about jointly developing
a commercial jet engine with either of the American jet engine giants. Finally, SNECMA and
General Electric signed an accord at the end of 1971, stipulating that the two companies would
jointly finance and collectively produce a new jet turbofan for commercial airliners-the CFM 56.
While General Electric produced the high-pressure sections of the engine and its combustion
chamber, SNECMA designed and built the low-pressure sections of the compressor and turbine, in
addition to the fan and thrust-reverser. By 1974, a CFM 56 prototype had been completed and the
engine was certified for commercial aircraft in 1979.141
Since the introduction of the CFM 56, the engine has progressed through multiple versions
and proven a remarkable commercial success. From the early 1980s until present, 16,237 CFM 56
engines have been produced, powering approximately half of the world's airliners with over 100
seats, including over 6,200 Boeing and Airbus aircraft. Due to the CFM 56's success alone,
SNECMA has emerged as the world's fourth largest commercial jet engine producer, trailing
General Electric, Pratt and Whitney and Rolls-Royce. Comparing the over 16,000 commercial
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turbofan engines produced since 1980 to the approximately 4,500 military turbojets and turbofans
manufactured since 1960, SNECMA's commercial sales have overtaken the firm's traditional
military activities in terms of economic value. Building on the success of their CFM 56 engine,
SNECMA and General Electric have launched a new joint venture to produce an engine to power
the next generation of jumbo jets, the Airbus A380 and Boeing 787.
In short, SNECMA has managed to transform itself from a technologically uncompetitive
military engine producer reliant on Second World War German technology to a profitable and
internationally competitive commercial engine manufacturer. SNECMA's ability to spin
technologies developed for its military projects off into the commercial sector owes much to the
DMA/DGA's interventions during successive aircraft development programs. Because SNECMA
engines performed less well than foreign counterparts, the Air Force and Dassault Aviation
repeatedly proposed building French aircraft around foreign engines.
Proposals ranged from equipping Mirage Ills with Rolls-Royce Avons, French Mirage IVs
with Pratt and Whitney J75, and Mirage Gs and F2s with Pratt and Whitney TF-30s. The DMA
opposed all of these efforts to power aircraft with British or American engines, forcing the Air Force
to make due with the inferior products of French industry. However, if not for the technology and
manufacturing capacity acquired by producing 3,366 ATAR turbojets to power Mirage combat
aircraft, SNECMA would have never been able to launch the CFM 56 in partnership with General
Electric.
The French experience contradicts conventional logic, which holds that military spin-offs
into the commercial sector are exceedingly rare.142 Both Dassault Aviation and SNECMA are
clear-cut cases of companies with no prior commercial aircraft activities successfully spinning
technologies from defense projects off into the commercial sector. Dassault's diversification-
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already 40 years old-has proven that a single firm can sustain commercial and military aircraft
development capabilities over an extended period of time.
Why have French aviation companies been more successful at adapting defense-related
technologies for the commercial sphere than their foreign counterparts? A primary factor is, once
again, the DMA/DGA's role in combat aircraft programs. By systematically opposing Air Force
requirements for technologies judged too sophisticated or uncertain, the DMA/DGA ensured that a
smaller portion of French aircraft development efforts were invested in expensive capabilities with
no commercial application-such as VTOL, variable geometry wings and the titanium construction
technologies needed for aircraft designed to fly at speeds above Mach 2.2. Contrarily, a greater
proportion of French efforts went to technologies and processes that could be applied to commercial
programs as well, including integral manufacturing, computer assisted design (CAD), active control
technology (ACT) and carbon-fiber composites (CFC). The DMA/DGA's constant preoccupation
with limited defense budgets also probably accustomed French aircraft companies to design aircraft
with development and operational costs in mind, an attitude differing sharply from British and
American military aerospace firms habituated to massive cost overruns in the pursuit of advanced
technology. 143
As a consequence of the DMA/DGA's influence, France emerged as the world's third largest
exporter of combat aircraft by the end of the Cold War, dwarfing the United Kingdom. As a
consequence, France has, since the 1980s, been the only state besides the United States and the
Soviet Union/Russia capable of designing and producing a modem combat aircraft out of entirely
indigenous components. Commercially, French companies have branched out from their state-
sponsored military activities to conquer commercial markets as well. France has progressed from
having an aerospace industry one-third the size of the United Kingdom's at the advent of the Fifth
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Republic, to possessing Europe's largest today. Technological spin-off was critical to this
process, but did not just happen. Led by the DMA/DGA, the French procurement process took
civil-military synergies into account at every stage of the development process, orienting
investments towards technologies with the most commercial and dual-use potential, rather than the
greatest military importance.
VI. Conclusion
By creating a powerful, autonomous procurement agency--the DMA/DGA--de Gaulle
fundamentally changed the shape of French military procurement. Rather than obeying the dictates
of the armed services, the DMA/DGA has come to view itself as the custodian of France's military-
industrial base. As a consequence, it has favored programs and activities that guarantee the
competitiveness of French defense industries, rather than fulfilling specific military requirements.
The combat aircraft sector is an exemplar in this regard. Not one French combat aircraft
began with a formal Air Force requirement. While the Air Force issued requirements for large
combat aircraft incorporating exotic technologies, the DMA/DGA collaborated with defense
industries to impose smaller and simpler designs. Thus, instead of long-range interceptors, twin-
engine fighter-bombers or vertical take-off aircraft, France built one generation of lightweight
fighter after another.
Calculated to satisfy a maximum number of foreign customers, France exported the majority
of the lightweight fighters it produced. This export windfall permitted French manufacturers to
lengthen their production runs, amortize development costs and offer regular improvements to their
basic designs. As a consequence, the French Air Force managed to sustain a fleet of 450 modem,
nationally-produced, combat aircraft at a high degree of readiness.
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Pursued over time, the DMA/DGA policy of producing lightweight fighters at regular decade
intervals-- Mirage III development beginning in 1955, Mirage F1 in 1965, Mirage 2000 in 1974 and
the Rafale in 1983--enabled French manufacturers to accumulate unprecedented experience with a
single category of combat aircraft. 1 This gradual specialization in lightweight fighters brought
commercial advantages as, "experience-i.e. the steady buildup and maintenance of expertise over
time through constant 'learning by doing'-is critical in the cost-effective design and development
of military aircraft." 146
In terms of technology policy, the DMA/DGA eschewed heavy investments in risky or
exclusively military research and development and instead concentrated on perfecting proven
military technologies and developing dual-use technologies and process innovations that would have
wider ramifications on non-defense sectors. Over time, the DMAIDGA policy bore fruit in a
number of technologies spun-off from defense industries into the civilian economy, such as Falcon
business jets, CATIA software and CFM engines. In France's case, spin-off was the deliberate result
of a defense procurement process that enshrined it as a central value, rather than the haphazard result
of heavy defense spending, as American advocates frequently claim.
When the DMA/DGA did invest in military technologies, it followed the safe route of
developing technologies that other states had already shown were viable. In fact, all of the key
technologies or construction techniques that made successive generations of French aircraft more
capable were developed elsewhere. As Table XIV illustrates below, the DMA/DGA and Dassault
were content to be technological followers, appropriating and improving on proven technologies.
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French Aircraft
Table XIV:
French Fighters and Borrowed Technology
New Technologies Originally Introduced
Mirage III (1961)
Mirage F1 (1974)
Mirage 2000 (1984)
Area Rule Fuselage
Tailless Delta
Thin Wing (honeycombed)
Integral Construction
Active Control Technology
Carbon Fiber Composites
F-102 (USA - 1954)
F-102 (USA - 1954)
F-104 (USA - 1960)
late 1950s
F-16 (USA - 1978)
1966 in laboratory (UK)
* Dates given for aircraft are in-service dates
appropriate and exploit new technologies in a timely manner. France was the second state to field a
fly-by-wire fighter and incorporated carbon composites into its designs before the United Kingdom,
which originally developed the technology. In perhaps the most telling example, France took delta-
wing aircraft to their technical and commercial pinnacle, despite having been a latecomer onto the
market.
The DMA/DGA accomplished its objectives by moderating between the competing
preferences of different actors. As Table XV illustrates, the ultimate product of French procurement
did not correspond to any single group's favourite scenario, but to a coherent DMA/DGA policy.
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Table XV:
Actors, Preferences and the DMA/DGA Solution
rnce DMA/DGA Solution
Acquire cutting-edge technology
Import superior foreign weapons
Maintain national technological base
Collaborate with European partners
Produce "cheap" exportable aircraft
Minimize technological risk
Retain prime-contractor status
Use superior imported sub-systems
Produce "cheap" exportable aircraft
Construct aircraft nationally
Develop aircraft evolutionarily
Equip aircraft with French sub-systems
Use proven technology
SNECMA/
Thompson
Keep role in developing key
sub-systems
The DMA/DGA blocked repeated Dassault and Air Force efforts to outfit French aircraft with
superior foreign sub-systems (engines and radars), thereby favoring domestic producers of sub-
systems at the expense of greater military capabilities or further airframe exports. The DMA/DGA
also sabotaged political efforts to foster European armaments collaboration, whether promoted by
nationalists like Messmer, conservatives such as Pompidou or convinced Europeans like Mitterrand.
Whenever politicians subscribed to a collaborative program, such as the AFVG in the 1960s or the
Eurofighter in the 1980s, the DMA/DGA subverted collaboration by sponsoring rival national
projects and making unacceptable demands of partners.
The group whose preferences were satisfied the least often was the Air Force's high
command. Instead of fulfilling the Air Force's requirements for diverse and sophisticated aircraft,
the DMA/DGA supplied one lightweight fighter after another. During the 1960s and 1970s, the
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Actorsc Prefere
Air Force
Political Leaders
Dassault
Arfnrc Prpfpr
DMA/DGA frustrated the Air Force's search for vertical take-off or swing-wing aircraft capable of
continuing operations from damaged runways. With equal assuredness, the DMA/DGA ignored
later Air Force requirements for twin-engine interceptors with long-range radars and twin-engine
fighter-bombers able to penetrate enemy air space at low altitudes. Until the end of the Cold War,
Air Force generals feared that their fleet of lightweight fighters would fail in the event of war,
grounded by attacks on aerodromes or unable to penetrate thick air defenses.
Contrary to the traditional image of a military-industrial complex wherein military
professionals and industrialists collude to shape foreign policy and foist unneeded weaponry on a
state's leaders, the French DMA/DGA led system of defense procurement entailed maximizing
industrial and political outcomes by imposing unwanted armaments on the military establishment.
The result was victories that can be measured in terms of export orders, technological spin-offs and
France's virtually unique capacity, amongst medium powers, to develop combat aircraft
autonomously. However, French leaders may count themselves fortunate that the Air Force's fears
about their preparedness for a full-scale war were never put to the test.
398
Endnotes
When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, he and Defense Minister Pierre Messmer
quickly collided with the armed services over procurement. Especially concerning the aerospace
sector, de Gaulle and Messmer reproached the armed services for seeking technological
sophistication to the detriment of military efficiency, according too little priority to the development
of missiles capable of carrying French nuclear warheads and being unresponsive to ministerial
directives. Dominique Pestre, "Innovation technique, fonctionnement des institutions et politique:
creer la DMA et concevoir les missiles de la force de frappe frangaise," Maurice Vaisse, ed.
Armement et Ve Republique: fin des annies 1950 -fin des annies 1960 (Paris: CNRS, 2002), 9-10.
2 Philippe de Gaulle, De Gaulle, mon pere, vol. 2 (Paris: Plon, 2004), 199.
3 Anne Rasmussen, "Les corps d'ingdnieurs militaires et les ddbuts de la D6l6gation
ministirielle pour l'armement (1961-1968)" in Vaisse, ed. Armement et Ve Rdpublique: fin des
annies 1950 -fin des annies 1960, 14-15.
4 The DMA dispenses 80 percent of France's military research, development and
procurement budget, which in turn accounts for 35 to 40 percent of France's overall scientific
research expenditures. Louis Gautier, Mitterrand et son armi'e, 1990-1995 (Paris: Grasset, 1999),
346-47.
5 In 1990, in the aeronautical sector, 60 armament engineers occupied positions in
Thompson, 55 in Adrospatiale, 40 in SNECMA, 18 in Matra and 16 in Dassault. Jean Guisnel, Les
geniraux: Enquete sur le pouvoir militaire en France (Paris: La Dicouvert, 1990), 254-55.
6 Like the Mirage III, the Durandal also featured delta wings, an "area rule" fuselage and the
SNECMA ATAR 9B turbojet. The advantages of the Mirage III over the Durandal were that the
Mirage mounted a full-fledged radar while the Durandal only carried a ranging-radar, and the
Mirage displayed better supersonic performance, due largely to its moveable shock cones. See Jean
Cuny, "SE 212 Durandal: La breve histoire d'une grande famille," Le Fana de l'Aviation no. 254
(January 1991): 12-21; Robert Jackson, Cold War Combat Prototypes (Marlborough, United
Kingdom: Crowood, 2005), 64-70; and D6plante, 147-58.
7 PRO AVIA 18/3250 Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment, Marcel
Dassault Mirage 3A, Evaluation by a Team of A.&A.E.E. at Istres in January 1960.
8 Of course, political realities strongly influenced aircraft choice. For example, few states
actually chose between the Mirage III and the MiG-21. Clients and satellites of the Soviet Union
frequently received the MiG-21 at a fraction of its market value, while other potential customers
avoided purchasing an Eastern Bloc aircraft for political reasons. Only in a few limited markets,
such as India and Peru, were Western and Soviet aircraft in direct commercial competition. The
Mirage III's major commercial rivals were therefore American and British aircraft. According to a
1973 RAND Corporation study, "It cannot be gainsaid that the company has been favored by the
coincidence of several outside circumstances. The foremost has probably been the dearth of
399
effective competition for the Mirage in its various models.... The only other low price competitor to
the MiG-21 available through most of the 1960s was the F-5A, which was handicapped by inferior
speed and a fire control system that left something to be desired." Dassault Vice-President Bruno
Revellin-Falcoz evaluated the Mirage III's competitive environment slightly differently. According
to Revellin-Falcoz, "The choice [for potential clients] was not very large: the short-ranged Lockheed
F-104; the remarkable two-engine Phantom II, which was visually unattractive and comparatively
expensive; and the Draken, which the Swedish government virtually refused to export.... The
British had practically nothing to offer." Robert Perry, A Dassault Dossier: Aircraft Acquisition in
France (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1973), 28; Bruno Revellin-Falcoz, "La genese des
programmes Mirage," Actes du Colloque, 1986, Commemoration des anniversaires des premiers
vols du premier avion d' reaction franCais: SO-6000 Triton (11 novembre 1946) du premier vol du
Mirage III (17 novembre 1956) du premier vol du Mirage F-1 (23 decembre 1966), 6.
9 The ATAR 9C delivered less thrust and consumed more fuel than its American and British
contemporaries-for example, General Electric's J79 produced 27 percent more thrust with a
specific fuel consumption rate 22 percent lower than the ATAR.
10 The semi-active radar guided missiles deployed during the 1960s proved extraordinarily
unreliable. However, the R.530 / Cyrano II combination appears to have been particularly useless.
While the Israelis scored only 1 out of 282.5 kills, or 0.35%, with the R.530, the United States Air
Force and Navy scored 24 out of 86 kills, or 28%, recorded between 1965 and 1968 with radar
guided missiles (Sparrow and Falcon). The percentage of American radar-guided missiles that hit
their targets was 8.9% and 9.3% respectively for the Sparrow and the Falcon. Similar data for the
Israeli missile kill rate is lacking. South Africa's refusal to deploy the R.530 on combat missions is
perhaps the greatest condemnation of the missile's value. During air combat over Angola in 1987
and 1988, Cuban MiG-23s proved capable of launching AA-8 missiles in head on (forward sector)
engagements, whereas South African Mirages had to maneuver to a position behind the MiGs to
launch Matra 550 heat-seeking missiles. The R.530 was the only weapon in the South African
arsenal that could have given South African Mirages the ability to fire missiles head on against the
MiGs. However, the missile's reliability was considered so inadequate, that the South Africans
decided to do without it. Fr6dric Lert, Mirage F1, tome 1: F1C et FIB (Paris: Histoire et
Collections, 2007), 54; Aloni, 15; Stevenson, 9-10; and See Dick Lord, Vlamgat: The Story of the
Mirage F1 in the South African Air Force (Weltevreden Park, South Africa: Covos Day, 2000), 163-
64.
PRO AVIA 18/3250 Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment, Marcel
Dassault Mirage 3A, Evaluation by a Team of A. &A.E.E. at Istres in January 1960; and Diplante,
154.
12 Jim Upton, Lockheed F-104 Starfighter (North Branch, Minnesota: Specialty Press, 2003),
77-78.
1 John Pacco, The Belgian Air Force (Averbode, Belgium: J.P. Productions, 1996), 91-101.
400
14 The Northrop F-5 is not included in these figures because it is a more rudimentary aircraft.
Roughly 89 percent of the Lockheed F-104s went to foreign clients, however many of the 2,578
Lockheed F-104s produced were manufactured under license. See Dominique Breffort and Andre
Jouineau, Mirage 1I. Mirage 5, 50 et derivis de 1955 a 2000 (Paris: Histoire et Collections, 2004),
82; and Upton, 73-82.
1 Importantly, the initiative to export the Mirage III to Australia came from Rolls-Royce.
Because of the English Electric Lightning's greater cost and more specialized role, Rolls-Royce
concluded that its only possibility of providing the engine for Australia's next combat aircraft would
be to join forces with Dassault. Otherwise, the Australians would purchase the Lockheed F-104.
Marcel Dassault himself doubted the likelihood of exporting the Mirage III to Australia, which had
traditionally acquired American or British aircraft. He only explored the Australian market at Rolls-
Royce's instigation. According to D6plante, the Australian Air Force had a negative opinion of the
Avon because of how earlier Avon versions performed incorporated in F-86 Sabers. Occasionally,
the firing of the F-86s guns produced a flame-out on the Avons. This phenomenon was also
experienced on the RAF's early Hawker Hunters, which were also powered by earlier versions of
the Avon. In the Hunter, the problem was eventually resolved. Also according to Diplante, the
rushed incorporation of the Avon into a Mirage III fuselage changed the aircraft's aerodynamic
characteristics, counteracting many of the Avon's basic advantages. In a production Mirage III with
Rolls-Royce Avons, this problem would probably have been solved. Claude Carlier, Serge
Dassault: 50 ans de defies (Paris: Perrin, 2002), 84-86; and Henri Ddplante, A la conquete du ciel
(Aix-en-Provence: EDISUD, 1985), 159.
16 The "Mirage Affair" proved politically significant in Switzerland. The Swiss Mirage III
exceeded its budgetary envelope by 66 percent, with each aircraft costing 15 million instead of 8
million Swiss Francs. Within Switzerland, considerable political energy was devoted to identifying
who was responsible for this cost overrun. Ultimately, it was concluded that the difficulties
experienced by the Swiss contractor in integrating the American subsystems into the French aircraft
was to blame. Fiona Lombardi, The Swiss Air Power: Wherefrom? Whereto? (Zurich: VDF, 2007),
50-51; and Diplante, 155-56.
17 Very few Israeli kills resulted from a proper radar lock-on. Shlomo Aloni, Israeli Mirage
and Nesher Aces (London: Osprey, 2004), 10.
18 Aloni, Israeli Mirage and Nesher Aces, 63-65; Breffort and Jouineau, 41-43.
19 Ibid., 82.
20 Breffort and Jouineau, 72-73.
21 The Kfir never entirely lived up to its potential. Being the first and only combat aircraft
designed and produced in Israel, the poor integration of the J79 into an airframe based on the Mirage
III annulled many of the theoretical advantages to be gained from combining an aerodynamically
excellent airframe with a.more power engine. Because the center of gravity of the new aircraft was
further to the rear of the aircraft than on the Mirage III, the Kfir proved more sluggish in dogfights.
401
The modifications to the airframe and air intakes to accommodate the J79 also added to
aerodynamic drag, counteracting the advantages of higher thrust. Shlomo Aloni, "L'avion du
disespoir: Israel Aircraft Industries 'Kfir'," Le Fana de l'Aviation no. 439: 54-61.
22 Breffort and Jouineau, 72-73.
23 Alfred Bodemer and Robert Laugier, L'A TAR et tous les autres moteurs a reaction
frangais (Riquewihr, France: J.D. Reber, 1996), 61-99.
24 Ibid., 116-18; 160-63.
25 Breffort and Jouineau, 1-82.
26 Thompson-C.S.F., "Les dquipements de bord de Thompson-C.S.F.," Actes du Colloque,
1986, Commemoration des anniversaires des premiers vols du premier avion d' reaction frangais:
SO-6000 Triton (1] novembre 1946) du premier vol du Mirage I (17 novembre 1956) du premier
vol du Mirage F-1 (23 decembre 1966), 5-6.
27 The Mirage III's need for long paved surfaces was a bi-product of its tailless delta. By
way of comparison, the Soviet MiG-21 needed 800m to take off. L'Atlas des avions de combat
frangais: de la premiere guerre mondiale a nos jours, 103.
28 Many conflicts in recent memory had included coordinated strikes against enemy airfields,
including Germany's early offensives in World War II, the United States Navy's air strikes against
Japanese airfields in Formosa prior to the invasion of Okinawa in 1945, the British and French
assaults on Egyptian airfields in 1956 and the Soviet attacks on Hungarian airfields in 1956. In
retrospect, Cold War planners probably overestimated the ability of attacking aircraft to disable an
airfield. When air strikes against enemy airfields caused significant damage, it was more as a result
of aircraft destroyed on the ground than the disruption of the airfields themselves. More recent
conflicts, such as the 1991 Gulf War, demonstrate that engineering units are generally successful at
repairing even significant damage to airfields in a relatively short time.
29 "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage Fl," World Air Power Journal 17 (Summer 1994): 49.
3 The Republic F-105 Thunderchief represented the paradigm of the tactical nuclear bomber
during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The aircraft had a combat weight of 15,850 kg (34,870 lbs),
compared to the Mirage III's 7,975 kg (17,575 lbs). Fully loaded, the F-105 only had a range of 200
miles.
3 When NATO decided to launch a VTOL competition, France was bereft of VTOL designs
that could be quickly developed into a competitive proposal. This is not to say that French designers
or firms had been entirely uninterested in VTOL. The successful concept for vectored thrust that
ultimately led to the United Kingdom's Hawker Harrier was pioneered by French engineer Michel
Wibault, but was developed in the United Kingdom beginning in 1956 because French aircraft
producers were initially uninterested. France's state-owned jet engine manufacturer, SNECMA, had
402
investigated VTOL in parallel between 1952 and 1959. However, the SNECMA prototype, the
Coldopatre, proved incapable of transitioning to level flight once it had taken-off vertically. The
project was abandoned after the prototype crashed during its ninth flight. Dassault Aviation had
also already developed an aircraft concept, entitled Cavalier, that was to be powered by the same
Bristol Pegasus motor that the Harrier later used. However, the colonel charged with evaluating
new aircraft designs rejected the Cavalier as too dangerous for pilots in the late 1950s. See
Bodemer and Laugier, 99-108; and Ddplante, 175-77.
32 After Rolls-Royce demonstrated VTOL lift-off using a metal frame containing two
vertically mounted Nene turbojets, Marcel Dassault told his engineers, "Don't get excited, it is only
a metal cage that flew." D6plante, 175.
13 PRO DEFE 13/305 Peter Thorneycroft to Julian Amery, 28 September 1962.
34 PRO DEFE 13/305 Julian Amery to Peter Thorneycroft, 4 October 1962.
35 Bruno Revellin-Falcoz, "Dibats," Actes du Colloque, 1986, Commemoration des
anniversaires des premiers vols du premier avion d' riaction frangais: SO-6000 Triton (11 novembre
1946) du premier vol du Mirage III (17 novembre 1956) du premier vol du Mirage F-1 (23
decembre 1966), 5.
36 Meanwhile, Dassault's approach of combining an existing airframe with lift jets was
showing its limits. With nine separate jet engines-eight for vertical lift and one for horizontal
flight-the Mirage III-V would be more expensive to produce and suffer significant maintenance
problems compared to British designs employing one jet engine for both vertical and horizontal
flight. By 1964, the DMA was increasingly skeptical of the commercial and technical viability of a
French VTOL aircraft. The first VTOL prototypee, named the Balzac, crashed twice in 1964 and
1965, killing two pilots. One the Mirage III-V prototypes was also destroyed in an accident.
Moreover, The British Ministry of Defence's Chief Science Advisor estimated the Mirage III-V's
production costs as 25 percent higher than the British P.1154 and as less reliable. PRO DEFE
13/305 "V/STOL - P.1154 versus Mirage III V," Solly Zuckermann to Peter Thorneycroft, 15
October 1962; Ddplante, 178-79; and Jackson, 144-46.
37 Ddplante, 181-82.
38 PRO CAB 164/351 Anglo-French Cooperation in the Aircraft Field, Solly Zuckerman, 25
Sept 1967.
39 Ddplante, 182; Bodemer and Laguier, 150.
40 Dassault's first variable geometry prototype likewise led the company to conclude that,
"In no case would these aircraft make good and agile fighters because of the penalties associated
with the structure and installation of a [wing] pivot, which is a comparatively heavy addition to an
aircraft." Revellin-Falcoz, "Ddbats," 5.
403
41 Deplante, 188-89.
42 "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage F1," 51.
43 D6plante, 190-9 1.
44 D6plante, 181-93; and "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage Fl," 49.
45 PRO PREM 15/1290 "Extract from meeting Prime Minister/Pompidou," May 22, 1973.
46 Given the fact that France ultimately acquired the comparatively inexpensive Mirage Fl,
while the United Kingdom went on to develop the much more costly Tornado in collaboration with
West Germany and Italy, one of the main reasons it took so long for the British and French air
forces to agree to AFVG requirements was that the French air force wanted a more expensive and
sophisticated aircraft. According to an internal British memorandum, France needed interception
capabilities in addition to low-level strike performance, whereas the RAF needed only the low-level
strike capabilities. British estimates suggested that an aircraft meeting French requirements would
carry a fly-away cost of f£1.8 million, whereas one built to meet the less demanding British
requirements would only cost f£1.6 million. The compromise solution largely favored French
requirements, entailing an aircraft with an estimated cost of £1.75 apiece. PRO CAB 148/32/35
AFVG Aircraft: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Minister of State for
Technology, May 10, 1967.
47 D6plante, 187.
48 Perry, 20.
49 The newspaper Le Figero commented that, "this aircraft is the finest, sleekest, most
elegant and purest that one can see." Jours de France, a newspaper owned by Marcel Dassault, also
waxed eloquently about the Mirage G lyrically describing it as "rapid as an arrow, yet capable of
landing [gently] as a flower." Jean Guisnel, Les giniraux: Enquete sur le pouvoir militaire en
France (Paris: La Decouverte, 1990), 214; and Jean-Pierre Bechter, Luc Berger and Claude Carlier,
L'ipopie Dassault (Boulogne, France: Timee-Editions, 2006), 49.
5 PRO CAB 148/32/47 Cabinet-DOP Committee, "The Aircraft Programme," 23 June 1967.
During flight tests, the Mirage F2 proved capable of landing at a speed of 140 kts, 30 kts
less than the Mirage III, and coming to a halt within 480 m. "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage Fl,"
51.
52 "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage Fl," 50-51.
53 D6plante, 190-91.
404
5 According to Ddplante, "SNECMA's leadership was not interested. Its [SNECMA]
president even criticized it as 'so little our own,' disregarding his company's role in developing the
afterburner." Ddplante, 184.
5 At the Air Force's insistence, SNECMA began developing a French variant, entitled the
TF-106, of the Pratt and Whitney JTF-10 engine in 1962. Interested in the greater performance of
the TF-30 engine, developed for the American F-111, the Air Force pressured SNECMA to reorient
its development work to produce a variant of the TF-30, entitled the TF-306, in 1965. Because civil
aircraft engines do not have afterburners (with the exception of the Concorde and Tu-144),
SNECMA's leadership feared that being limited to developing afterburners would condemn it to
being a niche supplier of military aircraft. Bodemer and Laguier, 148-50.
56 Ddplante, 184.
57 "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage F1," 51.
58 According to an Air Force Chief of Staff, "The Fl was imposed on the Air Force. The Air
Force did not oppose the Mirage F1 because it doubted the aircraft's viability, but because it did not
represent enough of a technological advance over the Mirage III to justify the cost of acquiring and
maintaining the new aircraft." Years later, one of Dassault's designers ironically stated that, "The
Air Staff's needs were addressed before they could even be expressed." Cohen, 214; Fredric Lert,
Mirage F]: Tome 1, F1C et FIB (Paris: Histoire et Collections, 2007), 6.
59 "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage F1," 51.
60 Bodemer and Laguier, 91-98.
61 Look-down radar capability defines the ability of a radar to identify aircraft flying below
the radar. Look-down was technically difficult because of the computing problem of isolating the
radar signature of a low-flying aircraft from the much larger radar signature of the earth. The
Cyrano IV radar was far from perfect. In South African service, the radar originally demonstrated a
mean time between failures (MTBF) rate of 12.2 hours. After improvements in maintenance
organization, the rate was raised to 16.3 hours. General Ward of the SAAF commented that that the
Cyrano IV was still awkward to operate, but produced much better results than its predecessor.
Pascal de Chassey, "Les Mirages III et F-I dans l'Armde de l'Air frangaise," Actes du Colloque,
1986, Commemoration des anniversaires des premiers vols du premier avion a reaction frangais:
SO-6000 Triton (11 novembre 1946) du premier vol du Mirage III (17 novembre 1956) du premier
vol du Mirage F-] (23 decembre 1966), 8; Thompson-C.S.F., 6-7; and Ward, 13, 135.
62 Revellin-Falcoz, "Ddbats," 3, and Ward, 31.
63 Whitford, 99-100.
64 "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage Fl," 54.
405
65 Expressing the prevailing view in the Air Force, General Pascal de Chassy observed that
the Mirage Fl's improved ability to take-off and land would be more important in the event of war
than the aircraft's bi-sonic speed. de Chassey, 7-8.
66 "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage F1," 54.
67 Instantaneous and sustained turn performance are both important for air combat.
Instantaneous turn performance refers to the turning capability of an aircraft at any given moment.
Sustained turn performance measures the ability of an aircraft to sustain a turn over an extended
length of time. See de Chassey, 8; Robert Shaw, Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering
(Annapolis: Navy Institute, 1985), 387-88.
68 General Ward stated that the Mirage III dominated combat at low speeds, but that the
Mirage F1 dominated in vertical maneuvers. The Mirage Fl could out-climb its opponent and take
favorable positions from which it could then make high-speed firing passes. Ward, 37.
69 The Mirage III remained in production well into the Mirage Fl 's production run.
Therefore, it is possible to directly compare the costs of the two aircraft. In the early 1970s, Mirage
FICs cost approximately $4.2 million apiece, compared to $3.5 million for the Mirage IIIE. See
Perry, 29.
70 "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage F1," 77-78.
7 Comparing aircraft costs is extraordinary difficult because costs vary significantly as a
result of avionics fits, contract terms, inflation, fluctuating exchange rates and profit margins.
However, a Mirage FIC cost the French Air Force approximately $4.2 million in 1972, while a F-
16A was designed for a fly-away cost of $4.5 million in 1975. Stevenson, 196.
72 The F-16's thrust/weight ratio was approximately 1, versus 0.69 for the Mirage Fl.
According to one French analysis, "Against the first generation F-16A, the French aircraft [the
Mirage Fl] is not laughable. However, there is a difference in modernity that is rapidly evident.
When climbing or maneuvering in the horizontal plane, the [French] ATAR 9K50 provides too little
thrust." de Chassey, 8; and Lert, 44.
7 Ddplante, 228.
7 The major difference between the Mirage FlE offered for the international competition
and the standard production Mirage FIC was that the Mirage FIE carried a new engine, the
SNECMA M53. By providing more power, the M53 increased the Mirage F1's thrust-to-weight-
ratio to 0.85, which was still inferior to the F-16.
" Vadepied, 293-300.
76 "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage Fl," 88-95.
406
77 Besides the General Dynamics F-16 and the Soviet MiG-21 and MiG-23, very few aircraft
in production during the 1970s can be classified as being in the same category as the Mirage F1.
Other American aircraft, the F-4, F- 14 and F- 15 were all substantially larger and, therefore, more
expensive. The only British combat aircraft in production, the Hawker-Siddley Harrier, was a
specialized VTOL aircraft, with a short range and limited air-to-air capabilities.
78 The United States Air Force (USAF), which operated several MiG-23s for air combat
training, evaluated the aircraft's combat potential in the following terms, "The Flogger pilot was
going to make one pass and run. If he tried to turn... you owned him." The USAF also evaluated
the MiG-23 as "unstable and difficult to fly." Because of its maintenance problems and delicate
handling, USAF pilots did not like to fly the MiG-23, leading an American colonel to remark that
"they [the USAF pilots] were scared of them [the MiG-23s]." Peter Grier, "Constant Peg: A Tale of
Purloined MiG Fighters, Secret Desert Airfields, and Double-Wide Trailers..." Air Force Magazine
(April 2007): 86-89.
79 Overall, 98 Mirage FIs accounted for over half of the Iraqi Air Force's confirmed air-to-
air victories over the Iranian Air Force fighters between September 1981, when the Mirage F1 was
declared operational, and the end of the war in 1988. By way of contrast, the Iraqi Air Force's
larger fleet of MiG-23s accounted for less than a quarter of confirmed air-to-air victories during the
same period. With air combat in general, but particularly with many wars in the Middle East, there
is a significant gap between claimed air combat victories and verifiable results. Discrepancies in
figures can be the result of multiple pilots claiming to have shot down the same aircraft, pilots
claiming to have shot down aircraft that are only damaged, pilots of one side claiming to have shot
down aircraft that the other side claims as downed by ground-based air defenses and outright lying,
either by pilots or their governments. In one example, Major Moukhaled Abdoul Kareem of the
Iraqi Air Force claimed to have shot down 14 Iranian aircraft with his Mirage Fl. Iraqi intelligence
services and the Iraqi Air Force were unable to corroborate 13 of the claimed victories, all having
taken place deep in Iranian airspace (hence no wreckage of the enemy aircraft) and beyond visual
range (hence no gun-camera footage of the victory). Adhering to strict criteria for counting aerial
victories, it is possible to affirm that the Iraqi Air Force shot down 25 Iranian combat aircraft
between September 1981 and the end of the war. Of these victories, 14 were won by Mirage Fls,
six by MiG-23s, four by MiG-25s and one by a MiG-21. The ACIG Team, "Arabian Peninsula and
Persian Gulf Database: Iraqi Air-to-Air Victories," September 2003, at The Air Combat Information
Group, www.acig.org/artman/publish (consulted 24 June 2007); and Ahmad Sadik and Tom Cooper,
"Les 'Mirage' de Baghdad: Les Dassault 'Mirage' F1 dans la force adrienne irakienne," Fana de
l'Aviation no. 434: 20.
80 Ward, 110-32.
81 One key necessity for low-level penetration missions is the ability of an airframe to resist
turbulence, which increases as altitude decreases. The susceptibility of an aircraft to low-level
buffeting is directly proportional to the velocity of an aircraft, but inversely proportional to its wing
loading. Therefore, for an aircraft to fly fast, at low level, a high level of wing loading is preferable.
In this context, the Mirage Fl's 54 percent higher wing-loading than the Mirage III made it a better
407
aircraft for low-level attacks. de Chassey, 8; and John Law, Aircraft Stories: Decentering the
Object in Technoscience (Durham: Duke University, 2002), 91-92.
82 Between January 1984 and August 1987, Iran and Iraq damaged or sunk merchant vessels
on 463 occasions. Iraq damaged more merchant vessels than Iran and the Mirage F1 accounted for
the majority of Iraqi successes. According to Huertas, Mirage Fls were credited with 37 out of 41
ships written off as a result of Iraqi attacks. Different figures are presented by Cooper, who claims
that roughly 650 Exocet sorties were flown, of which 400 missiles were launched, hitting 257 ships
of which 115 were written-off or sunk. During 1986, for which rough figures are available, Mirage
Fls accounted for 60 out of 61 Iraqi attacks on vessels in the Gulf. By late 1985, Iranian oil exports
were down by 40 percent. Several pilots of the Iraqi Air Force's 82 Squadron hit over a dozen oil-
tankers apiece, leading to them being termed the "millionaires" for the millions of tons of oil they
sunk. Nadia El-Shazly, The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq's Maritime Swordplay (London:
MacMillan, 1998), 34; The ACIG Team, "Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf Database: Tanker
War 1980-1988," September 13, 2003, at The Air Combat Information Group,
www.acig.org/artmanlpublish/article 209.shtml (consulted 24 June 2007); Ahmad Sadik and Tom
Cooper, "Les 'Mirage' de Baghdad: Les Dassault 'Mirage' Fl dans la force adrienne irakienne,"
Fana de l'Aviation no. 435: 71-72; Salvador Huertas, Dassault Mirage: The Combat Log (Atglen,
Pennsylvania: Schiffer, 1996), 145; and Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop, Iran-Iraq Air War: 1980-
1988 (Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer, 2000),185, 286
83 Sadik and Cooper, 65, 72-73.
84 Ward, 158-60.
85 de Chassey, 7.
86 Ward, 31.
87 The Mirage III lacked the range needed for escort missions, while the Mirage 5 and Jaguar
lacked the air combat potential. Ironically, the Libyan Air Force possessed Mirage Fls and Mirage
5s, as well as Soviet-built aircraft. Before France's intervention, Libya used Mirages, Su-22s and
MiG-23s extensively to attack ground targets in Chad. The four Mirage Fls based at N'Djamena
were viewed as essential for four reasons: 1) to escort French transports on both flights into and
within Chad, 2) to protect N'Djamena (the logistic hub of the operation) from Libyan bombers, 3)
prevent Libyan aircraft from supporting pro-Libyan rebels, and 4) escorting ground attack Jaguars.
See Colonel Spartacus, Operation Manta: Tchad 1983-1984 (Paris: Plon, 1985), 18-54; Yves Goutx,
"Caches par les 'Mirage', les 'Jaguar' attaquent: Au Tchad, en janvier 1987 l'Armde de l'Air utilisa
la ruse pour ddtruire un radar," Fana de l'Aviation no. 369 (August 2000): 18-27.
88 Etienne Copel, Vaincre la guerre: Une autre defense, une autre armie (Paris: Lieu
Commun, 1984), 130.
89 Michel Forget, Puissance airienne et strategies (Paris: Economica, 2001), 275.
408
90 After the success of the Mirage V, Dassault marketed a radar-less version of the Mirage
Fl. However, only South Africa (32 aircraft) and Libya (16 aircraft) purchased the radar-less
Mirage Fl. All other Mirage Fl s, including photo-reconnaissance and training versions, were
equipped with Thompson CSF radars. Almost all were equipped with Cyrano IVs, however some
Iraqi Mirage Fls were equipped with the Agave radar, optimized for use in maritime strike missions.
On the other hand, Mirage III trainers and photo-reconnaissance aircraft were not equipped with
radars. Moreover, 531 radar-less Mirage 5s were built, while Switzerland's 36 Mirage IIIEs
incorporated American radars. "Gallic Guardian: Dassault Mirage Fl," 59-95; Breffort and Joineau,
1-82; and Lert, 22-25.
91 The Iraqis also deployed the Soviet R-40R/T, R-23, R-23R/T and K-13R radar guided
missiles. Cooper and Farzad Bishop, Iran-Iraq Air War: 1980-1988, 284.
92 Ibid., 281-91.
93 Stehlin, quoted in Vadepied, 298-99.
94 The SNECMA TF-306 derivative of the Pratt and Whitney TF-30 weighed 1750
kilograms, compared to 1582 kilograms for the SNECMA ATAR 9K50. Therefore, two ATAR
9K50s weigh 89 percent more than one TF-306. In addition to adding weight, the ATAR 9K50
consumed more fuel for a given performance than the TF-306. The ATAR 9K50's specific fuel
consumption was 0.97 kg/kg/h versus 0.65 kg/kg/h for the TF-306. Being 49 percent less fuel
efficient than the TF-306 and adding significantly to the mass of the aircraft being propelled, the
substitution of two ATAR 9K50s for one TF-306 imposed a significant increase in the aircraft's
size. Bodemer and Laguier, 98, 159.
95 Alexis Rocher, "Histoire d'un reve: Les 'Super Mirage', de l'ACF au 4000," Fana de
l'Aviation no. 416 (July 2004): 24.
96 French experiments with the Mirage G prototype had already demonstrated that the heavy
weight and high wing loading of variable geometry aircraft tended to reduce maneuverability.
When he informed the French that the United States Air Force viewed maneuverability as critical for
its next aircraft, General Glasser told them that American research also favored a conventional wing
as more maneuverable. D6plante, 184.
97 The two prototypes proved to be well designed and the Mirage G8 prototype successfully
registered a speed of Mach 2.34, establishing a record that no European state (excepting the Soviet
Union/Russia) has broken since. Diplante, 188.
98 Alexis Rocher, "Histoire d'un rave: Les 'Super Mirage', de l'ACF au 4000," 24-25.
99 General Pierre Gallois, who worked for Dassault Aviation after his retirement from the
French Air Force, counseled Marcel Dassault that the ACF requirements were too ambitious from
the moment he saw them in 1972. Pierre Gallois, Le sablier du siecle: mimoires (Paris: L'Age
d'homme, 1999), 457.
409
100 Dassault calculated that 23 percent of the ACF would have to be built of titanium alloys.
Rocher, "Histoire d'un reve: Les 'Super Mirage', de l'ACF au 4000," 30; and Whitford, 104.
101 Rocher, "Histoire d'un reve: Les 'Super Mirage', de l'ACF au 4000, 1er partie," 30.
102 A heavier interceptor aircraft, the Soviet MiG-3 1, was developed at the same time as the
ACF. However, the Soviet aircraft was neither maneuverable nor was it exported to foreign clients.
See R.A. Belyakov and J. Marmain, MiG: Fifty Years of Secret Aircraft Design (Annapolis: Naval
Institute, 1994), 407-17.
103 Rocher, "Histoire d'un reve: Les 'Super Mirage', de l'ACF au 4000, 1er partie," 34.
104 Dassault Aviation always viewed itself as a producer of sophisticated warplanes and
never designed an aircraft for the supposedly lowest end of the combat aircraft market. When met
by new aircraft, the lowest end of the combat aircraft market has been filled by either advanced
trainers with some strike capacity, such as the BAC Hawk, or deliberately unsophisticated combat
aircraft such as the Northrop F-5, Fiat G-91, AMX-International and Soko Orao.
105 Alexis Rocher, "Histoire d'un reve: Les 'Super Mirage', de l'ACF au 4000, 2ieme
partie," Le Fana de l'Aviation no. 417 (August 2004): 71.
106 Deplante, 231.
107 Because delta wings can be built comparatively thickly for a given speed, they can be
built using large conventional spars to attach them to the fuselage, in contrast to the complicated
welding arrangements required on swept wing aircraft. In some cases, delta wings can be built as an
integral part of the fuselage. For all of these reasons, delta wings contribute to making aircraft
easier and cheaper to produce. An early pioneer of delta wings, German aircraft designer Alexander
Lippisch, stated that one of the reasons he chose to work on delta wing designs was that, "The
structure [of delta winged aircraft] would be lighter and simpler, insuring reduced construction costs
and lower aircraft weight at given payloads." According to Ddplante, Dassault longtime Technical
Director, reduced production costs were a main motivating factor behind Dassault's shift back to
delta wings in 1974. Although the swept-winged Mirage F1 carried significantly (42 percent) more
fuel than the delta-winged Mirage III at the cost of a nominal increase in aircraft weight (5 percent),
this change in spite, rather than because of the abandonment of the delta wing. Integral machining
permitted much more fuel to be carried in the fuselage. According to Ddplante, the additional fuel
capacity of delta wings was an important factor in France's return to them. French jet engines, even
the new M53, had higher (at least 20 percent) fuel consumption rates than equivalent American
engines. Therefore, to obtain similar performance to American aircraft, a larger proportion of the
interior volume of French aircraft had to consist of fuel tanks. This could be achieved with delta
wings. See Ddplante, 227-29; and Alexander Lippisch, The Delta Wing: History and Development
(Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University, 1981), ix.
410
108 Revellin-Falcoz, the project director of the Mirage F1 development team and later
Dassault Aviation Vice-President referred to the Mirage 2000's ACT technology as Dassault's
"revenge" for its defeat during the competition for the Belgian-Dutch-Norwegian-Danish order. See
Revellin-Falcoz, "La genese des programmes Mirage," 11.
109 The 1977-1982 loi de programmation provided for an annual increase of defense
spending by 0.09 percent of GNP. The Air Force's portion of the overall defense budget was slated
to increase by 2.4 percent. Although the loi de programmation was not adopted until 1976, its
characteristics were discussed intensely in 1975, when the previous loi de programmation
terminated. See J6rome de Lespinois, L'Armie de terrefrangais: de la defense d' la projection, vol.
1 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), 256-58; and Guisnel, 219.
110 Rocher, "Histoire d'un reve: Les 'Super Mirage', de l'ACF au 4000, 1er partie," 35.
"I Work on the ACF prototype was immediately halted upon Giscard's decision. Following
Dassault's 1974 decision to develop less complicated aircraft, engineers had already been diverted
from the ACF program to the Mirage 1000 and Mirage 4000 projects. The ACF was scheduled to
fly in July 1976, eight months after its cancellation. Alexis Rocher, "Dassault Mirage 4000,"
International Air Power Review 14 (2004): 115.
1 2As the French President's spokesman, Xavier Gouyou-Beauchamp, explained "This
choice will permit the Air Force to acquire a larger number of aircraft than would have been the case
if the two-engine design had been retained. The new 'Mirage' will feature the latest technical
developments and outclass other aircraft in its category, opening the door for significant exports."
Rocher, "Histoire d'un reve: Les 'Super Mirage', de l'ACF au 4000, 1er partie," 35.
13 As an added touch, the F-15 used for the occasion had been repainted with French
roundels to emphasis that the aircraft could soon fly French colors. Ibid.
14 Revellin-Falcoz, "D6bats," 7.
11s Friedrich List, French Deltas: The Dassault Mirage 2000 over Europe - Part ]
(Erlangen, Germany: AirDoc, 2005), 8.
116 Jean-Paul Philippe, Les Mirage 2000 (Suresnes, France: Jean-Pierre Tallandier, 1991),
52-53.
117 Bodemer and Laguier, 98, 118.
118 Thrust-to-weight ratios are a key parameter in an aircraft's dogfight performance because
it measures the ability of a fighter to maneuver in the vertical dimension. A ratio of 1.0 is frequently
considered ideal in dogfighters. Neither the Mirage III nor the Mirage F1 was particularly strong in
this regard, exhibiting ratios of 0.67 and 0.70 respectively.
119 Jean-Paul Philippe, 55.
411
120 Ibid., 55-57.
121 Jean-Paul Hdbert, Production d'armement: Mutation du systeme frangais (Paris:
Documentation Frangais, 1995), 76-78.
m Aircraft prices are notoriously difficult to compare contracts vary widely in terms of the
electronics included on an aircraft, whether completed aircraft are delivered or kits for assembly,
what spare parts are included in the order, whether or not industrial offsets are part of the deal and
the margin that the exporting state negotiated with a particular client. Nevertheless, on virtually all
lists of aircraft prices, the Mirage 2000 comes out at least a third more expensive than the F- 16. A
list of published estimates of aircraft flyaway costs in 1991 evaluated the F-16C/D as $18.4 million,
while the Mirage 2000 as ranging between $24 million and $27 million. An online database of
recent aircraft contracts lists the unit cost of F-16C/Ds sold to nine states as varying between $27.5
million and $37.5 million, while the unit costs of Mirage 2000s sold to four states vary between $40
million and $45 million. See Venik's Aviation, "Military Aircraft Prices," www.aeronautics.ru (last
consulted 1 July 2007); and Yolande Simon, Prospectsfor the French Fighter Industry in a Post-
Cold War Environment: Is the Future More than a Mirage? (Santa Monica: RAND Disseration,
1993), 63.
123 List, 10-11, 65.
1 Even the Chief of Staff of the French Air Force, General Jean Fleury, recognized in his
memoirs that the F-16's radar was clearly superior to those mounted on early Mirage 2000s. Jean
Fleury, Faire Face (Paris: Jean Picollet, 1997), 243-44.
125 List, 11.
126 Yefim Gordon, Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrum Multi-Role Fighter (Shrewsbury, the United
Kingdom: AirLife, 1999), 73.
127 By all accounts, the prices Russian manufacturers have offered for MiG-29s and Su-27s
are comparatively quite low for the size and capabilities of the aircraft concerned. For example, the
Su-27 (and its derivative Su-30) are two-engine aircraft approximately twice the size of the Mirage
2000 and considered equivalent to the United States F-15. However, despite their greater size, the
unitary cost of Su-30s sold to China in 2002 is estimated at $35 million to $37 million. In
November 1996, India chose to purchase Su-30s, which were in direct competition with Mirage
2000s, for a unitary cost of $36 million. The Indian Ministry of Defense cited price as the main
reason for its decision. There are several reasons for the comparatively low price of Russian
aircraft. Some aircraft exported were produced for the Russian Air Force, but never entered service.
Sukhoi's aircraft factory is in Novosibirsk in Siberia, where labor costs are comparatively cheap.
Finally, as with previous Russian aircraft, production techniques are deliberately simplified,
involving extensive riveting. Global Security, "Su-30 Flanker: Sukhoi," www.globalsecurity.org
(last consulted 2 July 2007).
412
128 The British aircraft included in the figures are: the English Electric Lightning, the Hawker
Harrier, the Panavia Tornado and the British Aerospace F3 Tornado ADV. This table excludes the
SEPECAT Jaguar from both French and British calculations because the Jaguar was jointly
produced by both states, each having half of the work share. Overall, 200 Jaguars apiece were
constructed for the French and British air forces. Approximately 192 were exported to four foreign
customers (India, Nigeria, Ecuador and Oman). Naval combat aircraft are similarly not included,
although doing so would probably make little difference as the production runs for the French Super
Etendard and British Sea Harrier were comparatively small and each was exported to only one state.
Jet trainers, with a secondary ground attack capability, are also not included in this table. For the
Panavia Tornado, the RAF's 228 ground-attack Tornados, 224 Air Defense Variants and the 62
Tornados exported to Saudi Arabia are included in the table.
129 Perry, 1.
130 Bodemer and Laguier, 98; and SNECMA, "La propulsion adronautique militaire,"
www.snecma.com (last consulted 3 July 2007).
131 Diplante, 233.
132 Ibid.. 166-67.
133 Carlier, Serge Dassault: 50 ans de difies, 90.
134 Ibid., 89.
135 Ddplante, 171-73, 206-08.
136 Carlier, Serge Dassault: 50 ans de difies, 236-37.
137 Carlier, Serge Dassault: 50 ans de difies, 237.
138 Philippe Esper et al. Difendre la France et l'Europe (Paris: Perrin, 2007), 88.
139 CATIA revenues are split evenly by IBM and Dassault Systems. Dassault Systems
provides the software, while IBM provides hardware and uses its software distribution chains to
market CATIA. In 1996, Dassault Systems had profits of 221 million French Francs for 1.13 billion
FF of turnover. Carlier, Serge Dassault: 50 ans de difies, 238-39; 256-57.
140 The ATAR engine series were all incremental improvements on the German World War
II BMW 003 engine. Bodemer and Laguier, 85-94.
141 Bodemer and Laguier, 160-65.
142 Many recent studies of aerospace procurement have concluded that spin-off from military
aviation programs to the commercial sector are rare. Mark Lorell of the RAND Corporation has
413
even argued that there is an inverse correlation between success in producing high performance
combat aircraft and commercial transports. According to Lorell, Commercial airliners are large
relatively slow transport aircraft optimized for safe, low-cost and efficient operation. Fighters are
small densely packed aircraft optimized for high speed, maneuverability, and effective delivery of
air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions.... The relationship between developing fighters and airliners
is roughly comparable to that between developing a high-performance sports car and a city bus.
Mark Lorell, The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of United States Fighter Aircraft R&D (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, ), 159-60; and Mark Lorell, Troubled Partnership: A History of U.S.-
Japan Collaboration on the FS-X Fighter (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), 56-57.
143 In fact, Dassault was historically credited with being the combat aircraft producer with
the best cost estimating techniques in the world. During the 1960s and early 1970s, Dassault initial
cost estimates remained within 10 percent of final costs, whereas Amercan estimates erred by
between 40 to 80 percent. Perry, 9.
144 In 2005, the earnings of French aerospace companies totaled 21E billion, compared with
186 billion for the United Kingdom. France also led the United Kingdom in the related domains of
missiles and defense electronics. Philippe Esper et al., 83-85.
145 Lockheed developed a lightweight fighter, the F- 104, that was mass-produced in the
1960s, but did not obtain another lightweight fighter contract until it won the Joint Strike Fighter
competition under the Clinton Administration. General Dynamic's major project before the F-16
was the two-engine F- 111 bomber. Although North American dominated United States lightweight
fighter development from the end of the Second World War until the early 1960s (with the P-5 1, F-
86 and F-100), it failed to win contracts thereafter. Northrop comes closest to Dassault's design
continuity, having designed an even lighter and cheaper aircraft than the Mirage III in the F-5
family, then moved onto its unsuccessful F-20 and successful F-18. The Soviet Mikoyan-Guryevich
Design Bureau (MiG) abandoned the development of lightweight fighters after its successful MiG-
15, 17, 19 and 21 designs. It then built heavier and more specialized interceptors (the MiG-25 and
MiG-23), before returning to the lightweight fighter concept in the 1970s. See Lorell, The Cutting
Edge: A Half Century of United States Fighter Aircraft R&D, 95; and Belyakov and Marmain.
146 Lorell, The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of United States Fighter Aircraft R&D, xv.
47 Between 1965 and 1967, the DMA opposed the AFVG because Dassault would have
been subordinated to BAC over the airframe. To undermine the program, the DMA financed
Dassault's effort to build the rival all-national Mirage G prototype. Later, when France negotiated
with the United Kingdom, Italy and West Germany over a future joint aircraft, the head of the DGA,
Emile Blanc, represented France. The DGA opposed participation in a European fighter for two
reasons-SNECMA would inevitably be subordinated to Rolls-Royce and the other partner states
favored an aircraft larger than the DGA thought could be exported. After half-heartedly attempting
to reach a compromise, Blanc received Mitterrand's permission to withdraw France from the project
that ultimately led to the EDF-2000 Eurofighter. Lamenting France's withdrawal from the common
European fighter, Mitterrand told an audience at the IHEDN in 1988 that, "The failure of the
414
negotiations for a European aircraft was largely the fault of [French] industries that were not
inclined to reach an accord." Guisnel, 218.
415
416
Chapter VI:
Weapons Procurement in the United Kingdom
Introduction
The development of a modem combat aircraft is complicated, with multiple
groups with different domains of expertise collectively determining the aircraft to
produce. Nearly always greater performance entails higher costs, while failure to
incorporate technologies can condemn an air force to defeat at war. These factors were
as true for the United Kingdom during the Cold War as they were for France. As France,
the United Kingdom lacked financial resources to sponsor competing prototypes or to
offset poorly conceived aircraft by quickly developing replacements, as the superpowers
could. Neither France nor the United Kingdom could rely on domestic orders for combat
aircraft on the same scale as the superpowers; thus they sought economies of scale by
exporting combat aircraft and/or by developing aircraft in collaboration with other states.
However, importing aircraft undermines the future of this hi-tech sector of the economy,
and because foreign aircraft are developed for specific needs of the home country, they
usually fail to satisfy the needs projected by military planners. For the United Kingdom,
purchasing another state's combat aircraft also represented a diminution in stature.
Aircraft producers in advanced, non-superpower states, as the United Kingdom,
prefer to develop aircraft that will meet cost and mission requirements of prospective
foreign clients as a means to offset initial costs of design and development. Because
micro increases in performance contribute disproportionately to cost, manufacturers
prefer aircraft whose performance falls short of what is achievable. The desire of air
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forces for high performance technology and the countervailing aspiration of
manufacturers to minimize risk and maximize market potential results in a tension
between combat aircraft that producers prefer to design and those that air forces wish to
receive.I
Elements of a state's bureaucracy have their own, separate agendas. A Ministry
of Finance often prefers to purchase foreign aircraft as cheaper to producing them, while
ministries charged with economic planning often favor manufacturing domestic combat
aircraft as a means of supporting civilian aircraft industries. Because of conflicting
interests, the institutional arrangements whereby procurement decisions are made
determine the groups that will control decisions. By empowering certain groups rather
than others, the institutional structure of procurement decision-making ultimately shapes
values and calculations embodied in a weapons acquisition program.
In the United Kingdom, structures mediating interactions between the British
Royal Air Force (RAF) and aviation industries evolved according to the twin imperatives
of responding to RAF requirements and optimizing the efficiency of the weapons
acquisition process. Unlike French, stemming from the Second World War, when the
RAF gained a reputation of making farsighted procurement choices, British political
leaders view the armed forces as capable adjuncts of foreign policy and competent judges
of technological trends.2 Despite reforms in the United Kingdom's aircraft and weapons
acquisition processes, the RAF's right to determine aircraft produced or purchased has
not yet been fundamentally altered.
By the end of the Second World War3 when the United Kingdom's output of
combat aircraft was inferior to that of only the United States,4 civil servants and central
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planners were organizing the aircraft production industrial effort.5 Although accepting
the RAF's prerogative to determine requirements, British government leaders during the
Cold War constantly sought to improve how mediating institutions apply centralized
bureaucratic power to generate military aircraft. Viewing civilian and military aircraft
development as two functions fulfilled by a single industry, they decided in 1959 to
amalgamate responsibility for managing military aircraft procurement and promoting
civil aviation into a single Ministry of Aviation. Although the names and mandates of
British institutions tasked with combat aircraft procurement have changed, their
composition and powers remained constant. Unlike the French, British procurement
institutions play no role in the formulation of requirements or the production of aircraft or
components. Unlike the French, non-technically trained civil servants run British
procurement institutions, which has created a disparity of technical expertise that has
hindered the ability of British procurement officials to contest the technological demands
of the armed services or the claims of industry.6 Throughout, British procurement
institutions retained only the intermediary role of transmitting requirements to industry
and overseeing industry's efforts to meet them.
Efforts to improve the process have focused on phasing procurement programs to
moderate the financial burden on the British state, on improving cost-analysis techniques,
on revising contracting procedures, and on coordinating RAF and Royal Navy
requirements to encourage joint aircraft programs. Procurement institutions have advised
elected officials on policy concerning aircraft manufacturers, such as when industrial
consolidation was necessary and which contractors were most capable.
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Because the RAF possesses more authority over procurement and because
mediating institutions have comparatively less than their French counterparts, what
predictions can be deduced about defense procurement in the United Kingdom? Firstly,
the RAF's monopoly on operational expertise and exclusive authority to issue
requirements should enhance its ability to obtain the weapons it desires. Secondly,
because British procurement agencies are not directly involved in weapons production or
exports, they are likely to be less sensitive to manufacturers' desires to minimize risk and
maximize sales by designing combat aircraft for export markets, by being concerned with
promoting civilian technologies and by sustaining employment. Third, meeting the
specific technical demands of the RAF is likely to force British aircraft manufacturers to
invest considerable resources and expertise into technologies with no foreseeable
application to civilian aviation, resulting in a diversion of resources from civilian to
military aerospace endeavors. And fourth, requirements for cutting-edge military
capabilities will increase the unpredictability of time and the cost estimates of British
aircraft.
This chapter's examination of combat aircraft procurement in the United
Kingdom considers seven distinct, interconnected procurement programs from 1957 to
1998: the TSR.2, F- 111, AFVG, UKVG, Jaguar, Tornado IDS and Tornado ADV, as it
reveals the thinking among military, governmental and industry leaders during the Cold
War. There are 10 sections:
1-3: Replacing the Canberra bombers with the TSR.2 between 1957 and 1965,
4-5: Searching for alternatives through a series of successor programs; the F-1 11,
AFVG, UKVG, after the TSR.2's cancellation,
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6-8: Examining three operational aircraft: the Jaguar, Tornado IDS and Tornado
ADV, that entered RAF service after numerous previous programs had been
cancelled,
9: Assessing the economic implications for the British aircraft industry of how
weapons acquisition was manage, and
10: in conclusion, examining the comparative advantages and disadvantages of
the institutional structure of weapons procurement in the United Kingdom.
I. "The Only Program" - Replacing the Canberra, 1957-1959
During the mid-1950s, the RAF issued requirements for sophisticated combat
aircraft that embodied new technologies and promised capabilities beyond fighters then
in use. Three were projected to enter service in the early 1960s: the Lightning, the
SR. 177, and the Fairey Delta III;7 at the same time the RAF projected the need to replace
the Canberra medium-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft.8 The high cost of these four
endeavors appeared as Sputnik demonstrated that missiles would replace bombers,
prompting a new British White Paper that cancelled all projects but the Lightening and
the Canberra replacement project. Table I illustrates the United Kingdom's four combat
aircraft programs and their fate following the 1957 defense review.9
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Table I:
Combat Aircraft Programs (Excluding Strategic Bombers)
And Their Fate After the 1957 White Paper
Projected
Program Service Date Fate Role
E.E. Lightning 1960 Ordered twin-engine point-defense
interceptor
S.R. 177 1960 Cancelled rocket / jet powered Mach
2.35 point-defense interceptor
Fairey Delta 1II 1962 Cancelled all-weather long-range Mach
2.25 twin-engine interceptor
Canberra Replacement 1965 Development all-weather low-level bomber
Continued and reconnaissance aircraft
(Became TSR.2)
The Canberra replacement became the only new aircraft project for which British
aviation manufacturers could compete to produce. Phenomenal when it entered service
in 1951, the Canberra bomber flew so high and fast that as to be virtually immune to
Soviet air defenses.10 When the Soviet Union developed improved fighter aircraft and
new surface-to-air missiles,1 the RAF determined that high-altitude, subsonic bombers
like the Canberra would not fulfill a meaningful military role after 1965. It demanded
new capabilities to conduct long-range strike and reconnaissance missions, which would
fly at low altitudes and high speeds to avoid Soviet fighter aircraft guided by ground
radars and surface-to-air missiles.' 3 As other Western air forces, the RAF anticipated that
the Soviet Union would initiate war with massive air attacks on NATO airbases,
necessitating British aircraft to operate from small-dispersed runways and taking-off from
short sections of runways that survived. They also felt it was necessary for the
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Canberra's replacement to operate from rudimentary grass runways throughout the
British Empire and Commonwealth, to deliver its weapons accurately at day of night, in
all weather conditions.
No aircraft yet produced or known to be in development combined the RAF's
Canberra replacement requirements. Because of the costs involved and the possible
diversion of funds from all armed serves to the Canberra replacement program, the
requirements alarmed the Ministry of Supply, the Army and the Royal Navy The Royal
Navy and the Ministry of Supply urged the RAF to purchase a variant of the Navy's
Blackburn Buccaneer strike aircraft poised to enter service in 1958. The Buccaneer, even
with modifications, would be cheaper than an entirely new aircraft but it would fall short
of the RAF's operational requirement." Endowed with the unquestioned authority to
issue and modify operational requirements for aircraft, the RAF rejected these
suggestions. 15
After failing to convince the RAF to accept solutions other than a new aircraft,16
the Ministry of Supply invited nine British aircraft producers to compete for the Canberra
replacement contract. It reasoned that aircraft firms which lost the design competition
(most of the aviation industry) would be bankrupted if the contract were awarded to one
firm and that no one company would have the talent to design and produce the new
aircraft.17 On 16 September 1957, chief civil servant of the Ministry of Supply,
Permanent Secretary Cyril Musgrave, informed the leaders of the nine aircraft
manufacturers invited to compete that only proposals from groups of two or three firms
working together would be considered. The hope was that consolidation would create
larger firms that could offer a mix of military and civilian aviation products. Britain's
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aircraft manufacturers were invited to determine the new corporate mergers and
alliances.18 In the following months, the structure of the United Kingdom's aviation
industry changed as companies combined in what has been characterized as government-
enforced "shotgun marriages."' 9 Although the state imposed rationalization, it allowed
industry to decide its own fate.
The two design proposals that received the most attention were a joint proposal
from English Electric and Shorts Aviation, and from the Vickers-Armstrong Aircraft's
submission. While English Electric and Shorts submitted a joint proposal, Vickers-
Armstrong negotiated with de Havilland over a merger. Vickers-Armstrong Aircraft,
known for management efficiency, was judged best able to design and produce the
aircraft on schedule, with minimal cost overruns. Vickers proposed a single engine
aircraft, versions of which could be used for strike and reconnaissance missions, which it
hoped would reduce cost and technical risk and have export potential.2 English Electric
proposed a larger, two engine aircraft to save funds. English Electric's partner, Short
Brothers Ltd., proposed giving the English Electric aircraft a revolutionary vertical take-
off (VTOL) capability.
The RAF favored the two-engine English Electric design because of its claims
that it could be landed safely in the event of engine trouble and because it promised more
capabilities than the Vickers counterpart.2 3 Alarmed at the prospective high cost of this
alternative, the Ministry of Supply urged the RAF to consider purchasing existing foreign
24aircraft. However, the RAF concluded that each one fell short. Attempting to forge a
corporate arrangement that would produce the cutting-edge aircraft the RAF demanded,
the Ministries of Supply and Defense in mid-1958 awarded the contract jointly to Vickers
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and English Electric, with English Electric's design, but with Vickers as prime contractor
with management responsibility, 2 and with Vickers' George Edwards as director.26
The forced merger disrupted corporate alliances then forming and resulted in
manufacturers creating less than ideal mergers.2 7 English Electric, Vickers and Bristol
Aviation joined to form the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC), while most of the United
Kingdom's other aircraft manufacturers joined the rival Hawker-Siddeley consortium.28
The Ministry of Supply's actions constitute an extraordinary example of state
intervention in private enterprise, which is especially surprising considering that a
Conservative Party government ruled the United Kingdom at the time. This decision
broke completely with the previous policy of allowing private enterprises to select their
partners.
Even before the announcement that the contract would be awarded jointly to
Vickers and English Electric, the RAF's Canberra replacement had reshaped the British
aircraft industry. Contrary to the desires of the Ministries of Supply and Defense, the
RAF's operational requirement was for a revolutionary aircraft, which precluded
purchasing a foreign aircraft or developing a modified version of an existing British
aircraft. The Ministry of Supply renamed the aircraft to "Tactical Strike and
Reconnaissance 2," or TSR.2.
II. Vicissitudes of Technology, TSR.2, 1959-64
In December 1958, the RAF concluded that higher performance was necessary.29
From the moment the new requirements were released, corporate planners anticipating
30
that the program would run over cost and behind schedule, feared it would be cancelled .
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From the start, they worked to lower the requirements.31 While some corporate managers
tried in vain to convince the RAF to lessen its requirements, others attempted also
unsuccessfully to persuade the RAF to purchase an existing terrain following and
navigation system from the United States. 32
With the RAF demanding that the TSR.2 be operational by 1965, industry had to
concurrently develop different components before integrating them into an ensemble,
thus increasing the risk of failure. A factor exacerbating the situation was no existing
aircraft possessed avionics capable of fulfilling the requirements.33 Costs soared as
technical problems abounded,34 prompting voices within the British administration to
question the TSR.2's rationale.35
RAF leadership, realizing that if the United Kingdom's defense budget remained
constant, they would be forced to find a cheaper alternative, attempted to persuade the
government to cancel aircraft-carriers replacements requested by the Royal Navy. 36 i
they could persuade the government that the TSR.2 was a better investment, they felt the
37plan would be saved. Because the prevailing view among British political leaders was
that aircraft carriers projected British power, the RAF had to make a convincing case that
the TSR.2 was capable of fulfilling the power projection role, in addition to penetrating
the Soviet Union's air defenses in Eastern Europe.
From late 1962, the armed forces engaged in an acrimonious struggle over
missions and means,38 with the RAF arguing that the TSR.2 could conduct nuclear and
conventional missions against the Warsaw Pact in Europe and also against overseas
adversaries, while the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers contributed nothing to NATO's
defense and the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent. The Navy countered that the RAF
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should procure the Blackburn Buccaneer, used by the Navy, as a lower-cost substitute for
the TSR.2.39 It claimed that aircraft carriers provided more air power than strike aircraft
based coming from distant islands and were uniquely capable of supplying close-air-
40
support to army units overseas. The struggle stagnated.
Inter-service rivalry reached its culminating point when BAC attempted to sell the
TSR.2 to Australia, the sole state with a requirement for such an aircraft. Although the
Australian order was for a comparatively small number (12 to 30), BAC's managing
director calculated that the British government would not cancel TSR.2 once a close ally
41had ordered the aircraft. Indications boded well for the Australian purchase until
Admiral Louis Mountbatten, the United Kingdom's Chief of Defense Staff, sabotaged the
sale, and Australia purchased the American TFX (F-1 11) instead. 42
TSR.2's survival was at stake, as many at the highest levels of power came to
view it as emblematic of the extravagant desires of the armed services and the ineptitude
of British industry.4 3 The program's continuation moved from a matter for the RAF to a
question of government policy.
III. Termination, 1964-65
As 1964 dawned, George Edwards of BAC was disappointed by the election,
which brought a Labour Party government to power, but he was shocked by the RAF's
shift in attitude toward a cheaper alternative, one that would not entail reductions in force
or operational readiness.44 The RAF turned to the American F- 111, even though it did
not meet all of the RAF's performance objectives.45 But, they argued, with the new Mark
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II avionics package, the F- 111 would fulfill their requirement. Table II below details the
46performance differences between the F- 111 and the TSR.2 requirement.
Table II:
F-111 versus TSR.2 Requirements
Specification TSR.2 F- 111
Combat Radius 1,000 nm 800 nm
Low-Level Speed Mach 1.1 Mach 1.2
High-Level Speed Mach 2.25 Mach 2.2
Take-Off Distance 3,000 ft 3,550 ft
Anticipated Cost per Aircraft E6 million E2.6 million
When the new Minister of Defense, Denis Healey, took up the TSR.2 dossier in
1965, his inclination was to replace the British aircraft (along with the contemporary
P.1154 and HS 681) with the cheaper American alternative.47 However, the TSR.2 had
become viewed as so important to the future of the United Kingdom's aviation industry
that a concerted effort was mounted to prevent its replacement by an American aircraft.
The RAF, the final arbiter of performance characteristics, would accept an improved F-
111, but not an improved Buccaneers (multiple versions were proposed) or a simplified
TSR.2.48
The British Cabinet voted on 1 April 1965 to cancel TSR.2 and take an option out
on the American F-L, with the intention of purchasing it once the Mark II version was
available. In the interim, the RAF's Canberra bombers, along with Vulcan and Victor
bombers, soldiered on in Central Europe. The British government had spent £190 million
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on the development of the TSR.2, a colossal misallocation of resources for an aircraft in
the prototype phase.49 Comparison with either the Mirage IV or an improved Buccaneer
demonstrates that the RAF could have obtained a cheaper aircraft had it been willing to
compromise on two or more of its performance criteria.50 Ironically, the RAF was
obliged to continue using the Canberra, which it claimed was obsolete from 1963, until
the F-Ill's projected entry into service in 1968. Table III below illustrates the cost
estimates for the TSR.2 versus these two less ambitious and more evolutionary aircraft.
Table III:
TSR.2, Mirage IV, Improve Buccaneer and F-111
Development Program Fly-Away
Aircraft Cost Cost Per Unit Cost
TSR.2 > E190 million E7.5 million E4.8 million
(E270 million est.)
Mirage IV E45 million E4.2 million £1.5 million
Buccaneer 2* £18 - 21 million N/A EO.7 - 0.8 million
F-111 Mk.2 (1965 est.) E2.6 million
British manufacturers bitterly impugned the RAF for having demanded unrealistic
performance objectives.5 1
IV. Search for Alternatives, 1965-1966
When the Cabinet decided to replace the TSR.2 with the American F- 11, the
government did not have to immediately fund its purchase because the Mark II version
was not yet available. It took out an option for 110 F- 1 Is, whose purchase it could
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52decide in three stages. This delay gave British aircraft manufacturers the opportunity to
lobby against the decision, making the case that canceling the TSR.2 would lead to BAC
going out of business, massive layoffs, and an exodus of trained engineers and
scientists.5 3 Furthermore, they felt that accompanied by loss of international reputation,
the United Kingdom would become totally dependent on the United States for future
aircraft, military and civil.5 4 The Government decided to not allow BAC and the British
aviation to collapse.
Minister of Defense Healey and Minister of Aviation Jenkins looked to
international collaboration as a salvation, which meant working with the United
Kingdom's only Western European ally with a significant aviation industry-France.5 5
Because the French government had independently come to view cooperation with the
United Kingdom as important to the viability of European aircraft industries, the British
and French governments reached an accord. 6
They decided to develop two combat aircraft. The first, an advanced jet trainer,
was projected to be launched on the basis of a design study that the French company,
57Breguet Aviation, had already conducted. Breguet would exercise design leadership on
the airframe, while Rolls Royce would do so with the engine, with BAC and French
engine manufacturer SNECMA also collaborating. The second would be a sophisticated
variable-geometry combat aircraft specialized in low-level strikes; BAC would exercise
design leadership, with SNECMA acting as prime contractor for the engine and Dassault
Aviation and Bristol assisting with the airframe and engine respectively.
It was hoped that the jet trainer would carry little design risk but vast export
potential and that the Anglo-French Variable Geometry aircraft (AFVG) would permit
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58BAC to sustain designs employed on TSR.2. A major drawback was that the AFVG
would not enter service before 1975. Because the RAF wanted to phase out the Canberra
as soon as possible, they still preferred the F-Ill to the proposed AFVG because the F-
111 was known and boasted a longer range than the AFVG.59
Healey proposed a compromise,60 that the United Kingdom would reduce the
purchase of F- 1 Is to 36, which would allow the RAF to retain credible long-range strike
and reconnaissance capabilities until the AFVG entered service in 1975. The Canberra
would continue to serve only in reconnaissance, while Victor and Vulcan bombers would
supplement the F- 1 Is in the ground-attack role.61 Healey hoped that this compromise,
which would save E85 million over the coming decade, would allow British
62
manufacturers to retain their ability to develop sophisticated aircraft.
BAC balked because of their immediate financial problems. Even before TSR.2
was cancelled, BAC had secretly been planning a cheaper alternative.63 Having
identified the French Mirage IV as a cost-effective aircraft that could be modified with
Rolls-Royce Spey engines and British avionic, BAC lobbied to acquire a limited number
of the improved Mirage IV instead of the F- 11I before the operational debut of the
AFVG. Immediately after the TSR.2's cancellation, BAC engineers set to work
developing a joint proposal with the Mirage IV's manufacturer, Dassault Aviation.64
BAC calculated that a British decision to purchase Mirage IVs would solidify Dassault's
commitment to the AFVG by compensating it with a development contract and
production order for improved Mirage IVs. Partisans of an improved Mirage IV argued
that a decision in its favor would reinforce the independence of British and European
aviation industries.65
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In the months following the TSR.2's cancellation, a fourth option re-entered the
Canberra successor debate -funding an improved Buccaneer. The advantage, pointed
out by Hawker-Siddeley Aviation, the Buccaneer's manufacturer, and individuals within
the Ministry of Aviation, was that the development and production work on a modified
Buccaneer would occur in the United Kingdom. Throughout 1965, Hawker-Siddeley
Aviation proposed numerous Buccaneer variants, with the first equipping the Buccaneer
with the TSR.2's terrain following radar, which studies suggested would double the
Buccaneer's ability to survive enemy air defenses and increase its lethality two-fold, and
could be obtained at the comparatively low cost of £20 million in development costs and
a 10 percent increase in the unit cost of aircraft.66 The effectiveness of this aircraft,
termed Buccaneer 2*, could be further augmented by arming it with precision-guided
munitions. To offset an anticipated negative RAF verdict to this version, Hawker-
Siddeley proposed that the Buccaneer 2** which would be based on a more sophisticated,
yet undeveloped, nose radar produced by the Elliott Company. This radar would permit
the Buccaneer to fly combat missions in all weather conditions and deliver bombs more
accurately than the Buccaneer 2*.67 Hawker-Siddeley further proposed developing a
supersonic Buccaneer, which would incorporate an afterburner into its two Rolls-Royce
Spey engines and an increased fuel storage capacity. Hawker-Siddeley suggested that the
aircraft, with all improvements, could enter service within four years of development
approval. 6 8
Table IV compares the costs and capabilities of the aircraft proposed (except the
supersonic Buccaneer).
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Table IV:
Potential Canberra Replacements Discussed in 1965
Development Unit
Cost to U.K. Cost Consequences
F-1Il Mark II
UK Mirage IV
(BAC data)
£0
E10 million
UK Mirage IV E50 million
(Ministry of Defense estimate)
Buccaneer 2* E18-21 million
Buccaneer 2** E25-28 million
AFVG E150 million
E2.6 million
£1.5 million
£1.8 million
Import (no British manufacturing)
Meets RAF requirements
Available in 1968
50 % manufacturing in United Kingdom
Does not meet RAF range, short-take off
or unprepared runway requirements
Available in 1970
EO.7-0.8 million All design and production work in UK
Does not meet RAF range, short-take off,
unprepared runway, supersonic speed or
bombing accuracy requirements.
E1.1 million All design and production work in UK
Estimated 1.5x to 2x as effective as 2*
Still fails to meet RAF requirements
Available 1971-1972
£1.75 million Meets most RAF performance criteria
High technology value for British industry
Available 1975
Of the possible alternatives, the improved Mirage IV received no high-level
support within the government, as the Ministry of Defense felt it fell short of the RAF's
Canberra successor requirement in terms of runway performance and range. Taking issue
with the cost-estimates provided by BAC,69 the RAF categorically opposed acquiring an
improved Mirage IV.70
If the RAF's objections to Buccaneer variants focused on performance, according
to British analyses, each of the Buccaneer variants (excepting the supersonic Buccaneer)
cost significantly less than the F-l l and would have been developed and manufactured
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Aircraft
Aircraft
entirely in the United Kingdom. However, the RAF contended that the Buccaneer was
incapable of fulfilling its requirements for a Canberra replacement regardless of
upgrades. The RAF produced a study examining the comparative abilities of the
Buccaneer and F-Ill to conduct a "likely" military mission-neutralizing 50 percent of
the Indonesian Air Force within 24 hours by attacking its airfields from bases in
Australia, the Cocos Islands, Singapore and Malaysia. Table V illustrates the RAF's
calculations as to the quantities of different types of aircraft needed to neutralize the
Indonesia Air Force.7 '
Table V:
Alternative Strike Forces to Neutralize Indonesian Air Force
35 F-l l lAs
Or
89 Buccaneer 2**s and 13 tanker aircraft
Or
145 Buccaneer 2*s and 18 tanker aircraft
The larger numbers of Buccaneers needed to conduct the same missions as a smaller
force of F-Il l s, made cost of a Buccaneer higher than that of F-Ills.72
The RAF also claimed that the F-Ill possessed the speed and range to conduct
strategic reconnaissance missions while the Buccaneer did not.7 3 Because of the recent
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), political leaders subscribed heatedly to the reconnaissance
requirement, 7 as did the Army.7 5 Neither the British political leaders nor the Army
questioned the technical judgment of the RAF.
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In a final act of inter-service competition, the RAF renewed its argument that
investing in sophisticated long-range land-based aircraft was more economical than
purchasing aircraft carriers equipped with less capable aircraft. In its hypothetical
campaign against Indonesia, the RAF demonstrated that the annual costs of a force of 35
F-Il l s would cost approximately one-fifth that of an aircraft carrier task group with 30
Buccaneers. 76
Early in 1966, the decision was made for the United Kingdom to acquire
American F-Ills rather than improved British Buccaneers or a Franco-British Mirage IV.
The relative capabilities of the different aircraft examined as successors to the TSR.2 and
Canberra are detailed in Table VI.77
Table VI:
Capabilities of Aircraft Considered in 1965
Combat Radius High-Altitude Max Runway Required for
Aircraft Low-Low Profile Speed Bomb load Take-off
F-i 11 800 nm Mach 2.2 34,000 lbs. Unimproved 2,200 ft
Mirage IV (UK) 530 nm Mach 2.2 14,000 lbs Concrete 5,500 ft
Buccaneer 2* 220 nm Mach 0.965 10,000 lbs Concrete 1,950 ft
S.S. Buccaneer 850 nm Mach 1.25 unknown Concrete
The RAF spelled its procurement philosophy out in a memorandum: "Provided we have
aircraft of quality our numerical requirements for aircraft can still be kept small in
themselves and a small portion of the defense budget.... once the TSR2 was
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eliminated.... Professional advice must be that a force wholly of F 1 I1s is the right
answer. "78
But the RAF did not receive its favored outcome of replacing the entire cancelled
TSR.2 program with 110 F-i 1 Is. Because British elected leaders anticipated that such a
move would precipitate the collapse of much of the United Kingdom's aircraft industry,
the Cabinet stipulated that BAC had to be given enough design and production work to
keep the company solvent, which ruled out purchasing 110 F-1 I1s.
The solution adopted in 1966 was for a purchase of 50 F- 1 Is to be delivered
between 1968 and 1970. The plan envisioned fulfilling the United Kingdom's long-range
strike and reconnaissance missions until 1975 by a combination of the F-1 I1s, and older
and less sophisticated V-bombers and reconnaissance Canberras. From 1975, the AFVG
would replace the V-bombers and Canberras, and supplement the F-1 I1s. The AFVGs
would fulfill all Canberra replacement criteria except combat range and payload. They
would replace Canberras in Europe, while F- 1 Is would fulfill the Canberra's extra-
European roles. Table VII below illustrates the 1966 answer.
Table VII:
The Canberra Replacement Program of 1966
A Op Op O 0 O OAFVG (Anglo-French) 100 planned
A in service 1975
A
A O O N N l O P OF-111 Mark H (USA) 50 planned
A in service 1968
TSR-2 -OP 0pp-
(Strike/Recon.) V
110 planned V 0 l lOo-Vulcan
V (converted to tactical bomber)
V
V l D * N l 0OlCanberra 64 in service
(retained in photo-recon. role)
* New aircraft are italicized while existing aircraft are not.
In theory, this compromise had the advantages of ensuring that the RAF's strike
and reconnaissance requirements would be adequately met, while the British aircraft
industry would receive enough work to remain viable; the significant disadvantage was
that it cost more than the alternative, as Table VIII illustrates.
Table VIII:
Projected Costs of 1966 Compromise
50 F- 1 Is x E2.6 million (fly-away cost)................ E130 million
UK Share of AFVG Research and Development ......... E150 million
100 AFVG x E1.75 million ........................ .. E175 million
Total Canberra Replacement Costs .................. £455 million
Projected Cost of 110 F- 11 s (April 1965)...........£... E286 million
British industry still faced imminent financial troubles as a result of the TSR.2's
cancellation. Initially, the additional funds for the mixed purchase of F-1 I1s and AFVGs
came from the cancellation of the Navy's aircraft carriers, but ultimately, in the face of
the equipment goals of the two armed services, a choice had to be made. Healey
therefore embraced the so-called "Island Strategy" rejected three years earlier. (See Note
30 for a description of this strategy.)
V. New Crises and Fresh Compromises, 1967-69
The state of affairs soon began to unravel. France withdrew from the AFVG
program on 22 June 1967, leading Edwards to speak of "French chicanery" and
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prompting Healey to despair that the program that "lay at the heart" of his aviation policy
was suddenly cancelled.79
The F-Ill program ran into problems when economic difficulties led the British
government to curtail the United Kingdom's defense budget.80 On 12 January 1968, the
British Cabinet voted to cancel the F-Ill despite the objections of the Minister of
Defense. 81 The cancellations of the AFVG and F-Ill in 1967 and 1968 put the United
Kingdom's Canberra replacement program back to square one.82 Moreover, the RAF
considered a gradual introduction of Vulcan bombers in the tactical ground-attack role
unacceptable since these large subsonic aircraft, built in the late-1950s, would be
vulnerable in a European conflict. The RAF doubted whether its long-range strike and its
reconnaissance aircrafts (Canberras and Vulcans) could accomplish their missions or
indeed survive long in the event of a war with the Warsaw Pact. In addition, the RAF's
need for new ground attack aircraft had grown since the Canberra replacement program's
inauguration in 1957 because by now its Hawker Hunters were approaching
obsolescence. Replacing the remaining ground attack Hunters soon became subsumed
within the Canberra replacement requirement. 83
On the industrial side, one of the United Kingdom's two airframe manufacturers,
BAC, lacked a single new combat aircraft project.84 To prevent the collapse of future
military aircraft production capabilities, BAC shifted profitable contracts to its now
unemployed combat aircraft facilities, which meant closing a profitable factory and
85
shifting production to lesser facilities. While these expedients kept the most
sophisticated factories operating, they increased costs, thereby reducing competitiveness.
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Detailed in table IX below, expenditures on numerous programs failed to provide the
RAF with a single combat aircraft.86
Table IX:
Resources Invested in the Canberra Replacement
1957-68
TSR.2 Research and Development ...................... E190 million
AFVG Studies ................................... E2.5 million
F- 11 Payments and Cancellation Fees ................... E46.4 million
Total Canberra Replacement Expenditure to 1968 ...... £ .239 million
Estimated Program Cost of 150 Buccaneer 2**............. f,193 million
Total Cost of Mirage IV Program (62 produced) ......... £.. .-259 million
Investing resources differently, the United Kingdom could have provided the
RAF with a Canberra successor and British aircraft manufacturers with continual combat
aircraft production work.87 Although neither the Mirage IV nor the improved Buccaneer
provided the performance the RAF demanded, both were superior to the older Canberras
and Vulcan bombers that the RAF would be forced to continue operating.
In the aftermath of the AFVG and F-Ill cancellations, the Ministry of Defense
scrambled to limit the damage inflicted on the RAF's operational capabilities and the
United Kingdom's combat aircraft industries. Answers had to be found more quickly
than the usual eight years of a "normal" aircraft procurement cycle. For the third time in
three years, British decision makers attempted to identify ad hoc solutions. The
immediate solution was to redefine the requirement for jet trainer aircraft. The originally
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planned bi-national jet trainer with France (the Jaguar) was reintroduced, to which the
RAF increased payload, range and strike requirements. Earlier plans to purchase 150
Jaguar two-seat trainers in 1965 rose to 165 strike Jaguars and 35 trainers in 1970. The
modifications the RAF demanded for the Jaguar program led to an extensive redesign of
the aircraft, with attendant explosion of costs. Ultimately, they acquired 200 Jaguars,
including two-seat trainers eventually converted for ground-attack missions.89 Given the
excessive cost of operating the Jaguar in its original trainer role, the French Air Force
was obliged to use the 200 Jaguars it acquired for ground-attack missions rather than for
training pilots as was originally planned.
Because the RAF's longer-range strike and reconnaissance missions demanded
additional aircraft, interim solutions were sought. After the F-I1l's cancellation, one was
to reassign Buccaneer strike aircraft from the Navy to the RAF. Since the Navy's new
aircraft carriers had been cancelled after the three existing carriers reached the end of
their service lives, their air wings would be decommissioned. Although the RAF had
long resisted acquiring Buccaneers, they now acknowledged that the soon to be
redundant Naval Buccaneers were more capable of penetrating enemy air defenses at
low-levels than the RAF's Vulcans and Canberras.90
The RAF, now eager to accept second-hand Navy Buccaneers after its own overly
ambitious aircraft programs had faltered, agreed to a new calendar to transfer Navy
Buccaneers to the RAF beginning in 1969. To complement these plans, the RAF placed
an order for an additional 26 new Buccaneers. 91
The RAF claimed that it still needed a more sophisticated low-altitude and long-
range ground-attack aircraft capable of striking the Warsaw Pact's most heavily defended
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military targets, such as airfields and key bridges. This aircraft would be fitted with
sophisticated avionics for flying at high speeds and low levels, and delivering
conventional or nuclear weapons on targets at night or in inclement weather. In other
words, the RAF renewed its calls for an aircraft equivalent to the TSR.2 and F- 111 Mark
II, but now it insisted that it also needed its future aircraft to feature variable geometry
wings.
Fortunately, the Ministry of Technology had provided funding for BAC's design
teams to study variable geometry aircraft soon after the French withdrawal from AFVG.92
In most respects, the new performance requirements for the new aircraft, entitled the
United Kingdom Variable Geometry (UKVG), were identical to the defunct AFVG. The
UKVG program, never intended to be purely British, was adopted to permit BAC to
retain expertise accumulated on low-level aerodynamics and short take-off during the
TSR.2 and AFVG programs, pending the launching of a new program with partners yet
unidentified.93 Although provisional, the UKVG program pushed the boundaries of
British knowledge about variable geometry.
The Ministry of Technology and the BAC hoped to develop variable geometry
expertise and resolve engineering problems before entering into a new combat aircraft
program with foreign partners. In this spirit, BAC launched a research effort to develop a
wing pivot bearing with sufficient strength and fatigue life,94 as the Ministry of Defense
sought suitable partners. Because the French were occupied in another new aircraft
project,95 West Germany and Italy became the United Kingdom's only other allies with
aircraft industries and defense budgets large enough to collaborate on the aircraft. A
complication existed in that at the time, West Germany and Italy were collaborating with
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Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands on a joint project to replace the Lockheed F-104
Starfighters with a new single-engine lightweight fighter, the cost of which would likely
consume their aircraft procurement budgets for the near future if it went forward. The
only way the United Kingdom was likely to find partners capable of jointly
collaboratively on the project was by joining the F- 104 replacement cartel and convince
its members to change their perceived needs to that of a large variable-geometry aircraft
rather than a lightweight fighter,96 which was a substantial diplomatic challenge.97
Eventually the F-104 replacement consortium agreed to let the United Kingdom join the
cartel, as a non-voting observer.98
For West Germany and Italy, the industrial advantages of collaborating on a joint
aircraft with the United Kingdom, with its larger and more sophisticated aircraft industry
outweighed the inconvenience of changing the requirement. However, the Dutch,
Belgians and Canadians abandoned the program, and the Canadians, who were
responsible for bringing the United Kingdom into the F-104 replacement cartel, were
embittered.
With the launching of the new joint combat aircraft program by the United
Kingdom, Italy and West Germany, the UKVG program design team was reassigned to
what was provisionally called the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), but would later
become the PANAVIA Tornado. The requirement defined by the RAF remained the
foundation around which the new procurement decisions were made, while limited
procurement budget and the vicissitudes faced by previous programs (TSR.2, AFVG and
F- 111) meant that improvisation and interim solutions were required until the new
MCRA program bore fruit.99 Table X details the mixture of interim solutions and long-
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term programs adopted between 1967 and 1969 to fulfill the RAF's need for a Canberra
replacement.
Table X:
Canberra Replacement Program, 1967-1969
A 0 0-F-111K (USA) D O-Buccaneer (UK)
A (cancelled 1968) ordered by RAF (1968)
TSR-2 (UK) D -
(cancelled 1965) V
138 planned V D IAFVG (w / Fr)W D Jaguar (w / Fr)
(cancelled 1967) V requirement changed (1967)
V in service 1973
V
V P N UKVG (UK)
(1967-68)
V
V P O MRCA - Tornado
(w / Ger & It)
in service 1982
* New aircraft are italicized while existing aircraft are not.
The RAF continued to operate with an assortment less capable aircraft, while its combat
future depended largely on two cooperative programs-the Anglo-French Jaguar and the
Anglo-Italo-German MCCA (Tornado). 100
VI. A Difficult Denouement, Part I, Jaguar
Employing nearly half of the quarter million individuals of the United Kingdom's
aircraft industry, BAC's continued existence depended equally on the technological,
political and economic success of the Anglo-French Jaguar and the Anglo-Italo-German
MRCA (Tornado) programs. Through these joint development programs, the United
Kingdom could procure aircraft the RAF demanded and sustain the country's ailing
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aircraft industries.'0'Although with the launching of the Jaguar and MRCA programs,
British decision-makers felt confident that the RAF's operational requirements would be
met and British aircraft industry would remain viable, both programs soon faced
unanticipated obstacles. The RAF incrementally changed the primary mission of the
Jaguar from a jet trainer to a ground-attack aircraft between 1968 and 1970.102 To their
credit, BAC and Breguet accomplished all of these modifications in a short period of
time.103 The Jaguar's basic design was comparatively simple to re-adapt and BAC's
recent design efforts saved effort and time.'04 Transforming the original design into a
dedicated ground-attack aircraft swelled the Jaguar's development cost, to more than
seven times as projected. 105 In addition, the aircraft was dramatically underpowered when
it entered service in 1973 due to its new requirements.
Despite the Jaguar's lack of thrust, the aircraft provided BAC with commercial
ambitions. For the first time since the 1950s, the United Kingdom could export a combat
aircraft that suited the needs of several potential clients.1 06 Sturdily constructed of
inexpensive aluminum alloys, the aircraft was price-competitive. For the many states
lacking highly skilled maintenance personnel and a sophisticated airbase infrastructure,
the ease of maintaining the Jaguar and its ability to operate from unimproved airfields
were attractions.107 Moreover, the aircraft's strong undercarriage and two engines,
exceptional on an aircraft of the Jaguar's size, permitted it to return to base regardless of
technical mishaps or battle damage. To give the Jaguar the minimal air-to-air capabilities
demanded by export clients, BAC succeeded in mounting AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles
above the aircraft's wings. Because BAC and Breguet were guaranteed of a production
run of 400 aircraft for the British and French air forces, they could offer the aircraft for
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export at a comparatively cheap price.108 Soon BAC sales teams were targeting over 30
states as potential Jaguar clients.109
But, BAC soon encountered an unexpected obstacle-their French partner. The
British-French 1965 Memorandum of Understanding to jointly develop the Jaguar and
AFVG stipulated two distinct, yet complementary aircraft. But France chose to build the
Mirage F1 in 1967, a lightweight fighter capable of conducting ground-attack missions as
well intercepting enemy aircraft, and then the RAF changed its Jaguar requirement from a
jet trainer to a lightweight ground-attack aircraft, which inadvertently placed the Jaguar
in the same market niche as the Mirage Fl. The two aircraft, priced competitively with
one another, appealed to the same potential customers. Breguet Technical Director Henri
Ziegler, wanting the Jaguar to be an export success, confidentially warned the British
government that France's decision to produce the Mirage Fl would put the aircraft into
competition." 0 The stage was set for a bitter, frequently zero-sum competition.
When Dassault Aviation acquired Breguet, it obtained the advantage over BAC of
privileged information on the aircraft's strengths and weaknesses. From the position of
inside knowledge, Dassault did everything in its power to impede Jaguar sales and favor
Mirage Fl exports,' prompting Edwards publicly to question the French understanding
of "partnership."112 Dassault and the DGA also hindered Jaguar upgrades to further
reduce the aircraft's export potential vis-A'-vis the Mirage F 1.11 The United Kingdom,
however, went ahead with Jaguar upgrades, incorporating incrementally improved jet
engines into the aircraft on two occasions and developing a succession of improved
avionics packages.14
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Entering service in the same year-1973, the Jaguar and Mirage F1 competed in
many foreign markets. Ultimately, 192 Jaguars were exported to four states (Oman,
Ecuador, India and Nigeria), while 457 Mirage Fls were sold to ten. Although the
aircraft was jointly produced, BAC and its successor (from 1977) British Aerospace
negotiated all four Jaguar contracts in the face of stiff French opposition." 5 Even though
the Jaguar was outsold by its French competitor and failed to gain the share of the
international combat aircraft market that BAC anticipated, it was a commercial success,
enjoying more export sales than any British combat aircraft produced since the 1950s.
BAC capitalized on the Jaguar program to sell its design expertise to Japan, providing
Mitsubishi with the technical advice needed to design Japan's first indigenous combat
aircraft since the Second World War."i6
It is ironic that the French Air Force dramatically verified the Jaguar's capabilities
in 1978 in its intended role as an uncomplicated and rugged low-level ground attack
aircraft, in Mauritania, and Chad 117. These operations proved that the Jaguar's
designers had created an aircraft meeting the RAF's requirement for a simple but rugged
ground-attack aircraft with superb low-altitude handling.
What French interventions in Africa failed to indicate was whether Jaguars could
have fulfilled their intended role in Europe against Warsaw Pact armored forces, airfields
and bridges. On the one occasion when Jaguars were used against a target similar those
that would have been faced in Europe, the results were disturbing. For the French Air
Force's first action during the 1991 Gulf War, 12 Jaguars were ordered to attack the Al
Jaber airbase in Kuwait. Using standard operating procedures developed for a European
conflict, the Jaguars were supposed to approach the airbase in two waves of six aircraft
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apiece, at the lowest possible altitude that atmospheric visibility and pilot skill permitted,
and then attack the airbase, with each aircraft making a single pass using either
parachute-retarded bombs or cluster-bombs. The Jaguar's comparative simplicity
compromised its effectiveness. Lacking all-weather avionics, the Jaguars attacked in
daylight, when enemy low-level air defenses had the least trouble zeroing in on attacking
aircraft. The absence of sophisticated navigation systems led to the first and second
waves becoming separated. Instead of attacking Al Jaber with an interval of one minute
apart, as planned, the two flights arrived at Al Jaber two minutes apart.' 18 With a low
thrust-to-weight ratio, the aircraft completed their attack missions at a sluggish speed of
480 knots (900 km/h), which left them exposed to enemy anti-aircraft fire longer than
necessary. 19
Although the first wave of Jaguars achieved surprise, delivering ordnance and
suffering only one aircraft damaged, in the second attack two minutes later, three were
hit, of which two had to be scrapped.10 The density of anti-aircraft fire forced the leader
of the second wave to cancel the attack and authorize his men to bomb targets of
opportunity they could locate. 121 The fact that the stricken Jaguars managed to continued
flying is a testament to their robustness, but overall results were unacceptable especially
122
as the operational results of the mission were disappointing.
After Al Jaber, French and British Jaguars flew subsequent combat missions over
Iraq and the former Yugoslavia at higher altitudes. The almost inescapable deduction to
draw from this change in tactics is that Jaguars, operating at day and in good weather,
would have suffered substantial attrition if they had attacked well-defended Warsaw Pact
military targets, a sobering conclusion. when it is considered that Jaguars were the most
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numerous British aircraft stationed in West Germany from 1976 until 1984, and that the
French Air Force depended on them for its most hazardous strike missions until after the
end of the Cold War.
VII. Troubled Denouement, Part II, Tornado
The decision making process employed in aircraft procurement by the United
Kingdom during the 1960s and the early years of the 1970s, while attempting to replace
the Canberra with an aircraft that would succeed against conflict with the Warsaw Pact
countries, was duplicated during the 1970s with the MRCA (Tornado), with similar
stages and ultimate results. As previously, the RAF set the requirements; industrial
leaders attempted to create the aircraft desired while minimizing risk and maximizing
market potential; and elected political leaders mediated and worked to forge partnerships
with allies and develop international markets.
The MRCA (Tornado) was the aircraft the RAF had long claimed it needed-
capable of taking off from short and improvised runways and penetrating enemy air
defenses at low altitudes and in all meteorological conditions. Only two major changes
distinguish the MRCA from the earlier TSR.2 requirements: variable geometry wings,123
and a more stringent low-altitude terrain-following requirement.12 4 Again, the RAF's
demand for a slight performance improvement, at the cusp of what was technically
possible, generated disproportionate cost increases. 2 5
While complicated avionics were one problem exacerbated by the RAF's
requirements, the British demand for a sophisticated long-range ground-attack aircraft
also created political difficulties for the program. As we saw earlier when the RAF
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changed the nature of the international F- 104 replacement cartel, three of its founding
members, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands, abandoned the program, and now Italy
and West Germany, threatened to abandon the MRCA program. After much negotiation,
Italy confirmed its participation during late 1970."2
Through considerable diplomacy and compromise, the United Kingdom also
managed to convince both the West Germans to persevere with the MRCA program.
Industrial agreements to retain political support for the MRCA frequently came at the
expense of sound financial management.127 Less qualified firms were tasked with
developing extremely complicated components of the aircraft and production ran over
schedule.128 Analogous to the situation in 1962 when the defense budget would not
support several procurement programs at the same time, deep cuts in procurement
programs and force structure were again needed, and once again the RAF argued lobbied
that these cuts be made by the Royal Navy.12 9 As in the 1960s, the RAF and the Royal
Navy argued their cases passionately.130
When Minister of Defense Francis Pym refused to cut any of the armed services'
most expensive procurement programs, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher replaced him
with John Nott, who decided in favor of the RAF.131 In a remarkably wasteful decision,
Navy's Fleet Air Arm would be virtually disbanded just as its VTOL aircraft carrier
program reached fruition, while its frigate and destroyer force would be cut by 30
percent. 32
Despite slight performance shortfalls, the first Tornado ground-attack squadron
entered service with the RAF in 1982, six years later than originally projected, 133 and
with it, the RAF finally acquired its long anticipated Canberra replacement.134 For the
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Tornado's most challenging mission of attacking well-defended Warsaw Pact airbases,
the aircraft's phenomenal low-altitude penetration capability was complemented by a
sophisticated purpose-built anti-runway weapons-the JP233, which was to permit a
single aircraft to pepper an enemy runway with 30 bomblets designed to crater a runway
and 215 anti-personnel mines to inhibit the repair of damaged runways. If all went as
planned, a small number of Tornados would disable an enemy runway in a single pass
and escape before an enemy's low-level air defenses would be able to respond.
The Tornado's only test in its low-altitude anti-runway role came in the 1991 Gulf
War. Because of the unique capabilities of the Tornado / JP233 combination, the United
States Air Force requested that the RAF dispatch Tornados and their anti-runway
munitions to the Persian Gulf.136 On 16 January 1991, the first night of the coalition air
attack on Iraq, ground-attack Tornados were tasked with flying the most challenging
mission they had been conceived for-attacking enemy runways-against an enemy
possessing many of the same surface to air weapons that would have protected Warsaw
Pact airbases. In the initial coalition attack, groups of four to eight Tornados attacked 10
Iraqi air bases with JP233s. At night and flying at low-levels, the Tornados succeeded in
delivering their munitions, with only one being shot-down in the process. In the days that
followed, Tornado crews repeated their runway attack missions. After the first night,
Tornados supplemented their JP233s with an increasing number of unguided 1,000 lbs
bombs, attacking the most highly defended targets at night, when Iraqi crews manning
visually aimed anti-aircraft weapons would have trouble aiming. Tornados continued to
fly sorties when poor weather grounded less sophisticated British and French Jaguars.138
Pilots also minimized the relative time that they were vulnerable over a target by flying at
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higher speeds, 540 knots versus 480 knots, than the Jaguars could manage at low
altitudes.139
Six Tornados were shot down between 16 and 22 January 1991, more than any
other single type of coalition aircraft.140 Moreover, anti-aircraft fire prompted Tornado
pilots to take evasive action instead of flying low, straight over runways; consequently
the JP233's anti-runway bomblets did not land in uniform patterns, incapacitating
runways. 141 Six days after the start of Tornado low-level operations, Air Force Chief of
Staff Paddy Hine ordered them to cease low-level operations. The Tornado/JP233
combination was never reemployed for the type of low-level anti-runway attacks for
which it had been devised. Many have taken Tornado losses and the abrupt shift in RAF
tactics for proof that the Tornado's original conception was wrong.
The question remains as to what the Tornado would have accomplished against
Warsaw Pact targets.142 Its four percent attrition rate suffered at flying low-altitude
missions in the 1991 Gulf War would have been acceptable during a conventional war
with the Warsaw Pact, provided they seriously disrupted the Warsaw Pact's offensive air
operations. 143 The fundamental question is whether RAF Tornados could have inflicted
damage on enemy runways sufficient to disrupt a Warsaw Pact air offensive. Data from
the 1991 Gulf War is inadequate for responding to this question. In a significant
departure from Soviet practice, Iraq relied on a small number of heavily fortified
airbases, with redundant taxiways, runways and base facilities.144 The Warsaw Pact
planned to disperse Soviet aircraft to a large number of small airbases, each of which had
fewer redundant facilities and air defenses than Iraq's "super bases."145 Would Tornados
have been more successful in disrupting these airfields than Iraqi bases? How much
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disruption would have been necessary to dislocate a Warsaw Pact's air offensive? These
questions cannot be answered based on the Tornado's actual combat record.
While the ground-attack Tornado was a technical success, the aircraft was a
commercial failure.146 Its variable geometry wings and sophisticated avionics required
intensive maintenance by well-trained technicians, resulting in an average annual
operating cost nearly twice those of the less complex Jaguar.147 Besides exceeding the
defense budgets and human capital available to most developing countries, the aircraft's
specialization in low-altitude ground-attack appealed to few potential customers, who
prefer to acquire a single type of aircraft that can conduct both ground attack and air
superiority missions, rather than dedicated aircraft for each purpose. As a consequence,
only one state, Saudi Arabia, has imported the Tornado.
Even though Saudi Arabia had the financial resources to purchase an aircraft of
the Tornado class and even with the personal diplomacy of the highest level of the British
government, it was difficult selling Tornados to the Saudi government.148 Lacking the
human resources to operate the Tornado's complex systems, Saudi Arabia required that
1,000 British Aerospace employees be stationed in Saudi Arabia to oversee every facet of
the aircraft's upkeep.149 The contract, which included support services and trainer
aircraft, amounted to £43 billion, one of the most lucrative arms contracts ever
concluded. The aircraft sale had probably mobilized the most significant marketing
efforts by the government of a great power.
After the Saudi deal, the United Kingdom's government and British Aerospace
devoted considerable effort at marketing the Tornado to other potential customers.
Despite a large-scale marketing campaign in the Middle East, South East Asia, Oceania,
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as well as to Greece, Japan and South Korea, none of the targeted states purchased
Tornados.15 2 Notwithstanding its unique technical capabilities, the Tornado was too
costly, complex and single-purpose for any but the wealthiest states to afford.
VIII. Troubled Denouement, Part III, Tornado ADV
If the ground attack Tornado eventually matured into a capable, albeit costly
aircraft, the development of the Tornado Air Defense Variant (ADV), a new variant
requested by the RAF was less satisfactory. This version of the Tornado was intended for
two distinct activities - engaging the enemy at long ranges, frequently beyond the visual
range (BVR) of pilots and in the short-range dogfight, where fighters maneuver to shoot
down enemy aircraft with cannons or infrared-guided air-to-air missiles. Studies
conducted during the 1960s convinced the RAF that variable geometry wings would
permit the Tornado ADV to function superbly in both capacities. 153 With the air defense
variant of the variable geometry Tornado, the RAF believed that it was adopting the most
modern technology available for fighter aircraft.
The RAF's confidence in the Tornado ADV's air-to-air combat capabilities
diminished after the aircraft's basic design was approved. When the Tornado ADV was
launched in 1971, no variable geometry fighter was yet in service anywhere, and as time
went passed, variable geometry wings proved incompatible with dog fighting
performance.154 It was still hoped that the aircraft would perform well as a missile-armed
beyond visual range (BVR) interceptor. However, the lessons of recent conflicts,
particularly the United States in Vietnam, led the RAF to reevaluate its air combat
priorities, revalorizing the dogfight at the expense of BVR missile engagements.' 5 5 In a
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1976 meeting, representatives of Western European air forces agreed that turning ability
and acceleration were the two most important characteristics for a fighter.' 56
When in the mid- 1970's it became clear that the Tornado ADV did not meet the
new priorities, the RAF attempted to terminate this aircraft that it had so vigorously
supported a few years previously, 5 7 with many agreeing that that importing an American
fighter, the F-16, would be a better use of funds.' 58 But because of the ongoing
development of the Tornado program, this decision came too late to replace the Tornado
ADV. Because the ADV represented nearly 30 percent (110 out of 385) of the United
Kingdom's contribution to the tri-national, (British-West German-Italian) Tornado
program, at the time projected to yield 809 aircraft, many in the RAF feared that
canceling the ADV would undermine the entire Tornado program. Faced with
contradictory desires to supplant the Tornado ADV with a more qualified American
aircraft, yet acquire the ground-attack Tornado (which was the service's highest priority),
the RAF's high command had trouble expressing a unified position.159
Voices in the British government lobbied for continuing the Tornado ADV.160
Decisively, the Chief of Defense Staff felt that it would be impossible to cancel the
Tornado ADV without crippling the broader Tornado program.161 The RAF was obliged
to continue the Tornado ADV program even though it no longer corresponded to its
beliefs about what would be needed. It was still hoped that the Tornado ADV would
prove a capable aircraft in the BVR role. Over the coming years, developing the Tornado
ADV as a BVR aircraft took longer, was more expensive, and yielded a less capable
aircraft than anticipated.
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Fundamentally, two capabilities were considered necessary to make the Tornado
ADV a capable BVR interceptor-excellent air-to-air radar capable of detecting enemy
aircraft at long ranges and tracking multiple contacts, and a radar-guided missile capable
of destroying enemy aircraft at long ranges. To save costs, the RAF decided to rely on
improving existing technologies for the Tornado ADV radar and air-to-air missile. 16 2
Even with these cost saving efforts, the cost and difficulty of developing the Tornado
ADV grew from the outset.163 The radar (Fox Hunter) proved exceptionally difficult to
develop. Although difficulties with the airframe delayed deliveries of the Tornado ADV
by three years (from 1981 to 1984), because of difficulties with the radar, no radar at all
was available when the RAF received the aircraft. The first Tornado ADVs carried lead
ballast in their noses to compensate for the weight of the Fox Hunter radars that did not
yet work. 164
When the RAF received production Fox Hunter radars in 1985, the first version
performed so poorly that it was judged incapable of serving in an operational fighter
aircraft. Mocking the incapacity of the initial ADVs and the United Kingdom's system
of assigning code names to radars (Green Satin and Orange Putter for example), RAF
officers dubbed the radar "Blue Circle," after the Blue Circle Cement Company. 165
Costing 59 percent more than anticipated, the radar did not become operational with the
RAF until 1987.166 The avionics of the 18 Tornado ADVs (designated the F2) delivered
before the radar was judged adequate were considered so poor that the aircraft were put
into storage by 1988, without ever becoming operational.167
Six years behind schedule and dramatically over-budget, the Tornado ADV
became operational, in its F3 version, in 1987.168 Although the Tornado F3 has provided
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the backbone of the RAF's fighter force since 1988 and is projected to remain in service
until 2010, the aircraft is not a success. Even excluding its development costs, the
Tornado F3 is one of the most expensive fighters in the world, costing as much as the F-
15 and approximately twice as much as the F-16.169 As the RAF foresaw from the mid-
1970s, the Tornado ADV is a poor dogfighter and one of the worse fighter aircraft for
this form of air-to-air combat. 170
Because of its poor maneuverability, Tornado F3 crews developed tactics for
keeping their aircraft out of close combat with enemy aircraft. 17 1 The aircraft also did not
turn out to be an effective beyond visual range (BVR) fighter.172 Because of
development problems by the time the Tornado F3 became operational in 1987 (rather
than 1981), active radar was becoming used on a variety of air-to-air missiles.'7 3 Unlike
aircraft armed with active radar missiles, the Tornado F3 can direct missiles only at one
enemy aircraft at a time, whereas aircraft equipped with active radar missiles can launch
missiles at multiple targets near simultaneously.'74 Because active radar missiles do not
require the attacking aircraft's radar to continuously illuminate the target, Tornado F3s do
not necessarily know when enemy missiles have been fired. 175 Moreover, an active radar
missile will continue pursuing its prey even when the launching aircraft has been
destroyed, so the Tornado F3 tactic of pursuing an engagement as long as the aircraft
fired its missiles lost its rationale once it became possible for an enemy missile, launched
second, to destroy the Tornado after the launching aircraft had been hit.
Although it is impossible to pass definitive judgment on the air combat
capabilities of a fighter that has not fired on enemy aircraft, indications exist that
highlight the Tornado F3's limitations.176 In fact, the RAF has avoided sending Tornado
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F3s into air-to-air combat. Although sent to Saudi Arabia in 1990, Tornado F3's were
not permitted to operate over Iraq or Kuwait during the ensuing air war, probably to be
kept safe from harm's way 177. From 1991 to 1998, the RAF sent no Tornado F3s to help
enforce no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, to which it contributed ground-attack
Tornados and Harriers. The next year, the RAF refrained from committing Tornado F3s
to NATO's air campaign (Operation Allied Force) intended to force Serbia to cease
military operations in Kosovo, where other RAF aircraft and Royal Navy combat aircraft
participated.178 In the only exception to the RAF's unwillingness to use Tornado F3s,
which was to enforce the no-fly zone over parts of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Krajina) in Operation Deny Flight, from 1993 to 1995, none of the
warring factions possessed fighter aircraft.179
Because of its high cost and comparatively low performance, the Tornado ADV
failed in international export markets.'80 The 24 of the 173 Tornado ADVs produced that
were sold abroad were all delivered to Saudi Arabia, which is reportedly dissatisfied with
the aircraft. Despite extensive marketing, no other state ordered the Tornado F3.181
It is hard to avoid concluding that the Tornado ADV was one of the most
expensive, yet least capable fighter aircraft ever produced.182 The RAF's decision to
build distinct ground-attack and fighter aircraft around a single airframe, and the
supposedly revolutionary technology-variable geometry wings-that it incorporated,
made it impossible for the service to extricate itself from the Tornado ADV program after
its limitations were realized. As a result, the RAF continued investing enormous
resources into an aircraft that would not be a good fighter and had meager commercial
prospects. The technological risk inherent in its design meant that it became combat
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ready six years later than planned, with a primary weapons system that was approaching
obsolescence. Although the aircraft is fundamentally limited, the RAF has had little
choice but to continue upgrading it, lengthening its useful life until the Eurofighter
supplants it around 2010. As part of one of these updates, the United Kingdom
announced plans in 1996 to modify 100 Tornado F3s to use AMRAAM.183
IX. Economics of Decline
As the 1950s came to a close, British aircraft manufacturers were poised for a
promising future, ranking only after the United States and the Soviet Union and
possessing three times the industrial capacity of its nearest competitor, France.
Technologically and commercially, the industry achieved notable successes after the
Second World War,'8 4 and as the decade wore on, the Hawker Hunter became one of the
greatest commercial warplane successes in history, with 17 foreign air forces acquiring
the aircraft, including Belgium and the Netherlands, which produced it under license.'85
In civil aviation, British aircraft manufacturers introduced the world's first passenger jet
(the de Havilland Comet) and reaped substantial profits exporting 450 Vickers Viscounts.
From 1960 onwards, the United Kingdom's loss of international orders for
military aircraft contributed significantly to its decline as an aircraft producer.186 As the
table below illustrates, the United Kingdom exported less than a third the number of
warplanes as France from 1960 until 2000, to a more limited number of countries, 87
while sinking to the world's fourth largest exporter of combat aircraft.'8 8
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Table XI:
Combat Aircraft Production and Exports
Year Total Total Foreign
Aircraft Operational Produced Exported Clients
Lightning 1961 334 61(18%) 2
Harrier I 1969 274 123 (45%) 2
Jaguar 1973 392 192 (49%) 4
Tornado GR.1 1982 498 96(19%) 1
Tornado F3 ADV 1987 173 24 (14%) 1
Total 1671 496 (30%) 8
Comparison with France 2841 1717 (60%) 26
The primary reason for the United Kingdom's decline lies in the characteristics of
British aircraft. While the vast majority of states capable of purchasing combat aircraft
demanded lightweight, multipurpose aircraft that they could afford to acquire and
maintain, British aircraft were heavy, specialized and expensive. Only one, the Jaguar,
remotely corresponded to the budget and needs of the majority of export customers. This
aircraft was sold in greater numbers, to more states than any other British aircraft of the
period. By way of contrast, all contemporary French aircraft, except the Mirage IV, were
lightweight multi-role fighters, each of which was exported in greater numbers to more
clients than even the Jaguar.
Commercial failure went hand-in-hand with technological innovation. British
aircraft were more sophisticated and pioneering than their French counterparts and often
led the superpowers.' 89 Unique capabilities increased cost, complexity and sometimes
the size of British aircraft.190 In addition, British aircraft appealed to only certain niche
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customers; for example, although the Harrier was the best VTOL aircraft in existence, its
mixture of strengths and weaknesses attracted the interest of only a few states.191 Thus,
although Harrier exports were mediocre in absolute terms, the aircraft captured the entire
international market for VTOL aircraft. 192 The Tornado, also appealing to a limited
clientele, 19 3 was reasonably successful, as table XII illustrates.
High-End Low-Lev
Producin
Country
Table XII:
el Strike Aircraft,
g Number
Exnorted
1960-Present
Foreign Purchasing
Clients States
Buccaneer (1962) United Kingdom
F-111 (1967) United States
Sukhoi Su-24 (1975) Soviet Union
Tornado (1982) UK-Italy-W. Ger.
F-15E Strike Eagle (1989) United States
South Africa
Australia
Iraq, Libya,
Syria, Iran,
Algeria
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia,
Israel, S. Korea,
Singapore
96
147
Others: F-105, A-5, A-6 United States,
Mirage IV France
Total 362
Acquiring low-level strike aircraft, such as the Tornado, makes sense only if a
state is confronted with vast distances (Australia and South Africa) or dense air defense
networks (Israel, Syria, Iraq and South Korea). Consequently, while a total of 362 strike
aircraft were sold to 11 states between 1960 and present, this number is dwarfed by the
commercial results of many lightweight fighter programs.'94 Although the Tornado was
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successful in capturing a significant portion of the market for sophisticated strike fighters,
the market was small.
The primary reason why British combat aircraft did not meet the needs of possible
clientele lies with the inflexible, demanding requirements issued by the RAF. Although
these requirements corresponded to what the RAF felt was necessary for the most
demanding air combat environment imaginable-war with the Soviet Union, aircraft
designed with the RAF's specifications in mind appealed only to a few wealthy
customers who felt that the extra capabilities justified the cost.
British aircraft manufacturers preferred to develop more evolutionary aircraft
aimed at satisfying international markets, with engineers proposing a series of simple
lightweight fighters throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 195 Although none of these designs
corresponding to an official RAF project, they were developed with export markets in
mind and in the vain hope that the RAF would adopt them.196 Based on design successes,
British aircraft manufacturers could have developed lightweight fighters that would have
been cost and performance competitive with aircraft offered by French, American and
Soviet designers and with radar and jet engine designs superior to those used by their
French and Soviet rivals. 9 7
The British aircraft industry continued to demonstrate its soundness on the rare
occasions that an RAF aircraft requirement corresponded with the broader demands of
export markets. Perhaps the best illustration is provided by their comparative success in
producing subsonic jet trainer aircraft with a secondary ground attack capability.198 In
this instance, British manufacturers competed on a relatively level playing field, where
the cost-effectiveness of the aircraft would play the predominant role in their commercial
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fortunes. As Table XIII illustrates, most foreign customers perceived that the resultant
Hawker-Siddeley Hawk as providing a better combination of reliability, performance and
cost its competitors.'99
Table XIII:
Jet Trainer / Strike Aircraft
Producing In Number Foreign
Aircraft Country Service Exported Clients
Hawker (BAe) Hawk United Kingdom 1976 725+ 18
Alphajet France/W. Germany 1978 326 8
L-39 Czechoslovakia 1971 499 6
Aermacchi MB.339 Italy 1979 86 8
British designers, like their French counterparts, repeatedly proposed aircraft that
responded to the demand of simple, affordable combat aircraft at a time when the air
forces of both countries preferred larger, more sophisticated designs. Judged by the
capabilities of domestically produced subsystems and prior combat aircraft, British
aircraft manufacturers were probably even more capable of developing lightweight
fighters than their French counterparts. The major difference between aircraft
procurement in the two countries is that, whereas French aircraft designers managed to
impose lightweight fighters on the French Air Force, the RAF forced their British aircraft
manufacturers to produce expensive, sophisticated aircraft with marginal export potential.
The absence of a British equivalent to the DMA/DGA permitted the RAF to issue
operational requirements without thought to commercial success.
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The United Kingdom's elected leaders attempted to compensate for the poor
commercial prospects of British aircraft by intensive marketing and lax export restraints.
From the 1960s, the United Kingdom exported Rolls-Royce Viper jet motors to
Communist Yugoslavia,200 and a few years later, Rolls Royce sold the license to build the
latest, most powerful version of the Viper jet engine to Romania, a member of the
Warsaw Pact.20 1 The British government and aircraft manufacturers then prospected in
the People's Republic of China, one of the largest potential markets for combat aircraft,
where British faced neither American nor Soviet competition. 202 This willingness to sell
to a state considered an international pariah shows the desperation felt by British leaders
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at rendering its aircraft industries profitable. In the early 1980s, the United Kingdom
guaranteed loans to Nigeria to purchase Jaguars, despite the country's poor human rights
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record and even worse credit rating. These efforts and others made by the highest
political leaders to market aircraft did not alter the fact that British combat aircraft did not
appeal to potential customers.
Poor export performance and high development costs in combat aircraft harmed
commercial aircraft projects as 1) commercial production was diverted to uneconomic
combat aircraft factories; 2) British firms were denuded of risk capital needed to launch
commercial aircraft programs; and 3) British aircraft firms were forced to invest
disproportionate resources in technologies with no civilian application. 20s After the
cancellation of the TSR.2 in 1965, and the near simultaneous cancellation of BAC and
Hawker-Siddeley's major combat aircraft programs (TSR.2 and P.1154), no British
aircraft company drew on its earnings from combat aircraft exports to finance
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commercial aircraft, as Dassault had done in France with the Mystere and Falcon
business jets.
By the early 1970s, the British government simultaneously confronted the need to
finance the expensive Tornado program, support Rolls Royce after its declaration of
bankruptcy, provide launching aid for the BAC 3-11 commercial airliner, and invest
funds needed for the United Kingdom to join the European Airbus consortium. Faced
with these interrelated projects, the British government funded Rolls Royce and the
Tornado, leaving the commercial airframe industry to decay.
As British aircraft industries focused on military projects, British aircraft
industries neglected to develop dual-use technologies and resources applicable to both
206commercial and military programs. By the 1970s, British aircraft factories possessed
fewer of the latest machine tools than their French and American counterparts, and
British design, development and production facilities were older, dirtier and more
207crowded than their French counterparts. In the years that followed, British aircraft
manufacturers failed to match French investments in computer-assisted design (CAD)
and computer assisted manufacturing (CAM).
The United Kingdom has not independently developed a commercial airliner
since the 1960s and has not even considered doing so since the BAC 3-11 was abandoned
in the early 1970s. Even after finally acquiring a stake in Airbus, the predominantly
military character of British aircraft development prevented British Aerospace from
branching into other commercial aviation markets. When BAe Systems sold its 20
percent share in Airbus in September 2006, it consecrated 40 years of the United
Kingdom's decline as a producer of airframes for commercial aircraft. For the first time
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since the dawn of aviation, no British firm has a sizeable interest in the full-scale
manufacture of commercial aircraft.
If France emerged as the world's third largest exporter of combat aircraft by the
end of the Cold War as a consequence of the DMA/DGA's influence over procurement,
the United Kingdom lost this position because of the RAF's quest for sophisticated
aircraft and high technology. Once at the leading edge of aircraft development, the
United Kingdom has not independently developed and produced a combat aircraft since
the 1960s or produced one since the 1970s. Because British airframe companies
abandoned their commercial aircraft programs to concentrate exclusively on the defense
sector, the United Kingdom declined from having European predominant aircraft
industry, to being a distant second to France.
X. Conclusion
By comparison with France, the principal features of the British weapons
acquisition process are the dominant influence of the armed services, the comparative
weakness of dedicated procurement agencies and the crucial role of politicians in
arbitrating inter-service disputes and enabling the system to "muddle through." Because
of their preponderant influence, the armed services favored programs consonant with
their vision of future warfare, regardless of the impact of their demands on the health of
British defense industries. Ultimately, this policy resulted in the United Kingdom
procuring sophisticated armaments that were largely devoid of both export prospects and
technological spin-offs.
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The combat aircraft sector is an exemplar in this regard. The RAF (and Royal
Navy over its programs) wielded unchallenged authority to determine the technical
characteristics of future combat aircraft. The only constraints on service requirements
came in the form of the size of defense budgets acceptable to the cabinet and the need for
consensus within the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Within this context, most weapons
requirements obeyed what Mary Kaldor has described as the "follow-on imperative."208
At regular intervals, military institutions sought to replace their existing weapon systems
with equivalent numbers of newer systems leveraging newer technologies to accomplish
existing missions. Ambitious programs as the TSR.2, AFVG and Tornado were all
conceived of as hi-tech successors to the venerable and comparatively inexpensive
Canberra.
In addition to the follow-on imperative, British armed services systematically
privileged technological requirements consonant with offensive doctrines, as predicted by
scholars of bureaucratic politics. For the RAF, this meant the expense of substantial
organizational energy and procurement resources to develop aircraft optimized for a
struggle of comparative runway destruction. By demanding aircraft optimized for
attacking enemy runways (the Tornado) and capable of continuing to fight the destruction
of their own runways (the Harrier), the RAF planned to seize the initiative in the event of
war by crippling Warsaw Pact airfields and continuing to fight regardless of the damage
suffered by their own runways.
The British armed services exhibited excessive optimism in deciding which
technological possibilities to pursue. For example, many of the aircraft detailed by RAF
requirements proved decades in advance of what available technology, let alone finances,
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permitted. Thus, the RAF's "urgent" 1958 requirement for a bi-sonic, low-level strike
aircraft (TSR.2) only became technologically and economically feasible around 1980.
Even worse, a fighter responding to the RAF's 1962 requirement for a bi-sonic VTOL
fighter (the P.1154) has not yet entered service in any country. Only the controversial
VTOL variant of the United States' costly F-35 program appears likely to make bi-sonic
VTOL a reality.
Ultimately, demanding weapons requirements provided an impulse for military
innovation, but proved deleterious to the health of British aerospace industries and
challenging to procurement agencies (the Ministry of Supply, Ministry of Aviation,
Ministry of Technology and, eventually, the Procurement Executive). Although the RAF
frequently demanded greater capabilities than existing technology could provide or
budgets afford, the service nevertheless identified and fostered novel technologies. The
United Kingdom thus became a pioneer of low-level, high speed flight, automated terrain
guidance, VTOL, variable geometry wings and specialized anti-runway munitions. It
successively introduced the world's fastest climbing interceptor (the Lightening), the first
operational VTOL fighter (the Harrier) and the combat aircraft with the highest lift
coefficient (the Tornado).
Invariably, these technical achievements were only achieved through the
concerted efforts of, and frequently at the expense of, the well-being of British aerospace
industries. Despite the changing nature (and names) of the procurement agencies, British
procurement institutions lacked the technical expertise to evaluate RAF requirements and
the budgetary authority to allocate funds accordingly, such as the French DMA/DGA
possessed. Because British procurement agencies could not alter RAF requirements to
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render them compatible with the capabilities of British industry, their only recourse
involved prodding industry to restructure itself into ensembles possessing the requisite
human and financial resources. Thus, the RAF's ambitious TSR.2 requirement was
accompanied by the Ministry of Supply strong-arming 27 aircraft prime contractors to
consolidate down to two. Likewise, the RAF's focus on acquiring a single hi-tech
product, the Tornado, prompted the Ministry of Aviation to consolidate the United
Kingdom's remaining producers in 1977. In both cases, the weakness of intermediary
institutions vis-a-vis the armed services and their brutal coercion of industry provide a
stark contrast with France, where procurement agencies overruled service requirements
and worked in symbiosis with defense industries.
Paradoxically, the primacy of the individual armed services in the procurement
process created a need for politicians to intervene. By demanding revolutionary
technologies, which inevitably entailed high development risks, the British armed
services created an environment where their inter-service compromises and budgetary
phasing proved ephemeral. Although weapons acquisition programs were the product of
agreement in the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the dramatic cost escalations and schedule
delays associated with cutting edge technologies ruptured inter-service bargains. The
only way an armed service could obtain continued support for programs running over
cost was to obtain resources at the expense of sister services. Thus, inter-service rivalry
became a recurrent feature of the British procurement process.
When the Chiefs of Staff Committee could not arrive at a consensus, political
leaders were obliged to adjudicate inter-service disputes. To give one example, Defense
Minister Healey was obliged to take a proactive role in defense procurement once the
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RAF's TSR.2 and the Navy's aircraft carrier program both overran their budgets. As each
service argued for the merits of their particular programs, Healey was obliged to find a
solution. At first, Healey upheld the aircraft carriers but replaced the TSR.2 with an
apparently economic buy of American F- 1 Is and Anglo-French AFVGs. When this
solution failed to produce sufficient savings and the French withdrew from the AFVG,
Healey was forced to extemporize further solutions. Although the details of their
interventions differ, the sweeping defense reviews of Defense Ministers Sandys (1957)
and Nott (1981) were similarly actuated by inter-service disputes triggered by troubled
and over-budget procurement programs.
Noted scholars have highlighted how inter-service rivalry spurs innovation and
provides civilian leaders with policy options. Unfortunately, inter-service competition
appears to have been much less productive for British procurement. Coming during the
latter phases of the procurement process, inter-service rivalry in the United Kingdom
forced politicians to cancel programs upon which substantial investments had already
been made. Inevitably, such necessary decisions entailed considerable waste. A case in
point is Nott's 1981 decision to sell ships that were virtually new and scrap others then
under construction. Another example can be found in the Canberra replacement program,
where £239 million was invested between 1958 and 1968 on a series of ambitious
programs (TSR.2, AFVG and F-111) that were all ultimately cancelled. Had the money
lost to program cancellations been invested differently, the United Kingdom could have
acquired more armaments and greater military capabilities for the same defense
expenditure. In this context, a more active political role at the onset of the procurement
process would have been more efficient than interventions once programs had gone awry.
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Ultimately, the RAF's incessant demands for highly specialized aircraft combined
with the retrenchment efforts of civilian politicians to grievously damage the United
Kingdom's aerospace industries. Most of the technologies demanded by the RAF, such
as variable geometry wings, VTOL and low-altitude avionics, lacked any commercial
applications whatsoever, while technologies with spin-off potential, such as carbon fiber
composites and fly-by-wire avionics, were neglected. Moreover, the costly and
complicated aircraft thus produced failed to meet the requirements of foreign air forces
and were, therefore, only exported in small numbers. Taken as an ensemble, the
application of substantial engineering resources to produce commercially unviable and
militarily un-exportable technologies progressively robbed the British aerospace industry
of its ability to compete internationally.
Given that the RAF dictated requirements and ultimately received aircraft meeting
its perceived needs, it is now necessary to ask whether the RAF was well prepared for the
conflict it anticipated with the Warsaw Pact. Within this context, the decade stretching
from 1965 to 1975 appears particularly problematic. Having enunciated overambitious
requirements for a revolutionary Canberra replacement and a bi-sonic VTOL fighter, the
RAF was then frustrated by repeated delays and cancellations. Receiving few new
combat aircraft during this period, the RAF's inventory aged.
From 1975 onwards, the RAF's procurement programs, albeit behind schedule,
provided aircraft meeting the RAF's performance specifications. By the mid-1980s, the
United Kingdom's aircraft inventory largely corresponded to the RAF's judgment that the
best way of countering a Warsaw Pact air offensive was to destroy the enemy's runways,
while using short take-off, VTOL and unimproved runway capabilities to continue
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fighting despite damage to British runways. With the Harrier, the Tornado and the
Jaguar, virtually the entire RAF front line was capable of operating independently of
large intact airbases, thus in this respect, the RAF was less vulnerable to attacks on its
runways than other major powers. With the Tornado/JP233 combination, the RAF also
had the best low-level anti-runway capability in the world.
Judging by their technical characteristics, British aircraft were well suited for their
designated missions. However, a variety of groups, both in the United Kingdom and
abroad, questioned the RAF's analysis. Fundamentally, employing sophisticated aircraft
to attack heavily defended and easily reparable concrete targets, such as runways,
appeared hazardous to many experts. Drawing on its Vietnam War experience, the
United States Air Force argued that heavily defended targets are best attacked from
higher altitudes and with the assistance of electronic countermeasures. 209 Within the
British defense establishment itself the Office of the Science Advisor concluded that
Soviet air defenses would be sophisticated enough to inflict excessive attrition on British
aircraft attacking at low altitudes.210 Elements within the RAF also questioned the
wisdom of the service's perceptions of runway vulnerability and its emphasis on
attacking enemy runways. 211 One squadron leader asked, "Are the targets really so
important that counter-air attacks ... will be made in which the attackers risk suffering
high losses for small gains? This might well be true for certain targets of high strategic
significance, but can hardly be justified for counter-air targets as a whole." 212 For critics
such as these, the RAF appeared fixated on an offensive doctrine that would yield meager
results for disproportionate costs and was overly worried by the Soviet Union's runway
attacks. 213
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With the information available, it is impossible to say whether the RAF's
leadership or its detractors would have been vindicated in a major war. In this context,
data that exist from the 1991 Gulf War is inconclusive. In the anti-runway mission,
Tornados reached their targets suffering acceptable attrition (2 percent), but failed to
inflict the expected damage on enemy runways. However, lessons drawn from this
conflict must be temporized with the understanding that Iraqi runways and air defenses
differed from their Soviet equivalents, and that the Iraqi Air Force constituted a
negligible threat to Tornados reaching their targets.
What is clear from the Gulf War experience is that sophisticated all-weather strike
aircraft like the Tornado performed significantly better in the low-level anti-runway role
than less sophisticated attack aircraft that could attack only during day light, in clear
weather. In this context, the RAF's aircraft requirements, issued since 1957, led to the
service acquiring a better anti-runway capability than the Soviets or French, which had
similar doctrines but relied on less-sophisticated aircraft and weapons. However, it
remains still questionable whether the best technology available rendered an inherently
risky mission cost-effective.
In sum, the British weapons acquisition process enabled the armed services to
acquire innovative weapons consonant with their visions of future warfare. Ultimately,
the weight given to the opinions of the armed services proved detrimental to the
aerospace industry as a whole, which could not pursue technological spin-offs and saw its
arms export activities decline. Despite their frequent interventions in the procurement
process, political leaders were unable to shape its fundamental dynamics and reduced to
the role of crisis managers. Whether the British weapons acquisition process succeeded
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at its core mission of providing the armed forces with suitable weaponry depends on
one's view of the requirements issued by individual armed services. If it is accepted that
individual armed services relied on their best professional judgments of future warfare to
define requirements, then the weapons acquisition process succeeded in providing them
with what they needed. On the other hand, if service requirements were tainted by
organizational biases towards the offensive and follow-on systems, then the weapons the
services requested were incapable of cost-effectively providing the nation with the
security it demanded.
473
Endnotes
1 For much larger states, like the United States and (during the Cold War) the
Soviet Union, the size of the internal market for combat aircraft was so large that the goal
of pleasing potential overseas customers paled in comparison to the need to please the
state's air force. Moreover, stiff competition between rival companies in the United
States and design bureaus in the Soviet Union enhanced national air force leverage vis-a-
vis aircraft designers. Nevertheless, American companies repeatedly attempted to build
aircraft that would please broad international markets, such as the Northrop F-5 and F-20
and the Lockheed F-104 and Lancer.
2 An impartial analysis of the RAF before and during the Second World War must
weigh numerous cognitive failures against the organization's undeniable successes.
Although the Spitfire, Hurricane and Lancaster have gone down in history as well-
conceived aircraft, the Fairey Battle (a light bomber) and Gloster Defiant (a fighter with a
gun turret) were failures. Meanwhile, one of the United Kingdom's best aircraft, the De
Haviland Mosquito, was the result of a corporate initiative, which did not respond to an
existing RAF requirement. The RAF's broader claim to have anticipated the character of
the air war is likewise tenuous. Before and during the war, the RAF overestimated the
results and underestimated the difficulty of conducting a bombing offensive on Germany.
3 Under government insistence before the start of war, the United Kingdom
established redundant industrial capacity to produce warplanes-so-called "shadow
factories," which permitted a rapid conversion of the country's manufacturing industries
to military production when war began. Later, shortly after taking power, Prime Minister
Winston Churchill created a centralized Ministry of Aircraft Production, with the specific
objective of developing and manufacturing aircraft to meet the RAF's demands. Thanks
to centralized organization and competent planning, the United Kingdom produced
substantially more aircraft than Germany between the fall of France and the United
States' entry into the war. During the crucial summer months of 1940, the United
Kingdom manufactured twice as many Spitfires and Hurricanes as Germany did Bf- 109s
and Bf-1 10s.
4 Although the Soviet Union produced slightly more aircraft than the United
Kingdom, most of the Soviet Union's aircraft production consisted of lightweight single
engine fighters and attack aircraft, while a significant proportion of the United
Kingdom's production comprised four engine (Lancaster and Halifax) and two engine
(Wellington, Beaufighter, Mosquito) bombers.
5 By 1964, government leaders decided that greater efficiency could be obtained
by subsuming the Ministry of Aviation into a new Ministry of Technology, charged with
developing the United Kingdom's technology base. After further reflection, the British
government concluded that weapons acquisition could be more effectively managed if
entrusted to a distinct agency, the Procurement Executive of the Ministry of Defense,
created in 1971. After further study, the 1998 Strategic Defense Review significantly
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reformed the procedures and career structures of the Procurement Executive. See Glen
Segell, Royal Air Force Procurement: The TSR.2 to the Tornado (London: Glen Segell,
1998), 13; and Jeffrey Engel, Cold War at 30,000 feet: The Anglo-American Fight for
Aviation Supremacy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 2007), 21-23.
6 George Edwards, the dominant figure of Vickers Aviation and the British
Aircraft Corporation (BAC) between 1945 and 1975, observed the technical superiority
of DMA/DGA officials vis-a'-vis their British counterparts during the AFVG and Jaguar
programs. According to Edwards, "The French senior civil servants [in procurement]
were drawn from chaps who had been put through the l'Ecole Polytechnique system.
The result was you got on one side British Greek scholars de luxe who were absolutely
ace on what I would describe as public school and Oxford projects, whereas, on the
French side, you had chaps who knew what a pound per square inch was." See Robert
Gardner, From Bouncing Bombs to Concorde: The Authorized Biography of Aviation
Pioneer Sir George Edwards (Thrupp, United Kingdom: Sutton, 2006), 202.
7 The SR. 177 was similar in conception to France's Trident, which was cancelled
in favor of the Mirage III after three prototype aircraft were lost. At the time the SR. 177
and Fairey Delta III were cancelled in 1957, neither was yet in advanced development
and prototypes did not yet exist of either, although the Fairey Delta III was derived from
an experimental aircraft (the Fairey Delta II) and the SR. 177 was developed from the
prototype SR.53 rocket fighter. Given the problems similar aircraft faced abroad, it is
doubtful whether either the SR. 177 or the Fairey Delta III would have been ready on
schedule. Tony Butler, British Secret Projects: Jet Fighters Since 1950 (Hinckley, the
United Kingdom: Midland, 2000), 80-92, 103-13.
8 Discussion of a Canberra replacement began in September 1951, but a final draft
of an RAF operational requirement was not ready until March 1957. PRO AIR 20/10576
ASR 343 - Historic Diary.
9 The Defense White Paper was written after the British government decided to
reduce defense spending from 10 to seven percent of the state's Gross National Product
(GNP). The end of conscription was the most important ramification of the Paper.
Developing guided missiles to succeed manned bombers and surface-to-air missiles to
succeed fighter aircraft was one of the Paper's stated technological goals. The 1957
White Paper has been severely criticized in many histories of British aviation. For
example, Charles Gardner claimed that, "What Sandys set down was really a Dan Dare
scenario which might conceivably be valid by the turn of the century, but which bore no
relation to the state of the art or the practicalities of life for the 1960s.... He demoralized
the Royal Air Force and the industry, and set British military aviation development back
by at least several years-and some say by a decade." Although the Sandys review was
traumatic for Britain's aviation industries, it is hard to see how there was any alternative.
Given budgetary realities, the United Kingdom was eventually obliged to cancel the
ballistic missiles. (Blue Steel) supported by the White Paper as well as the Canberra
replacement aircraft. See Stephen Twigge, The Early Development of Guided Weapons
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Charles Gardner, British Aircraft Corporation (London: B.T. Batsford, 1981), 19-2 1.
10 In August 1953, a camera-equipped Canberra flew evading Soviet fire, from
West Germany, over Czechoslovakia, Poland and a significant portion of the Soviet
Union, to photograph the Soviet Union's missile test facility at Kapustin Yar, southeast
of Stalingrad. The Canberra was a standard bomber aircraft, rather than one of the
photographic reconnaissance Canberras, which were being produced with longer wings to
operate at even higher altitudes. Over the course of several years, Canberras set 22 world
records for speed, height and range. In August 1953, when a camera equipped Canberra
flew from West Germany, over Czechoslovakia, Poland and a significant portion of the
Soviet Union, to photograph the Soviet Union's missile test facility at Kapustin Yar,
southeast of Stalingrad. Soviet air defenses scrambled a significant number of MiG
fighters to intercept the Canberra. Lacking internal radars, many had trouble visually
locating the plane at such a high altitude. Near Kharkov, two MiGs became confused and
fired on each other. Near Kapustin Yar, a MiG pilot actually managed to approach the
Canberra, however operating at an aircraft higher than his aircraft was designed, the MiG
was constantly in danger of stalling. The MiG managed to fire a burst at the Canberra,
with one cannon shell hitting, but the MiG subsequently lost speed and altitude, and the
Canberra continued its mission. The inability of the Soviet Union's air defenses to halt a
single Western bomber aircraft led to the removal of several generals and officers from
their positions. One committed suicide after being demoted to the rank of lieutenant
colonel. Curtis Peebles, Shadow Flights: America's Secret Air War Against the Soviet
Union (Novato, California: Presidio, 2000), 43-45.
" New Soviet capabilities were demonstrated in 1956 when a Syrian MiG-17 shot
down a RAF Canberra during the Suez Crisis. Bruce Halpenny, English Electric
Canberra: The History and Development of a Classic Jet (Barnseley, the United
Kingdom: Pen and Sword, 2005), 17.
12 In 1952, Air Vice-Marshal Geoffrey Tuttle of the RAF's operational
requirements department already anticipated that the Canberra would be unable to fulfill
daylight missions from 1955 onwards because of the Soviet MiG-15 threat. By 1957, it
was anticipated that the Canberra would be unsuited for operations during great power
wars by 1963 and would be unable to fulfill any military role by 1965. Given the fact
that the RAF still operated Canberras in 2000, the RAF was either premature in judging
the aircraft obsolete or obliged to continue operating an aircraft once it had become
gravely outmoded. Tony Butler, British Secret Projects: Jet Bombers Since 1949
(Hinckley, the United Kingdom: Midland, 2003), 87-104.
1 Initially, the RAF deemed a height of 1,000 ft (305 m) and a low-level speed of
Mach 0.95 as sufficient for penetrating enemy air defenses, but enough doubters
remained so that the RAF included a requirement for a minimum speed of Mach 1.7 at
higher altitudes. In previous generations of aircraft, high altitude was perceived as a
means of protecting aircraft from enemy air defenses. For aircraft such as the B-29
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placed them above the range of light enemy anti-aircraft guns and rendered it difficult for
enemy fighters to attain the necessary altitude to shoot bombers down before the latter
reached their targets. With improvements to early warning radars and the climb rates of
fighters, the slow high-altitude approach became increasingly problematic, before finally
proving obsolete when surface-to-air missiles permitted the Soviet Union and People's
Republic of China to shoot down high altitude reconnaissance aircraft (the Lockheed U-2
and reconnaissance versions of the Canberra) in 1959 and 1960.
The RAF's Bomber Command continued to argue that high altitude performance
was the most important criteria for the future aircraft. PRO AIR 20/10576 ASR 343 -
Historic Diary.
14 According to 1957 estimates, the costs of designing a modified Buccaneer
were assessed at E20 million versus E190 million for an entirely new aircraft.14 However,
even with modifications the Buccaneer would fall a little short of meeting the RAF's
operational requirement, with a range of 850 nm versus 1000 nm, a low-level speed of
Mach 0.85 opposed to Mach 0.95 and a subsonic speed at high altitudes, against the
Mach 1.7 desired by bomber command. The Buccaneer also could not meet the RAF's
short take-off requirement for the Canberra replacement.
15 A subject of continuing debate is whether the RAF rejected the Buccaneer
solely for performance reasons, or because of an emotional desire not to adopt a naval
aircraft. RAF sources tend to argue the former, while some accounts promote the latter
theory. Healey himself opined that, "Under the conditions of internecine warfare which
had ruled the between the services, the RAF would never accept an aircraft originally
designed for the navy - a syndrome described in the Ministry as NIH, or 'Not Invented
Here'." See Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin, 1989), 274; and
Minister of Defense Denis Healey wrote, "The real tragedy is that [the Canberra] TSR2
should never have begun." PRO AIR 20/10576 ASR 343 - Historic Diary.
16 The Ministry of Defense suggested that Valiant bombers hitherto used in the
strategic bombing be recycled. The Vickers Valiant was the United Kingdom's first jet
powered strategic bomber. By the time the Canberra replacement requirement was
issued, the Valiant was joined in the strategic bombing role by the more advanced Avro
Vulcan and Handley Page Victor bombers. Minister of Defense civil servants therefore
argued that Valiants could be diverted to replace Canberras. Unknown at the time, this
proposal was unsound. When Britain's strategic bomber force (the V Force) shifted to
low level delivery, it was discovered that low altitude turbulence generate stress cracks in
the Valiant's fuselage. PRO AIR 20/10576 ASR 343 - Historic Diary.
The de Havilland Company suggested that a tactical bomber, the Christchurch
DH.1 10, derived from the Royal Navy's Sea Vixen fighter could be developed quickly
and affordably. The Christchurch proposal involved adding extra fuel tanks to the Sea
Vixen's wingtips, strengthening the aircraft's structure for low-level flight and replacing
the aircraft's RA-24 turbojets (Avons) with RB.133s (developed Avons). Blown flaps,
used on the Buccaneer and Supermarine Swift, would be added to the Sea Vixen to
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Staff of 15th February 1963. In February 1963, the Chief of the Air Staff argued, "What
could the carrier do in the way of providing close air support and air defence to an
intervention force pitched into Central Africa." PRO AIR 20/11423 Note by the Chief of
the Air Staff: Interim Report by the C.S.A.'s Inquiry.
41 Being the only client for an aircraft of its type, the TSR.2 faced stiff
competition for the Australian order from the American B-58 Hustler, A-5 Vigilante and
F-111, and France's Mirage IV.
42 One unverified but widely repeated story is that Mountbatten had a habit of
slapping down five card-sized photos of the Buccaneer and one with a drawing of the
TSR.2, and saying "Five of one or one of the other at the same cost." Based on recent
scholarship, Mountbatten's intervention does not appear to have been the decisive
element in Australia's decision not to purchase TSR.2. Rather, growing enthusiasm for
the TFX (F-Il l1) aircraft, launched by the United States under Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, was the most important influence on Australia's decision. Robert
Gardner, 166-69.
43 Mountbatten, along with Solly Zuckerman, the Ministry of Defense Chief
Science Advisor, resuscitated the idea that the RAF should acquire Buccaneers as a cheap
substitute for TSR.2A. A supposedly neutral committee led by Zuckerman concluded
that aircraft carriers provided more air cover and greater geographic flexibility than RAF
aircraft from island bases. TSR.2 proponents have accused Zuckerman of having an
"aircraft carrier bias." Zuckerman had good social relations with Admiral Mountbatten.
However, it is impossible to ascertain the role of subjective factors such as "bias" and
"friendship" in the conclusion of the committee Zuckerman led, versus objective
analysis. PRO AIR 20/11424 Solly Zuckerman, Report on Inquiry into Carrier Task
Forces, April 23, 1963.
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In a rare statement on defense policy and one of the most acerbic attacks on RAF
policy, Burke Trend wrote the Prime Minister that, "We commit vast sums of money for
e.g. the Canberra replacement, without stopping to consider whether, politically, the
T.S.R.2 makes sense or has a useful role to play. Defence is the servant of foreign
policy: it is not war games for generals (underlined in original). In short, I fear that we
are committing altogether too much money for future expenditure based on old patterns
rather than gradually re-allocating new resources to meet emerging needs.... As for TSR
2, I cannot think what it will ever be called to do, if indeed it ever gets off the ground.
Keeping up the morale of the [Armed] Services is, it is true, an essential aspect of
Defence Policy; but there is a limit to the number of new toys the nation can afford to
give them." Burke Trend to Prime Minister, International Affairs, March 26, 1964.
44 By late 1964, the estimated cost for the RAF to acquire 110 TSR.2s had risen
from E325 to £750 million, and would increase further to £1,135 million. Saki Dockrill,
82-83.
45 Although a contract for the F-Ill development was issued in the United States
in December 1962, three years after the TSR.2 contract had been signed, the development
of the American aircraft overtook its British counterpart, with the F- 111 prototype flying
in December 1964, three months after the TSR.2. Performance shortcomings included:
the combat radius was shorter, ability to operate from unimproved runways lesser, and in
its initial version, it lacked the TSR.2's sophisticated avionics system for low-level high-
speed flight it had advantages. A Mark II avionics package was planned to redress this
last shortcoming. Robert Coulam, Illusions of Choice: The F-111 and the Problem of
Weapons Acquisition Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 56-68.
46 The figures for the F-Ill are actual figures, whereas those for the TSR.2 are
derived from the requirement. Although two TSR.2 prototypes were completed, not
enough flight-testing had been completed to confirm that it met all of its objectives. In
terms of range, the TSR.2 was supposed to fly a hi-low-low-hi profile, whereas the F- 11
flew a low-low-hi-hi. Ibid., 78.
47 RAF Chief of the Staff Charles Elsworthy openly discussed canceling the
TSR.2 in favor of the F-Ill in a letter to Minister of Aviation Hugh Frazer, justifying the
proposal on the uncontrollable costs of the British project. He came to view the financial
savings associated with the American aircraft, evaluated at between E285 million and
£369 million, as vital to the RAF's future.
BAC argued that cancellation would provoke mass layoffs and discredit Britain's
newly consolidated aviation industry. Minister of Aviation Roy Jenkins also pleaded
against purchasing an American aircraft, contending that a simplified and cheaper TSR.2
or enhanced Buccaneer would be developed to meet the RAF's requirements. For
Jenkins, these alternatives had the advantage that British procurement funds would be
spent acquiring products from British manufacturers. Saki Dockrill, 84-85, 93.
483
48 The proposals to ameliorate the Buccaneer largely concentrated providing it
with some of the avionics developed for TSR.2 and the Hawker-Siddeley P.1154.
Concurrently, the Ministry of Aviation and BAC made one last effort to save the TSR.2.
With development of the aircraft far from complete, they attempted to negotiate a fixed
price contract to complete the development, pre-production and production of 100
aircraft. After intensive negotiations, there remained a gap of E20 million between the
highest sum the Ministry could offer and the lowest that BAC would accept. At the time
of these negotiations in January 1965, E190 million had already been spent on the
TSR.2's development. The best estimates at the time predicted that an additional E560
million would have to be spent to complete the program for 110 aircraft. The Ministry of
Aviation initially offered a fixed price contract of E414 million to complete the contract,
while BAC initially bargained for E475 million. Ultimately, negotiations collapsed when
the Ministry would not raise its offer above E430 million and BAC would not accept
below E450 million. Although both BAC and the Ministry wanted to salvage the TSR.2,
there was an element of unreality in their negotiations. Few felt that costs could be
contained to the limits they were willing to accept and both sides understood that BAC
(whose capital upon formation was E20 million) could not underwrite the losses likely to
occur. PRO AIR 20/10576 ASR 343 - Historic Diary; PRO DSIR 23/32965 An
Effectiveness Comparison of the Buccaneer 2 and 2*, June 1965; and Robert Gardner,
176-77.
49 France developed the Mirage IV for the comparatively modest sum of E45
million. Based on contemporary exchange rates, the total program cost per Mirage IV
built for the French Air Force was E4 million (fly away cost E3.45) whereas the predicted
program cost for TSR.2 came to E7.5 million per aircraft (fly away cost E5 million).
Although failing to meet the same performance criteria as the TSR.2, the Mirage fit into
the same category of aircraft and competed against the TSR.2 for the Australian export
contract. Predicted development costs for Buccaneer enhancements, estimated to range
from f 18 million to E21 million, would have been even more economical. Over the
course of the TSR.2 program, many distinct proposals to improve the Buccaneer were
presented. These included adding extra fuel to the aircraft; giving it more efficient
engines and incorporating advanced avionics (developed for either the TSR.2 or P. 1154)
into it. See Jean Forestier, "Le Mirage IV, arme de pr6cocit6," Armement et Ve
Republique: Fin des annies 1950 - Fin des annies 1960 (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2002),
205; and PRO DSIR 23/33256 The Cost and Cost/Effectiveness Comparison of the
Buccaneer 2 and 2*, July 1965.
50 The Mirage IV met the TSR.2's speed requirement, while an improved
Buccaneer would have met its requirement for low-level flying and the precise delivery
of munitions. Both could have carried the same nuclear payloads as TSR.2, but neither
could carry as heavy a conventional bomb load. Neither aircraft could match the TSR.2's
short take-off or unimproved runway requirement, but the Buccaneer was better in this
respect than the TSR.2. Both aircraft also fell short in terms of combat radius, but the
Mirage IV was better in this respect. British documents indicate that an improved
Buccaneer could have been developed and over 200 procured for the same sum of money
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expended on the TSR.2's development, which was still incomplete. PRO AIR 20/11752
A Comparison - Mirage, F111 and Buccaneer 2*, n.d. (1965).
51 Because the United States' F-Ill program encountered significant difficulties
meeting similar objectives, despite an enormous design team of 4,000 to 6,000, while the
Anglo-German-Italian Tornado proved troublesome to develop more than a decade later,
it appears that the primary cause of the TSR.2's troubles were the over-ambitious
performance requirements that the RAF defined in 1957 and revised upwards in 1959.
Hooker, of Bristol Aero-Engines, claimed that the RAF's requirements led to the
"pouring of effort and money down the drain." According to Hooker, "The fresh arrivals
of brilliant and dedicated young RAF officers in the Operational Requirements branch
tended to justify their existence by changing, usually upwards, the numbers cranked into
official specifications." Hooker, 147.
5 A commitment to the purchase of an initial batch of 10 aircraft had to be made
by 1 January 1966, while the purchase of a second batch of 70-100 aircraft was to be
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confirmed by April 1967. PRO CAB 65/39 pt. 2 21st Conclusions, 1 April. 1965.
If the United Kingdom persevered with the full F-Ill purchase, all 110 aircraft
would be delivered by 1970. PRO CAB AIR 10/11750 Buccaneer 2**, January 1966.
53 Robert Gardner, 174.
5 PRO CAB 65/39 pt. 2 2 0 'h Conclusions, 1 April 1965.
5 The British government established an independent advisory committee under
the leadership of Lord Plowden to study the United Kingdom's aircraft industry. This
committee concluded that the United Kingdom should purchase its most complex
military aircraft from the United States and develop the rest in cooperation with other
European states. Sweden had a comparatively large aviation industry, but refused to
collaborate with NATO member states because of its non-alignment during the Cold
War. The West German and Italian combat aircraft industries were largely dismantled
after the Second World War and were only gradually reestablishing themselves. PRO T
225/2685 Committee to Redecide the Aircraft Industry, 1 February 1966.
56 On 17 May 1965, soon after the TSR.2 cancellation, Healey and Jenkins signed
a joint memorandum of understanding with French Minister of Defense Pierre Messmer
providing for the development of two collaborative aircraft.
5 The jet trainer would replace the United Kingdom's Jet Provost and France's
Potez (Fouga) Magister. The Breguet design, the Br. 121, was an adaptation Breguet's
design submission, the Taon, for NATO's lightweight fighter competition in the late
1950s. See Andy Evans, SEPECAT Jaguar (Ramsbury, United Kingdom: Crowood,
1998), 7-10.
485
58 Because the AFVG would conduct similar missions as envisioned for the
TSR.2, albeit at shorter ranges (a radius of action of 400 nm), it was anticipated that
much of the research conducted on terrain following and low-level flight during the
TSR.2 program would prove valuable to the AFVG.
59 The United States Air Force restricted its version of the Canberra bomber to
operations over South Vietnam, where they did not face opposition from enemy fighters
or missiles. PRO AIR 20/11750 Denis Healey, Memorandum by the Secretary of
Defence: The Canberra Replacement, January 1966.
60 In a January 1966 Memorandum to the United Kingdom's Defence and
Overseas Policy Committee, Healey admitted that, "Militarily the best and most effective
answer [to the Canberra replacement requirement] would be a force composed entirely of
F- 11 A's. But we must take into account... the need to secure a stable industrial
programme in the future [for the aircraft industry]. Ibid.
61 Both the Vulcans and Victors were subsonic, however they carried heavy bomb
loads, could fly long ranges and possessed sophisticated electronic warfare suites. The
RAF had rejected the use of "V bombers" (the collective term for the Vulcan, Victor and
Valiant) as Canberra replacements as early as 1957. However, the aircraft were
considered more capable than the Canberra and no new production would be necessary.
In Healey's words, "By taking a small number of aircraft with the highest performance
[the 36 F-1 I1s], we can take the risk of retaining in service with them some of the 'V'
bombers (and transferring [them]... albeit at some risk - to the tactical role), and a small
and declining number of Canberra reconnaissance aircraft. PRO AIR 20/10576 ASR 343
- Historic Diary and PRO AIR 20/11750 Denis Healey, Memorandum by the Secretary
of Defence: The Canberra Replacement, January 1966.
62 This calculation covers purely the costs of the coming decade for the tactical
strike and reconnaissance roles, including retaining the V bombers and photo-
reconnaissance Canberras in service, the purchase of F-Ills and the development of the
AFVG. It does not include the entire AFVG production run. PRO AIR 20/11750 Denis
Healey, Memorandum by the Secretary of Defence: The Canberra Replacement, January
1966.
63 Robert Gardner, 214.
64 As a high-altitude nuclear bomber, the Mirage IV required significant
modifications for low altitude operations. However, BAC and Dassault believed that
adequate performance could be obtained by incorporating existing British avionics,
developed for the TSR.2 and the cancelled P.1154, into the Mirage IV's airframe..
Increased range would be obtained by substituting the Mirage IV's fuel-guzzling ATAR
9K engines for more efficient Rolls-Royce Speys. Refitted with new engines and
avionics, the Mirage IV could meet or approach many of the TSR.2's performance goals,
including minimum altitude, low-level speed and high-level speed.
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65Arguing that the advanced Mirage IV could be developed at a comparatively
reasonable cost, BAC commented that although Dassault would conduct the development
on the modified Mirage IV, half of the production effort and a similar proportion of the
aircraft's components would come from the United Kingdom. BAC projected E10
million, compared to the £190 million that had already been spent on the TSR.2 or the
£20 million anticipated for an improved Buccaneer.
BAC also argued that the British government could negotiate a quid-pro-quo with
the French government on other deals and that Dassault's commitment to the AFVG
project was lukewarm because the French company was denied design leadership over
the airframe. PRO AIR 20/11752 Air Commodore G.F. W. Heycock to C. Hartley, DCAS,
November 8, 1965; and PRO AIR 20/11752 F. Cooper, Influence of the Sprey-Mirage
Decision on French Interest in Bloodhound, December 10, 1965.
66 PRO DSIR 23/33256 Royal Aircraft Establishment, The Cost and
Cost/Effectiveness of the Buccaneer 2 and 2*, July 1965.
67 Ministry of Defense studies suggested that the Buccaneer 2** would be 50 to
100 percent more effective than the Buccaneer 2*, but would cost £23 million to E28
million to develop, which was at least £3 million more than the Buccaneer 2*. PRO AIR
20/11750 The Aircraft Problem, December 1965.
68 PRO AIR 20/11750 Wing Command R.J. Bannard, Supersonic Buccaneer,
December 23, 1965.
69 While BAC and Dassault estimated that the French variant of the aircraft would
cost £10 million to develop, the RAF cited a larger figure of E50 million. Although the
cost estimate of £10 may have been overly optimistic, the RAF's sum of £50 million
appears unduly pessimistic considering that Dassault originally developed the Mirage IV
for £45 million. PRO AIR 20/11752 Mirage IVISpey, n.d..
70 The RAF contended, "It is clear that the fitting of a British nav/attack system of
sufficient accuracy, which is the smallest alteration we should need, would make the
aircraft virtually as dear as the F 11.... After conversion to meet our needs, the aircraft
will still have a lower bomb load and range than Fl 11 and would be tied to long concrete
runways whereas F 111 will be able to operate from short rudimentary strips." PRO AIR
20/11752 Mirage IVISpey, n.d..
71 The RAF's decision to use Indonesia as the designated adversary in this study
was not incidental. British Canberras, the aircraft whose replacement in question, were
stationed at airfields at Labuan and Kutchings during the confrontation with Indonesia
over Borneo (1963-66). In British eyes, the Canberras deterred Indonesia from escalating
the confrontation beyond limited guerrilla attacks in Borneo. PRO AIR 20/11750
Assistance Chief of Air Staff, The Canberra Replacement, November 30, 1965; and
487
Bruce Halpenny, English Electric Canberra: The History and Development of a Classic
Jet, 120-21.
72 The RAF argued that although 100 Buccaneers 2*s could be acquired for the
same cost as 50 F- 1 Is, the 50 F-i I 1s had a combat value equivalent to 150 to 200
Buccaneer 2*s. Also, the costs of maintaining a larger number of less-capable aircraft
would be higher in long run than maintaining a smaller number of more capable aircraft.
Examining other scenarios, the RAF contended that 101 Buccaneer 2* sorties would be
required in an intervention against Iraq, against 33 F- 111 sorties. See PRO AIR
20/11750 Comparative Performance and Cost Effectiveness of Canberra, Victor, Vulcan,
Buccaneer 2, Buccaneer 2 * (Ferranti Radar), Buccaneer 2** (Elliott Radar), Mirage-
Spey, and F1 JA, n.d..
7 PRO AIR 20/11750 Assistance Chief of Air Staff, The Canberra Replacement,
November 30, 1965.
74 Minister of Defense Healey argued to the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas
Policy Committee that, "The reconnaissance task is important and vital to both political
and military decision making. In times of apparent calm discreet reconnaissance will
disclose threats. In times of tension reconnaissance can provide the essential basis for
political and military decisions." PRO AIR 20/11750 Denis Healey, Memorandum by the
Secretary of Defence: The Canberra Replacement, January 1966.
75 The Army claimed that it would need 200 reconnaissance sorties flown a day,
up to 100 nm behind the forward edge of battle in the event of a Soviet attack in Western
Europe. It felt that reconnaissance flights would be crucial in determining the likely axis
of Soviet armored breakthrough efforts. As a result, its primary requirement was for
reconnaissance flights up to 100 nm deep. The RAF argued that certain critical
reconnaissance targets were 500 nm behind the Warsaw Pact. PRO AIR 20/11750 The
Need for the F1IJA to Meet Future Reconnaissance Requirements, September 13, 1965.
76 PRO AIR 20/11750 Assistance Chief of Air Staff, The Canberra Replacement,
November 30, 1965.
77 The performance characteristics listed in Table VI are those upon which the
RAF based its analysis, and can be found in various documents already cited from PRO
AIR 20/11750 and PRO AIR 20/11752. Figures for combat radii are those for a low-low
mission profile carrying 10,000 lbs of bombs, except for the range for the supersonic
Buccaneer, where the only figure cited for a low-low profile involved a 2,000 lbs bomb
load.
78 Written by the Assistance Chief of the Air Staff, the text specifies that the F-
I1I model discussed is the F- 11 A. For simplicity's sake, this was omitted from the
quote. PRO AIR 20/11750 Assistance Chief of Air Staff, The Canberra Replacement,
November 30, 1965.
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79 Charles Gardner, 138-39.
80 The government reduced expenditure from E2,000 million in 1966 to £1,800
million by 1975. After the Pound was devaluated by 14 percent in November 1967, the
British government decided to cut social and defense spending still further. Because of a
shrinking defense budget and the devaluation of the Pound, which rendered future
payments on F-1 I1s more expensive (the value of £1 dropped from $2.8 to $2.4,
increasing the cost of the F-Ill from E2.6 million to E3 million), the F-Ill program itself
soon became controversial.
81 Saki Dockrill, 197-208.
82 The question was raised after the AFVG and F-Ill cancellations whether the
Canberra replacement requirement was a sensible formulation of future aircraft needs.
According to Chief Science Advisor Zuckerman, "During the (interdepartmental)
studies... some doubts were cast on the feasibility, in any likely European operational
environment of the seventies and eighties, of an aircraft, even with the low-level
performance of the MRCA, ever being able to attack defended targets with conventional
weapons.... In the final analysis, however, one must attach some weight to the RAF's
professional judgment of what would be operationally practicable in the opening stages
of a military clash in Europe. I doubt, therefore, whether any Minister will feel disposed
to press objections to the aircraft on these grounds, though the doubt inevitably remains."
PRO PREM 15/1374 Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister, The Multi-Role Combat
Aircraft, July 8, 1970.
83 Harrier VTOL aircraft were replacing some of the Hunter ground-attack force.
84 The British aircraft industry was quickly obliged to fire 8,000 employees, of
which 5,000 were at BAC.
85 BAC closed the Luton factory, transferred its production of Jet Provost trainers
to Preston, and shifted much of the BAC 1-11 airliner manufacturing from Hurn to
Weybridge. Charles Gardner, 117-18.
86 Charles Gardner, 116.
87 According to British estimates, it would have cost less to replace the entire
British Canberra fleet of 150 aircraft with improved Buccaneers than did the actual
policies enacted. It is useful to note that the entire program costs of France's Mirage IV,
including research, development, production (62 aircraft) and a certain stockpile of spare
parts, cost only slightly more than the resources squandered on the TSR.2, AFVG and F-
111 programs. Forestier, 205; and PRO AIR 20/11750 The Aircraft Problem, December
1965.
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88 In the end, the Jaguar's overall development cost was nearly as high as that of
the French Mirage F1 and Mirage IV combined, which were more sophisticated aircraft.
The Jaguar's development costs were FF 1200 million, whereas the Mirage lVs was FF
635 million and the Mirage F1 FF 670 million. Evans, 20.
89 Butler, British Secret Projects: Jet Bombers Since 1949, 174-75.
90 The RAF initiated discussions with the Navy and the Ministry of Defense on 22
January 1968, barely 10 days after the F- 111's cancellation. PRO AIR 20/10576 ASR
343 - Historic Diary.
91 The RAF was first asked to evaluate the Buccaneer for its Canberra
replacement needs in 1955. Since then, the Buccaneer's producers (Blackburn Aviation
and then Hawker-Siddeley Aviation [after industry consolidation]) repeatedly proposed
upgraded Buccaneers for the RAF, including: the B.103A (1957) with 300 gallons of
additional fuel and 10 percent more thrust (Gyron Junior engines with afterburners); the
B. 108 with a two-man cockpit, photo-reconnaissance equipment and terrain following
radar; the Buccaneer Mark 2 with the more powerful Spey engines; the Buccaneer 2*
with improved avionics (Ferranti radar); the Buccaneer 2** with better avionics (Elliott
radar); and the supersonic Buccaneer. See Butler, British Secret Projects: Jet Bombers
Since 1949, 89-93; PRO AIR 20/11750 The Aircraft Problem, December 1965; and PRO
AIR 20/11750 Wing Command R.J. Bannard, Supersonic Buccaneer, December 23,
1965.
92 In the project definition for the new study, entitled the United Kingdom
Variable Geometry (UKVG) aircraft, the RAF specified that BAC should design an
aircraft with a low-level speed of Mach 0.9, a combat radius of action of 400 nm and the
ability to operate from short runways.
93 The government learned from the TSR.2 experience and based its decision also
on the Plowden Committee Enquiry into the Aircraft Industry report of 1964. PRO FCO
46/178 Military Aircraft Industrial Potential: Defence and Foreign Policy
Considerations, September 22, 1967.
94 Another basic design challenge, the incorporation of high-lift devices into the
leading and trailing edges of the entire wing to improve both take-off performance and
slow-speed maneuverability, also became the focus of intensive engineering efforts.
Butler, British Secret Projects: Jet Bombers Since 1949, 180-81.
95 The French had already decided on an aircraft project, the Mirage Fl. Even
after problems with France over the AFVG, the British government considered that, in
the long run, "a reasonable solution [for the British aircraft industry] will only be found
through some adequate tie-up between out own and French firms. PRO PREM 15/1374
Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister, The Multi-Role Combat Aircraft, July 8, 1970.
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96 As a secret memorandum addressed to the United Kingdom's Prime Minister
admitted after the fact, "Essentially we moved in on what was originally a German-
Italian-Dutch-Canadian [Belgian] plan, and altered it to suit our needs." PRO PREM
15/1374 Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister, The Multi-Role Combat Aircraft, July 8,
1970.
97 The RAF dispatched a team to Canada on the day after the AFVG's
cancellation. Capitalizing on its privileged relations with the Royal Canadian Air Force
(RCAF), it attempted to persuade the Canadians to convince the other F- 104 replacement
cartel members to allow the United Kingdom to join their group despite the fact that the
RAF was not a F-104 user and had no requirement for a lightweight fighter. Charles
Gardner, 138-39.
98 By 1969 British diplomats and the RAF convinced the West Germans and
Italians to abandon the cheap lightweight fighter for a large variable geometry aircraft
similar to the UKVG's specifications. As the United Kingdom's Chief Science Advisor
confided to the Prime Minister in 1970, "By joining [the F-104 replacement consortium],
the RAF also changed the character of the project, and succeeded in injecting their own
ideas for a two-seater aircraft designed primarily for the strike role, rather than a single-
seat fighter." PRO PREM 15/1374 Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister, The Multi-Role
Combat Aircraft, July 8, 1970.
99 Interim solutions included extending the longevity of the Vulcans and
Canberras; but Buccaneers would now join them for low-level strike missions. By
changing its Jaguar requirement from jet trainer to ground-attack aircraft, the RAF
ensured that it would have a new, if unsophisticated, aircraft for its shorter-range ground-
attack missions from 1973. However, the United Kingdom would have to wait for the
new MCRA program before it would acquire a cutting-edge aircraft capable of replacing
the Canberra in all of its missions.
100 Performing missions originally discharged by a homogenous fleet of
Canberras, by 1979 the RAF possessed six squadrons of Vulcan bombers, four squadrons
of Buccaneers and three squadrons of reconnaissance Canberras. Mark Hewish et al.,
Forces airiennes du monde entire (Paris: Elsevier, 1979), 70-72.
101 The bi-national Jaguar program was launched with a guaranteed order of 300
aircraft, later increased to 400, and the tri-national MRCA program was launched on the
basis of 900 aircraft. In the end, the Jaguar's overall development cost was nearly as high
as that of the French Mirage F1 and Mirage IV combined, which were more sophisticated
aircraft. PRO PREM 15/1374 Statement on MRCA, July 22, 1970.
102 To accomplish this objective, the aircraft had to be strengthened and enlarged
to accommodate more fuel and carry more bombs, and its aerodynamics modified to
maximize high-speed low-level flight rather than provide the stability and handling
needed in a training aircraft.
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103 The transformation of the Jaguar into a dedicated ground attack aircraft was
facilitated by the aircraft's design lineage. The original design for the Jaguar trainer
aircraft, the Breguet 121, was derived from the company's submission to NATO's
lightweight fighter competition of 1958, the Breguet 1001 Taon. Although the Taon had
been designed as a subsonic single-engine aircraft, its function was providing European
states with a cheap and reliable ground-attack aircraft-a requirement analogous to the
RAF's revised Jaguar specifications. After losing the NATO competition, Breguet
continued work on its design, adapting it for a French requirement for a two-engine
lightweight fighter, the Breguet 1100 and, later, the Breguet 121 two-engine trainer.
Despite being a more sophisticated aircraft, the Taon (Breguet 1001) lost the NATO
competition to the Fiat G.91. The Breguet 1100 design was likewise cancelled when the
Gazibo jet engine that was supposed to power it encountered technical problems. Roland
de Narbonne, "Les chasseurs legers de Les avions du concours OTAN," Fana de
l'Aviation no. 440 (July 2006): 50-55; Butler, British Secret Projects: Jet Bombers Since
1949, 173-75.
104 While the overall layout of the Jaguar was Breguet's responsibility, BAC
contributed its wing planform and assisted with the aircraft's design. In both of these
respects, Jaguar benefited from BAC's experience from the TSR.2 program. The
Jaguar's thin highly swept wing, mounted high in the aircraft's fuselage, was a direct
product of BAC's research into low-level high-speed aerodynamics. The small surface
area of the wing rendered the Jaguar extremely stable and flyable in the highly turbulent
air at low altitudes. The TSR.2 program involved considerable basic research into the
dynamics of low-level flight and turbulence. BAC conducted some of this research in-
house, but the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE), which provided basic scientific
advice to both British aircraft manufacturers and the RAF, conducted much. The RAE
developed a formula for predicting how aircraft would respond to gusts of wind at low
levels and various speeds. Using this formula, English Electric and Vickers both
developed TSR.2 proposals with wings mounted high in the fuselage. Having
accumulated an unrivaled expertise in low-altitude airframe fatigue, BAC advised
Breguet how to strengthen the aircraft's structure and, thereby, avoid the stress fractures
that develop in aircraft flying for prolonged periods at low altitudes and high speeds.
Vickers, one of the component companies of BAC, faced the problem of stress cracks
developing from low level flight when the company's Valiant bombers were withdrawn
from service when they were obliged to shift from high-altitude to low-altitude missions.
Extensive research on low-altitude structural fatigue was later conducted both when the
Vulcan and Victor bombers transitioned to low-level missions and as part of the TSR.2
program. Having begun their Mirage IV bombers at high-level flights, the French were
comparatively late to study low-level metal fatigue. PRO AIR 20/10576 ASR 343 -
Historic Diary.
105 As a comparatively simple aircraft, with no new technologies and mounting
minimal avionics (the aircraft lacked a radar), the Jaguar would not normally have faced
cost escalation of this magnitude, except for the fact that the RAF's modification of the
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Jaguar's purpose entailed the aircraft's comprehensive redesign at a comparatively late
stage of development. The Jaguar was originally anticipated to be a fairly cheap
program, costing approximately half as much as the Mirage F1 to develop. Cost growth
was produced by a number of factors, including the aircraft's redesign, engine troubles
and duplication of design and prototype testing effort. Originally, 120 million francs had
been allocated for the Jaguar's development to the prototype stage. Development
ultimately cost 864 million francs. A RAND Corporation study indicates that the
program suffered a 309 percent increase in development costs, but specific costs are not
given. The decision to change the Jaguar's purpose from a trainer to a ground attack
aircraft came too late for the aircraft's intended engine to be upgraded. At the same time
as BAC and Breguet received the contract to design the Jaguar's airframe in 1965, Rolls
Royce and the French engine producer Turbomeca were tasked with building the
aircraft's power plant-two Adour 101 jet engines. However, when Rolls Royce and
Turbomeca were initially tasked with developing the Jaguar's engines, the aircraft was
anticipated to weight approximately 3,500 kilograms. In modifying the Jaguar's airframe
for ground-attack missions, they doubled its mass, augmenting the Jaguar's empty weight
to 7,000 kg. Unfortunately, by the time the airframe redesign was complete, it was too
late to redesign the Adour 101. See Andy Evans, SEPECAT Jaguar (Ramsbury, the
United Kingdom: Crowood, 1998), 20; and Mark Lorell and Julia Lowell, Pros and Cons
of International Weapons Procurement Collaboration (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation,
1995), 18.
106 Possessing limited financial resources, most states interested in purchasing a
combat aircraft sought a simple economic design capable of fulfilling both ground-attack
and fighter roles. The Jaguar was in the same lightweight category as the Mirage III,
Mirage Fl and Lockheed F-104, which were all commercially successful.
107 The Jaguar was built with maintainability in mind. Four hundred quick release
panels cover 30 percent of the aircraft's surface. This enables mechanics to easily access
many of the aircraft's systems. Charles Gardner, 145.
108 Contemporary British documents estimated that experience accumulated
during a long production run would result in a 10 to 20 percent decrease in the aircraft's
cost. PRO AVIA 97/30 Plowden Report, November 19, 1965.
109 Andy Evans, SEPECA T Jaguar (Ramsbury, the United Kingdom: Crowood,
1998), 101.
110 According to the British record of Ziegler's warning, "He wished to express
the concern he shared with the British Aircraft Corporation that the French Government
were contemplating ordering the Dassault Mirage 3F1 [later Mirage F 1].... The Mirage
3F1 would of course be competitive in exports markets with the Anglo-French Jaguar.
M. Ziegler suggested that in the common interest of maximizing Jaguar sales, it would be
entirely appropriate for the H.M.G. .[Her Majesty's Government - the British
Government] to attempt to influence the French Government against proceeding with the
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Mirage 3F1." PRO PREM 13/1308 P. Reilly, Anglo-French Aircraft Collaboration,
January 24, 1967.
"I According to BAC's publicity manager, Charles Gardner, "There were acute
problems on the sales side from the time Dassault took control of Breguet.... Quite often
the French were trying to sell the Dassault Fl fighter... against the Jaguar. To help them
in this they had, of course, all Jaguar performance and cost data, and were able highlight
any development problem of the day, while keeping silent on any hitches with the Mirage
Fl. The French were, by various stratagems, also able at one time, to keep the cost
quotation of possible export Jaguars high and to delay deliveries." Charles Gardner, 146.
112 Ibid., 147.
13 After the French Air Force expressed a need for a low-level reconnaissance
version of the Jaguar, the DGA encouraged it to instead develop a variant of the Mirage
Fl. When the French Air Force later proposed upgrading its Jaguars by equipping them
with more powerful Adour jet engines, jointly developed by Rolls Royce and Turbomeca,
and a French-designed inertial navigation system, the DGA likewise blocked the proposal
because it would increase the Jaguar's attractiveness to foreign clients and lead to a
portion of France's aircraft procurement funds budget being spent in the United
Kingdom. According to General Jean Fleury, the total cost of upgrading France's Jaguar
fleet would have been a comparatively modest 1 FF billion. The government would not
have opposed the Air Force's demand, but the DGA would have subsequently refused to
fund the upgrade. According to Fleury, France deliberately limited the capabilities of its
Jaguars, adopting a "poor man's navigation system" and electronics so rudimentary that
France initially refused to send Jaguars to the United States for "Red Flag" exercises "so
as not to appear ridiculous because of our under-equipped aircraft." See Jean Fleury,
Faire Face: Mimoires d'un chef d'itat majeur (Paris: Jean Picollec, 1997), 129-44.
"4 Dassault later refused to collaborate with BAC in offering a joint submission
for the so-called "sales of the century" wherein Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and
Norway intended to equip their air forces with a common aircraft. Since the Belgian and
Dutch requirements were primarily for a ground-attack aircraft, with a secondary
requirement for air superiority, BAC reasoned that the Jaguar and the Mirage F1 should
be offered as a package. Dassault refused to cooperate, offering an upgraded Mirage F1
to fill both roles. Ultimately, neither the two-aircraft solution nor Dassault's enhanced
Mirage Fl won the "sale of the century." The four states ordered a total of 348 American
F-16s in 1974. The United Kingdom began refitting its Jaguars with the Mk1O4 Adour,
which provided more power than the original Mk102 Adour, in 1978. Later, the even
better Mk8 11 Adour was developed for export Jaguars, which were sold to Oman and
Nigeria. Evans, 59-61.
"5 The one state that purchased both the Jaguar and the Mirage Fl was Ecuador,
indicating that it at least considered the two aircraft complementary. India and Oman
chose the Anglo-French Jaguar over French aircraft Oman chose the Jaguar in 1974,
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while the Indian decision came in 1978. Egypt originally expressed an interest in Jaguars
in 1972, however the United Kingdom was not willing to sell them at this point, when
they would have likely been employed in a future Arab-Israeli War. When Egypt's
relations with Israel improved later in the decade, the United Kingdom changed its
position on selling Egypt Jaguars. However, France now offered the Mirage 2000, which
Egypt purchased, albeit with Saudi financial assistance. Kuwait was unsatisfied with the
reliability of the English Electric Lightnings they had purchased in the 1960s and chose
the Mirage F1 as a consequence. PRO DEFE 11/653 1.S. McDonald, Director of Sales to
Hd/DS13, January 28 1974; PRO DEFE 11/653 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence
Policy Staff, British Military Assistance to Oman, February 15, 1974; Robert Gardner,
217; PRO CAB 148/121 Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, The Supply of Arms to
Egypt, September 13, 1972; and Evans, 101.
116 The Mitsubishi F-I's airframe and wing planform strongly resembled the
Jaguar's and was powered by the same Adour jet engines. Mark Lorell, Troubled
Partnership: A History of U.S. -Japan Collaboration on the FS-X Fighter (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, 1995), 61-62.
117 When Southern Saharan POLISARIO guerrillas attacked Mauritanian iron-ore
exports beginning in early 1977 and took expatriate French workers prisoner, France
responded by dispatching ten Jaguars to Dakar, Senegal. Late in the year, on 18
December 1977, the Jaguars surprised a POLISARIO column of 25 to 30 all-terrain
vehicles, armed with 12.7 mm machine guns and 20 mm cannons. Despite intense anti-
aircraft fire, the Jaguars obliterated three-quarters of the POLISARIO column, leading to
a temporary cessation of POLISARIO attacks and the rapid liberation of French hostages.
When POLISARIO sought to renew its offensive in May 1978, six French Jaguars
methodically destroyed the column with conventional bombs and cannon-fire in two
distinct series of low-level attacks. Although the subsequent overthrow of the
Mauritanian government by military officers brought French Air Force operations against
POLISARIO rebels to a halt, the Jaguar had already proven that it was remarkably well
designed for its intended role.
The Jaguar's next combat missions were flown over Chad in 1978, when the
aircraft helped detachments of Foreign Legionnaires and Marine infantry prevent larger
rebel forces from taking the capital of N'Djamena. Tactically, Jaguar raids overwhelmed
poorly equipped rebels, reportedly killing more than 200 in a single attack near Djadda.
Between 1983 and 1987, French Jaguars returned to Chad where they were regularly
employed against both Libyan backed insurgents and the Libyan armed forces.
Throughout these operations, the Jaguars confirmed their suitability for a wide-range of
attack missions. They successfully interdicted Libyan supply columns, attacked armored
columns and even struck the Libyan airbase at Ouadi-Doum on two occasions. SHAT 3
K 4 Entretien avec le G6ndral Guy Mdry, November 1996; and Mark Lorell, Airpower in
Peripheral Conflict: The French Experience in Africa (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 1989), 27-29.
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118 Jean-Pierre Otelli, Pilotes dans la tourmente: Secret difense (Levallois-Perret,
France: Altipresse, 2005), 38-39.
119 The Chief of Staff of the French Air Force, General Fleury, stated that, "The
speed was a bit feeble with respect to the enemy air defenses, but the aircraft could not do
better with the jet engines they had." Fleury, 290.
120 One Jaguar was hit by a SAM-7 man-portable surface-to-air missile, which
destroyed the right jet motor. One Jaguar had its hydraulically powered flight controls
cut by a 23mm cannon round. The pilot of a third Jaguar was hit in the head by a
Kalashnikov assault rifle bullet, but survived because the bullet glanced off his skull.
Fleury, 290-91.
121 Otelli, 42.
122
122 Two of the aircraft, 16.5 percent, were beyond repair and one pilot suffered a
bullet wound to the head and was hospitalized; 33 percent of the aircraft that participated
in the Al Jaber mission was damaged.
The overall commander of French Forces in Saudi Arabia, General Michel
Roquejoeffre, and the Chief of Staff of the French Armed Force (CEMA), General
Maurice Schmitt, both suggested ceasing French participation in the allied air offensive.
Instead, the French Air Force ordered its Jaguars to change tactics, delivering bombs
from comparatively safe altitudes above 5,000 m (15,000 ft), where man-portable
surface-to-air missiles and small-caliber anti-aircraft guns cannot reach. Suspending air
operations would have been politically delicate, so Fleurg and General Lartigau, the
commander of French tactical aviation, decided to raise the height of Jaguar missions to
5,000m. See Fleury, 290-93; and Etienne de Durand and Bastien Irondelle, Strategie
airienne comparie: France, Etats-Unis, Royaume-Uni (Paris: C2SD, 2006), 143.
m Normally, the aerodynamic requirements for low altitude penetration and
maneuvering in air combat are diametrically opposed. Low altitude penetration requires
wings to be swept as far back as possible (70 degrees) to maximize speed and minimize
an aircraft's response to gusts of wind. Contrarily, air combat requires moderate sweep
(45 degrees), which is needed for an aircraft to be able to turn rapidly at the low-
supersonic, high-subsonic speeds where most air combat occurs. Variable geometry
wings can, in theory, permit aircraft to obtain optimal performance in both domains by
modifying the sweep of their wings.
Barnes Wallis developed the concept of variable geometry wings while working
for Vickers, which became part of BAC. Thus, when the TSR.2 project was launched
BAC engineers considered equipping the TSR.2 with variable geometry wings, but the
company's management rejected the idea as adding the excessively complicated
engineering task to an already revolutionary aircraft.
The British shared variable geometry technology with the United States because
of bilateral accords for sharing certain defense-related technologies. John Stack, the head
of the Mutual Weapons Development Program, visited BAC's research center at
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Weybridge, while Wallis and a British team presented their findings to NASA. After the
Americans became interested in variable geometry wings and adopted them for the F-Ill
(TFX), the British RAF mimicked them. In the words of a 1976 RAF study, "Anyfuture
projects which are multi role in nature or where a reasonably wide range of performance
parameters are required, the best solution will be to adopt variable sweep [my italics]."
Charles Gardner, 209-11; Robert Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 20-23; PRO DSIR 23/41952 D.E. Shaw, Swing Wing
Performance (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft), June 30, 1976;. PRO AIR 20/10576 ASR 343
- Historic Diary.
124 Assuming that Soviet air defenses had improved in effectiveness in the
previous 11 years since the TSR.2 requirement, the RAF fixed a lower altitude for the
MRCA. The new requirement demanded the aircraft to be capable of approaching enemy
targets at 100 ft (30 m) rather than the 200 ft (61 m) mandated for TSR.2. The Tornado's
low-altitude requirement has not been published or declassified. However, numerous
first hand accounts by Tornado pilots and British commanders have cited the figure of
100 ft (30 m). Peter de la Billiere, Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf
War (London: HarperCollins, 1992) 213.
125 Between 1969 and 1973, the anticipated cost of developing the MRCA's
avionics rose by 70 percent, despite the fact that British companies were prime
contractors for six out of the ten avionics contracts. PRO CAB 148/130 Defence and
Oversea Policy Committee, The Multi-Role Combat Aircraft - Review of Progress,
March 1, 1973.
126 Italy's primary concerns with the MRCA were financial. While Italy intended
to purchase 11 percent of the MRCAs produced, it demanded 15 percent of the aircraft's
production work. Italy also required that the United Kingdom reimburse its expenditures
if the project collapsed in the first 12 months. The British government ultimately agreed
to the first but not the second of these demands. The Italians also, in collaboration with
the West Germans, pushed for the aircraft to be equipped with an American radar, which
would presumably be more economic than a British radar.
It was politically controversial for West Germany to build a long-range ground-
attack aircraft that could be construed as an offensive weapon, rather than the defensive
lightweight fighter originally planned by the F-104 replacement cartel. In a November
1970 meeting between the British Minister of Defense and West German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt, Schmidt warned the British that there was a significant "risk of political
controversy about the aircraft in Germany" because of the country's Second World War
legacy, which meant that "the term 'strike aircraft', for example, had only one [offensive]
connotation."
West German leaders pushed the United Kingdom to purchase an American-
designed radar to reduce development expenses. In the same November 1970 meeting,
Schmidt also warned that, "The technical risks [of the MRCA] should not be
underestimated." PRO PREM 15/1374 Record of Discussion Between Lord Carrington
and Herr Schmidt in London on Thursday, 19 th November, 1970, November 20, 1970;
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and PRO PREM 15/1374 Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister, The Multi-Role Combat
Aircraft, July 8, 1970.
127 The West German government was adamant that German firms develop the
center section of the MRCA's fuselage, which contained the aircraft's complex variable
geometry pivot. Calculating that variable geometry was a critical technology, the
Germans desperately wanted to develop the expertise needed for future variable geometry
programs. Unfortunately, West German companies had no experience whatsoever with
variable geometry, whereas BAC and, before it, Vickers had been developing the
technology since the mid-1940s. However, the logic of apportioning critical
development contracts to companies in the same proportion that their governments
contributed to the costs of the program-known as "fair return-led to the contract for
the center fuselage and the variable geometry wing pivot being awarded to
Messerschmidt-B6lkow-Blohm (MBB). The wing pivot took longer to develop and
ended up more expensive than originally anticipated. Lorell and Lowell, 14.
128Not surprisingly, MRCA costs exceeded expectations, ran behind schedule and
had trouble meeting its performance objectives. As early as July 1971, the MRCA
partners judged that aircraft's performance would be "somewhat lower than envisaged"
but "still acceptable to all three air forces." By May 1973, British records demonstrate
that the MRCA's development costs had already risen by 15 percent, while the aircraft's
projected entry into service was now two years later than originally anticipated. PRO
CAB 148/130 Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, The Multi-Role Combat Aircraft
- Review of Progress, March 1, 1973.
129 The defense budget crisis of the early 1980s was the product of a number of
factors. The Tornado project was over-budget and six years behind schedule, which
meant that its financial costs had to be paid during fiscal years different during from
those originally planned. Meanwhile, the government's project to modernize its
submarine launched Polaris missiles, entitled Chevaline, and consumed £l billion in
development funds during the 1970s. However, problems with the Chevaline's
development led to its cancellation and a British decision in 1980 to purchase American
Trident missiles at a projected cost of f5 billion. Meanwhile, the Navy's aircraft carrier
program was moving ahead, with Invincible in service, Illustrious virtually complete, and
Ark Royal under construction. Despite real increases in the defense spending of three
percent annually, the Ministry of Defense failed to keep within budget beginning in 1979.
Michael Dockrill, 106-121; and Warren Chin, British Weapons Acquisition Policy and
the Futility of Reform (Aldershot, the United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2004), 72-73.
1 One technical argument between the RAF and the Navy was whether the
RAF's intended Tornado ADVs could shoot down Soviet maritime reconnaissance
aircraft shadowing Navy ships in the North Sea and the so-called Greenland-Iceland-
United Kingdom Gap. The Navy argued that only its new aircraft carriers, equipped with
Sea Harriers, had the flexibility to carry out this mission, while the RAF argued that
Tornado ADVs could fulfill the same role better. Besides arguments over capabilities,
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the debates of 1979 to 1981 also involved questions of equity. The principal RAF
position was that Trident was a Navy weapon and that the £5 billion to pay for its
acquisition should come from other Navy programs. The Navy argued that Trident was a
national program to sustain the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent.
Therefore funds for its acquisition should have come equally from economy measures
imposed on all three services. Interview with Admiral Henry Leach.
131 Under Nott's guidance, the Ministry of Defense heavily cut the Royal Navy.
Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of
Staff (London: Brassey's 1992), 396.
132 Although some of the cuts to the Navy were reversed after the Falklands War,
the RAF had clearly won the 1981 battle.
133 One figure, cited by the British government in a recent parliamentary debate,
claimed that the Tornado's development cost to the United Kingdom was £7 billion.
However, it was not stated explicitly whether this figure was stated in E sterling from the
year development began (1969), deliveries began (1980) or the statement was made
(2007). Given inflation, it is difficult to judge how much the Tornado's actual
development budget exceeded its planned budget. House of Commons, Hansard Debates,
Dr. Fox, Column 1071, April 26, 2007.
134 The aircraft embodied all of the principal qualities the RAF had demanded 25
years earlier in a Canberra replacement; with its variable geometry wings and attached
high light devices, the Tornado could take off from shorter runways than any supersonic
combat aircraft in the same class, including the F- 111. The published figures for Tornado
and F- 111 take off distances are respectively 3,550 ft and 3,000 ft.
The Tornado's terrain-following avionics permitted the aircraft to approach
targets at lower altitudes and higher speeds than any comparable system, permitting
precision bombing attacks in all weather conditions. From the standpoint of operating
from short dispersed or damaged runways and penetrating enemy air defenses at high
speeds and low altitudes, the Tornado remained in a category of its own. The United
States' McDonnell Douglas F-15E was the first American aircraft with terrain following
avionics comparable to the Tornado's. However, the F-15E did not enter service until
1988, six years after the Tornado. The F-15E also remained confined to comparatively
long runways, rather than the short fields the Tornado could use.
135 The weapon was also one of the most expensive conventional munitions ever
developed. The JP233 cost more than £1 million/unit, compared to $1.2 million for the
American Tomahawk cruise missile. House of Commons, Hansard Debates, Henry
Cohen (Leyton), May 2, 1991.
136 House of Commons, Hansard Debates, Tom King (Minister of Defense),
Column 106, January 21, 1991.
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1 House of Commons, Commons Written Answers, Archie Hamilton, Column
166, March 20, 1991.
138 "The Gulf War Campaign Diary," Royal Air Force, www.raf.mod.uk/gulf (last
consulted August 1, 2007).
139 Actual speeds for both the Tornado and Jaguar frequently fall short of
specified speeds. In this case, the actual speed of a Tornado conducting its attack mission
is drawn from the memoirs of flight lieutenants John Peters and John Nichol, who were
shot down over Iraq on 17 January 1991. John Peters and John Nichol, Tornado Down
(London: Penguin, 1998), xvii-xviii.
140 Six Tornados were shot down between 16 and 22 January 1991.
141 The JP233 bomblets produced small "scabs" in Iraqi runways rather than large
fissures. One analyst estimated that Iraqis repaired their runways within four and six
hours. General Peter de de la Billiere cites a slightly longers 48 hours. Historically,
damaged runways have been repaired comparatively rapidly. For example, during the
1973 Arab-Israeli War, Arab repair teams restored damaged runways after an average of
nine to twelve hours. Faced with the mounting evidence that Tornado anti-runway
attacks were not immobilizing Iraqi air operations, the British Ministry of Defense
prevaricated, stating that "RAF Tornado GRIs... were used to disrupt and harass Iraqi air
operations rather than to close Iraqi airfields. House of Commons, Commons Written
Answers, Archie Hamilton, Column 50, April 25, 1991; Christopher Centner, "Ignorance
is Risk: The Big Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks," Airpower Journal (Winter
1992), www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles (last consulted August 1, 2007); and
de la Billiere, 208-230.
142 By the time tactics were changed, the Tornado force had flown 148 sorties,
with an attrition rage of four percent. "The Gulf War Campaign Diary," Royal Air Force,
www.raf.mod.uk/gulf (last consulted August 1, 2007).
The attrition rate per JP233 sortie was two only percent, since each Tornado
carried two JP233s. Taylor implies that Tornados carried two JP233s apiece during the
Gulf War. Bill Taylor, Royal Air Force Germany Since 1945 (Hinckley, the United
Kingdom: Midland, 2003), 162-64.
While the Tornado's overall attrition rate of four percent per sortie was higher
than the attrition rates suffered by other coalition aircraft, it was not excessive by historic
standards. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Israeli attrition rates varied between two
and four percent, the United States suffered an attrition rate of two percent during its
attacks on North Vietnamese targets in the Red River Delta in 1967 and again during
Operation Linebacker in December 1972, and the Argentines suffered 10 percent attrition
during the 1982 Falklands War. Targets in the Red River Delta were the most heavily
defended in North Vietnam. Wayne Thompson, To Hanoi and Back: The United States
Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966-1973 (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific,
2000), 143, 305-12.
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143 According to RAF Air Marshal Patrick Hine, then commander of NATO's 2nd
Allied Tactical Air Force, "We... need to attack the enemy's main offensive air fields.
Unless we were effective in greatly reducing the number of offensive sorties the enemy
can launch, we would find it increasingly difficult to keep the enemy air force off our
own back and provide direct support for the land battle." Imperial War Museum Oral
History Archive, 16197, Field Marshal Nigel Bagnall and Air Marshal Patrick Hine,
"Concepts of Land-Air Operations in the Central Region: A British Perspective," May
23, 1984.
144 Each of these large Iraqi airbases (some covering 5,000 acres) was ringed by
significant air defenses. Centner.
45 One intelligence report listed 65 permanent airfields and 112 dispersal fields.
This 1969 intelligence report was completed the same year that the MRCA Memorandum
of Understanding was signed. According to British intelligence, "The normal
deployment appears to be 6 guns per TAF [Tactical Air Force] airfield.... All Soviet
TAF airfields in E. Germany and Poland have an associated SA 3 (surface-to-air missile)
site, usually sited on the high ground to the West of the airfield." PRO DSIR 23/28528
Squadron Leader I.A.N. Worby, The Main Options Open to the Warsaw Pact Air Forces
in Conventional Operations in Central Europe in 1970, July 23, 1969.
146 Because of its sophistication, the Tornado was expensive to design and
produce, significantly more so than many contemporary combat aircraft, such as the F-
16C, Mirage 2000, and F/A-18C. The Tornado was estimated to cost £25 million ($38
million) in 1993, the F-16C $18 million, the Mirage 2000 $27 million, and the F/A-18C
$18 million. House of Commons, Hansard Debates, Mr. Aitken, June 17, 1993; and
Yolande Simon, Prospects for the French Fighter Industry in a Post-Cold War
Environment: Is the Future More than a Mirage? (Santa Monica: RAND Dissertation,
1993), 63.
47 Because of the complex engineering involved in permitting an aircraft's wing
to pivot, variable geometry aircraft were maintenance intensive. In the United States, the
variable geometry F-Ill and F-14 was amongst the least mechanically reliable American
aircraft, being unavailable for combat missions 46.7 percent of the time. Costs were
estimated to be £10.4 million/year for the Tornado and £5.5 million for the Jaguar, while
it cost the RAF 37 percent more per year to operate a Tornado squadron than a Jaguar
squadron. House of Commons, Commons Written Answers, October 12, 2004; House of
Commons, Commons Written Answers, January 20, 1993; and Joshua Epstein,
Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe (Princeton: Princeton
University, 1984), 28.
148The Saudi decision to purchase the Tornado is revelatory of the difficulty of
selling an aircraft of its type. Because Saudi Arabia is one of the few states with the raw
financial resources to purchase an aircraft of the Tornado's class, British Aerospace
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(which BAC became after its merger with Hawker-Siddeley), and Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher both viewed the sale of Tornados to Saudi Arabia as a strategic
priority. Both industry and the British government attempted to see the Tornado to the
Saudis beginning in early 1984.
When the Saudi government appeared to favor purchasing cheaper French Mirage
2000s the following autumn, the highest levels of British government intervened.
Defense Minister Michael Heseltine rushed to Saudi Arabia to urge the Saudi government
against buying a French aircraft. Prime Minister Thatcher herself began negotiating with
Prince Bandar, son of Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan. Thatcher later visited Saudi
Arabia's King Fouad to push the Tornado deal.
By mistake, the United Kingdom's National Archives released documents relating
to the 1985 Al Yamamah arms deal under a freedom of information act. Although the
National Archives later withdrew the documents, a non-profit organization had copied
them by that time. The Guardian newspaper has published the documents on line, as a
complement to an article published by the paper. R.C. Mottram, Briefingfor the Prime
Minister's Meeting with Prince Sultan, September 25, 1985, image.guardian.co.uk/sys-
files/Politics/2006/10/25/PJ5 39BriefforThatcherSept85.pdf (last consulted August 2,
2007).
The British sales effort overwhelmed the French, where not a single cabinet
member visited Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Dassault sales effort. According to
General Pierrick Boquet, a member of the French military mission in Saudi Arabia,
"Thatcher couldn't travel anywhere in the world without stopping in Riyadh to say hello
to King Fouad and explain to him that the British aircraft were the best and she
eventually succeeded in selling him her aircraft." SHAT 3 K 81 Entretien avec Gindral
Pierrick Boquet.
149 British Aerospace was required to provide language training to Saudi officers,
who then received their flight training in the United Kingdom. To cap the deal, British
Aerospace agreed to accept payment for the Tornado sale in the form of crude oil. The
Saudis were particularly nervous about the supply of spare parts for the Tornado. The
issue was one of the first raised by Prince Sultan in his meeting with Minister of Defense
Heseltine prior to the signing of the contract for the sale. It is unclear what form British
guarantees took. R.C. Mottman, Note for the Record of a Meeting with his Royal
Highness Prince Sultan Bin Abdulaziz al Saud at 1130 on Thursday 26 September,
September 26, 1985, image.guardian.co.uk/sys-
files/Politics/2006/10/25/JJ5 39HeseltinemeetsSultanSep 1 985.pdf (last consulted August
2, 2007).
150 "Une erreur 'yamamesque'," October 28, 2006, www.defensa.org (last
consulted August 3, 2007).
151 In her memoirs, Thatcher recalls attempting to sell Tornados and tanks to
Saudi Arabia, Hawk Trainer aircraft to the UAE and Tornados to Oman in a 1981
diplomatic tour of the Persian Gulf. By her own admission, Thatcher capitalized on the
United Kingdom's historic presence in the Middle East, its maintenance of a patrol of
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three frigates in the region beginning in 1980 and her personal diplomacy as the United
Kingdom's Prime Minister to sell arms to states in the Persian Gulf. According to
Thatcher, "Our old defence links reinforced our commercial interest. Some British
aeroplanes and tanks were eminently suitable for this area.... The pattern of the visit [to
Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE], combining diplomacy, commerce and private
discussion would be repeated on many occasions in the years ahead." Margaret Thatcher,
The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 163-64. Thatcher and British
Aerospace drew on the United Kingdom's privileged relations with Oman, which had
already purchased Jaguars, to convince the Sultanate to order Tornados. Swayed by
British pressure, the Sultan Qaboos of Oman announced his intention to purchase
Tornados in 1985, however the expense of the aircraft and a drop in oil prices led him
cancel his order in 1989. The Oman sale was considered final enough that British
Aerospace included it in a 1985 promotional brochure for the aircraft. The brochure
highlighted the Tornado's performance at the United States Strategic Air Command's
Bombing and Navigation Competition. While courting Oman, Thatcher also attempted to
sell eight Tornados to Jordan, where she repeatedly raised the issue with King Hussein.
House of Commons, Commons Written Answers, Margaret Thatcher, Column 691,
March 23, 1989. See British Aerospace, Tornado Wins Again (promotional brochure),
1985, www.tomado-data.com/History/Pressreleases/tornado wins again.htm (last
consulted August 3, 2007); House of Commons, Commons Written Answers, Mr.
Sainsbury, Column 586, June 30, 1989.
152 The British government sent four Tornado ADVs on a 66-day world tour to
demonstrate its capabilities. The March 1990 dispatch of Tornados to Malaysia was for
the ostensible purpose of participating in joint exercises with the air forces of Malaysia,
Singapore, New Zealand and Australia. However, marketing the Tornado to these states
was the principal reason for the deployment. House of Commons, Commons Written
Answers, Archie Hamilton, Column 254, June 27, 1990. Jon Lake and Mike Crutch,
Tornado Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (Hickley, the United Kingdom: Midland, 2000), 77;
and British Aerospace and Rolls Royce, Tornado ADV, Exercise Golden Eagle: World
Tour 1988, 1988 www.tornado-
data.com/History/Pressreleases/operation golden eagle.htm (last consulted August 3,
2007).
153 It was calculated that a missile-armed variable geometry BVR fighter plane, at
low sweep angles (25 degrees), would have the fundamental advantage over conventional
aircraft of being able to maintain longer combat air patrols. At maximum sweep angles
(68 degrees), the aircraft would achieve bi-sonic speeds to either intercept or escape an
enemy aircraft. Meanwhile, intermediary sweep angles would permit the aircraft to
maneuver efficiently at various speeds. In a dogfight, it was anticipated that the
flexibility provided by variable geometry wings would give the Tornado ADV an edge
over enemy fighters because the Tornado could change its wing configuration to exploit
an adversary's performance deficiencies. Many of the RAF's beliefs about the utility of
variable geometry wings for a dedicated fighter followed superpower thinking along
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similar lines, with both the United States and Soviet Union working on variable wing
fighters.
According to a 1976 document, "Many design teams concluded that if the size
and weight [of a multi-role aircraft] were going to be kept reasonably low then the
optimum solution was a configuration with a swing [variable geometry] wing. From the
growing number of in-service swing wing projects it appears that a growing number of
customers also regard the swing wing as the best solution [the documents lists fighters
such as the F-14 and MiG-23, and bombers such as the Su-17, F-Ill and Tu-22M]."
PRO DSIR 23/41952 D.E. Shaw, Swing Wing Performance (Multi-Role Combat
Aircraft), June 30, 1976.
1 Because the complex mechanisms, pivots, the wing box and servo motors used
to join a variable geometry wing to an aircraft's fuselage, the planes are vulnerable to
forces imposed by tight high-speed turns. Pilots of variable geometry aircraft are
frequently obliged to avoid even some turns that the wing planform would otherwise
permit. The wing pivots and the servo-motors required to move a wing added
significantly to the weight of variable geometry aircraft, giving them a lower thrust-to-
weight ratio than conventional fighters of a similar size. Because the thrust-to-weight
ratio of an aircraft is critical to its ability to maneuver vertically, the comparative
disadvantage variable geometry aircraft suffer in this aspect negatively effects their
ability to engage in air-to-air combat. While a low thrust-to-weight ratio hinders vertical
maneuvers, the aircraft's wing planform handicaps the Tornado ADV's ability to
maneuver horizontally. In common with all variable geometry aircraft, the Tornado
ADV's wings are comparatively narrow. When coupled with the aircraft's heavy weight,
narrow wings generate a high level of wing loading (the surface area of the wing divided
by the mass of the aircraft). This, in turn, prevents variable geometry aircraft from
turning as tightly as aircraft with conventional wings. The United States F-14 partially
compensates for this by the design of the aircraft's fuselage. Because the F-14's
comparatively broad fuselage assists the wing in providing lift for the aircraft, the
aircraft's functional wing loading is 44 percent lower (54 lbs/ft2 rather than 97 lbs/ft2)
than the standard wing loading equation would yield. The Tornado's narrower fuselage
did not provide a similar advantage in turn capability. See Robert Shaw, Fighter
Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 139-42; Ray
Whitford, Fundamentals of Fighter Design (Ramsbury, Marlborough: Crowood, 2000),
18, 33, 92.
155 The poor reliability of radar guided missiles, the lack of BVR engagements
and the prevalence of dog fighting led the United States Air Force to emphasize
maneuverability in its requirements for the F-15 and F-16 fighters. It had a kill rate of
8.9 percent. During Operation Rolling Thunder (1965-1968), only 8.9 percent of the
radar guided Sparrow missiles fired hit their targets. None of these engagements were
BVR. Because of the large number of "friendly" aircraft in the skies and deficiencies in
identification friend/foe (IFF) technologies, the United States Air Force required its pilots
to visually identify opposing aircraft before firing on them. Finally, in dogfights
expensive and sophisticated F-4 Phantom Ils had trouble in dogfights with MiG-2 Is and,
504
even, MiG-17s. See James Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the
F-18 Hornet (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993).
156 Shortly thereafter, an RAF study on the characteristics most important for a
future fighter emphasized that, "The aerodynamic performance of the aircraft will be the
key to its performance as an air combat fighter.... It seems most likely that a
combination of high thrust to weight and low wing loading will provide the most
economical method of achieving the desired performance." PRO DEFE 72/52 D.J.
Harper, EPG Ad Hoc Group on Tactical Combat Aircraft, June 26, 1976.
Although the air staff target was not ostensibly related to the Tornado ADV, the
RAF was actively hoping to replace the ADV with an American aircraft, such as the F-
16. By emphasizing performance characteristics similar to the F-15 and F-16, but quite
removed from the ADV, the RAF hoped to further its case for one of the American
aircraft. PRO DEFE 72/52 Air Staff Target No. 403 For an Offensive Support Aircraft to
Replace Harrier and Jaguar, April 29, 1976
m Field Marshal Michael Carver, who served as the United Kingdom's Chief of
Defense Staff between 1973 and 1976, recalls, "There were... grave doubts about the air
force's commitment to the air defence version of the Tornado, in which very large sums
were involved over a long period. This fighter version of the MRCA was required only
for the RAF... it was intended to replace the ageing and unsuitable Lightnings as well as
the American-made Phantoms. The problem was that its performance was little better
than that of the Phantom.... My deputy who dealt with these matters, Air Marshal
Michael Giddings, a man of rigid, puritanical devotion to his profession, was a convinced
opponent and a firm supporter of choosing an American aircraft." Michael Carver, Out of
Step: The Memoirs of Field Marshal Michael Carver (London: Hutchinson, 1989), 472.
158 At a meeting of the Ministry of Defense's Equipment Policy Committee, the
RAF's chief technical officer, Air Chief Marshal Douglas Lowe, argued the F-16's
merits. According to Lowe, the fact that four European states (Belgium, the Netherlands,
Norway and Denmark) had already ordered the F- 16 meant that importing the American
aircraft "was in a sense the most European solution of all." Lowe also argued "that the
F16 was reputedly half the MRCA [Tornado] cost" and was available so that "we could
pick it up anytime in the next 4/5 years." In a final oblique blow to the Tornado ADV,
Lowe stated that the program had been launched without sufficient knowledge of what
direction the Americans were going to take in the development of their own fighter
aircraft. PRO DEFE 72/52 Ministry of Defence, Defence Equipment Policy Committee,
Minutes of a Meeting Held Wednesday, 9 June 1976 at 2.30 pm, June 9, 1976.
159 According to Carver, "Extracting a coherent policy on air defence from the air
staff [RAF] proved a tough, prolonged and frustrating process." Carver, Out of Step: The
Memoirs of Field Marshal Lord Carver.
160 The Ministry of Industry responded to Lowe's desire to purchase F-16s by
stating that, "an ultimate decision to buy F16 would be very difficult industrially." The
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Foreign Office likewise preferred European collaboration to the purchase of a foreign
aircraft and feared the consequences should the United Kingdom abandon a program it
had invested so much diplomatic capital in launching. PRO DEFE 72/52 Ministry of
Defence, Defence Equipment Policy Committee, Minutes of a Meeting Held Wednesday,
9 June 1976 at 2.30 pm, June 9, 1976.
161 Carver, 473.
162 For the Fox Hunter radar, which was being designed for the Tornado ADV, it
was decided to develop a pulse doppler system operating at extremely high pulse
repetition frequencies (PRF). Although better than earlier monopulse radars, the Fox
Hunter's high PRF and low data processing capabilities were not ideal for medium range
BVR combat and lagged technologically behind the radar being developed in the United
States for the F-15.
To accompany the Fox Hunter radar, the United Kingdom began developing the
Skyflash missile in 1969. Because the Tornado ADV was originally supposed to enter
service in 1981, the RAF decided not to equip the aircraft with an active (fire and forget)
radar-guided missile, such as the United States' AIM-120 AMRAAM. The AIM-120 or
an equivalent British active radar guided missile would only be available years after the
Tornado ADV was slated to enter service. The RAF decided to develop the Skyflash as a
variant of th4e semi-automatic radar-guided United States AIM-7 Sparrow missile. Only
later did the RAF plan to acquire an active radar-guided variant of the Skyflash,
provisionally referred to as Skyflash 2.
A semi-active radar-guided missile (sometimes referred to as semi-active radar
homing or SAHR) involves the attacking aircraft's radar illuminating the target
throughout the engagement and the missile homing in on the reflected radar energy. For
this reason, the attacking aircraft must remain pointed in the general direction of the
target throughout the engagement and the target is likely to learn that it is under attack
when it detects the attacking aircraft's radar. Active radar guided missiles are launched
in the general direction of an enemy aircraft that has been detected. They fly unguided,
directed by an inertial navigation system, until they are within range of the missile's own
radar. Then the missile will "go active" and maneuver to hit the enemy aircraft.
Although the attacking aircraft only has to detect the enemy target briefly in order use an
active radar-guided missile, the probability of hitting the target increases if the attacking
aircraft occasionally paints the target with brief sweeps of radar. Whitford, 123.
163 The RAF decided to develop the Skyflash as a variant of the semi-automatic
radar-guided United States AIM-7 Sparrow missile. Only later did the RAF plan to
acquire an active radar-guided variant of the Skyflash, provisionally referred to as
Skyflash 2. The Skyflash missile rose by 37 percent to develop (£173 million versus
£126 million) and was ready to enter service two years later than expected. The Skyflash
was largely developed for the Tornado ADV, however its development costs were not
included in the ADV's overall costs because Skyflash could also be used by the United
Kingdom's F-4 Phantom Is. Originally, Skyflash was intended to enter operational
service with the F-4s in 1977 and then serve with Tornado ADVs once the latter entered
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service in 1981. Ultimately, Skyflash were not introduced until 1979, but the Tornado
ADV (F3) was not in service until 1987.
Early into the design process, it proved necessary to add four feet to the airframe
forward of the wing box, to provide enough space to attach the aircraft's four radar-
guided air-to-air missiles, a modification that increased the cost of the ADV by over 50
percent. The cost of the ADV was an anticipated f£100 million by 1973. Ultimately,
only 80 percent of the airframe remained identical between the Tornado and the Tornado
ADV. Because of costs and delays of developing Skyflash, its active radar-guided
successor (Skyflash 2) was cancelled at this stage. Even though the Tornado ADV
airframe and Skyflash missile were both more expensive than anticipated, the Fox Hunter
radar proved the most troublesome aspect of the Tornado ADV. PRO PREM 15/1374
Burke Trend (Cabinet Secretary) to Prime Minister, The Multi-Role Combat Aircraft
(MRCA), March 6, 1973; PRO CAB 148/130 Defence and Oversea Policy Committee,
The Multi-Role Combat Aircraft - Review of Progress, March 1, 1973; PRO PREM
15/1374 Burke Trend (Cabinet Secretary) to Prime Minister, The Multi-Role Combat
Aircraft (MRCA), March 6, 1973; Chin, 220; Lake and Crutch, 44.
164 Lake and Crutch, 44.
165 The "Blue Circle" designation was initially applied to the original ADVs
supplied with ballast in place of the radar. The RAF seems to have continued referring to
the inadequate radars that began to equip ADVs in 1985 by the same mocking term.
Lake and Crutch, 43; and House of Commons, Hansard Debates, Public Accounts
Committee, John Wilkinson, October 17, 1991.
166 House of Commons, Hansard Debates, Public Accounts Committee, John
Wilkinson, October 17, 1991.
167 The Tornado F2s were used as conversion aircraft to train pilots before the
combat ready Tornado F3s were received. However, the F2s were considered so
inadequate that it was decided to stockpile them rather than attempt to upgrade them to
F3 standard. Lake and Crutch, 43-44.
168 Because of ongoing problems with the radar, the annual cost of sustaining a
Tornado ADV squadron was one-third more than a ground-attack Tornado squadron, and
nearly two times as much as a Jaguar squadron. These are figures from 1993, which list
the running costs of a Tornado F3 squadron as £35.6 million, compared to £26.7 million
for a Tornado GR. 1 (ground attack) squadron, f 19.7 million for a Buccaneer squadron
and £19.4 million for a Jaguar squadron. House of Commons, Commons Written
Answers, Column 306, January 20, 1993.
169The comparative costs of combat aircraft are always difficult to determine with
exactitude. A 1992 German study on the costs of combat aircraft listed the cost of the
Tornado ADV as DM 122 million, versus DM 123 million for the F-15F. Chin, 171.
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170 A manual on designing fighter aircraft written by Ray Whitford, Senior
Lecturer at the British Royal Military College of Science, lists the Tornado F3 as
possessing the worst combination of thrust-to-weight ratio and wing loading of any
fighter aircraft. According to ADV weapons system officer John Nichol, "Most fighters
are... very agile aircraft-the American F-15s and F-16s and the Russian MiG-29
Fulcrums are incredibly agile-but the Tornado is not.... The Tornado is incredibly fast
at low level, but it is not a good aircraft in which to be dogfighting or 'turning and
burning' against other fighters. Take it above 5,000 feet and it is at a disadvantage
because it is based on a low-level bomber." Whitford, 201; and John Peters and John
Nichol, Team Tornado: Life on a Front-Line Squadron (London: Signet, 1994), 191.
171 Tactics include using the aircraft's Skyflash missiles at maximum range,
before an enemy fighter can fire its own missiles, and when an enemy's targeting radar
illuminates the Tornado F3 before the latter can fire its missiles, turning and accelerating
away as quickly as possible in the hope of escaping beyond the range of enemy radar or
missiles. This phenomenon was described by Nichol: "The instant we get a firing
solution [from the radar], we start to launch missiles, even knowing that if he turns away
from us the missile will be wasted.... If we are locked-on by a radar before we have our
missiles in the air, we have to turn away to defeat a possible missile shot, holding that
course for about ten seconds and then turning back in. As we press back in, we are
looking for our RHWR - our radar warning - to be clean.... There is absolutely no point
in pressing on into a fight... if he is firing missiles and we have none in the air, because
we are going to die before we even clap eyes on him.... Even if there is an enemy
missile in the air, if we have launched our own ten seconds earlier it would defeat his
missile shot, because if his aircraft disintegrates, his radar is no longer locked-on to us."
The Tornado F3s best hope of survival in air-to-air combat is to remain at long range,
beginning attack passes from fifteen to twenty miles away, launching missiles once in
range, and running away once missiles have hit a target or if the enemy aircraft's
targeting radar illuminates the Tornado before its missiles have been fired. Tornado F3
crews refer to these rather tactics for exchanging missile shots as the "rolling fight."
Ibid., 192.
m The Fox Hunter radar/Skyflash missile combination does not permit the
Tornado F3 to engage enemy aircraft from appreciably longer ranges than the F-4
Phantom II / Sparrow combination that it eventually replaced. A crucial variable that is
unknown is the relative kill-probability of the different missile systems. During the
Vietnam War, the Sparrow (AIM-7D and E) achieved a kill rate of 8.9 percent. By the
1991 Gulf War, the improved AIM-7M Sparrow accounted for 72 percent of Iraqi aircraft
downed, with 71 missiles having been fired. As the Skyflash has never been fired in
anger, no comparative data exists for its kill probability. Whitcomb, 198; and Carver,
472.
173 This included including the American AIM-120 AMRAAM and the Soviet
R-77 "Amraamski" and R-37.
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174 In exceptional circumstances, the Tornado F3 can engage two targets at once,
but they must remain comparatively close together throughout the flight time of the
missiles, so that the Fox Hunter can continuously illuminate both of them. Lake and
Crutch, 41.
175 Tornado pilot John Peters described the situation: "AMRAAMs... are awful
news for us, because they are 'fire and forget' missiles. With an AMRAAM we may
only get a momentary warning, a brief blip on the screen when the enemy aircraft
acquires us. The blip will disappear from the screen again, and we may think that we are
safe. The first warning that the missile is in the air might be when it blows us to pieces."
Nichol and Peters, Team Tornado: Life on a Front-Line Squadron, 175-76.
176 According to Tornado pilot John Peters' experience, "it takes two Tornados to
fight one F-15" despite the fact that the Tornado F3 costs as much as an F-15C and was
introduced ten years after the American fighter. Nichol described Tornado F3 tactics for
engaging F-15s in the book he jointly wrote with Peters. According to Nichol, "Our
tactics consisted of trying to confuse the Americans' radar picture so that they could not
'sort' us or decipher the way we were flying. It involved quite a bit of planning by the air
defence leader, because in confusing the Americans' radar picture, we were also doing a
pretty good job of confusing our own. We were running in, turning back, descending,
running back in, going up - getting all sixteen aircraft going forward and turning back....
We were hoping to get a few aircraft a bit further forward each time, until we were close
enough to use our own missiles." Ibid., 194, 220.
177 Publicly, the RAF claimed that the aircraft were confined to Saudi Arabia
because their identification friend/foe systems were not compatible with the United States
Air Force's systems. At typical combat speeds, without afterburners lit, two fighters
approaching each other at 480 knots (890 km/h) take approximately 30 seconds to cover
18 km (11 miles). Under these circumstances, a pilot may have as little as two seconds
between the time that time he can visually confirm that the opposing aircraft is an enemy
and the time when the aircraft have passed. In general, this is too little time for a missile
to arm and be fired. Under these circumstances, a dogfight is almost inevitable, because
both aircraft will have to turn and maneuver to get on one another's tail, in order to fire
short-range infrared guided missile. Thus, if BVR kills are prohibited, there is a high
likelihood that an air-to-air engagement will end in a dogfight. Lake and Crutch, 88.
178 In both of these cases, the presence of enemy fighter aircraft and the necessity
to confirm the identity of an aircraft before firing on it may have led to this otherwise
non-deployment of Tornado F3s. Coalition aircraft achieved BVR kills during the
Kosovo campaign. At the very least, the victory of the Dutch F-16 over the Serbian
MiG-29 on the opening night of the war was achieved with an AMRAAM fired without a
visual contact. Ibid., 137-38.
179 Serbia possessed fighter aircraft, including 24 MiG-29s. Peters admitted with
respect to the MiG-29 that "we [Tornado pilots] were scared stiff of them." However,
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Serbia was not officially a party to the Bosnia War and its fighters did not intervene over
Bosnia. Lake and Church, 116-17; and Nichol and Peters, Team Tornado: Life on a
Front-Line Squadron, 212-13.
180 Compared to most other fighter aircraft in production, including the American
F-16 and F-18 and the Mirage 2000, the Tornado ADV was significantly more expensive,
less capable in a dogfight and had no secondary ground-attack capability. And the one
fighter in the same price range as the Tornado ADV, the American F-15, was more
capable in every form of air combat. Initially British Aerospace attempted to compensate
for the limitations of the aircraft through shrewd marketing. In fact, Tornado ADV
marketing began long before the aircraft entered service, with a 1978 approach to Canada
in which British Aerospace offered substantial industrial participation in the ADV. Even
compared to other British combat aircraft, 14 percent exports was a historic low for the
period stretching from 1960 to 2000. Lake and Crutch, 77.
181 When the Eurofighter program suffered from repeated delays, the United
Kingdom leased 24 Tornado F3s to Italy to replace the latter country's F-104 Starfighters,
which had exceeded their useful service lives. The contract signed between the United
Kingdom and Italy in 1994 was for a five-year no-cost lease. The Tornados provided
were aircraft withdrawn from British service as part of the RAF's post-Cold War
cutbacks. The Italians paid to have them brought up to the latest British standard and
purchased 96 Skyflash missiles to accompany them. Although the United Kingdom was
willing to renew the Tornado F3 lease when the Eurofighter suffered from further delays,
the Italian Air Force instead accepted a similar offer for American F-16s. Like their
British counterparts, Italian Tornado F3s were not used in Serbian airspace during the
Kosovo conflict. Ibid., 55-56.
182 In a sense, the RAF fell victim to its willingness to gamble on an unproven
technology. Although the Americans and Soviets were both developing variable
geometry fighters at the time the RAF launched the ADV program in 1971, no variable
geometry fighter was yet in service and the RAF did not appreciate its limitations. Only
three variable geometry fighter aircraft have ever been built. Of these, the MiG-23 was
the first to enter service. Series production of the first combat capable model of the MiG-
23, the MiG-23M, began in 1972. However, air combat evaluations carried out with the
pre-operational MiG-23S in 1970 revealed the aircraft's lack of maneuverability. In
simulated air combat, the earlier MiG-21 and the small and economic American F-5
outmaneuvered the MiG-23. Eventually, specialized tactics were developed for the MiG-
23. In a somewhat similar fashion to the Tornado ADV, the MiG-23 is limited to a single
tactic for most air combat situations. The basic tactic of the MiG-23 is to dive towards
opponents from high altitudes and fire its semi-active radar guided missile. If the missile
misses or other enemy aircraft are in the sky, the MiG-23 must continue accelerating as
rapidly as possible in the hope of escaping at low altitude. Like the ADV, the MiG-23
cannot turn. Although the MiG-23's shortcomings were gradually understood by the
Soviets from 1970 onwards, the RAF was understandably not informed. Unlike the MiG-
23 or Tornado ADV, the United States Navy's F-14 is a dogfighter and uses the
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configuration of its fuselage to provide the lift and horizontal turning capability lacking
in the other two aircraft. However, the F-14 has a low-thrust to weight ratio. See Gordon
and Dexter, 19-7 1.
183 Lake and Crutch, 58.
184 France's postwar aircraft industry either built British aircraft under license or
equipped new French designs with British jet engines; the Vampire and Ouragan and
Mystere IV, respectively. Switzerland and the United States manufactured British
military aircraft under license, while a host of European, Middle Eastern, South
American and Asian states vied to purchase British warplanes. Even the United
Kingdom's Cold War opponent, the Soviet Union, reverse engineered the Rolls-Royce
Nene motor when it needed a jet engine powerful enough to propel the new MiG-15
fighter.
185 Bill Gunston, L'aviation militaire d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Elsevier, 1979), 78-79.
186 Also contributing to its decline was a failure of dedicated civil aviation
programs and competition from American producers.
187 This list includes aircraft that entered service after 1960 and before the end of
the Cold War (1989). As such, it does not include the Hawker Hunter, whose production
largely occurred during the 1950s, although the assembly line remained open until 1966.
Neither does it include the EDF 2000 Eurofighter, which was developed from the 1970s
onwards, but did not enter operational service until after 2000. For collaborative
programs, such as the Jaguar and ground-attack Tornado, all export sales are credited to
the United Kingdom, which negotiated the sales, even though only half the Jaguar's
content, and a little less of the Tornado's, was produced in the United Kingdom. Jaguar
exports are not included in the French totals, either for exports or total production. In
terms of total production, the numbers cited for collaborative programs are RAF acquired
aircraft plus export orders. However, it must be kept in mind that the United Kingdom
did not independently manufacture 402 Tornados for RAF service, but 42.5 percent of the
components incorporated in the 900 ground-attack Tornados acquired by Italy, West
Germany and the United Kingdom. Likewise, the United Kingdom did not produce 200
Jaguars, but 50 percent of the content of the 400 Jaguars acquired by France and the
United Kingdom. Naval aircraft are not included in this list, but would not change it
appreciably, as production runs were shorter and export clients less numerous (one for
both France and the United Kingdom). The Harrier II, which was essentially an
American program, which the United Kingdom only joined as a partner at a
comparatively late stage, is also not included. The eight states that purchased British
combat aircraft during this period were-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Ecuador, Nigeria,
the United States, Spain and India. Three of the eight states that purchased British
aircraft during this period-Kuwait, Ecuador and Spain-also acquired French aircraft.
Tornado F1 production figures are from: Alexandre Vautravers, ''Manouvres
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internationales: un arriere gouft de guerre froide," Revue Militaire Suisse (July 2007)
www.revuemilitairesuisse.ch/node/255 (last consulted August 3, 2007).
188 Bereft of export orders on the same scale as those enjoyed by France, the
United Kingdom's aircraft industry produced only half as many combat aircraft as its
French equivalent. Roughly speaking, the British and French aircraft industries produced
equivalent numbers of aircraft for their national air forces. French industry produced the
2,841 aircraft listed in the table, plus the 200 Jaguars not included, for reasons discussed
in the previous footnote. Subtracting the export orders (1,717) from this total, one arrives
at a figure of the French producing 1,314 aircraft for national use. For the United
Kingdom, subtracting exports from total production yields a figure of 1,175 aircraft
delivered to the RAF by industry.
189 The English Electric Lightning's staggered turbojet engines gave the aircraft a
phenomenal climb rate, not exceeded by other production aircraft until the late 1970s. In
the Harrier, the United Kingdom introduced the world's first production vertical take-off
aircraft, which remained the best in its category for nearly two decades. Finally, the
Tornado featured groundbreaking terrain-following avionics and a complex variable
geometry wing.
190 Although it could climb faster and was equipped with a better radar and
missile system, the English Electric lightning was twice as heavy as the Mirage IIIC and
correspondingly more expensive. The Lightning was difficult to maintain and could not
used in the ground attack role. The Hawker-Siddeley Harrier was novel in its
introduction of VTOL technology, but the aircraft was complex; in United States Marine
Corps service, it suffered from an accident rate twice as high as any contemporary
American combat aircraft. In a conventional role, the Harrier's performance was limited
by the aircraft's subsonic speed, mediocre endurance and lack of radar. In peacetime
service, the Harrier's loss rate averaged 25 aircraft per 90,000 flight hours and 50 aircraft
per 213,000 flight hours. This compares unfavorably with contemporary American
aircraft. For example, the F- 15 suffered 4 losses per 90,000 hours and 15 losses per
213,000 hours. The F-16 suffered 10 losses per 90,000 hours and 30 losses per 213,000
hours. This meant that the Harrier suffered three times as many accidents as the F-15 and
two-thirds more than the F-16 for every 213,000 hours flown. Dennis Jenkins,
Boeing/BAe Harrier (North Branch, Minnesota: Specialty Press, 1998), 4.
191 Eventually, the United States Marine Corps and the Spanish Navy acquired the
Harrier for very specific reasons. The Marines intended to use it for amphibious warfare,
transferring Harriers from ships to rustic bases ashore, while the Spanish acquired the
Harrier because it was the only jet aircraft capable of operating off the country's small
aircraft carrier, the Principe d'Asturias. International demand for VTOL aircraft grew
slightly in the 1980s, driven by the spread of VTOL-capable aircraft carriers. When India
purchased the ex-Royal Navy aircraft carrier Hermes, it acquired Sea Harriers to go along
with it. When Italy and Thailand acquired small VTOL aircraft carriers, they also
acquired VTOL aircraft-the McDonnell Douglas Harrier II. Spain and the United States
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Marines also replaced their Harrier Is with the McDonnell Douglas Harrier II. So far, the
RAF is the only military service to acquire VTOL aircraft without intending to fly them
from VTOL aircraft carriers. All of the other states to acquire VTOL aircraft-the
United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, India, Thailand and Spain--did so with the
intention of flying them from warships.
192 The Soviet Union's rival Yak-38 did not receive a single export order. The
Yak-38 was a much less capable aircraft than the Harrier and largely viewed as a
technical failure. For example, when deployed to the Indian Ocean, the Yak-38
experienced trouble taking off in hot weather and had its operation radius restricted to a
mere 40 nm (75 km). The Yak-38 equipped the Soviet Navy's four Kiev-class aircraft
carriers. Although the Yak-38 was superficially similar to the Harrier, it was hardly a
commercial competitor because the Soviet Union made no effort to export it. See John
Fricker and Piotr Butowski, Yakovlev's VISTOL Fighters: The Full Story of Russia's
Rivals to the Harrier (Leicester, the United Kingdom: Aerofax, 1995), 15-26.
193 During the period in question, none of the aircraft produced in this category
garnered significant export orders.
194 France alone exported 1,771 lightweight fighters during this period.
195 Sydney Camm, the Chief Engineer of Hawker-Siddeley and father of the
Second World War Hurricane fighter, bombarded the RAF and Ministry of Supply with
proposals (the P.1083, P.1090 and P.1121) to develop supersonic versions of the Hawker
Hunter. Already a best-selling lightweight fighter of the late 1950s, Camm reasoned that
the Hunter could be developed into a capable and economic supersonic fighter by
equipping it with a thin-wing and a new jet engine. Camm was so committed to the last
of his supersonic proposals-based loosely on the Hunter-that he convinced Hawker's
board to develop the aircraft on company funds, even though the RAF did not support the
project. Despite the success of the Hunter and Camm's reputation as an aircraft designer,
the RAF was uninterested in sponsoring a supersonic lightweight fighter inheriting
significant design elements from the Hunter. Butler, British Secret Projects: Jet Fighters
Since 1950, 48-50, 89-92.
196 One of the Hawker projects, the HS. 1201, was specifically designed to provide
a small, simple to maintain, lightweight fighter that would provide maximum value for
limited cost. Although its airframe was highly conventional, the aircraft would be
comparatively agile because of fly-by-wire flight controls. It would also be easy to
service because its single motor would be mounted in a pod over the fuselage-a practice
common in commercial aircraft but rare in warplanes. After the HS. 1201, Hawker
proposed building an aircraft superficially similar to the American F- 16, labeled the
HS. 1202. Butler, British Secret Projects: Jet Fighters Since 1950, 143-48.
197 The last British-produced lightweight fighter, the Hunter, was so commercially
successful that Hawker-Siddeley Aviation was obliged to open an entirely new factory,
513
with 5,500 employees, to satisfy export demand. The opening of this aircraft factory was
a unique occurrence in a country where the long-term trend of the aircraft industry's labor
force was one of gradual decline. Bramson, 192-93.
198 The requirement closely approximated the specifications of the contemporary
Franco-German Alpha Jet, the Italian Aermacchi MB.339 and the Czech L.39. RAF Air
Vice-Marshal Giddings characterized the Franco-German requirement as "slightly less
demanding than, but broadly consistent with our own requirement." The United
Kingdom considered either joining the Franco-German project or launching a joint
venture with Italy. However, British aircraft manufacturers pleaded with the RAF:
"given the necessary R&D support, it [Hawker-Siddeley or BAC] could produce an
aircraft that will not only meet our draft [Air Staff Requirement] more nearly than the
Franco-German trainer, but would be a superior product, with competitive potential in the
export field." PRO AIR 2/18602 Air Vice-Marshal K.C.M. Giddings, Franco German
Trainer, February 26, 1970; PRO AIR 2/18602 ACAS to Air Attach6 Rome, n.d.; PRO
AIR 2/18602 ACAS (OR), Military Trainers, April 1970.
199 Figures for the Czechoslovakian L-39 account for only aircraft exported
outside of the Communist world. Exports within the Communist bloc were not
competitive and were rarely paid for in cash. Counting exports to communist states, 2,
810 aircraft were exported, of which 2,081 were delivered to the Soviet Union. Of the
aircraft listed, only the Hawk and M.339 are still in production. L-39 Vycvikovy 1-
39.cz/L-39 uzivatele.html (last consulted August 8, 2007); Dassault Aviation, Alphajet
www.dassault-aviation.com/fr/passion/avions/dassault-militaires/alphajet.html (last
consulted August 8, 2007); Aermacchi, MB.339 www.aermacchi.it/MB339.htm (last
consulted August 8, 2007); and The BAE Hawk www.vectorsite.net/avhawk.html (last
consulted August 8, 2007).
200 These were the SOKO Galeb and Yastreb.
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China the license to produce its most recent and powerful military jet engine-the Rolls-
Royce Spey 202-in December 1975. The Spey 202 powered the United Kingdom's
imported F-4 Phantom 11 jet fighters and was proposed for the British version of the
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production engine was tested in 1979. However, changing policy led to the precipitate
abandonment of Spey production in China. Hooker, 218-19.
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commercial aircraft.
207 Sydney Camm, chief engineer at Hawker and creator of the Harrier,
complained that his design bureau was housed in an "inverted lavatory block." Alan
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209 Despite American advocacy of this alternative approach, the RAF remained
convinced of the merits of its own approach. According to Field Marshal Michael
Carver, "We mistrusted [the American] concept as leading to too highly centralized a
system, which would not respond to the demands of... battle.... We believed in, and had
put all our money into, very low flying techniques, relying more on pilot initiative than
intimate control." Carver, 443.
210 In 1970, interdepartmental studies conducted under the auspices of the
Ministry of Defense's Chief Science Advisor "cast doubts on the feasibility, in any likely
European operational environment of the seventies and eighties, of an aircraft, even with
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211 In a 1974 analysis of the future Warsaw Pact offensive air threat in Central
Europe, RAF Squadron Leader D.J. Cutting calculated that the low-altitude surface-to-air
missiles and concrete aircraft shelters then entering service with NATO would render a
Warsaw Pact air offensive against NATO airfields excessively costly for the coming
decade. According to Cutting, "It is currently estimated that [Warsaw Pact] aircraft
losses to such point defenses [low-altitude surface to air missiles] would be as great or
greater than the damage/losses inflicted on the target.... The high losses and low
effectiveness of the very first raid would force the Soviet air commanders to rethink, and
probably abandon, deep penetration, conventional-weapon, raids into 2ATAF [NATO's
2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, which contained RAF Germany] rear areas." PRO DEFE
48/574 Squadron Leader D.J. Cutting, Critique of Warsaw Pact Air Attack Options to the
Study of Air Defence Fighter Effectiveness in 1985, July 4, 1974.
212 Ibid.
213 Cutting's analysis on the prospects of the Warsaw Pact air offensive comes to
conclusions similar to the most detailed non-classified study on the subject-Joshua
Epstein's Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe. Published in
1984, Epstein's analysis was that "Soviet Frontal Aviation falls short of the Phase I
[attacks on airfields and NATO command-and-control] success criterion, and each of its
less demanding alternates, by a very wide margin [italics in original]." Interestingly,
Cutting's analysis was written in 1974 and attempted to predict enemy effectiveness for a
period ending in 1985. Having been published in 1984, Epstein's analysis largely
validated Cutting's projections into the future. See Epstein, 174-75; and PRO DEFE
48/574 Squadron Leader D.J. Cutting, Critique of Warsaw Pact Air Attack Options to the
Study of Air Defence Fighter Effectiveness in 1985, July 4, 1974.
214 There is evidence that the RAF's leadership began to rethink its doctrine of
attacking enemy airfields as the Cold War was coming to a close. In a 1984 statement
about an eventual air battle over Europe, Air Marshal Patrick Hine, who commanded the
2 " ATAF in West Germany and later became the RAF's Chief of Staff, emphasized both
air-to-air combat and counter-air operations as a means of breaking a Warsaw Pact air
offensive. He commented:
We must, in my view strive to give any aggressor a bloody nose in his first
swipe at us. His pilots will lack combat experience. They will be nervous
and they will be flying over unfamiliar terrain on difficult missions. If we
can inflict high attrition on his first one or two massive waves, then we
may be able to gain the psychological upper hand. So I need to put up the
strongest possible resistance to those initial attacks.... Many of our
offensive air craft also have an air defense capability and it would in my
judgment make sense to use them in this capacity, especially as we could
not expect to get political clearance for offensive operations the other side
of the inner German border before a major aggression against NATO had
been identified. The more aircraft we can put up against him in his first
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one or two attacks against us, than the less damage is likely to be inflicted
on NATO airfields and our ability to mount offensive sorties against him
and provide direct support for the army.
Only after the first Warsaw Pact air attacks had been blunted in the air would offensive
counter-air operations become necessary. Unfortunately, the RAF's force structure was
overwhelmingly oriented towards the latter mission. In 1985, the RAF counted only 20
fighter aircraft in West Germany, compared to 72 ground-attack Tornados. Ironically,
whereas the French Air Force repeatedly requested costly strike aircraft, but received
mostly lightweight fighters, the RAF decided that it needed greater air-to-air capabilities
after it had received the sophisticated strike aircraft it had long desired. See Imperial War
Museum Oral History Archive, 16197, Field Marshal Nigel Bagnall and Air Marshal
Patrick Hine, "Concepts of Land-Air Operations in the Central Region: A British
Perspective," May 23, 1984; and Taylor, 203.
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Chapter VII:
French Military Interventions
I. Introduction
There is no domain where armed forces prize autonomy more and political leaders
have greater motivation to interfere than the conduct of military operations. Most
military officers hold the normative ideal that political leaders should decide when to
employ force, but delegate the achievement of their objectives to military professionals.
In military eyes, the "inexperienced meddling" and "piecemeal gradualism" of politicians
cost lives and compromise the chances of victory.
Political decision-makers see things differently and rarely grant the military an
entirely free hand. Military operations, even minor ones, have foreign and domestic
policy ramifications. Calling-up reservists, mobilizing economic resources and
employing disproportionate force can alienate domestic and international opinion,
harming the state's overall position. Moreover, militarily expedient acts, such as "hot
pursuit" of rebels across borders, "rough interrogation" of prisoners and bombing military
targets in civilian agglomerations can have prejudicial political effects out of all
proportion to their tactical benefits.
During the Cold War, France intervened continuously in regional conflicts. In
each case, civil military interactions weighed on: 1) the decision to intervene; 2) the
nature of the intervention agreed upon; and 3) the selection and autonomy of field
commanders.
519
Research indicates that the degree of military influence on interventions has a
tangible impact on how force is employed. Military professionals believe that
overwhelming force should be employed, with few restrictions, to guarantee success.
Objectives should be clear from the outset and political leaders should mobilize popular
support before committing troops to an operation. Military professionals should be given
the authority and overwhelming resources to destroy an adversary's armed forces. 1
Phrases such as "piecemeal gradualism," "political meddling" and "hands tied" reflect
military opinions of political restrictions on the use of force.
While soldiers favor clear objectives, the unrestricted use of force and operational
autonomy, civilian leaders frequently prefer less categorical commitments. Whereas
professional soldiers underline worse case scenarios and view military operations as an
all-or-nothing effort to deprive an adversary of its ability to fight, political leaders
emphasize the use of limited force to contribute to foreign policy objectives.
Diplomatically, a military presence can reassure allies and bluff or deter adversaries.
While soldiers prefer maximizing the chances of military success by demanding
overwhelming force, civilian leaders must take competing non-military factors into
account. Political decision-makers are rarely willing to spend more economic or political
capital on an intervention than is needed to obtain a high probability of success. As one
scholar put it, the military prefers optimizing the chances of success through
overwhelming force, while civilian leaders tend to "satisfice" by reducing commitments
to the minimum level that still provides an acceptable likelihood of success.2
Civilian policymakers also balk at granting the armed forces operational
autonomy, which may be abused to involve-the state in unplanned military adventures.
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During the 19th century, field commanders saddled governments with unwanted
conquests, while, during the Cold War, political leaders feared that an overzealous
military might provoke nuclear war. Tight civilian control of field commanders and
active involvement in military planning are two means for civilian policymakers to
moderate the dangers of escalatory or impulsive military behavior.
In short, civilian leaders employ military force to achieve limited diplomatic
objectives and are prone to restrict the authority of field commanders, while military
leaders oppose the use of force unless the objectives are clear, the means overwhelming
and the military highly autonomous. Table I, below, illustrates the differences between
military and civilian views on military operations:
Table I:
Civilian and Military Preferences and Military Operations
Subject Civilians Military Commanders
Quantity of Force Minimum Force Overwhelming Force
Objective Change adversary's Destroy enemy military
political calculations capabilities
Domestic Politics Minimize political capital Mobilization of public opinion
capital required to in favor of commitment
intervene
Civil-Military Political control Operational autonomy
Interactions
Because soldiers and civilians view military force differently, their relative influence
shapes how a state conducts military operations.
Until the Fifth Republic, military leaders commanded the autonomy they so prize.
Napoleon Bonaparte set an early example when he disregarded the government's war
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plan in 1796 and negotiated the 1797 armistice of Campo Formio without consulting the
foreign ministry. Later, throughout France's colonial expansion, ambitious field
commanders seized territories and provoked minor wars without government approval.
At the onset of the First World War, the French legislature suspended its debates and the
cabinet granted the General Staff broad powers. After the Versailles Treaty, the army
opposed limited interventions in the Rhineland (1935) or Spain (1936), arguing that
France must fully mobilize to deter Italy or Germany. Most recently, under the Fourth
Republic, military commanders in Algeria assumed control of basic state functions such
as education and law enforcement. When civilian leaders attempted to negotiate
Algeria's independence, field commanders brought the regime down.
Catapulted to power by a civil-military crisis, de Gaulle curbed the authority of
the high command and field commanders. To circumscribe the high command's
influence, de Gaulle broke its monopoly on military expertise. With the President's
Private Military Staff, de Gaulle created a tool for advising the head to state on military
affairs. Established in the same spirit as the Private Military Staff, the Secretary General
of National Defense (SGDN) and minister's military cabinet play similar roles, granting
the prime minister and minister of defense access to independent expertise.
Borrowing from practices dating back to the Third Republic, the minister of
defense presides over the chiefs of staff committee, making it difficult for the service
chiefs to sweep inter-service disputes under the table to confront politicians with a single
set of recommendations. The outcome is a form of divide-and-rule whereby civilians
exploit divisions within the military.
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Working closely with a larger number of officers, politicians have better
information and more choice when it comes selecting officers to occupy the state's
foremost commands. The president generally nominates the chief of staff of the armed
forces from amongst his service chiefs or the chief of his private military staff. Other
officers are also promoted for their ability to collaborate with political superiors.
Between parallel military staffs, political supervision of the chiefs of staff
committee and the ability of civilian leaders to appoint military commanders, political
leaders command multiple assessments of whether and how to conduct a military
intervention.
Rather than delegating the pro-consular authority that Joffre exercised on the
Western Front, Lyautey in Morocco or de Lattre in Indochina, the Fifth Republic's
political leaders circumscribe the autonomy of field commanders. One way of
accomplishing this has been strengthening other government agencies, such as the foreign
ministry, intelligence services and the president's Africa-cell, to play a greater role in
overseas interventions.
Depending on the nature of the intervention, high-powered ambassadors, foreign
ministry crisis cells and intelligence personnel have played significant roles during many
military interventions. Political leaders have also taken advantage of new
communications technologies to enhance their control of operations. Under the
Pompidou administration, France invested heavily in the Center for Military Operations
(Centre Opdrationelle des Armdes), whose large staff and advanced communications
facilities, located underneath the ministry of defense building, permit authorities in Paris
to oversee military operations worldwide. 4
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Taken as an ensemble, reforms promulgated under the Fifth Republic
strengthened the ability of civilian leaders to undertake and mange military interventions,
while diminishing the authority of the military high command and field commanders.
Given this balance of civil-military authority, one would expect interventions to be
conducted according to civilian leaders' preferences--minimal force, tight civilian control
and limited and potentially vague objectives.
The remainder of this chapter will test these hypotheses. Of France's many
interventions, this chapter will examine three specific cases-Chad (1969-72),
Mauritania (1978) and the Persian Gulf Crisis (1990-91). These cases were selected to
control for as many extraneous factors as possible. Between them, they involved all of
the Fifth Republic's Cold War presidents--from the notoriously interventionist Giscard to
the hands-off Pompidou. They also represent the spectrum of French interventions, from
one of its smallest (Mauritania) to its largest since 1956 (the Persian Gulf, 1990-91).
II. Chad, 1968-1972
The Fifth Republic's first significant military intervention confronted
policymakers with formidable challenges. Conducting a counterinsurgency in a large,
poor country typically poses military and civil-military problems. France accomplished
its objectives in Chad by circumscribing military authority, entrusting the "hearts and
minds" campaign to a civilian agency and empowering a diplomat to oversee both
civilian and military aspects of the intervention, adjudicating the inevitable disputes
between the two.
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After the Algeria War, de Gaulle eschewed foreign conflicts. Instead, France
focused on building a nuclear deterrent, reforming NATO, partnering with West
Germany and pursuing ddtente with the Soviet Union. However, French leaders
gradually came to view the political convulsions wracking post-colonial Africa as a
threat. The rapid accession of Sub-Saharan colonies to independence in 1960 left
France's colonial infrastructure intact and the new states without experience in self-
government. French administrators and teachers, of which there were 10,367 in 1967,
fulfilled the same roles as before independence, France continued to control the monetary
policy of its former colonies. Not surprisingly, French businesses also dominated the
economies of former colonies, leading de Gaulle to conclude that privileged relations
with francophone Africa enhanced France's international influence.5 To cement its
authority after decolonization, France concluded military assistance treaties with 11 of its
former colonies.
Unfortunately, inter-ethnic and civil-military problems shook many of France's
African allies beginning in the 1960s. 6 After the overthrow of three francophone African
leaders in 1963, de Gaulle feared that further political turmoil would undermine France's
African sphere of influence. In 1964, Paris militarily reinstated Gabon's president, after
the latter was overthrown by a coup d'dtat, but three francophone heads of state fell to
coups d'6tats the following year.
The Chadian Civil War, which began in 1965, posed an even greater problem for
France. With a southern Christian/Animist majority and a northern Muslim minority,
which historically dominated and enslaved its southern neighbors, Chad was inherently
unstable.7 When independence brought democracy, Chad's Christian/Animist majority
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elected a southerner, Frangois Tombalbaye, president. Fearful of traditional Muslim
authorities, Tombalbaye stripped tribal chiefs of their power and, thereby, created an
administrative void, leaving the government without representatives in villages.8
Combined with disastrous financial management and ethnic favoritism, this shortsighted
policy drove Chadian Muslims to despair.9
In 1965, frustration gave way to rebellion. Villages revolted in central Chad and
the traditional tribal leader (the "DerdeY,") of the nomadic Toubous sought support in
Libya.'0 Faced with peasant uprisings, the Chadian Army responded with brutality and
incompetence, inadvertently swelling rebel ranks.' Within two years, distinct rebel
movements came into being. In the center and east of Chad, the Chadian National
Liberation Front (FROLINAT) constituted the most dangerous movement because of its
size and proximity to the capital of Fort Lamy. Meanwhile, the smaller Chadian
Liberation Front (FLT) dominated two western provinces. Finally, the Toubous
occupying Chad's enormous northern deserts formed a third movement. Only southern
Chad, home to Tombalbaye's ethnic power-base, remained loyal to the government.
Chad's small army proved incompetent. Although the rebels were badly armed-
only one in three possessing a firearm-government forces numbering a mere 3,000
troops, for a country twice as large as France, never occupied much of Chad's vast
interior.12 Unmotivated and abysmally trained, government forces also disintegrated
whenever they faced opposition, however inferior in weaponry.13
Although Chad itself was one of France's least valuable former colonies,
francophone African leaders viewed it as a test for whether France would uphold its
commitments to allies. In January 1968, Madagascar's Philibert Tsiranana urged Prime
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Minister Pompidou to support Tombalbaye. Meanwhile, Jacques Foccart, Secretary
General for African Affairs, reported similar declarations from other francophone rulers.
The issue came to a head on 25 August 1968, when Tombalbaye officially requested
French military assistance to lift the rebel siege of Aozou in northern Chad.15
Tombalbaye's request divided the French government. While Foccart and
Ambassador Fernand Wibaux supported military intervention, General Michel Fourquet
opposed involvement in what he considered a militarily intractable problem.16 Meeting
with de Gaulle on a daily basis, Foccart convinced de Gaulle to order a limited
intervention to save Aozou. Without firing a shot, a company of French paratroops broke
the blockade less than two weeks after Tombalbaye's request. Their mission
accomplished, the French returned home.1 7 Unfortunately, the Chadian garrison at
Aozou mutinied after the siege, abandoning their post and fleeing southwards. Military
indiscipline emboldened the rebels and granted them what arms could not.'
Soon rebels controlled Chad's three northern provinces, encircling army units in
their garrisons, and began lashing out at government forces in central and eastern Chad.
In January 1969 rebels repulsed a government offensive, inflicting 80 casualties.19 Then,
less than 400 kilometers from the capital, insurgents annihilated four platoons of
20
gendarmes in March. With these reverses, the Chadian army lost the initiative to rebels,
who conducted 227 attacks in the first half of 1969.
A protdgd of Foccart, Ambassador Wibaux diagnosed Chad's problems as poor
administration and Tombalbaye's disenfranchisement of northern chieftains. Wibaux
argued that only French military force could create an environment conducive to
administrative reforms, but that it would be vain to seek military victory over the rebels.
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After meeting with Tombalbaye, Foccart rallied to Wibaux's point-of-view and urged de
Gaulle to send military forces.
As before, the armed forces opposed intervention. General Louis Dio personally
advised de Gaulle that France "should never set foot in Chad again." 23 For a trained
military mind, Chad's rebellions were a nightmare. Rugged terrain and intractable ethnic
and religious divisions meant that Chad's problems could not be solved by a conventional
military victory. After recent turmoil in France (May 1968), de Gaulle was also
unwilling to mobilize domestic opinion or significant financial resources.
Despite military objections, de Gaulle decided to intervene in Chad on 18 March
1969.26 While planning the intervention, French leaders privileged civil, rather than
military objectives. They created two distinct bodies: 1) a military force (entitled the
Military Delegation) to combat the rebellion and retrain the Chadian army and 2) a
Mission for Administrative Reform (MRA) to reinvigorate Chad's civil administration.
To coordinate the activities of these structures, France's ambassador, Wibaux, was given
overall authority over both. 27
When it came to selecting a military commander, political imperatives, rather than
military desiderata guided French leaders. France's most distinguished soldier, General
Marcel Bigeard had been promised command of operations in Africa.28 However,
Bigeard was a media icon after heroics at Dien Bien Phu, victory in the battle of Algiers,
and his portrayal, under a pseudonym, in recent films. 29 De Gaulle personally rejected
Bigeard's appointment, arguing, "Bigeard would be very good, but his presence would be
too visible to the world and international opinion would conclude that we are directing
the repression [of the rebellion]."30 Instead, de Gaulle insisted on a lower-ranking and
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publicly unknown commander, Brigadier-General Arnaud, who was merely termed
France's "military delegate" in Chad.
For the vague mission of "creating the security necessary for administrative
32
reforms," the French government committed the minimum forces judged necessary.
Besides 1,000 personnel already in Africa, the government dispatched only 390 troops
from France. Because of restrictions placed on using conscripts, General Arnaud initially
controlled only two French infantry companies, which were clearly inadequate against an
estimated 2,330 rebels. 33
Worse, Arnaud's Chadian allies were a liability. The southerners of the army
responded to rebel attacks with arbitrary reprisals on villagers, leading the French to
deduce that Chadian officers "were the initiators and remain the partisans of a racial and
religious total war against Islam.... They would like to turn the north of the country into
a gigantic desert."34 The Chadian Army's animosity towards Muslim civilians was
matched only by its military ineptitude, as demonstrated on the many occasions spear
wielding rebels routed Chadian soldiers. 35 As if the situation was no bad enough, the
army threatened the country's civilian government, prompting Tombalbaye to create his
own paramilitary guard and Arnaud to retain French forces for anti-coup duty.36
Vicious vis-a-vis civilians, inept against rebels and menacing to civilian
government, only significant reforms would permit the Chadian Army to play a positive
role. Arnaud's judgment was categorical, "This army is worse than worthless. Its value
is negative. By its unthinking, undisciplined and uncontrolled actions, it creates critical
or disastrous situations." 37
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Less than a month after arriving, Arnaud launched an offensive. On 24 April, two
Foreign Legion companies advanced on the besieged city of Mangalme, in Guera
province, where the rebellion had begun. Not accustomed to disciplined opponents,
nearly 200 rebels attempted to ambush the legionnaires, but were routed on 29 April.
After this first bloody lesson in French military power, the rebels avoided further
engagements. The rebels adapted to French tactics by dispersing into smaller groups, of
three to five combatants and retreating whenever threatened. 38 Although the French
achieved a psychological victory at Mangalme, the rebellion remained intact.39
Mangalme demonstrated the tactical dilemma of the Chadian War. French troops
could vanquish rebels, but had great trouble bringing them to battle and lacked the
numbers to occupy Chad's vast territory. Only Chadian forces and civil administration
could produce durable results by holding and administering re-conquered areas.
Having judged the Chadian Army incompetent, Arnaud imposed a re-training
program, attaching French officers to Chadian units, cycling units through a training
program and creating a military academy to educate Chadian officers.40 Meanwhile,
Pierre Lami, the civilian head of the MRA, struggled to restore government
administration in newly liberated areas. Having identified Tombalbaye's campaign
against chieftains as the primary cause for disorder, Lami re-empowered local chieftains
and helped them recruit private armies, called goums.41
Unfortunately, Arnaud and Lami soon clashed. Once restored to power, local
chieftains proved vindictive and used their private armies to bully villagers. Many MRA
backed administrators went further, arguing for a scorched earth policy against
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42populations judged disloyal. Arnaud sought to curb these excesses, while Lami
dismissed such behavior as unavoidable.43
The hostility between the Arnaud, Lami and the Chadian Army exploded in
August. Pressed by his military commanders, Tombalbaye ordered the extermination of
the 15,000 Arab inhabitants of Dekaker.44 This order outraged Arnaud. To calm
acrimonious shouting between Arnaud and Tombalbaye, Ambassador Wibaux advised
Tombalbaye to reconsider his decision.45 After this dispute, Wibaux felt that Arnaud
could no longer work with either his French or Chadian counterparts.46
Within two days, Defense Minister Michel Debrd ordered the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces to find a replacement for Arnaud.47 This unexpected demand for Arnaud's
removal incensed General Fourquet, who had supported his strategy and ordered a
military fact-finding mission, which concluded in Arnaud's favor. 48 Despite military
protests, the government persisted in removing Arnaud.
Because of the circumstances behind Arnaud's removal, many officers refused to
take his place.49 Eventually, the high command's choice settled on Brigadier-General
Edouard Cortadellas, a veteran of Indochina and Algeria. Cortadellas was at the end of
his military career, with further promotion (theoretically) out of the question and
retirement looming in 18 months. Well known for frankness and persistence, the high
command calculated that Cortadellas would stand-up to diplomats and politicians.
After approval by Defense Minister Michel Debrd, Cortadellas assumed command on 26
September.
Notwithstanding his dismissal, France government acceded to Arnaud's demands
for additional resources. France deployed two additional infantry companies to Chad .
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and replaced the unusable conscripts in country with volunteers, increasing France's
available infantry from two companies to seven and bringing its total forces to 2,851
personnel and 34 aircraft by the end of 1969.5
Once in Chad, Cortadellas persevered with Wibaux's strategy. Geographically,
while Chadian soldiers defended oases in northern Chad, the French would conduct an
offensive in central and eastern Chad. When French forces cleansed a region of rebel
bands, the Mission for Administrative Reform (MRA) would reinstall local chieftains and
recruit village militias. After a region was pacified, French forces would re-deploy
elsewhere, to continue to the offensive.53 Once central and eastern Chad were under
control, French and Chadian forces would shift northwards to fight the Toubou revolt.
Unlike his predecessor, Cortadellas worked closely with Wibaux and supported
the ambassador's efforts to restore chieftains, empower civilian prefects and create local
militias. He built a positive relationship with Tombalbaye and the Chadian Army.5 4 To
enact his strategy, Cortadellas demanded more forces. Judging a larger French military
presence problematic, Wibaux proposed enlarging the Chadian Army, which would
provide Cortadellas with troops at a lower political and economic cost.:s Partially
heeding Wibaux's advice, Cortadellas suggested expanding the Chadian Army from six to
15 companies (1,900 to 4,300 men), but still argued that he needed more French soldiers
and helicopters to spearhead the counterinsurgency. 56
Cortadellas traveled to Paris in early December 1969 to argue his case. Because
France's intervention comprised both military and civil components, Cortadellas was
obliged to make his case before the Defense Minister (Debrd), the Foreign Minister
(Schumann), the Secretary of State for Cooperation (Bourges), the Armed Forces Chief
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of Staff (Fourquet) and the Secretary General for African Affairs (Foccart). Expressing
dismay at Cortadellas' demands, the government approved his plan to expand the Chadian
Army, but refused to deploy additional helicopters or French troops. While France's
contribution to the Chadian Army would be costly, obliging France to finance 52 percent
of the Chadian defense budget and detach more than three times as many French officers
and non-commissioned officers (610 in total) to command the Chadian units, political
leaders judged this course of action cheaper than sending French forces.58
With the support he obtained, Cortadellas launched his dry season campaign in
central and eastern Chad. Continuing in Arnaud's footsteps, Cortadellas cleansed Guera
province in late 1969.59 Thereafter, Cortadellas shifted his offensive to Chari Baguirmi
province. Operating in the wake of military units, the MRA established seven village
militias in Guera and eight in Chari-Baguirmi by February.60
In January, Cortadellas shifted his offensive once again, to the provinces of
Ouaddai and Salamat, where decimated bands had sought refuge. Because the rebels
avoided battle, Cortadellas fractioned his units into smaller, more mobile groupings of
platoon size.61 Once again, Chadian garrisons, village militias and the private armies of
the Sultans of Ouaddai and Sila followed in the wake of regular French forces. 62
In parallel with Cortadellas' operations, Wibaux and Foccart conducted a
diplomatic offensive. Since its inception, Chad's rebel movements lacked external
material support, but diplomatic errors earned Tombalbaye the enmity of the leaders of
the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and Libya. On 11 January 1970, Foccart
reconciled Tombalbaye to Central Africa's Jean-Bedel Bokassa, precipitating the
extradition of rebel sympathizers to Chad.63 Likewise, French authorities orchestrated a
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rapprochement between Tombalbaye and Sudanese dictator Nimeiri.64 Reconciling
Tombalbaye to Libya's Mohmar Khaddafi proved more difficult. Upon French advice,
Chad distanced itself from Israel and recognized Libya's new regime after Khaddafi's
September 1969 coup d'dtat, but Chado-Libyan relations remained tense.65 Less
successfully, Wibaux dialogued with Abbas-Siddick, the nominal leader of the
FROLINAT rebel movement, and France's Ambassador in Tripoli negotiated with the
Toubou Derdei (traditional ruler). 66
Deprived of foreign support and hammered by Cortadellas' implacable offensive,
the rebellion collapsed in central and eastern Chad. Aggressive operations of French
platoons drove rebel units from population centers, permitting the installation of Chadian
units and the creation of village militias, of which 60 existed by June 1970.67 With
Chadian units in major population centers, patrols scouting the countryside, and militias
and gendarmerie detachments in loyal villages, rebel bands faced increasing problems.
As soon as government forces detected rebel bands, the Franco-Chadian high command
encircled them with airmobile French forces, horse mounted paramilitaries and motorized
Chadian Army units converging from multiple directions.68 Cut off from the peasantry
and deprived of the occasional combatants who provided the bulk (84 to 90 percent) of
rebel manpower, the rebellion withered.69
While rebels still extorted aid from isolated villages, rebel bands were repulsed
every time they approached villages protected by pro-government militias.70 By July
1970, government authority was established in central and eastern Chad, and the
frequency of rebel attacks dropped to peacetime levels.7 '
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While France pacified central and eastern Chad, civil-military tensions resurfaced
between the Military Delegation and Mission for Administrative Reform (MRA). Village
militias and sultans' armies (goums), but General Cortadellas mistrusted the sultans and
worried that the creation of the sultans' salaried armies would undermine the unpaid
militias he considered essential. Failing to convince Lami to join Cortadellas in a joint
civil-military general staff, Wibaux suggested dismissing Lami. In April 1970, after
three months of argument and a fact-finding mission by the Minister of Cooperation,
Paris replaced Lami with another civil servant, Martin Paillard. With the change in
personnel, control of militias and goums shifted from the civilian MRA to General
Cortadellas.
Unfortunately, successes in central and eastern Chad were counterbalanced by
problems in the north. Following Khaddafi's overthrow of Libya's King Idriss in
September 1969, Khaddafi convinced 600 Toubou tribesmen of Idriss' guard to join their
rebel kinsmen in northern Chad. Armed with modern firearms and trained in small unit
tactics, this new infusion of troops dramatically increased the combat potential of the 400
dissident tribesmen already at large.76 Nomadic and warlike, the Toubous were
superlative guerrillas in Chad's arid and mountainous wastes, prompting one Frenchman
to conclude, "Whether European [French] or southern Chadian, all of the Military
Delegation's forces are unsuited to a struggle against the Toubous, who are rustic,
courageous, fluid and perfectly at ease in their rocky deserts and mountains."77
Emboldened by the new arrivals, the Toubous launched a concerted offensive. In
September 1970, rebels launched simultaneous attacks on four separate objectives--Fada,
Zoui, Bedo and Zouar. The.Toubou attacks miscarried at Zoui and Fada. However, they
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obtained limited, but psychologically significant victories at Zouar and Bedo. In early
September, rebels blockaded Zouar's garrison of two companies (one French, one
Chadian) in the village's fort. With Toubous dominating its supply lines, the garrison
would starve if a relief convoy did not break the blockade. 78
Other Toubous ambushed a French paratroop company, on 11 October, near the
oasis of Bedo. Although the paratroops riposted, attacking the flanks of the ambush, the
Toubous resisted skillfully. By nightfall, the Toubous killed 11 paratroops and wounded
16, in exchange for an estimated 70 Toubou casualties (25 bodies left behind). 79 After
Zouar and Bedo, the Chadian companies garrisoning northern Chad hunkered down in
ancient Turkish forts.80
Arriving so soon after central and eastern Chad seemed pacified, these reverses
shocked France's government. Rebel victories could embolden potential rebels elsewhere
in Chad, while even minor casualties, such as those suffered at Bedo, could turn the
French electorate against the war. Summarizing his fears, Cortadellas reported, "The
situation is entirely new and extremely grave. I no longer possess either the numeric
superiority, firepower advantage or mobility to deal with more than one trouble spot at a
time.... I have lost the initiative and can only hope to react [to enemy initiatives]."'
Cortadellas set about the urgent task of breaking the siege of Zouar. He
assembled all his reserves--three paratroop companies (two French, one Chadian), an
armored car platoon and air support--into a relief column. Personally accompanying this
force on its 1,000-kilometer drive north, Cortadellas surprised the Toubous on 22
October. Arriving with astounding speed (200 kilometers per day), the Franco-Chadian
column routed the Toubous, killing 41 and capturing 2.82
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Demanding more helicopters, Cortadellas now planned to wage a mobile
counteroffensive. 83 Faced with this demand for greater means and the prospect of heavier
casualties, the French government met on 19 October. While the Secretary General for
African Affairs (Foccart) and Defense Minister (Debrd) supported Cortadellas plan to
combine offensive operations with diplomatic negotiations, the Foreign Minister
(Schumann) and Prime Minister (Chaban-Delmas) argued that France should withdraw
from a conflict that was becoming an unpopular quagmire. After a long debate, President
Pompidou opted for the offensive. 84
After two months of preparations, including the arrival of a flotilla of naval
helicopters, the French launched their largest offensive, codenamed Bison, on 10 January
1971. With 1,250 soldiers (900 French and 350 Chadian), 150 vehicles, 18 helicopters,
all available armored cars, and eight aircraft, Cortadellas intended to crush the 500 rebels
in Tibesti province.86 Air-supplied Franco-Chadian mobile units--motorized and
mounted--patrolled 3,500 kilometers of inhospitable roads for nearly three months.
Meanwhile, airmobile paratroops systematically cordoned and searched the region's
oases. Traveling light, without heavy weaponry, Franco-Chadian forces received support
from attack aircraft and helicopter gunships.87
Despite the means available, the Bison offensive failed because guerrillas fled
contact. During the offensive's first phase the targeted rebel band (150 combatants)
escaped detection. During the next phase, French forces located a group of 20 rebels, but
suffered two dead and five casualties in their haste to come to grips with them.88
After the first two phases of Operation Bison, the Toubou Derdei asked to
negotiate from his safe haven in Tripoli. Impatient to conclude a settlement, France's
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Foreign Ministry called for a ceasefire. Eager to finish with the rebellion in the north,
Cortadellas pleaded to continue operations, while Wibaux, reasoning that military
pressure would hasten negotiations with the Toubous, also urged Bison's continuation.89
Backing diplomats over their field commander, President Pompidou halted the
Tibesti offensive on 12 February. Using this pause, the Toubous hid their arms and fled
to the mountains.90 Thereafter, the Derdei broke off negotiations. Having been suckered
by the Derdei's ruse, French forces failed to locate either rebels or arms when they
renewed their offensive. Of 500 rebels active in Tibesti province, the two-month Franco-
Chadian offensive neutralized only 16. Although Cortadellas hoped to renew offensive
operations, Operation Bison exhausted his men and emptied his supply depots.91
While political leaders deduced that it was militarily impossible to defeat the
Toubous, military commanders blamed diplomats for interrupting a promising offensive
before it yielded decisive results. Before Cortadellas could renew his stockpiles, the
government withdrew the reinforcements it had sent for the Tibesti offensive, including
the navy helicopter flotilla.92
Possessing fewer means, French troops conducted their last offensive in northern
Chad in June 1971. With modest forces, but valuable intelligence, a French company and
Chadian platoon decimated the Toubou band that mounted the bloody Bedo ambush in
October 1970.93 After the Saharan summer abated, a massive Franco-Chadian convoy re-
supplied the isolated garrisons of northern Chad. 94
Disappointed with the stalemate in northern Chad, Khaddafi schemed to reignite
the rebellion in central and eastern Chad. By dispatching camel caravans of modern
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weaponry via the Sudan, he hoped that the previously ill-equipped rebels in eastern Chad
would surprise government forces and regain the initiative.
When FROLINAT rebels began infiltrating Chad from sanctuaries in the Sudan in
February 1972, they found themselves operating in a hostile environment. The MRA's
efforts--digging 146 village wells and building 21 schools--won the peasantry to the
government's cause.95 Confident in their militias, of which there were over 100, villages
denied rebels food and guides.96 Between 18 February and 9 March, French and Chadian
forces detected and engaged all four rebel bands. In each case, rebel units fled after brief
encounters. Once defeated, local militias slaughtered many bedraggled rebel survivors,
while others, repelled from villages, died of thirst or starvation. 97 Encouraged by French
diplomacy, Sudan's dictator Nimeiri ordered his army to massacre the few rebels
(approximately 400 of 1,000) that escaped to his territory.98 The Franco-Chadian
victories of February and March, combined with the Sudanese attacks in April, destroyed
the rebellion in central and eastern Chad.99
French diplomacy profited from the rebel setbacks to orchestrate a reconciliation
between Chad and Libya. With Niger's President Hamani Diori mediating, Tombalbaye
and Khaddafi agreed, in April 1972, to restore diplomatic relations. After further
negotiations, Libya abandoned Chad's rebels in exchange for Chad breaking diplomatic
relations with Israel and ceded the disputed Aouzou Strip to Libya.100
Having isolated Chad's rebels and crushed their forces in the Center and East,
France ended its military intervention on 26 August 1972, before Socialists could exploit
the government's unpopular intervention in Chad in France's upcoming legislative
elections. 101 Although the Toubous remained defiant in Chad's desolate north, France
539
accomplished its political objectives in Chad. The rebellion was vanquished in the
Center and East, where it threatened Chad's government and economy. In the process,
French forces inflicted 5,100 casualties on the rebellion in exchange for 39 French
soldiers killed and 102 wounded. Chadian forces, meanwhile, suffered 629 casualties. 0 2
Table II:
Casualties Compared, 1968-1972
Group Killed Wounded Missing Total
French Forces 39 102 141
Chadian Forces 291 296 42 629
Total 330 398 42 770
Rebels 3,800 1,300 5,100
Rationing resources, the French government accomplished significant results for a
minimal expenditure of lives and money.
France achieved tremendous economy of force, with its expeditionary force never
exceeding 3,500 soldiers, thanks to the adroit coordination of military, diplomatic and
administrative initiatives. Patient diplomacy permitted France to gradually end foreign
support for the rebellion and sow discord between the Toubous in northern Chad and
FROLINAT in the Center and East. Meanwhile, the creation of village militias, the
restoration of local chieftains and the MRA's development activities progressively
isolated rebel bands from the rural populations capable of housing and feeding them.
Chadian military and paramilitary forces, which grew from 7,100 personnel in 1969 to
10,700 personnel in early 1972, guaranteed the security of government employees and
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administrative facilities in pacified territories.'0 Finally, small French military forces,
relying heavily on helicopter mobility, broke rebel offensives and prevented rebel groups
from establishing a "liberated zone" within Chad.
Ambassador Wibaux played a critical role in synchronizing military, diplomatic
and administrative initiatives. His authority over the Military Delegation and the
Movement for Administrative Reform (MRA) permitted him to shape French strategy
within Chad. When broader issues arose, such as the dispatch of additional
reinforcements or diplomatic initiatives to third parties (Sudan, Libya, the Central
African Republic and the Derdef), the French cabinet decided matters at the cabinet level.
While France's subordination of co-equal civil and military authorities to a
diplomat produced a flexible and integrated political-military campaign, the process
frustrated both the military high command and the field commanders. Disregarded when
it came to deciding whether to intervene, slighted in the selection of the field commander
and overruled when Ambassador Wibaux wanted to dismiss the Military Delegate, the
high command impotently observed the intervention from Paris. On the ground in Chad,
French field commanders enjoyed more authority, but also suffered from more frequent
disputes, outlined in Table III, with their civilian counterparts.
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Civil-Military
Ouestion
Table III:
Disputes During Chadian Intervention (1968-72)
Contendine Parties Result
Decision to Intervene
Chadian atrocities
(summer 1969)
Reinforcement Request
(late- 1969)
Sultans' armies and
village militias
(early 1970)
Negotiations with
Derdei vs. continuing
Bison offensive
(February 1971)
Foccart (civilian) vs.
Generals Fourquet and Dio
Military Delegation vs.
MRA (civilian)
Military Delegation vs.
Ambassador Wibaux
Military Delegation vs.
MRA
Military Delegation and
Ambassador Wibaux vs.
Foreign Ministry
France Intervenes
Military delegate
dismissed
Compromise: Chadian
Army enlarged but
no new French troops
or helicopters sent
Military Delegation
given control of
militias, MRA's head
(Lami) dismissed
Offensive suspended
The most acerbic civil-military problem during the first year opposed successive opposed
successive military commanders with the head of the Mission for Administrative Reform
(MRA) over the control and behavior of militias and private armies. When matters
became unmanageable, Wibaux recommended first the replacement of the Military
Delegate (August 1969) and then the dismissal of the MRA's director (February 1970).
With more tractable individuals heading both civil and military organizations, the MRA
and Military Delegation collaborated fruitfully. Thereafter, civil-military disputes
revolved around reinforcements and the synchronization of political and military actions.
In no case did the Military Delegation receive all of the forces he judged necessary to
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defeat the rebellion, however he received enough to pacify Chad's most productive
regions while diplomats isolated the rebellion from international backers.
In sum, France's intervention in Chad proved successful because of the fusion of
military, diplomatic and administrative initiatives under civilian leaders. However,
contempt for purely military factors led France to concentrate on the economically useful
and more densely populated Center and East, leaving the North in the hands of Toubou
rebels who would ultimately seize power six years after the end of France's intervention.
III. Mauritania 1977-78
France's Mauritanian intervention was the first undertaken under Valerie Giscard-
d'Estaing's presidency. Compared to other operations, the Mauritanian intervention
posed particularly delicate challenges in terms of political-military coordination. France
pursued specific foreign policy aims--obtaining the release of French hostages and
halting POLISARIO raids on Mauritania's iron mine--while striving to avoid involvement
in the broader regional conflict over the Western Sahara. Drawing on the institutional
and technical tools available, France's president accomplished his aims by subjecting
both military and diplomatic efforts to an unprecedented degree of micro-management.
Although distasteful to military professionals, these modalities resulted in an extremely
efficient use of military force.' 04
Mauritania's problems began when its government claimed part of Spain's
Western Sahara. In the wake of Morocco's invasion of the economically valuable
northern portion of the Western Sahara in November 1975, Mauritania and Morocco
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divided the territory. In the Madrid Accords, signed on 14 November, Spain left the
territory in Moroccan and Mauritanian hands from February 1976.
The Western Sahara's nomadic arabo-berber inhabitants, the Sahraoui, rejected
absorption. The Saharaoui nationalist organization, POLISARIO, declared the Western
Sahara independent and began training combatants with Libyan and Algerian
assistance.10 5
With modern weapons, the Sahraoui developed guerrilla tactics suited to their
desert environment. In an up-dated version of the traditional nomadic "razzia" or raid,
POLISARIO columns of approximately 25 to 50 vehicles and 200 to 300 combatants
struck from their Algerian sanctuaries.io6 Using assault rifles, machine guns and anti-
tank rockets, the Sahraoui brutally attacked unsuspecting victims, before disappearing
into the desert at a speed of 50 kilometers per hour.
The skill and violence of the Sahraoui offensive surprised both Morocco and
Mauritania. Although caught off-balance and ill-equipped, Morocco possessed a solid
military establishment. For Mauritania, the situation was worse. Bereft of financial
resources and possessing a small army, Mauritania proved incapable of countering
POLISARIO. The situation degenerated in mid-1977 when the Sahrouai shifted from
attacking army posts to Mauritania's only significant economic resource, the iron mine at
Zouerate.107
Zouerate's remoteness entailed vulnerability because that the only means of
profitably commercializing its iron was via the world's longest trains, comprised of 200
wagons and seven locomotives apiece, which plied the lone railway linking the mine to
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the port of Nouadibou, 650 kilometers away.108 Established under French colonial rule,
Zourate still depended on French engineers and businessmen for its operation.
With Mauritania so dependent on a single resource, Zouerate and the Zouerate-
Nouadibou railway became ideal targets for the Sahraoui. However, French management
of Zourate meant that French expatriates would suffer in the process. On 1 May 1977, a
column of 60 POLISARIO vehicles raided Zourate, killing two Frenchmen and capturing
six. After this dramatic beginning, the Sahraoui continued their attacks, demonstrating
Mauritania's powerlessness to stop them.
The Sahraoui campaign threatened France's profitable exploitation of Zouerate
and endangered its expatriates. Worse, Mauritania's poverty and political fragility raised
the specter of its collapse as a functioning state, accentuating centrifugal tensions
between Arabo-Berber tribes in the north and black tribes in the south. Chaos or
Mauritanian desperation could provide the Soviet Union or its Cuban allies with an
opportunity to intervene.1 09
French leaders felt they must act to avert Mauritania's collapse or shift in
allegiance, but wanted to avoid broader involvement in the Western Sahara conflict.
Because Mauritania's government based its legitimacy on anti-colonialism and
engagement with the Arab world, French President Valerie Giscard-d'Estaing worried
overt French support would discredit the government France intended to consolidate.
French leaders faced a serious dilemma finding a means to covertly defeat mobile
and skilled Sahraoui attacks. Lacking easy solutions, Giscard ordered French Atlantique
anti-submarine patrol aircraft, based in Senegal, to fly reconnaissance missions over
Mauritania after three more Sahraoui attacks in July 1977.110 Using panoramic radars,
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French aircraft developed a picture of POLISARIO movements and tactics. With
Presidential authorization, the air force supplemented the Atlantique patrols with an
equally informative Mirage IV photoreconnaissance mission."U1
Four further raids in October 1977, wherein the Sahraoui kidnapped two more
French expatriates, convinced Giscard to intervene.12 With its citizens targeted and eight
already imprisoned in southern Algeria, France had to either evacuate its expatriates from
Mauritania, crippling the Mauritanian economy, or riposte.
Drawing on his private military staff, the chief of staff of the armed forces and the
service chiefs, Giscard demanded proposals for dealing with POLISARIO. After
preliminary staff work, the high command presented Giscard with three competing plans.
The Navy suggested stationing the aircraft carrier Foch off the Mauritanian coast where
its attack aircraft could retaliate against Sahraoui attacks. The chief of Giscard's private
military staff, General Claude Vambremeersch, argued for sending France's rapid
response paratroop battalion, the 3 Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment (RPIMa), to
protect Zouerate and the railway. Finally, the Air Force proposed sending a squadron of
Jaguar fighter-bombers to Dakar, Senegal, whence it could intervene against
POLISARIO columns. Table IV below illustrates the options presented to Giscard.
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Table IV:
Options for Mauritania Intervention
Prot~ osal
Paratroops to defend
railway
Aircraft carrier in
international waters
Airstrikes launched
from Senegal
A dvanta es
- Proven in past
interventions
Disadvantages
- Presence in Mauritania
- Casualties likely
- Intervention visible
Army
Navy
Air Force
ly
The presence of army officers, Generals Guy Mdry and Claude Vambremeersch,
at the head of both the inter-service joint staff and Giscard's Private Military Staff
favored the use of paratroops. Vambremeersch was so confident in his proposal that he
ordered the 3rd Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment to prepare to deploy.1 13 Giscard,
however, ruled-out the deployment of paratroops, whose presence would be impossible to
conceal and probably result in French casualties. The Navy's alternative kept French
soldiers out of harm's way and minimized France's presence in Mauritania, but an aircraft
carrier was costly and lacked discretion, inviting criticism from domestic and
international opponents. Finally, the air force proposal had the advantages of minimizing
French casualties and being comparatively discreet and economic. However, excepting
air force officers, military leaders doubted that air power based in Senegal would be
effective.
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- Proximity to coast - Visible and cos
renders air strikes
effective
- Minimal presence - Success judged
in Mauritania improbable
- Discretion
- Maximizes political
control
e_ p_ gS rvice
Naval aircraft could deploy offshore from Nouadibou, the terminus of the
beleaguered railway and quickly respond to attacks on Zouerate, which was less than 650
kilometers distant. Contrarily, air force jets had to traverse at least 1,100 kilometers--
requiring two aerial refuelings--before they reached the scene of an attack. In the
meantime, rebels would have every chance of escaping. 114 Nothing like the air force's
proposed strategy had been attempted and many doubted whether it would work.
Weighing the alternatives, Giscard adopted the air force's proposal. Using air
power rather than ground forces maximized Giscard's political control as he could direct
individual operations via the Center of Military Operation's state-of-the-art
telecommunications equipment."5 Air forces based in Senegal under a false pretext were
also discreet, shielding both France and Mauritania from a backlash in public or
international opinion. In his final decision, Giscard privileged political expediency over
military efficiency.'' 6
Because of the political delicateness of the situation, Minister of Defense Yvon
Bourges appointed General Michel Forget, deputy commander of French tactical air
forces (FATAC). After serving as Chief of Bourges' Military Cabinet, Forget had a good
working relationship with the Minister, who felt that he possessed the necessary
flexibility and political judgment for the assignment." 7
In November 1977, Forget's small air armada, eventually consisting of 23 aircraft,
trickled into Dakar. Initially, Forget possessed six Jaguar fighter bombers, in addition to
transport, aerial refueling and maritime reconnaissance aircraft.1"8 While most French
forces assembled in Senegal, Forget and a small staff installed themselves in Nouakchott,
Mauritania, where Forget stationed his two flying command posts. To guard the secret of
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the mission, Forget and his staff traveled to Mauritania in civilian clothing, under cover
as councilors to the French Embassy.1 19
Besides Forget and his staff, France deployed one other unit to Mauritania itself.
Having seen its proposal to send a paratroop battalion rejected, the Army nonetheless
convinced Bourges to include a small detachment from a special forces regiment (the 13
Parachute Dragoons Regiment or 13 RDP) specialized in covert reconnaissance
missions. With the Air Force manifestly indifferent to their presence, the approximately
100 elite soldiers of the 13th RDP established four observation posts designed to inform
Parisian decision makers of POLISARIO and Mauritanian Army movements.120 Table V
below shows the components of France's intervention.'2
Table V:
Forces Deployed, Mauritania 1977-78
Service Means Based
Air Force 6-10 Jaguar Fighter-Bombers Senegal
2 C135F airborne refuelling aircraft Senegal
2 C-160 airborne command posts Mauritania
Navy 4-5 Atlantique maritime reconnaissance Senegal
aircraft
Army Four observation posts (<100 personnel) Mauritania
1-2 helicopters (pilot rescue) Mauritania
Total approximately 350 personnel and 23 aircraft
In parallel to military deployments, Giscard and the Foreign Ministry attempted to
resolve France's dispute with POLISARIO diplomatically, via the intermediary of
Algeria's President Houari Boumediene. From November to January, France
dispatched a succession of intermediaries to convince Boumediene to release the eight
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French hostages and persuade POLISARIO to abandon attacks on Zouerate and the
Zouerate-Nouadibou railway.' 23
To synchronize military strikes and diplomatic initiatives, Giscard insisted on
controlling both. From a military point of view, Forget had carte blanche to fly
reconnaissance flights and launch fighter-bombers. However, Giscard reserved the right
to decide whether to open fire. In Paris, the Center for Military Operations would receive
General Forget's reports. From the Center, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces,
General Mdry, had to call the Chief of Giscard's Private Military Staff, General
Vambremeersch. Vambremeersch, in turn, had to seek Giscard's permission to bomb.
Once Giscard made a decision, Vambremeersch, Mdry and Forget had to relay the order
to attack to the Jaguar fighter-bombers already in flight.' 24
When POLISARIO's next attack came, on 2 December, the Atlantique patrol
aircraft detected the Sahraoui column after Mauritanian authorities signaled its attack. 125
As planned, Forget vectored France's Jaguars towards the column. The Atlantique
maintained a radar lock on the Sahraoui column, the Jaguars succeeded in refueling three
times en route to the target and Forget's communications links functioned impeccably.
However, Giscard still hoped to resolve the Mauritanian problem diplomatically, without
using force. When the Jaguars were poised to attack, Giscard ordered them to desist.1 26
Instead of assaulting the POLISARIO column, the Jaguars flew photoreconnaissance
passes over the Sahraoui vehicles and fired a warning shot in front of the lead
POLISARIO vehicle.12 7
Perplexed at not receiving permission to fire, General Forget nonetheless drew
valuable lessons.128 The Atlantiques could not detect POLISARIO movements prior to a
550
raid, but once Mauritanian authorities signaled an attack, it became comparatively easy
for the Atlantiques to follow the raider's subsequent movements. Meanwhile, the photos
taken by the Jaguars revealed that the Sahraoui possessed formidable anti-aircraft
weapons, including twin 14.5mm canons and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles.129
Not intimidated by the warning shot, the Sahraoui renewed their attacks on the
Zouerate-Nouadibou railway ten days later, on 12 December. At mid-morning, a
POLISARIO column of 43 vehicles raided an iron-ore train, massacring Mauritanian
workers and burning the damaged train. 130 Alerted, Forget went airborne in his command
post and ordered the Jaguars to take off.131 However, as the fighter-bombers approached
their target, Paris delayed giving Forget a definite order to attack.
Unbeknownst to Forget, France's Ambassador to Algeria was at that instant
negotiating with President Boumediene. Giscard refused to authorize an attack until he
knew Boumediene's response. If the Ambassador secured a diplomatic solution,
Boumediene would view an air strike as an affront and possibly backtrack. In the event,
Boumediene proved intractable. When he exited his meeting, the French Ambassador
contacted Giscard's staff to report. Informed of the failed diplomatic effort, General
Vambremeersch, the Chief of Giscard's Private Military Cabinet, telephoned Giscard's
portable telephone. Driving when the call arrived, Giscard's automobile entered a tunnel
as General Vambremeersch explained the situation. After several long minutes of
silence, Giscard ordered an attack.13 2
After waiting for what seemed an eternity, Forget received permission to attack.
Evening was fast approaching and the Jaguars had burned much of their fuel. Beginning
their attack at 5 pm, the Jaguars strafed the column at 500 knots. Whenever they hit, the
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Jaguars' canons ignited the POLISARIO vehicles. In a matter of minutes, the Jaguars
destroyed a quarter of the POLISARIO column, whose defensive fire failed to hit any of
the French aircraft.133
Although the Jaguars mauled the POLISARIO column, the advanced hour
prevented them from rearming and returning before nightfall. However, the Atlantiques
managed to track the Sahraoui raiders throughout the night. Knowing that the surviving
raiders had driven 300 kilometers, but were still far from their Algerian sanctuaries,
Forget ordered the Jaguars airborne at dawn.134 After a flight of 1,200 kilometers, the
Jaguars reached the raiders at mid-morning on 13 December. By denying permission to
attack, Giscard disappointed the pilots eager to finish what they had begun the previous
evening.
No sooner were the Jaguars on the ground, than Paris abruptly changed its mind,
ordering an attack. With the order to attack arriving at 3 pm, barely enough daylight
remained (three hours) to refuel, rearm and overtake the Sahraoui raiders, who were now
1,350 kilometers from Dakar. Divided into two patrols, the first Jaguars reached their
prey at 5:20 pm, while the follow-on wave arrived at twilight (6 pm). By the time they
finished their attacks, an additional 20 POLISARIO vehicles were aflame.1 35
Over the course of two days, the Jaguars destroyed two-thirds of the vehicles
comprising the Sahraoui raiding force. If not for Paris' slowness in authorizing an attack
on 12 December and its refusal to order on the morning of 13 December, the
POLISARIO column would have been annihilated. As it was, its decimated remnants
skulked back to Algeria under the cover of darkness.
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Impressed by France's destruction of the POLISARIO column, Boumediene
decided to release French hostages, but opted to embarrass Giscard in the process. On 13
December, the day of the Jaguars' second attack, Boumediene contacted the head of the
French Communist Party, Georges Marchais. After a long meeting, Marchais,
announcing that he "wanted to publicly resolve the matter of the French hostages taken at
Zouerate."136 The next day, Boumediene declared that he would release the hostages
before Christmas. After helping the French Communist Party take credit for the
liberation of the hostages, Boumediene invited Socialist leader Frangois Mitterrand to
Algiers, to whom he perhaps intended to entrust the hostages.
When the Sahraoui launched their next attack, on 18 December, Giscard wasted
no time in ordering the Jaguars to attack. Having learned from their prior woes, the
Sahraoui raiders responded swiftly, filling the sky with lead and sending several SA-7
missiles skywards. The Sahraoui anti-aircraft barrage damaged four or five of the
Jaguars, including one badly enough that it crash-landed at Nouadibou. In return, the
Jaguars destroyed half the POLISARIO column of 50 vehicles.138
The mauling of this second raiding force, coupled with France's display of
resolve, convinced Boumediene to hand the eight hostages to United Nations Secretary
General Kurt Waldheim, on 23 December, rather than offer them to French opposition
politicians. For its part, POLISARIO changed tactics, substituting small sabotage actions
for the large motorized raiding forces that provoked French intervention. 139
France did not respond to POLISARIO's lower intensity attacks, including a 30-
vehicle raid on the Mauritanian garrison at Choum, and General Forget returned to Paris,
replaced by the lower ranking Brigadier-General Maffre.14 0 Now that the hostages had
553
been released, Algerian and Sahraoui leaders doubted whether France would respond to
renewed motorized raids on Zouerate. On 2 May 1978, a motorized Sahraoui raiding
force set out once again for the railway. However, POLISARIO underestimated Giscard,
who order the Jaguars to attack. On 2 and 3 May, the Jaguars pounded the Sahraoui
column, inflicting losses similar to those visited on the two previous columns.1
After this raid, POLISARIO ceased attacking Zouerate and the railway. Having
avoided involvement in the broader dispute over the Western Sahara, France contented
itself with this victory. Deploying no more than 350 military personnel and suffering no
casualties, France's triumph was one of the most economic in military history. With
diplomacy and air strikes, France obtained the release of its imprisoned citizens and
demonstrated both its willingness to defend its economic interests. Expatriates remained
at Zouerate and French industry continued to consume its iron ore. Thanks in part to its
revenues from Zouerate, Mauritania survived as a unified state. 4 2
Considering the results, France's intervention in Mauritania was an exemplar of
political-military integration. Drawing on parallel chains of command, Giscard extracted
three proposals for how France should intervene. After careful debate, it emerged that air
strikes mounted from Senegal best met his criteria of discretion, limited force and a high
degree of political control. Once the intervention began, Giscard's centralization of
military and diplomatic decisions in his own hands permitted him to coordinate
overlapping political and military initiatives.
While France's intervention was an undeniable success, its conduct irritated
military commanders. With the exception of the air force's leadership, the high command
was skeptical of a plan that employed miniscule military means and relied on unproven
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techniques. Once the operation began, most officers objected to Giscard's
micromanagement. They viewed ordering air strikes via cellular telephone as a violation
of a field commander's normal freedom of action and a sign of presidential megalomania.
As Table VI reveals, Giscard's approved half of his general's requests to attack.
Table VI:
Mauritania (1977-1978): Missions
Permission
to Attack?Date Result
12/2/77
12/12/77
12/13/77 (AM)
12/13/77 (PM)
12/18/77
1/12/78
5/2/78
No
Yes (delayed)
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Photographs of POLISARIO column
Destruction of one-quarter of column
Wasted sortie permits column to near
Algeria
Approximately 20 vehicles destroyed,
remaining third escape after nightfall
Approximately half of column destroyed,
Four to five Jaguars damaged,
hostages released (23 December)
POLISARIO column withdraws
POLISARIO column badly damaged
Not privy to the secret diplomacy occurring in Algiers, Giscard's decisions appeared
haphazard to the military establishment. Reflecting years later, Forget argued, "The need
for detailed permission from Paris is not an easy requirement to meet. A better
equilibrium must be found between the invasive demands of political decision-makers
and the need for field commanders to dispose of a minimal degree of operational
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autonomy."144 France's intervention in Mauritania succeeded, but the conditions of its
success violated military norms for how military operations ought to be managed.
IV. The Gulf War, 1990-1991
Giscard's successor, President Frangois Mitterrand, France continued intervening
in Africa and the Middle East, and displayed the same penchant for minimal force and
discretion as his predecessor. However, the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990 and 1991 posed
unique challenges because the size of the Iraqi Army obliged France to assemble its
largest expeditionary force since 1956 and the world's media scrutinized every diplomatic
and military development.145 To complicate matters further, France participated as a
junior partner in an international military operation for the first time since the 1950s. 146
Using France's parallel staff system, Mitterrand tailored France's contribution to the
coalition to support his foreign policy aims. However, politically motivated deployments
proved inappropriate in the Persian Gulf, where there was a risk of high-intensity combat,
and Paris' micro-management hindered French cooperation with allies.
On 2 August 1990, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait surprised and discomfited French
political and military leaders. Although France monitored Iraq's negotiations with
Kuwait over financial debt and the ownership of two Persian Gulf islands, it mistook
invasion preparations for political brinksmanship. Until 1990, France enjoyed a
privileged relationship with Iraq, with France's political elites viewing Baathist Iraq as a
secular and modem counterweight to the region's fundamentalist oil monarchies. 147
Considered a state receptive to French influence, in a region dominated by American,
British and Soviet interests, France had furnished Iraq with sophisticated armaments. 148
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Despite previously close relations, Mitterrand immediately condemned Iraq's
occupation of Kuwait and began struggling to resolve the crisis diplomatically. 149 To
influence the political evolution of the crisis, Mitterrand concluded that France must be
militarily present in the region. From August until October, Iraq appeared poised to
invade Saudi Arabia and needed to be deterred from this additional act of aggression.10
Without deploying to Saudi Arabia, where France had not been explicitly invited,
Mitterrand hoped to manifest France's strength and resolution. Prodded by Mitterrand,
French military planners developed two plans for creating a military presence in the
Middle East.15 ' Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Maurice Schmitt suggested
deploying a French aircraft carrier to launch retaliatory strikes should Iraq invade Saudi
Arabia. Admiral Jacques Lanxade, Chief of the President's Private Military Staff,
considered the narrow waters of the Persian Gulf too dangerous for aircraft carriers and
argued that, if the carrier were deployed to the Mediterranean, its aircraft would have to
cross Syrian or Turkish territory to strike Iraq. Lanxade proposed basing a regiment of
42 anti-tank helicopters (instead of aircraft) aboard an aircraft carrier. Afloat in the Red
Sea, the helicopter regiment could transfer to Saudi soil should Iraq invade Saudi
Arabia.15 2 Mitterrand needed no one's permission to station a warship in international
waters and France would avoid the stigma of "defiling" Saudi Arabia's soil with the
presence of infidel soldiers.
Weighing the arguments and counterarguments, Mitterrand opted for Lanxade's
solution--deploying the aircraft carrier Clemenceau to the Red Sea equipped with a
regiment of Army anti-tank helicopters. After Mitterrand gave his orders on 10 August,
the armed forces commenced their operation three days later.
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When Sheik Zaid of the United Arab Emirates expressed fears of an Iraqi bid for
hegemony over the Arabian Peninsula, the Foreign Ministry argued that France should
militarily reassure a longtime ally. At first, the French Army planned to send American-
made Stinger missiles for air defense. Arguing that France would thereby miss an
opportunity to export weaponry, the General Delegation for Armaments (DGA) wanted
to send a French surface-to-air missile--the MATRA Mistral--despite its suffering
development problems and not yet being in service.153 Privileging commercial prospects
over military efficiency, the government ordered the Mistrals deployed.
While Mitterrand was content with his strategic choices, French journalists and
newspapers misconstrued the government's actions. Rather than signaling France's
willingness to defend Saudi Arabia, they editorialized the dispatch of a helicopter carrier
to the Red Sea as mere posturing. To remain credible, the French government began, in
late August, studying means of reinforcing France's presence in the Persian Gulf and
contributing to Saudi Arabia's defense.
Hoping to minimize the political costs of deploying military forces, Mitterrand
specified that France could not send conscripts.'5 4 Working within Mitterrand's limits,
General Schmitt recommended deploying a brigade drawn from the 6 h Light Armored
Division, which was France's most powerful non-conscript unit.155 Largely professional
(see chapter on French doctrine) and equipped with wheeled armored vehicles, the 6 th
Light Armored Division was logistically and politically simple to deploy, and could
participate meaningfully in a defensive battle against armored divisions. 5 6
Focused on sending a light armored brigade, Schmitt neglected to examine air
options. The head of Prime Minister's Michel Rocard's Military Cabinet, General Menu,
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argued that France should privilege air power. Seizing on Menu's logic, Air Force Chief
of Staff General Jean Fleury suggested Mitterrand appoint an air force general to
command French forces in Saudi Arabia.15 7
Faced with proposals for predominantly land and air deployments, Mitterrand
compromised, sending a mixture of land and air forces under the command of an army
general, with an air force deputy.158 While French planning progressed, Iraq maladroitly
provided a pretext for Mitterrand to deploy these forces. On 14 September, the Iraqi
Army violated international law in seizing France's embassy in Kuwait. French public
indignation swelled against Iraq and Saudi Arabia invited Mitterrand to deploy a
contingent. 159 The French government decided to deploy the army brigade and air
contingent, comprising a total of 5,700 personnel (detailed in table VII) the next day.160
Table VII:
French Forces Deployed to Saudi Arabia September to November 1990
Component Personnel
Ground Component (Wadi al-Batin) 4,294
72 AMX-10 RC (light tank / armored car)
65 helicopters (40 anti-tank Gazelles, 25 other)
24 long-range anti-tank missile vehicles (VAB-HOT)
Air Component (Al Ahsa base) 614
Logistics Component 635
Headquarters (Riyadh) 209
Total French Contingent 5,752
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On 17 September, Mitterrand appointed General Michel Roquejoeffre as overall
commander of French forces in Saudi Arabia.
While Mitterrand believed that France must participate in both the defense of
Saudi Arabia and the eventual liberation of Kuwait, he mistrusted American aims.'61
French policymakers suspected that the United States preferred to liberate Kuwait
militarily, crushing Iraq's military potential, rather than permit Iraq to negotiate a face-
saving withdrawal.16 2 French diplomats hoped to stop the slide to war and feared that
military subordination to the United States would hinder France's diplomatic effort.
Reconciling the government's desire for military autonomy with the practical
requirement for some form of integration fell on General Schmitt and Defense Minister
Chevenement, who traveled to Saudi Arabia on 15 September. Both Americans and
Saudis expected the French to join the American command structure and reserved
facilities for them.163 To everybody's surprise, the French demanded complete autonomy.
Unable to convince the French to join a coalition structure, Saudi commander General
Kaled ben-Sultan suggested the French land at Yanbu--Saudi Arabia's furthest port from
Kuwait--where French forces would remain out-of-the-way, but contribute nothing to the
coalition. 164
Deploying to Yanbu postponed, rather than solved the delicate matter of France's
integration in the coalition. Hoping to maximize France's leverage and advance Europe's
integration, Mitterrand proposed that France and the United Kingdom form an
autonomous European contingent in Saudi Arabia. After the British rejected Mitterrand's
initiative, France had no choice but join either the American or the Saudi command
structure. Believing it less onerous, the French accepted nominal Saudi authority.'66
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Studying allied military dispositions, General Schmitt proposed a formula that
maximized de facto French autonomy. Defending critical air and port facilities at Jubail
and Dahran, the Americans left the direct route from Kuwait City to the Saudi capital
Riyadh virtually unguarded. Schmitt therefore proposed using France's brigade to cover
Riyadh, where, isolated by 150 kilometers of desert from other coalition forces, save one
Saudi brigade, the French remained virtually independent.167 Both American and Saudi
authorities accepted Schmitt's proposal, which gainfully employed the French while
satisfying their political requirements. 168 Meanwhile, the French concluded a similar
arrangement for their air forces.169 By expanding and modernizing the small unused
airfield at Al Ahsa, the French remained distinct from the massive Anglo-American force
at Dahran.170
Having preserved French military autonomy, Mitterrand prepared his diplomatic
offensive.' 7 French strategy rested on condemning Iraq's aggression, using the United
Nations to apply military and economic pressure, and negotiating Iraq's peaceful
withdrawal from Kuwait.17 2 Seeking to orchestrate a face-saving compromise that would
permit Iraq to evacuate Kuwait without losing domestic and international credibility,
French diplomats hoped the promise of an international conference on the Israel-Palestine
problem would provide Iraq with a pretext to declare victory for the broader Arab cause
and evacuate Kuwait. 7 3
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas and Defense Minister Chevenement proposed
holding an international conference on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict after Iraq's
withdrawal from Kuwait. Mitterrand later suggested a series of conferences on Middle
Eastern disputes, including Israel/Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq/Kuwait. France conveyed
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similar messages to Iraq via two of France's traditional allies in the Arab World--Algeria
and Morocco--and numerous high-level emissaries. 7 4 In its final formulation, the French
proposal comprised four elements: 1) Iraq should declare its intention to evacuate
Kuwait, 2) the coalition would halt its military preparations, 3) Iraq would withdraw from
Kuwait, and 4) the international conferences would begin.17 5
Unfortunately, Baghdad proved no more receptive to France's proposals for a
face-saving withdrawal than it had to American threats or Arab mediation. Instead, Iraq
seized on France's less bellicose rhetoric to attempt to divide the coalition. Having
retained western expatriates as hostages, Iraq released French hostages on 23 October to
placate France and sow discord between it and other coalition members, whose citizens
remained imprisoned. However, preferential treatment of French hostages exercised no
impact on national policy and France's military buildup continued.176
While France struggled for a diplomatic solution, coalition military planners
doubted their ability to repel an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia, until the American Army's
first mechanized division, the 24th Mechanized Division, arrived in early October.177
Defending a secondary invasion corridor, the military threat facing the French diminished
more slowly than in the American zone, remaining critical until 15 October.178
As Iraq's opportunity to attack waned, coalition military planners began
examining the liberation of Kuwait. At President's Bush's behest, American military
planners began studying offensive military operations in early October. Unfortunately,
the French government's refusal to integrate with American forces and micro-
management of its forces impeded France from participating in or influencing the
planning process. Despite American offers of a seat in the planning staff, General
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Roquejoeffre could neither commit French forces to a given mission without Paris'
permission nor sanction an operational plan that his political superiors had not
approved.179
After discussions between American planners and the Pentagon, on 9 November,
President Bush announced his decision to reinforce American forces for the land
offensive. 180 The American decision to double the size of its contingent was followed, on
29 November, by the United Nations Security Council's adoption of Resolution 678,
authorizing the coalition to liberate Kuwait after 15 January 1991.181
The American buildup raised the question of how France would participate in the
offensive. After the United States announced its troop increases, other coalition partners
did likewise.1 82 If its contribution was to remain politically significant, France had to
increase its military presence in the Middle East. Without possessing detailed knowledge
of American military plans being prepared, General Roquejoeffre studied how French
forces could participate in an allied offensive.183 France's light armored division had the
speed and firepower for a battle of movement, but lacked the heavy armor and artillery to
defeat fortified enemy positions or engage Iraq's elite armored divisions. Roquejoeffre
concluded that his forces could execute reconnaissance, flank guard or exploitation
missions, but not conduct a frontal assault on Iraqi defenses.
France's dilemma of deciding how to participate in Kuwait's liberation became
more acute in early December, when the United States briefed France on its war plans.
According to American planners, United States Marines and Arab forces would attack the
heart of Iraq's defenses in Kuwait, to lure Iraqi reserves to the southeast.'84 Then, the
main attack--by the armored forces of the American VII Corps--would strike the Iraqi
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defenses in a giant left-hook, hopefully surrounding Iraqi forces in Kuwait 15 To protect
the coalition's flank, the light forces of the American XVIII Corps would conduct a
massive sweep westwards of the main attack, overwhelming scattered Iraqi forces and
blocking road junctions against a counterattack launched from Baghdad.186 Now
informed of American plans, France had to decide how it would participate in the
coalition's overall strategy.
From the outset, French leaders disagreed on where they should make their
effort.' 87 Defense Minister Chevenement wanted to join the Arab offensive into Kuwait,
emphasizing France's independence vis-a-vis the United States, its close ties with the
Arab world and its benign intentions towards Iraq. Admiral Lanxade contradicted
Chevenement, proposing that France should participate in the main attack, where its
engagement would be most appreciated and remarked. Uncomfortable with Lanxade's
reasoning, General Schmitt argued that France's light armored forces were best suited to
XVIII Corps' flank protection mission.'88 Table VIII, below, illustrates the competing
options for how French forces would participate in the coalition offensive.
Table VIII:
Options for Participating in Coalition Offensive
Coalition Forces Mission Supporters
Joint Forces Command - Liberation of Kuwait Defense Minister Chevenement
(Arab) - Diversionary Attack
VII Armored Corps - Main Attack Admiral Lanxade
XVIII Airborne Corps - Flank Attack General Schmitt
Roquejoeffre to prepare three distinct plans. Mitterrand lengthily pondered the three
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alternatives (presented on 6 December) before committing France's division to the XVIII
Corps offensive.189 While sensitive to military advice, Mitterrand's choice was shaped by
political calculations. By operating on the coalitions' westernmost edge, French forces
would possess a greater autonomy and would only encounter second-line Iraqi units.
French would keep its casualties to a minimum and have the cache of operating deep
inside Iraq.190
French leaders now faced the question of determining the forces that would
participate. As the coalition's military buildup continued, French policymakers feared
that their own contingent would appear trivial if not reinforced to divisional size, as the
United Kingdom had already done. 191 Although sending a division appears simple at first
glance, its exact size and composition were soon subject to lively debate. All agreed to
send an additional light armored battalion, motorized infantry battalion, helicopter
regiment and artillery battalion. Ideally, Mitterrand wanted to send 10,000 personnel,
including those already in Saudi Arabia, and refused to exceed 15,000. As former
paratroops, Schmitt and Roquejoeffre pushed to include a powerful paratroop formation
in France's order of battle. Roquejoeffre went so far as negotiating Schwarzkopf's loan of
192American helicopters to carry French paratroops in an air assault on Nassiriyah.
Coming from France's Rhine Army, Army Chief of Staff General Alain Forray
pleaded with Mitterrand to send a tank battalion. Forray worried that exclusion from the
largest intervention since 1956 would demoralize France's armored and mechanized
forces. To bolster his argument, Forray created France's first professional tank battalion
out of cadre and volunteers drawn from a plethora of separate units. Having begun this
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process in October, Forray had a deployable, albeit makeshift battalion to offer
Mitterrand in December.193
Weighing the conflicting recommendations of his military commanders,
Mitterrand ordered Forray to send his tank battalion, but refused Roquejoeffre's request
for paratroops.194 Counting all reinforcements, France's total force peaked at 14,708
troops, just short of Mitterrand's ceiling of 15,000.195 Over three times larger than its
September and October deployments, France's Gulf War contingent, detailed in table VIII
below, was the largest it had employed since 1956 and the coalition's fifth overall (after
the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Kingdom).196
Table IX:
French Forces Present in Saudi Arabia, January 1991
% Increase
Component Personnel over November
Ground Component 9,541 122%
96 AMX-10 RC (light tank / armored car)
60 anti-tank Gazelle helicopters
44 AMX-30B2 main battle tanks
24 long-range anti-tank missile vehicles (VAB-HOT)
18 towed 155mm howitzers (TR Fl)
12 ERC-90 Armored Cars
Air Component (Al Ahsa base) 1,780 190%
26 Jaguar Fighter-Bombers
14 Mirage 2000 Fighters
4 Mirage F1CR Photo-Reconnaissance Aircraft
Logistics Component 2,573 305%
Headquarters (Riyadh) 350 67%
Total French Contingent 14,708 156%
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By the expiration of the United Nations embargo on 15 January, Mitterrand possessed a
military force in Saudi Arabia designed, down to the selection of each battalion, to serve
France's political aims.'97
In a final triumph of political principle over military expediency, Mitterrand
promised that the international coalition would not use nuclear weapons, regardless of
Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons. Mitterrand's proclamation flew in the face
of American strategy and French military advice, which aimed to deter Iraqi chemical or
biological attack with threats of nuclear reprisals. Although conscious of the risk of
coalition casualties, Mitterrand considered preserving the nuclear taboo more important
than preventing Iraq from using other forms of weapons of mass destruction.'98
Having demonstrated France's independence by undermining the United States'
deterrent, France's government braced for its final efforts to negotiate a diplomatic
solution. Although Mitterrand believed that war could not be averted, he ceded to
Foreign Minister Dumas' demand for France to attempt once again to parley Iraq's
withdrawal from Kuwait.199 In Mitterrand's televised New Years Eve speech, the French
president reiterated his call for international conferences to address crucial Middle
Eastern issues, including Iraq/Kuwait, Israel/Palestine and the foreign occupation of
Lebanon. Shortly thereafter, Mitterrand's envoy to Baghdad promised Iraq a series of
face-saving international conferences after it evacuated Kuwait.200
Faced with Saddam Hussein's intransigence, Mitterrand made a final effort, on 14
January, to save a former regional ally from destruction. Proposing that Iraq's willingness
to evacuate Kuwait should be linked to an international conference on the Palestinian
question, Mitterrand infuriated the United States and offered Iraq the most favorable
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conditions he could expect on the eve of war. Overly confident in his armed forces,
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein only rewarded France's efforts with diplomatic silence.
After the failure of France's final diplomatic effort, the coalition unleashed its
massive air offensive on 17 January. During the first days of the air offensive, Mitterrand
still hoped that Iraq's evacuation could be negotiated and, therefore, acceded to Defense
Minister Chevenement's proposal that French aircraft only strike targets in Kuwait and
not Iraq.202 Because neither France's allies nor domestic public opinion understood the
reasons for French restraint, Schmitt and Lanxade persuaded Mitterrand to lift the ban
after five days. 203
During the air offensive, French aircraft conducted 2,100 sorties, or two percent
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of the coalition's total. After France's first disastrous air raid, where four out of 12
Jaguar fighter bombers were damaged, Iraqi air defenses failed to inflict meaningful
damage. Meanwhile, the Jaguar's niche capability to strike high value targets with AS-
20530L laser guided missiles led American planners to repeatedly call upon them.
To compensate for reinforcements that France either could not or would not send,
Schwarzkopf reinforced France's light armored division--code named the Daguet
Division--with an American paratroop brigade, two artillery brigades and a multiple
rocket launcher battalion.206 Once the coalition land offensive began on 24 February,
France's light armored division cut through the defenses of Iraq's 4 5th Infantry Division.
Under-strength, but reputedly combative and comparatively intact, the 45th Division
207defended its sector as best it could with approximately 40 tanks and 30 artillery pieces.
Divided into two columns, one heavy based around the tanks of the 4th Dragoons and one
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light centered on the wheeled AMX- 1ORCs, French forces simultaneously struck the
center and flank of the Iraqi defenses. 208
Beginning at 9:30 am on 24 February, French tanks and infantry assaulted the
Iraqi 4 5th Division's entrenched front line brigades (supported by 11 dug-in tanks and 18
artillery pieces) from oblique angles via the southeast.209 Although Iraqi artillery
attempted to riposte, the speed of the French advance meant that their shells fell
harmlessly in the desert.210 By 1:00 pm, the Iraqi front line broke, obliging the French to
spend the rest of the day collecting over 2,000 prisoners of war.21
The following day witnessed the climax of France's ground offensive. Before
dawn, French and Iraqi artillery sprang to life. Then, French tanks and infantry overran
212the Iraqi artillery pieces. Faced with the final disintegration of their combat position,
the Iraqi 45th Division's armored reserve charged into the fray with ten tanks and assorted
armored vehicles. Once detected, two French tank platoons intercepted and annihilated
the Iraqi armor before the Iraqis could fire a single shot.213
After the French heavy column overran the 45th Division's forward defenses, the
lighter French column surged from the desert, striking the final French objective, the
Iraqi As Salman airbase. Combat groups comprised of foreign legionnaires and armored
cars stormed the airbase after a two-hour artillery bombardment, destroying Iraqi
214
automatic canons, machine guns and a solitary Type-69 tank. Fleeing or hiding, the
airfield's demoralized defenders offered no resistance.m
By the end of 25 February, French forces had accomplished all of their military
objectives, a full day before originally planned. Occupying As Salman, France's light
armored division was well placed to protect the international coalition's western flank. In
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barely 36 hours, the French had advanced 150 kilometers and destroyed the Iraqi 4 5th
Infantry Division, despite the latter's best efforts to resist. By the end of the ground war,
216the French captured over 3,000 Iraqi prisoners and seized 5,000 Iraqi small arms.
For France, the 1991 Gulf War ended in an incontestable military victory. As
may be seen, overarching political concerns marked every stage in France's preparation
for war. Sending a helicopter carrier, Roquejoeffre's appointment, the deployment of
forces astride the Wadi al-Batin, the reinforcements dispatched in December and France's
participation in the XVIII Corps' flanking maneuver were all political decisions taken by
President Mitterrand himself. Weighing the conflicting recommendations advanced by
his military advisors, Mitterrand chose those options that advanced his foreign policy
goals of contributing to the coalition, manifesting France's independence and facilitating
a diplomatic solution. Table X below illustrates the recommendations tendered to
Mitterrand by military advisors and the Minister of Defense and Mitterrand's ultimate
choices.
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Sources of Advice
Table X:
Alternative Advice and Mitterrand's Choices
Retained Options in Italics
Initial Commander December
Denlovment of Exnedition Reinforcements
Chief of Staff of
Armed Forces
Chief of President's
Private Military Staff
Field Commander
(Roquejoeffre)
Minister of Defense
Army Chief
Air Force Chief
Aircraft Carrier Army General Two paratroop
battalions
Helicopter Carrier . . ..
Two paratroop
battalions
Tank Battalion
Flanking attack
(XVIII Corps)
Main attack
(VII Corps)
Flanking attack
(XVIII Corps)
Operations only
in Kuwait
Air Force General
Mitterrand Choices Helicopter
Carrier
Army General Tank Battalion Flanking attack
(XVIII Corps)
More rarely, in two instances--France's categorical declaration against the use of nuclear
weapons and his restriction of bombing to Kuwait--Mitterrand privileged suggestions of
his civilian advisors over united military opposition.
Although Mitterrand succeeded in integrating every military deployment and
action into his overall political strategy, France's military means did not optimally serve
its political ends. There is strong evidence that France's carefully calculated military
actions failed to send the signals and exert the influence that Mitterrand intended. In a
crisis that witnessed hundreds of thousands of American troops deploying to deter, then
defeat hundreds of thousands of Iraqi troops, international statesmen neither knew nor
cared why France sent a helicopter carrier rather than an aircraft carrier, or deployed to
the Al Ahsa instead of Dahran. Worse still, French actions lent themselves to
misinterpretation. Critics Mitterrand's decision to send a helicopter carrier as a sign of
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Military
Plan
.
. . .
.
France's hesitancy to act forcefully, rather than its willingness to participate in Saudi
Arabia's defense. Later, France's autonomous military posture enticed Iraq to try to
entice France into leaving the coalition.
When it came to operating alongside allies accustomed to delegating greater
power to their field commanders, Paris' micro-management of French military plans and
deployments weakened France's influence within the military coalition. Although
Schwarzkopf was predisposed to give the French an important role, Roquejoeffre's
inability to integrate or commit French forces prohibited the French from exercising any
influence on planning and relegated their forces to the coalition's military periphery.217
After the war's end, American, British and Saudi generals all lamented their
difficulty working with the French. France's diplomatic initiatives and Paris' micro-
management of French tactical deployments convinced Schwarzkopf that the French
were unreliable allies, who may have even pursued a covert agenda.218 The Saudis
likewise found the French awkward partners and were frustrated at the lack of
coordination between their two forces.219 Although not collaborating directly, the British
recognized that France's decision-making process operated much differently, according
little to no autonomy to the commander in the field.
V. Conclusion
Although the three military interventions examined were undertaken under four
presidents and differed in terms of the types of operations involved, all shared certain
similarities. To paraphrase Clauswitz, French military operations were an extension of
state's foreign policy by other means. Civilian leaders shaped decisions such as how
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many troops to send, which battalions to deploy and where to conduct military
operations. By micro-managing operations, French leaders successfully integrated
diplomatic and military initiatives into a coherent ensemble. Keeping operations small,
discreet and tightly controlled, French leaders managed to intervene more frequently than
any state save the United States, whose military resources and commitments were much
greater. However, in assessing the institutional decision-making process, one must weigh
difficulties operating in international coalitions and politically motivated, yet
operationally dubious decisions against France's comparative advantages in political-
military integration and minimizing the political costs of intervention.
Political micro-management of military operations remained constant regardless
of who ruled France and the state of telecommunications. Neither de Gaulle nor
Pompidou devoted much personal attention to France's 1968-72 intervention in Chad and
telecommunications did not yet enable presidents to direct military operations from afar.
Nevertheless, by dividing responsibility for the intervention between the Military
Delegation and the civilian Mission for Administrative Reform (MRA), Paris
circumscribed the authority of its field commanders and created institutional tension
between the two bodies which advanced competing recommendations on many
occasions. By subordinating both bodies to a diplomat, leaders ensured that broad
foreign policy considerations would dominate strategy. Even so, the French government
220decided many matters directly from Paris.
After the Center for Military Operations (Centre Op6rationelle des Armies) was
established and lavishly equipped with telecommunications equipment, French presidents
meddled increasingly in operational and even tactical details. During the Mauritania
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intervention, Giscard personally ordered each air strike--on one occasion from his mobile
telephone--while supervising France's diplomatic initiatives with equal diligence. Later,
during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis, Mitterrand and his government immersed
themselves in the smallest details of French deployments, battle plans and relations with
allies. To the dismay of French generals and allies, civilian micro-management
continued into the initial phases of the air campaign.
To compensate for their deficiencies in personal military knowledge, civilian
leaders drew upon France's parallel military staffs for alternative recommendations.
During the Mauritanian intervention, Giscard chose amongst a menu of three options--
deploying a paratroop regiment, an aircraft carrier or fighter bombers--presented by
competing staffs and services. What Giscard did at the beginning of the Mauritanian
intervention, Mitterrand erected as a principle during the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis. At
every juncture, Mitterrand elicited a host of proposals, permitting him to select courses of
action consonant with France's political objectives.
Invariably, political leaders preferred certain forms of action to others. In each
intervention, the initial commitment was the minimum compatible with France's
objectives. In Chad, the two paratroop companies initially deployed proved wholly
inadequate and were later reinforced. In Mauritania, Giscard selected the smallest and
least conspicuous of the military options presented him, which succeeded contrary to the
expectations of the military establishment. During the Gulf Crisis, Mitterrand deployed
forces sized to meet his objective of ensuring a visible, yet autonomous presence.221
Politicians favored minimal force because it limited the political capital they
would likely expend during an operation. Ordinarily, political leaders gamble their
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reputations for probity and sound judgment to convince voters that the cause being
defended is just or necessary, that casualties suffered are not in vain and that the final
peace agreement will advance national interests. However, given the complexity of the
issues involved and the uncertainty of the outcomes, French presidents rarely felt
comfortable risking their political standing on military interventions. Minimizing the size
and type of forces involved constituted one means of limiting the political costs of
intervening.222
While minimal force lowered domestic political costs, it also palliated the
diplomatic difficulties of intervening. Counseled by diplomats and foreign policy
advisors, French presidents understood that forces of anti-colonialism, Arab nationalism
and pan-Islamic solidarity opposed Western interventions in Africa and the Middle East.
Keeping intervention forces deliberately small and their actions discreet lessened the
outcries raised by offended states at the United Nations, the Organization of African
223Unity and the Arab League.
Together, minimal force and political discretion permitted France to remain
exceptionally active in international affairs. France intervened more than any state save
the United States between 1958 and 1989, exceeding the Soviet Union and the United
Kingdom. 2 Table IX details many of France's more important interventions.
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Table XI:
Selected French Interventions, 1962-1995
Peak Nature Combat
Strength of Mission Deaths Result
Gabon 1964
Chad 1968-72
Mauritania, 1977-78
Chad, 1978-80
Zaire, 1978
Lebanon, 1978-79
Central Africa, 1979
Lebanon, 1982-84
Chad, 1983
Chad, 1986-87
Comoros Islands, 1990
Gulf War, 1990-91
Croatia/Bosnia. 1992-95
600
3,500
350
2,600
-1,000
1,370
~500
3,000
3,500
3,000
1,500
14,700
7,200
Regime Change
Counterinsurgency
Deterrence / Coercion
Stabilization
Hostage Rescue
UN Peacekeeping
Regime Change
Peace Enforcement
Deterrence / Defense
Deterrence
Coercion/Regime Change
Conventional Combat
UN Peacekeeping
2
39
0
18
5
> 2
0
88
14
1
0
2
20
Mean (sample of 13) 15 69% successes,
31% failures
As may be seen, France conducted a disproportionate number of interventions, most of
which remained of modest size. Through its interventions, France shaped international
affairs, protecting friendly regimes, defending economic interests, overthrowing enemies
and manifesting France's commitment to certain states.2 25
576
Location
~3,290
success
qualified success
success
failure
success
failure
success
qualified failure
qualified success
success
success
success
qualified failure
,
The ability to remain discreet, limit losses and maintain tight political control
enabled French leaders to intervene in circumstances when their foreign counterparts
would not. However, the flip side of minimum force is that French forces sometimes
lacked the resources needed to accomplish the objectives fixed for them. With only half
of France's interventions unqualified successes and a third failures, greater publicity and
numbers involved would have embarrassed politicians and hindered their ability to use
force in the future.
Despite the limited means, French interventions accomplished their objectives
more often than not because military operations were well integrated into a broader effort
along with diplomatic and political initiatives. France rarely sought to impose its will by
defeating enemy military forces, but used force to: add weight to deterrent threats,
complicate an adversary's calculations, give courage to friendly regimes and confer
urgency to negotiations.226 In Chad, military force acted in synergy with diplomatic,
administrative and developmental efforts to halt the insurgency's military progress,
deprive it of external support and turn the peasantry against the rebellion. During the
Mauritanian intervention, the deft combination of air strikes and negotiations
accomplished France's objectives at negligible cost. In other cases as well, armed forces
and diplomacy combined to produce results unobtainable by either acting alone.
Not only was force frequently an adjunct to diplomacy, but French leaders viewed
military force as a sine qua non for participating in diplomatic processes. Such was the
case in Lebanon, the Persian Gulf and the former Yugoslavia, when France sent military
forces with the expectation that its voice would therefore carry greater weight
negotiations.
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If France generally proved capable of conducting an inordinate number of
interventions and carrying most forward to a successful conclusion, its policymaking
institutions nonetheless betrayed distinct weaknesses. Excessive political interference in
operational matters negatively impacts the military effectiveness of French forces.
Comparatively unimportant in low-intensity operations, every reduction in military
efficiency counts in high-intensity combat against a determined adversary.
In Chad, the misguided decision to halt operations during negotiations with the
Derdef robbed French forces of their sole chance of defeating the Toubou rebellion.
Unable to participate in Saudi Arabia's defense while at Yanbu and lacking a clear
protocol for collaborating with the Saudis thereafter, France's politically motivated
deployments could have spelled disaster had the Iraqis attacked during the coalition's
build-up in the Persian Gulf.227 Political decisions to send Mistral, instead of Stinger,
missiles, and renounce nuclear retaliation against chemical or biological attacks,
sacrificed military security in a way that could have proven tragic against a more
enterprising and able foe.
Political micro-management of military operations also hindered France's ability
to collaborate with allies. Because France's policymaking process centralizes decision-
making in the hands of political leaders in Paris, who must select amongst the rival
options presented by parallel staffs, field commanders possess comparatively little
freedom when dealing with their foreign homologues. Working besides foreign
commanders who can make operational decisions on their own, the need to constantly
refer matters to Paris negatively impacts both the overall flexibility of the coalition as
well and French commanders military influence within allied councils. During the
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Persian Gulf Crisis (1990-91) these factors frustrated coalition partners, reduced France's
sway over planning and introduced unneeded military risks. In this context, it is not
surprising that three out of the four French failures (Lebanon in 1978-79 and 1982-84,
and the former Yugoslavia) listed in Table XI involved coalitions, while eight out of its
228
nine successes were essentially national efforts.
When United States Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger and General Colin
Powell published their doctrine on military interventions, they emphasized the use of
overwhelming force to achieve clear military goals, before withdrawing according to a
pre-established plan. Drawing on scant resources, but adroitly combining minimal force
with diplomacy, France achieved success time-after-time while disobeying every stricture
of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine.
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poorly despite their generally low intellectual level."
Cortadellas quickly formed the opinion that the Chadian Army's three colonels,
Malloum, Odingar and Djogo, posed a threat to the regime and opposed France's role in
Chad. Djogo was considered the least dangerous and was temporarily neutralized by
being sent to Paris, for the Ecole de Guerre. Malloum, rightly, was considered the most
dangerous. Malloum ultimately mounted a coup d'dtat in 1975.
While Chadians could provide significant manpower, Cortadellas believed that
higher quality French forces were needed for mobile offensive operations. During the
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establish a military presence throughout Algeria (known as "quadrillage" or gridding).
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self-defense units prevented the FLN from terrorizing or establishing a presence in pro-
French villages. The self-defense forces, also known as "harkis," numbered up to
200,000.
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becoming evident to the world at large." Deploying a fighter-bomber squadron to Dakar
would be relatively discreet. French military forces would operate from Senegalese
rather than Mauritanian territory, and could disguise their deployment under the cover of
pre-arranged exercises in Senegal and the Ivory Coast. SHAT 3 K 4 Entretien avec
Gdndral Guy Mdry, 11 December 1996.
117 Interview with General Michel Forget, Paris, 26 January 2006; and Guisnel,
21.
118 Forget's forces comprised 6 (later 12) Jaguars fighter-bombers, two C-160
Transall aircraft equipped to serve as flying command posts, two KC-135 aerial re-
fueling aircraft, two Puma helicopters and four (later 5) Breguet Atlantique maritime
reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to the 16 to 23 aircraft, a unit of French Commandos
de l'Air (Air Commandos) was deployed to Dakar to protect the aircraft. SHAT 3 K 4
Entretien avec Gindral Guy Mdry, 11 December 1996.
119 Forget and his staff were all lodged in rented private apartments, rather than on
a military base, in a hotel or at the embassy. This was also considered part of the effort
of keeping their intervention discreet. SHAT 3 K 4 Entretien avec G6ndral Guy M6ry, 11
December 1996.
120 According to General Gaget, the primary purpose of the 13th RDP was to
inform Forget of POLISARIO and Mauritanian activities. Forget, however, claims that
they never provided him with valuable intelligence, but served as an independent source
of information to decision-makers in Paris. Robert Gaget, Au-dela du possible:
Recherche du renseignement en rigions hostiles (Paris: Grancher, 2002), 180-86; and
Interview with General Michel Forget, Paris, 26 January 2006.
121 SHAT 3 K 4 Entretien avec Gdndral Guy Mdry, 11 December 1996; and
Michel Forget, "Mauritanie 1977: 'Lamantin,' Une intervention exterieure a dominante
'air."' n.d.. (unpublished paper, adapted and published in Revue Historique des Armiees
no. 1 (1992)).
m After Pompidou launched the diplomatic process, Giscard became France's
first president to visit Algeria after independence. Although Giscard's 1975 visit to
Algeria proved a first step in normalizing relations between the two states, Franco-
Algerian relations remained distant. Giscard did not receive a personal message from
Boumediene between 1975 and 1978. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Le Pouvoir et la Vie
(Paris: Compagnie 12, 1991), 361-96.
123 SHAT 3 K 3 Entretien avec Gdndral Frangois Gerin-Rose, 10 October 1996.
594
14 SHAT 3 K 3 Entretien avec G6ndral Frangois Gerin-Rose, 10 October 1996;
SHAT 3 K 4 Entretien avec G6ndral Guy Mdry, 11 December 1996; and Interview with
General Michel Forget, Paris, 26 January 2006.
1 SHAT 3 K 4 Entretien avec Gdndral Guy Mdry, 11 December 1996.
126 Interview with General Michel Forget, Paris, 26 January 2006.
127 Interview with General Michel Forget, Paris, 26 January 2006.
128 Forget was not informed about the diplomatic efforts running in parallel to
France's military intervention. Interview with General Michel Forget, Paris, 26 January
2006.
129 The Moroccans had already signaled the presence of SA-7s, which they
suspected of downing their own piston-engine aircraft. However, this intelligence had
not been presented as firm to Forget. Interview with General Michel Forget, Paris, 26
January 2006; and Jean-Pierre Otelli, Pilotes dans la tourmente (Paris: Altipresse, 2005),
135-80.
130 Forget, "Mauritanie 1977: 'Lamantin,' Une intervention exterieure a dominante
'air."
131 Interview with General Michel Forget, Paris, 26 January 2006.
132 SHAT 3 K 3 Entretien avec Gdn6ral Frangois Gerin-Rose, 10 October 1996.
133 Interview with General Michel Forget, Paris, 26 January 2006; and Michel
Forget, "Mauritanie 1977: 'Lamantin,' Une intervention exterieure a dominante 'air."' n.d..
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Guisnel, 23.
137 The Jaguar that landed at Nouadibou was shipped disassembled back to
France. Interview with General Michel Forget, Paris, 26 January 2006; Guisnel, 23; and
Michel Forget, "Mauritanie 1977: 'Lamantin,' Une intervention exterieure a dominante
'air.'" n.d..
138 Michel Forget, "Mauritanie 1977: 'Lamantin,' Une intervention exterieure a
dominante 'air."' n.d..
595
139 A Mauritanian garrison was overwhelmed at Touagil on 25 January 1978. But
the Mauritanian Army successfully repulsed attacks on Tichla (2 February) and Touagil
(again, 28 February). Michel Forget, "Mauritanie 1977: 'Lamantin,' Une intervention
exterieure a dominante 'air."' n.d..
40 As deputy commander of French tactical aviation (FATAC), Forget's
assignment to Mauritania was considered temporary from the outset. Once the most
delicate phase of the operation had passed--the liberation of the eight French hostages--
Forget returned to FATAC's headquarters in Metz, to be replaced by a more junior
officer. See Interview with General Michel Forget, Paris, 26 January 2006.
141 Ibid.
142 While France accomplished all of its objectives, the same cannot be said for
the Mauritanian government. In part because of its debacle in the Western Sahara, the
Mauritanian Army overthrew President Ould Daddah in 1978 and renounced its claim to
the Western Sahara in 1979. Morocco persisted, however, and eventually defeated the
insurgency after decades of effort.
143 Interview with General Michel Forget, Paris, 26 January 2006.
144 Michel Forget, "Mauritanie 1977: 'Lamantin,' Une intervention exterieure a
dominante 'air."' n.d..
145 Not counting the Algerian War, which was a counterinsurgency waged in what
was considered metropolitan France, France's last intervention exceeding its Gulf War
contribution occurred during the 1956 Suez Crisis. The size of the Iraqi Army drove
France's exceptionally large intervention. Possessing an army of 1,000,000 at the end of
the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Army was frequently qualified as the world's fourth largest.
Schwarzkopf estimated that it counted 63 divisions, including eight of the elite
Republican Guard, with a total of 5,747 tanks, 10,000 other armored vehicles and 3,500
artillery pieces. Iraq's armed forces possessed many weapons considered sophisticated,
including Soviet T-72 tanks, South African G8 artillery pieces, French GCT self-
propelled guns, Brazilian Astros II multiple rocket launchers and Roland II surface-to-air
missiles. Its air force also possessed capable MiG-29, Su-24 and Mirage F1 combat
aircraft. Former United States military attach6 to Syria, Lieutenant-Colonel Rick
Francona estimated that the Iraqi Army was the second most powerful (after the Israelis)
and third most professional (after the Jordanians and Israelis) in the Middle East. Its
chemical weapons capabilities were particularly feared in 1990. By the end of the Iran-
Iraq War, the Iraqis had synthesized combat gases including nerve gases (Tabun and
Sarin), vesicants (mustard gases), and hydrogen cyanide. The Iraqis had extensive
experience combining different types of gas to maximize battlefield effects and
combining gas in artillery fire-plans. Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Rick Francona,
California, 6 January 2000; and Fredrick Guelton, La guerre am ricaine du Golfe:
596
Guerre et puissance a l'aube du XXIe siecle (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon,
1996), 64-95.
146 During the 1950s, French forces participated as junior partners in the Korean
War and the Suez Crisis. France occasionally operated in concert with allies during its
subsequent interventions. In Chad (1969-72) and Mauritania (1977-78), French forces
cooperated with those of their hosts. In 1978, France collaborated with Belgium and the
United States (which provided transportation) during the Second Shaba (Zaire) Crisis. In
1983, French forces worked with their Zairian counterparts in Chad. And in 1984,
France, Italy and the United States all intervened in Lebanon. Notwithstanding these
examples of collaboration with allies, France was at least an equal partner in its
interventions since the advent of the Fifth Republic.
147 During the Iran-Iraq War, most of France's political elite favored Iraq, as a
counterweight to Iranian power and fanaticism. However, Mitterrand's government could
be divided between those who viewed Iraq as the lesser of two evils, including Charles
Hernu (Defense Minister 1981 to 1985) and Roland Dumas (Foreign Minister 1984 to
1986 and 1988 to 1993). Pro-Iraq decision-makers included Defense Minister Jean-
Pierre Chevenement and former Foreign Minister (1981-1984) Claude Cheysson.
Jacques Chirac, then Mayor of Paris, had had a close relationship with the Iraqi
government while Prime Minister under Giscard. Although retired, Pierre Gallois, one of
France's nuclear theorists, also favored Franco-Iraqi collaboration. Interview with
Frangois Heisbourg, Paris, July, 13, 2004; Pierre Gallois, Le sablier du siecle (Lausanne:
L'age d'homme, 1999), 475; and Interview with Admiral Jacques Lanxade, Paris, 14
January 2005.
148 Iraq was France's second largest arms supplier. Amongst the arms it supplied
were: (133) Mirage F1 fighters, Gazelle helicopters, Exocet anti-ship missiles, laser-
guided missiles (AS-30L), self-propelled GCT artillery, Roland surface-to-air missiles
and light armored vehicles. Kenneth Timmerman, Le lobby de la mort: Comment
l'Occident a armi l'Irak (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1991); and Interview with Admiral
Jacques Lanxade, Paris, 14 January 2005.
149 Hubert Vidrine, Les mondes de Frangois Mitterrand: ' l'Elysie, 1981-1995
(Paris: Fayard, 1996), 519-27.
150 The French government was divided as to the real threat posed to Saudi
Arabia. General Schmitt and Admiral Lanxade, drawing mainly on American military
intelligence, considered the threat to be real. Defense Minister Chevenement and Jean-
Louis Bianco, Secretary General to the President, suspected the United States of
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170 The Saudis initially offered Buraydah. However, because Buraydah was less
than 350 kilometers from the border and not protected by American Patriot surface-to-air
missile batteries, Air Force Chief of Staff General Fleury refused the offer. Afterwards,
Roquejoeffre's Air Force deputy, General Gellibert, obtained the use of Al Ahsa. Fleury,
263; Chevenement, 44-45; and Interview with General Maurice Schmitt, Marseilles, 21
January 2005.
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171 Vidrine dates the beginning of France's diplomatic push to 24 September, the
same day as French combat forces began disembarking in Saudi Arabia, Mitterrand
declared before the United Nations that, "If Iraq declares its intention to withdraw its
troops [from Kuwait] and free the hostages, then anything may be possible." Vddrine,
534.
m According to V6drine, American diplomats wanted to avoid seeking a Security
Council Resolution in late-November. They argued that Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter (the right to self-defense) justified the use of force. French policymakers argued
for a specific United Nations resolution. Vddrine, 533-38.
m Mitterrand had argued for an international conference on the Israeli-Palestinian
problem since 1984. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Mitterrand refused linking an Iraqi
evacuation to the scheduling of a conference on Israel-Palestine. However, he continued
championing the conference in the hope that Hussein would seize on it as a face-saving
pretext for evacuating Kuwait. Although Mitterrand was skeptical about the chances of
his initiative succeeded, he argued that the west needed to make greater efforts in favor of
an Israeli-Palestinian solution, lest western powers be accused of a double standard--
punishing Iraq for its occupation of Kuwait, but accepting Israel's occupation of
Palestine. Lanxade argues that Mitterrand had little faith in France's initiative succeeded,
but nonetheless embraced the Foreign Ministry's strategy on the slight hope it might bear
results. Vddrine, 534-38; and Interview with Admiral Jacques Lanxade, Paris, 14 January
2005.
m Mitterrand's emissaries included Claude Cheysson, Edgar Pisani and Michel
Vauzelle. As Foreign Minister between 1981 and 1984, Cheysson had particularly close
relations with Iraq and its leaders. Although a European Commissioner at the time,
Cheysson hoped that his personal relations with Iraqi leaders would render his effort
more credible. Considered a "progressive" left-wing Arab regime, whose political
ideology was similar to Iraqi Ba'athism, Algeria, it was hoped, would also be able to
convey French proposals to Iraq. Vddrine, 533-35; and Jacques Berniere, "Le contexte
diplomatique de la guerre du golfe," Cahiers du CEHD No. 21: La participation militaire
frangaise a' la guerre du golfe (Paris: Ministere de la Ddfense, 2001), 24.
175 In addition to their own proposal, Mitterrand also supported the Soviet Union's
efforts to negotiate Iraq's withdrawal according to a similar formula. Soviet Vice-
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeni Primakov, conversed with Mitterrand about the
Soviet proposals on 7 October. Like the French formula, the Soviet proposal also
depended on Iraq evacuating Kuwait before anything else could be done. However, once
Iraq evacuated Kuwait: 1) an Israeli-Palestinian peace process would begin in which all
of the Security Council's permanent members would participate, 2) the Arab League
would organize bilateral negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait on their territorial
disputes (the islands of Warba and Bubyan and the Rumelia oil field), and 3) the creation
of a regional collective security system. See Vddrine, 536-37; and Evguini Primakov,
Missions a Bagdad: Histoire d'une nigociation secrete (Paris: Seuil, 1991), 57-70.
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176 Berniere, 24.
m Pentagon wargames and United States Air Force analyses indicated that the
window of vulnerability closed fairly quickly. However, Schwarzkopf mistrusted
analyses that counted heavily on air power stopping an enemy land offensive. For him,
Saudi Arabia was not safe until American heavy (armored and mechanized) combat units
became available in October. In retrospect, the window of vulnerability was probably
comparatively brief. As the Battle of Khafji demonstrated, small land forces supported
by massive air forces can inflict enormous casualties on attacking armored forces in a
desert environment. See Rick Francona, Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of
Iraq's Fallfrom Grace (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 48-53.
178 Intelligence evaluated the forces capable of attacking along the Wadi al-Batin
three armored divisions, with 900 tanks. Given that the French and Saudis initially
deployed only two brigades, they were below the threshold of possessing at least a third
the forces of their opponents. French forces are also universal in declaring the Saudi
brigade to have been worthless. Lacking the trained mechanics to maintain their
vehicles, the brigade's tanks were immobile. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the brigade
transported its tanks to their new positions aboard tank transporters (large trucks). Once
arrived, they used their tanks as static bunkers.
With French forces in short supply and Arab forces (eventually Egyptian and
Syrian divisions deployed to the area) of uncertain value, the French still feared an Iraqi
attack as late as mid-November. As mentioned before, the road to Riyadh via the Wadi
al-Batin was poorly defended compared to areas further to the east where American
forces concentrated. Franco-Arab planning therefore continued for how French forces
would react to either a penetration or outflanking of the main Arab defensive position.
Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005; General Maurice Schmitt,
Marseilles, 21 January 2005; SHAT 3 k 81 Entretien avec le Gdn6ral Pierrick Boquet,
n.d.; and Division Daguet, Etude des possibilitis d'action de la Div Daguet, 8 November
1990.
179 Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005.
180 Comprising the heavily armed VII Corps from Germany, two divisions from
the continental United States and the 2nd Marine Division, the reinforcements virtually
doubled the United States' presence in Saudi Arabia. Falcona, 69-77.
181 At an early November meeting between American Secretary of State James
Baker and President Mitterrand, Baker expressed his opinion that Article 51, on
legitimate defense, of the United Nations Charter permitted the coalition to liberate
Kuwait. Mitterrand opposed Baker's reasoning, declaring that France would not
participate unless the liberation was legitimated by a specific Resolution. According to
Admiral Lanxade, President Bush acquiesced to Mitterrand's demands during a later
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meeting between the two presidents on 18 November. Lanxade, Quand le monde a
basculi (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 74-75.
182 The United Kingdom and Egypt both doubled their military contributions,
from a single brigade to a full armored division in the former case and from one to two
divisions in the latter case.
183 On 29 November, General Roquejoeffre queried General Yeosock,
commander of the American 3rd Army, about the nature of American offensive plans.
Yeosock responded that no plan had yet been agreed upon. The Americans were
considering either broadly outflanking Iraqi forces with a vast turning movement through
the Iraqi desert or a narrower turning movement, attacking northwards towards Kuwait
City via Hafar al Batin-Al Ruqui-Kuwait City. Interview with General Michel
Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005.
184 The Marines consisted of two divisions. The Arab forces were divided into
two ensembles. The Joint Forces Command (JFC) East, operating to the east of the
Marines, comprised two mechanized brigades formed of Saudi and Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) forces and a Saudi National Guard infantry brigade. JFC North,
operating on the western flank of the Marines, comprised two Egyptian divisions (3'd
Mechanized and 4 Armored), one Syrian division (9th Armored), two Saudi brigades and
two Kuwaiti brigades.
Iraq's defenses on the Saudi-Kuwait border were the most heavily fortified. Iraq
deployed 14 infantry divisions along the border, meaning that each division defended an
average of 16 kilometers. The divisions were entrenched behind large sand berms and
trenches. Some of the trenches were filled with oil, equipped for ignition.
As a diversion, the Marines were to attack at the beginning of the coalition
assault. Judged less competent, the Arabs were supposed to attack 48 hours later. For
political reasons, the Arab coalition members were given the task of liberating Kuwait
City. Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Rick Francona, California, 6 January 2000.
185 By far the largest of the coalition's corps, the VII Corps consisted of five
armored and mechanized divisions, including the 1 t Armored Division, the Ist
(Mechanized) Infantry Division, the 3 d Armored Division, the 1 st Cavalry (Armored)
Division and the British 1lt Armored Division. Altogether, the VII Corps counted
146,000 men, 1,600 tanks and 800 combat helicopters.
The VII Corps aimed to destroy the Iraqi Republic Guard, which itself comprised
eight divisions. See "Interview with General Frederick Franks, Commander of VII
Corps," Frontline: The Gulf War, www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/gulf/oral/franks
(consulted June 2000).
186 The XVIII Corps consisted of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, the 101st
Airmobile Division, a brigade of the 82 Airborne Division and, eventually, the French
Daguet Division.
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187 In his memoirs, Schmitt recalls Schwarzkopf proposing the flank guard
mission to the French (probably on 6 December). However, Roquejoeffre's earlier
conversations (on 29 November) with General Yeosock, commander of the American 3rd
Army, indicating that France could choose where its forces would participate. In
practice, Roquejoeffre prepared three contingency plans, which Mitterrand chose
between. Maurice Schmitt, De Dien Bien Phu a Koweft City (Paris: Grasset, 1992), 213-
14; and Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005.
188 Arguing against employing France's division further alongside VII Corps,
"The proper mission for French forces was covering the coalition against an attack from
Baghdad. The destruction of entrenched Iraqi forces necessitates a true armored division,
equipped with 200 AMX-30B2 tanks and two regiments of self-propelled artillery.
However, the Daguet Division lacked such forces, but its light armored vehicles and
combat helicopters were well adapted to fighting a swift mobile battle against Iraqi forces
attacking from the northwest. It is worth mentioning that even our AMX-30B2 main
battle tanks were outclassed by the Czech and Soviet T-72 tanks equipping Iraq's
Republican Guard. The T-72s possessed 125mm canons and could fire while moving,
while our tanks had 105mm canons and could only fire accurately once stationary."
Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005; Interview with Admiral
Jacques Lanxade, Paris, 14 January 2005; Interview with General Maurice Schmitt,
Marseilles, 21 January 2005; and Maurice Schmitt, De Die~n Bie~n Phu a Koweit City
(Paris: Grasset, 1992), 214-15.
189 France's three contingency plans were code named Nabuchodonosor 1 to 3.
Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005; Interview with Admiral
Jacques Lanxade, Paris, 14 January 2005; and Interview with General Maurice Schmitt,
Marseilles, 21 January 2005.
190 Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005; Interview with
Admiral Jacques Lanxade, Paris, 14 January 2005; and Interview with General Maurice
Schmitt, Marseilles, 21 January 2005.
191 According to Cohen, Mitterrand initially did not want to send more than 5,000
troops to Saudi Arabia. However, once convinced that he needed to send at least a small
division, he sent more reinforcements than Roquejoeffre requested under any of the
operational plans he presented on 6 December. Samy Cohen, La difait des geniraux: Le
pouvoirpolitique et l'armi'e sous la Ve Ripublique (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 128; and
Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005.
192 The paratroop force proposed would have included two battalions, a command
element and combat engineers. The United States promised to loan American Chinook
helicopters for its use. Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005;
and Michel Roquejoeffre, "Les legons de la guerre du Golfe," 20.
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193 Michel Bourret, "Operation Daguet: L'Armde de terre frangaise dans la guerre
du golfe," Batailles & Blindis: Histoire de la Guerre Micanisie et des Engins Militaires
Hors Sdrie 2 (April-May 2006): 5; and Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23
January 2005.
194 Mitterrand announced his choice on 10 December. Interview with Admiral
Jacques Lanxade, Paris, 14 January 2005.
195 The figures were given by General Roquejoeffre directly from his notes.
Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005.
196 Because of the constraint of not being able to send conscripts, France's land
contingent, entitled the Daguet Division, was comprised of units drawn from several
peacetime divisions. Most of the 6 th Light Armored Division was deployed, except for
the division's organic artillery regiment (the 6 8 1h Artillery Regiment) and part of the 21st
Marine Infantry Regiment. The 6 8 th Artillery was a conscript unit and was still equipped
with obsolete BF 150 (155mm) artillery pieces. Two composite helicopter regiments,
drawn from nine peacetime regiments, were sent from the 4th Airmobile Division. The
9 th Marine Infantry Division, whose composition was similar to the 6th Light Armored
Division, contributed 12 infantry companies and armored car (AMX-1ORC) squadrons,
and the 11h Artillery Regiment. The 11th Paratroop Division contributed only commando
patrols and an armored car squadron (ERC-90). To fill specific equipment needs, the
French government had recourse to two unique expedients. For mine clearing, France
acquired six former East German mine flails to attach to modified French tanks. France
also sent the prototype of the cancelled Orchidee helicopter, which was originally
designed for acquiring land targets at long range (150 kilometers) in Europe, to guide
French combat helicopter operations. Because of the need to assemble a tank battalion
and logistics support (comprising 1,200 personnel, or 10 percent of the total), it was
ultimately necessary to personnel from 192 of 195 "basic units" comprising the French
Army. While the entire army was made to contribute to forming the Daguet Division,
four divisions of the Rapid Action Force (FAR) supplied 80 percent of its personnel. The
6th Light Armored Division furnished alone approximately half of the Daguet Division's
strength. See Bergot, 89-118; Yves Debay, "Special 6e Division legere bindde," RAIDS
no. 51 (August 1990): 19-43; Louis Gautier, Mitterrand et son Arm e (Paris: Grasset,
1999), 157-71; J6rome de Lespinois, L'Armi'e de terre frangaise: de la difense du
sanctuaire a la projection, vol. 2, 1981-1996 (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2001), 673-94; and
"L'armde de terre frangaise souhaite envoyer le radar Orchidde en Arabie Saoudite," le
Monde (16 December 1990).
197 It remains a subject of some debate how many forces France could have sent to
the Gulf had Mitterrand decided to make a larger effort. Roquejoeffre argues that France
could have spared several additional combat battalions had the need been felt. His basis
for this is that France had prepared to replace the 6th Light Armored Division with the 9th
Marine Division if the standoff continued, could have sent the two paratroop battalions he
requested and had recently relieved a helicopter regiment. Thus, a maximal French effort
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could have seen many more forces deployed. General Forray contends that France
possessed 40,000 troops in professional units in 1991. Of these, 15,000 were in Africa,
15,000 in the Gulf (actually 13,000) and 10,000 in reserve. Based on these figures,
Forray argues that France provided the largest contingent it could while still retaining a
strategic reserve to respond to unforeseen contingencies. Schmitt reasons that France
sent all of the forces that it could comfortably dispatch. However, if the crisis involved a
region with greater ties to France, such as Tunisia, France would have scrapped together
larger professional forces. General Quesnot, Lanxade's successor as Chief of the
President's Private Military Staff, agrees with Schmitt that more troops could have been
sent, but it would have required reducing French forces in Africa. In its secret report, the
CGA concluded that France's effort was close to its maximum. The CGA highlighted
logistical limitations of France's ability to project forces. Undoubtedly, the size of
France's contingent was determined by political rather than military factors. France could
have sent more forces. How many, though, remains a matter of speculation and
disagreement amongst the best placed decision-makers. "D6bat," Cahiers du CEHD No.
21: La participation militairefrangaise a la guerre du golfe (Paris: Ministere de la
Ddfense, 2001), 120-21; Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005;
de Lespinois, 688; and No. 37 DEF/CGA/OCF/RI/CD/91 Contr6le G6ndral des Armdes,
Rapport de Synthese, 6 August 1991, 1-10.
198 Neither Lanxade nor Schmitt argued that the coalition should use nuclear
weapons or that France should explicitly threaten their use. However, both believed that
France's silence would reinforce the United States' threat. In describing Mitterrand's
motivations, Lanxade emphasized his desire to uphold the uniqueness of nuclear
weapons. Cohen, on the other hand, argues that Mitterrand's motivations were
diplomatic, hoping that France's independent and measured approach would impress
moderate Arab states. Interview with Admiral Jacques Lanxade, Paris, 14 January 2005;
and Interview with General Maurice Schmitt, Marseilles, 21 January 2005.
199 Both Vddrine and Lanxade contest that Mitterrand did not believe that France's
final diplomacy would succeed. See Vidrine, 535; and Interview with Admiral Jacques
Lanxade, Paris, 14 January 2005.
200 Foreign Minister Dumas wanted to lead the last-minute negotiating effort
himself. Mitterrand refused, preferring a less eminent messenger. Instead, Mitterrand
sent the President of France's National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Commission, Michel
Vauzelle. Vddrine, 535-36.
201 The American ultimatum at Geneva (9 January) threatened military action
unless Iraq unilaterally withdrew by 15 January. The French proposal suggested that an
Iraqi statement that it was willing to withdraw sufficed to postpone the allied offensive.
Then withdrawal would be followed by a conference on the Palestinian question.
Chevenement blames the United States and United Kingdom from refusing to
submit France's propositions to a Security Council vote on 14 January. However, Iraq
could have still embarrassed the international coalition by accepting France's last minute
proposal. The French proposal bore strong similarities to the proposals floated by Soviet
606
diplomats in the preceding months. Moreover, a number of Arab states had also
subscribed to the same fundamental ideas. A last minute Iraqi embrace of France's
proposal would have divided the coalition between states that hoped to destroy Iraq's
military potential and others thankful to obtain Hussein's bloodless withdrawal from
Kuwait. Vddrine, 536; Berniere, 24; Lanxade, 78-79; Interview with Admiral Jacques
Lanxade, Paris, 14 January 2005; and Chevenement, 48-49.
202 Mitterrand's statement that his government should be prepared for negotiations
during hostilities dated from 19 December, nearly a month before the air campaign
began. He appears to have held little hope for a diplomatic solution once hostilities had
actually began. Chevenement, 47-50.
203 Lanxade presented the matter to Mitterrand in manner that the president was
unlikely to refuse bombing targets in Iraq. On 21 January, Lanxade called Chairman of
the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, asking that Powell assign France
targets in Iraq. On 22 January, the Americans transmitted a target list to Schmitt,
containing targets in Iraq. Schmitt transmitted the targets to Paris, where Lanxade posed
the question to Mitterrand whether he would approve the Iraqi targets proposed by
American planners for French aircraft. Presenting in this way, it was more difficult for
Mitterrand to refuse striking Iraq. France's first raid on Iraq occurred on 24 January.
Lanxade, 82-83; and Frangois Regnault, "La participation adrienne frangaise aux
operations," Cahiers du CEHD No. 21: La participation militairefrangaise a la guerre
du golfe (Paris: Ministere de la Ddfense, 2001), 80.
204 The United States conducted 89 percent of the coalition's missions and the
British five percent. R6gnault, 88.
205 Michel Roquejoeffre, "D6bat," Cahiers du CEHD No. 21: La participation
militairefrangaise a la guerre du golfe (Paris: Ministere de la Ddfense, 2001), 104.
206 The American paratroop brigade, with 2,115 men, substituted for the two
French paratroop battalions that Mitterrand refused to send. The American artillery,
comprising 116 canons, accounted for 87 percent of the artillery (not counting mortars)
under French control. Lacking professional artillery personnel, France could not
realistically have sent more than the 18 guns it deployed. Although France had
purchased American multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) they were not yet in service.
Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005.
207 American intelligence on the eve of the ground war indicated the 4 5th Division
remaining largely intact, possessing 50 to 75 percent of its heavy weapons. Havin
participated extensively in counterinsurgency operations against the Kurds, the 45
Division was reputedly combative and comprised mostly of professional soldiers. The
French captured 3,077 prisoners along with 5,424 individual arms. The French captured
or destroyed 26 artillery pieces and counted 25 destroyed tanks. Roquejoeffre claimed
after the war that the division originally possessed 11,000 personnel. However, many
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Iraqi divisions were under strength and the 45th Division may have had considerably
fewer combatants. Falcona, 133; Bernard Janvier, "La division Daguet et les aspects
opirationnels," Cahiers du CEHD No. 21: La participation militairefrangaise a' la
guerre du golfe (Paris: Ministere de la D6fense, 2001), 95; Yves Debay, "La division
Daguet," Batailles & Blindis: Histoire de la Guerre Micanisie et des Engins Militaires
Hors Sdrie 2 (April-May 2006): 87; Pierre Dufour, La Ligion dans la guerre du golfe
(Paris: Jacques Grancher, 1991), 328-29; James Cooke, 100 Milesfrom Baghdad: With
the French in Desert Storm (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993), 81; and Michel
Roquejoeffre, "La guerre du golfe plus de 3 ans apres," unpublished speech to Rotary
Club, Foix, France, 26 September 1994.
208 Arm6e de terre frangaise, Division Daguet, Ordre d'operations No. 1:
Modificatif No. 1 du 18fivrier 1991.
209 The tanks were comparatively obsolete Soviet T-55s. Eight were dug-in on the
right of the road to As Salman airbase and three on the left. One battalion of nine 152mm
artillery pieces supported the Iraqi positions on the right, while another of nine 122mm
guns supported the left. Cooke, 98-110.
210 Cooke, 109.
21 Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005.
m Cooke enumerated two 122mm canons and nearly a battalion of 152mm guns
captured or destroyed beginning at 6:30 am. Cooke, 116.
213 Accounts differ slightly on the size of the Iraqi column. The French tank
battalion (4th Dragoons) commander claims eight to nine T-55s accompanied by an
American-built (ex-Iranian) M-48, a BTR-50 armored personnel carrier and other
unidentified vehicles--giving a total of 12 to 15 armored vehicles. The commander of
the tank squadron that engaged the Iraqis claims that the Iraqi reserve consisted of eight
vehicles, including T-55s, one M-48 and reconnaissance BRDMs. Cooke mentioned an
encounter with eight T-55s and a BRDM, and a separate encounter, shortly thereafter
with one T-55 and one BTR-50. See Bourret, 24; Cooke, 117; and Jacky Allavena, "Le
1 er Escadron au combat," Batailles & Blindis: Histoire de la Guerre Micanisie et des
Engins Militaires Hors Sdrie 2 (April-May 2006): 45.
2 The artillery bombardment of As Salman began at 14:30. At 16:20, the heavy
120mm mortars of the 2nd Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment joined in. Ten minutes
later, four assault groupings charged forward. Each assault grouping was composed of an
infantry company paired with an armored car (AMX-10RC) squadron. Comprised almost
entirely of Foreign Legionnaires, who had trained since October in combining motorized
infantry and light armor, the assault was flawless. According to the 2nd Foreign Legion
Infantry Regiment's postwar report, "The couple--light armored squadron / motorized
infantry company--proved its effectiveness and the synergy produced by combining two
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different types of forces from the moment that commanders are prepared to work
together. From this point of view, the conquest of As Salman was an exemplar.
Extremely aggressive and mobile (practically effervescent [in original]), this couple (light
armored squadron / motorized infantry company) is ideal for raids, flanking movements
and the conquest of fixed defenses." In the conquest of As Salman, the attacking column
fired: 705 artillery shells (155mm), 288 mortar rounds (120mm) and 60 armored car
canon rounds (105mm). One tank and three self-propelled anti-aircraft guns were
captured on the field. See 2ieme Regiment dtranger d'infanterie, Journal des marches et
operations: "Operation Daguet," n.d.; 2ieme Rdgiment 6tranger d'infanterie, Rapport sur
l'operation Daguet: du 20 septembre 1990 au 11 avril 1991, annexe I, section I, n.d.; and
Interview with Commandant Henri Billaudel, Paris, 3 March 2000.
215 Dufour, 312-17.
216 In terms of results, lists of Iraqi equipment captured or destroyed varies
slightly between different sources. One lists: 20 tanks destroyed, 1 captures; 17 armored
vehicles destroyed; 114 trucks destroyed, 7 captured; 26 canons destroyed, 40 captured;
and 70 mortars destroyed. Another source indicate: 23 artillery pieces destroyed, 3
captured; two tanks captured; and 107 vehicles destroyed. Michel Roquejoeffre, "La
guerre du golfe plus de 3 ans apres," unpublished speech to Rotary Club, Foix, France, 26
September 1994; de Lespinois, 682; and Dufour, 329.
217 Schwarzkopf offered the French a seat on his planning staff. When it came to
planning the land offensive, Schwarzkopf ordered his planners to only entrust critical
missions to American, British and French forces. In other words, sparing American lives
could only depend on French, American and British forces achieving their objectives.
However, France's diffidence in committing to a particular action meant that
Schwarzkopf's planners could not afford to assign the French a critical mission, which the
French might reject.
Only the British ultimately participated along the American planning staff in
developing the coalition's offensive plan. Only the French and the British enjoyed access
and reserved seats in Schwarzkopfs war room. However, Roquejoeffre was unable to
occupy his seat before France unambiguously committed itself to action. Falcona, 70 and
96; Interview with General Michel Roquejoeffre, 23 January 2005; and Michel
Roquejoeffre, "L'engagement des force frangaises," Cahiers du CEHD No. 21: La
participation militairefrangaise a la guerre du golfe (Paris: Ministere de la D6fense,
2001), 46-47.
218 Etienne de Durand, "La perception Amdricaine de la participation frangaise au
conflit," Cahiers du CEHD No. 21: La participation militairefrangaise d la guerre du
golfe (Paris: Ministere de la Defense, 2001), 99.
219 General Sultan specifically claimed that he suspected the French wanted to be
able to withdraw without notice or choose not to fight should Iraq attack. Sultan, 269-78.
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220 Matters decided in Paris included the reinforcement of Chad after the Bedo
ambush, the suspension of hostilities to facilitate negotiations with the Toubou Derd6 and
the withdrawal of French troops in 1972.
2 His early deployment of an aircraft carrier equipped with a helicopter regiment
was viewed by domestic and international opinion as insignificant. Later, a brigade
sufficed for the defensive stage of the coalition's military buildup. Eventually, military
advisors convinced Mitterrand that France needed a division to credibly and
autonomously participate in Kuwait's liberation. Mitterrand, nevertheless, arbitrarily
limited the size of France's division.
222 By deploying few troops and many of them initially Foreign Legionnaires, de
Gaulle prevented France's intervention in Chad from becoming a political issue. By
carefully rationing reinforcements, the government prevented many French voters from
eventually realizing, at least until the Bedo ambush of October 1970, that their country
was fighting an insurgency. Later, during the Mauritanian intervention, Giscard chose
means calculated to limit human losses and media attention. Mitterrand's decision,
during the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis, to not deploy conscripts, even ones that volunteered,
likewise reassured public opinion and lowered the domestic political capital he expended
during the conflict.
223 During the Chad intervention, policymakers feared that France's intervention
would stir forces of popular anti-colonialism, which were then at their peak throughout
Africa. Concern about international opposition led de Gaulle to exclude the well-known
General Bigeard in favor of comparatively unknown commanders of lesser rank. The
situation was even more delicate in Mauritania, where the ruling regime based its
legitimacy on opposing French neo-colonialism and developing close relations with the
Arab world. Any overt assistance France might grant Mauritania would undermine
President Ould Daddah's hold on power. Therefore, Giscard chose to mount a secretive
air campaign, based out of Senegal, supported by a miniscule French presence in
Mauritania.
Similar considerations underlay Mitterrand's decisions during the 1990 military
buildup in Saudi Arabia. Because of the presence of Islam's holiest sites on Saudi
territory and the Kingdom's declaration that its entire territory constituted a mosque,
Mitterrand refused to deploy forces to Saudi Arabia until a majority of Arab states
condemned Iraq's actions and the Saudi government officially invited the French to
intervene. Dispatching a helicopter carrier to the Red Sea became France's means of
reconciling its desire to avoid a precocious presence on Saudi soil while manifesting its
resolve to participate in the defense of Saudi Arabia against a land invasion.
224 The French College Interarmdes de Defense (CID) published, in 2003, the
most comprehensive list published so far of French foreign operations. According to the
CID, France conducted 172 military operations abroad between 1958 and 1989.
However, only a portion of these operations can be characterized as military
interventions. The CID list includes operations in Algeria, French Guyana and New
Caledonia, which are not technically "foreign" because all were French territories,
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departments or protectorates at the time of the operations. Djibouti and Tunisia (Bizerte)
do not qualify as interventions either because they involved forces permanently based in
the country in question. Some of the CID listed operations were unmilitary in nature,
such as providing humanitarian relief to victims of the 1960 earthquake in Morocco.
Operating from open sources, the compilers of the CID list also uncovered references to
code-names for two operations, which otherwise remain unidentified. Even accounting
for the catch-all nature of the CID list, it reveals France's exceptional interventionism.
The list presented in Table XI includes France's operations that involved both the
deployment of forces and combat operations. Certain large operations are not included,
such as France's participation in escorting shipping and clearing mines in the Persian Gulf
from 1984 to 1987, during the Iran-Iraq War. At its peak, France deployed 11 naval
vessels in the region, including an aircraft carrier and five destroyers or frigates. The
table has attempted to remain as comprehensive as possible for interventions, between
1962 and 1991, with at least some land-based component. For reasons of space, many
interventions were excluded, including: the 1977 Zaire intervention wherein France only
supplied logistic support for a Moroccan intervention force; the 1980 Gafsa incident
wherein French paratroops arrived in southern Tunisia after Tunisian forces had defeated
the Libyan supported insurgents; and the 1990 Gabon intervention wherein six infantry
companies intimidated the country's democratic opposition movement during riots. The
Yugoslavia intervention has been included in the list because it was comparatively large
and long.
In the table, only deaths attributable to enemy action are listed. In some
interventions, deaths through accident exceeded those by enemy action. In the former
Yugoslavia, 45 French soldiers perished from accidents as opposed to the 20 who died
from enemy action. During the Chad intervention, 10 died of accidental causes, versus
18 from enemy causes. See Liste des Opdrations par Annde, College Interarmies de
defense. www.cid.defense.fr (consulted March 14, 2004); Jean-Louis Dufour, Les Crises
internationals, de Pekin (1900) a Bagdad (2004) (Paris: Complexe, 2004, first edition
1996), 151-54, 175-95, 203-06 and 246-49; Jdr6me de Lespinois, LArmee de terre
frangaise: de la difense d la projection, vol. 1, 1974-1981 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001),
318-38; de Lespinois, LArmie de terrefrangaise: de la defense a la projection, vol. 2,
1981-1996, 567-85, 769-8 10; Lieutenant Rappolt, Les missions impossibles desforces
francaises au Liban, mars 1978 - Aout 1986, Memoire, Ann6e 1986-1987; and Les
interventions militairesfrancaises au Tchad, vol. 2 (Vincennes: SHAT, 1989), 303.
225 France deterred Libyan efforts to dominate Chad in 1983 and 1986 to present.
It re-installed Leon M'Ba as president of Gabon in 1964 and saved Omar Bongo's regime
in the same country in 1990. It overthrew Jean-Bedel Bokassa as ruler of the Central
African Empire in 1979 and Bob Denard, after the later seized control of the Comoros
Islands in 1990. France's 1978 Zaire intervention aimed at both rescuing the 2,500
Europeans, who had fallen into the hands of Angolan-backed rebels, and defeating the
rebels themselves and thereby saving Mobutu's regime. Both the Gabonese and
Mauritanian interventions were motivated principally by economic interests, oil in the
former case and iron in the latter. France's Lebanon interventions (1978-79 and.1984-86)
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aimed at upholding Lebanon's sovereignty against Israeli, Syrian and Palestinian
ambitions.
226 The only two cases where France's military ends included routing an enemy's
military force were Zaire (1978) where the French hoped to defeat the Katangese rebels
such that they would not attack anew, and the Persian Gulf (1991) where the liberation
was only possible after Iraqi forces had been forcibly evicted. By way of contrast, the
United States strived to militarily destroy opponent military forces as the means or a
prerequisite for imposing a favorable peace in many of its interventions, including
Vietnam (1965-73), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989) and the Persian Gulf (1991).
Vietnam is a complicated case, where the United States lacked an overall strategy. The
war in South Vietnam aimed to destroy the insurgency militarily through attrition, while
the air war against North Vietnam fitfully aimed to coerce the North Vietnamese
government to halt aid to the rebellion.
m Today, there is generally a consensus, derived from the effectiveness of
airpower in halting the Iraqi offensive against Al Khafji, that American airpower could
have stopped an Iraqi offensive from mid-August onwards. However, neither French nor
American planners thought so at the time. Schwarzkopf did not rest easily until the 24 th
Mechanized Division arrived in October, while the French still worried about their sector
until early November.
228 However, three of France's interventions involved nominal collaboration. In
Chad (1968-72), French forces worked alongside their Chadian counterparts, however the
French dominated the relationship, providing 52 percent of the Chadian Army's budget
and commanding many of its units. Moreover, the French Military Delegate presided
over the Franco-Chadian General Staff, while Ambassador Wibaux co-chaired the
Franco-Chadian security council. During the 1978 Zaire operation, the United States
assisted with air transport and a Belgian paratroop force was sent after the French
battalion. Nevertheless, the French fought entirely independently and the Belgians only
arrived after the invading Katangese had been routed. During the 1983 Chadian
intervention, Zaire had already deployed air forces to assist the Chadian government.
Nonetheless, there appears to have been little interaction between the Zairian contingent
and the French.
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Chapter VIII:
British Military Interventions
I. Introduction
Soldiers and statesmen view the use of military force differently. Military professionals
favor the use of maximum force, with minimal restrictions, to obtain clear military objectives,
such as destroying an adversary's armed forces. Statesmen, on the other hand, deal with a wider
context. Military force is a diplomatic commodity, to be sparingly employed to coerce, deter,
posture or negotiate. In the French case, political leaders' ability to draw on multiple assessments
of how to conduct a military intervention enabled them to ensure the primacy of the latter set of
desiderata. In the previous chapter, tight political control led French military interventions to
privilege the manipulation of force for diplomatic ends. In the United Kingdom, where political
and military roles are more clearly delineated, and the armed forces possess operational autono-
my, opposite values are emphasized.
Having never weathered political military crises akin to those in France, British leaders
never felt the need supervise the chiefs of staffs' meetings or develop the parallel staff systems
that underlay civilian power in France. Rather, British leaders permitted civil-military interac-
tions to evolve along functional and hierarchic lines. In practice, this produced a sharp separation
between politics and diplomacy on the one hand, and military operations on the other. British
military doctrine, in fact, normatively recognizes the existence of four levels of command, each
of which oversees a specific series of decisions.'
At the top, political and foreign policy decisions are made by either the cabinet, the cabi-
net's Defense and Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC) or an ad-hoc "War Cabinet" assembled to
deal with a particular crisis. Comprised of politicians and advised by the civil service, these bo-
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dies determine when, why and with what means the United Kingdom will use force. In terms of
British military doctrine, this level of authority is termed "grand strategic." 2
The only conduit between these top-level policymaking bodies and the armed forces are
the chiefs of staff. All four chiefs formerly attended cabinet or DOPC sessions, however the
Chief of Defense Staff alone has fulfilled this role since 1982.3 Because they participate in the
cabinet's deliberations and formulate directives for the armed forces, the chiefs of staff play a
critical function of furnishing political leaders with military advice and translating political de-
sires into military orders. British military doctrine refers to this level of command as "military-
strategic" and specifies that it is responsible for designating operational commanders, determin-
ing campaign objectives, coordinating with allies and allocating military resources.4
Below the chiefs of staff, the British armed forces respond to significant interventions by
appointing a joint commander to manage operations from a headquarters in the United Kingdom.
Smaller interventions are typically controlled by a joint commander deployed to the theater of
operations. Exceptionally, two joint commanders may be appointed: one to manage the alloca-
tion of forces from the United Kingdom; and the other to shape military plans in the theater of
operations. According to official doctrine, this level of authority is termed "operational" and
tasked with designing, planning and conducting an inter-service campaign.
A number of field commanders answer to these joint commanders. In general, each ser-
vice's contingent has a field commander and separate commands may also exist for specific func-
tions, such as orchestrating an amphibious landing or operating detached from other British
forces. During the Falklands War four distinct field commands existed, while in the 1991 Gulf
War three field commands existed. Termed "tactical," this level corresponds with the employ-
ment of forces in battle.
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Thus, British military operations are governed by a strict hierarchy of levels of command.
Information and advice percolates up this hierarchy, while orders and directives are transmitted
downwards. With each level of command responsible for a distinct set of activities, political and
strategic directives are reinterpreted by each echelon of authority. To better visualize British
command structures, Table I below presents a schematic model.
Table I:
Levels of Command Authority (Generic)
Cabinet, War Cabine
or DOPC
Chief of Defense Staff or
Chiefs of Staff Committee
Joint Commander(s)
Field Commanders
Grand Strategic Level
Military-Strategic
Level
Operational Level
Tactical Level
In practice, the hierarchical distance isolating political leaders from tactical and operational
commanders renders the latter comparatively autonomous and deprives the former of much of
their ability to shape military operations.
Clearly separating political and military responsibilities, the British system approximates
Samuel Huntington's model for how military operations ought to be conducted. According to
Huntington, armed forces will fight more efficiently when the management of military operations
is left to professional officers, with political leaders only setting political goals and allocating
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military means.6 Today many accept Huntington's view that military strategy should be the
autonomous province of military professionals and it has underscored developments such as the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Weinberger-
Powell doctrine of 1984.7
Despite the popular belief that wars are best prosecuted when left to "professional manag-
ers of violence," a number of scholars warn that military officers have biases and agendas that do
not necessarily coincide with a states' interests. Military officers are frequently held to possess an
"offensive bias," meaning that they prefer offensive strategies and exaggerate their utility vis-a-
vis defensive or deterrent postures.8 During interventions, the military's offensive mindset cre-
ates pressures for escalation, as military commanders push to attack objectives that were off lim-
its, destroy an adversary's deterrent forces or utilize means hitherto proscribed.9 In some cases,
the offensive bias translates into a preference for preventative attacks to deal with opponents
while they are weaker or less prepared than they might be at a future date.'0
Besides an offensive bias, military professionals prefer employing "overwhelming" or
"massive" force to deal with problems. Huntington diagnosed military officers as both congeni-
tally "conservative" and "pessimistic."" Other scholars have concluded that military organiza-
tions frame problems in ways that enhance their future claims on resources.12 Together, inherent
pessimism and the desire to justify large force structures prompt military commanders to exag-
gerate threats and demand excessive forces to deal with them.
Finally, military organizations are not unitary bodies, but collections of distinct services,
branches and platform communities. Each of these services and communities competes with one
another for resources and prestige. The representatives of these communities lobby to impose
strategies that advance their bureaucratic agendas. Thus, air force officers push for strategic
bombing campaigns, marines for amphibious landings and special forces for commando raids. In
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some cases, a service may attempt to "win the war on its own" in order to assure its budgetary
future, even if doing so entails excessive casualties and risks.13 If political leaders lack the means
of carefully examining military operations, plans may degenerate into the sum total of the bu-
reaucratic agendas advanced by services and branches.
Combining Huntington's positive image of military professionals expertly using force
with the cautionary notes sounded by other scholars, a mixed picture emerges of the strengths and
weaknesses the United Kingdom's armed forces are likely to exhibit during military interven-
tions. Table II, below, illustrates these predictions.
Table II:
Predictions About British Military Operations
Strengths Weaknesses
Operational and tactical virtuosity An offensive bias and escalatory pressures
Excessive demands for resources
Plans shaped by bureaucratic politics
Taken as an ensemble, one would expect British interventions to bear the mark of a very high
degree of professional skill in framing plans and executing operations, however the biases and
bureaucratic politics of military organizations will shape British strategy in ways inconsistent
with the aims established by political leaders.
The remainder of this chapter will test these hypotheses on three British interventions:
Oman (1965-75), the Falklands (1982) and the Persian Gulf Crisis (1990-91). These cases were
selected because they represent distinct varieties of interventions, including a counter-insurgency,
a conventional conflict and a coalition war. As much as possible, the forms of intervention stud-
ied parallel those explored in the preceding chapter on French interventions. These cases also
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control for the varying leadership styles as they collectively spanned the governments of four
prime ministers.
II. Oman, 1965-1975
Between 1962 and 1975, the United Kingdom fought its first post-colonial war and last
"hot war" of the Cold War. The outcome of Britain's struggle against Soviet and Chinese sup-
ported insurgents remained long in doubt, prompting senior British officials to refer to Oman as a
"micro-Vietnam," an "Arabian Vietnam," and "another Aden." 4 In an exemplary counter-
insurgency campaign, the British armed forces first prevented insurrection from spreading
beyond Dhofar province and then crushed the rebellion in Dhofar itself. Key to the British victo-
ry was the fusion of political and military authority in military hands, which created paramilitary
forces, drilled wells, and built schools and mosques. More controversially, British officers pulled
a reluctant government into an unwanted war, masterminded a coup d'etat against the Sultan, mo-
bilized Islam against the insurgents, introduced Iranian forces into Oman, and ordered attacks on
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).
Between the 1940s and 1960s, the United Kingdom fought counter-insurgencies in Pales-
tine, Malaya, Cyprus, Kenya, Yemen and Borneo.' 5 When it decided to abandon its Far and
Middle Eastern military commitments in 1967, Britain's Labour government planned to end in-
volvement in distant conflicts. However, the United Kingdom's remaining alliances drew it into
Oman's war. Beginning in the 1950s, Oman's Masirah Island permitted the United Kingdom to
project forced globally, serving as a staging point for reinforcing Hong Kong, Australia and Sin-
gapore, and permitting the United Kingdom to uphold its commitments to the Central Treaty Or-
ganization (CENTO).16 According to a 1958 agreement, the United Kingdom could use Masirah
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as long as it trained and officered the Omani armed forces and sustained Oman's Salalah base, in
Dhofar Province.17
Soon, the United Kingdom's obligations towards Oman proved more costly than expected.
Attempting to insulate Omani society from consumerism and foreign ideologies, Sultan Said bin
Taimur opposed schools, medicine and modem agriculture.'8 Because of these policies and the
country's general poverty, armed dissidence became a feature of Omani life.19 The discontented
subjects of Dhofar province began sniping at the Sultan's Armed Forces in 1962.20 Ethnically
distinct from other Omanis, the Dhofaris initially sought autonomy.2 ' However, government in-
transigence prompted the rebels to demand independence and name themselves the Dhofar Libe-
ration Front (DLF).
22Supported only by expatriate contributions, the DLF appeared destined for defeat.
However, decisions in London, Beijing and Moscow transformed the Dhofar War in 1968, before
the Sultan's Armed Forces could convert their new-found oil wealth into military victory.2 In
1967, the United Kingdom withdrew from South Yemen permitting Yemenite communists to
seize power and begin supporting Dhofar's rebels.
Because of their struggle for leadership of the global communist movement, both China
and the Soviet Union fell into line with South Yemen's strategy. After the Chinese supplied the
DLF with its first arms shipments, the Soviet Union offered more and better weaponry. Soon
Chinese advisors led DLF rebels on raids, while the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and East Germa-
ny provided bases, training camps and weaponry. New confidence swept Dhofar's rebels as
they exchanged bolt action rifles for AK 47s and took possession of their first mortars, grenades
and anti-tank rocket launchers.
Rebels seized the initiative by mortaring Salalah, containing Dhofar's administrative capi-
tal, only airfield and logistics base.26 Encouraged by their benefactors, Dhofar's rebels adopted
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"scientific socialism" as their ideology and renamed themselves the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG).2 7 Then, in 1969, the rebels captured Western Dho-
far's largest town, Rakhyut, and executed the region's hapless governor (Wali) in public.28 The
29rebel's newfound vigor stunned the Sultan's Armed Forces. By 1970, the rebellion controlled
the countryside and had grown to 2,000 full-time rebels and 4,000 part-time militiamen.30 Hear-
tened by the Sultan's difficulties, revolutionaries plotted to spread rebellion to the rest of Oman.3 1
British assessments highlighted the worsening strategic outlook, judging in February 1970
that, "Time is not on the side of the SAF [Sultan's Armed Forces]. Guerrilla pressure has been
increasing and with it the pressure to RAF [Royal Air Force] Salalah."3  Three weeks later, the
Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom's armed forces doubted that the Sultan would retain con-
trol of Dhofar for another year.33 And the Joint Intelligence Committee independently concluded
that, "If the Sultan were to lose control in Dhofar ... the trouble might spread, for example to
Inner Oman."34 Given the gloomy predictions, the British government hoped to avoid involve-
ment in the war.35 However, without political leaders ever deciding to intervene, seconded Brit-
ish personnel accompanied Omani units into combat and the British detachment at Salalah strug-
gled to protect the base from rebel attacks.
Far from keeping their commitment limited to the clauses of their treaty with the Sultan,
British officers increased the United Kingdom's involvement in Oman's internal troubles. Draw-
ing on their experience in past insurgencies, British officers rapidly concluded that they needed to
implement a "hearts and minds" campaign, combining political reforms and development ef-
36forts. When Sultan Said refused to introduce local democracy or fund development programs
through deficit spending, British officers began scheming to replace the Sultan with his tractable
Sandhurst-educated son, Qaboos bin Said. They reasoned that only a new Omani government
would approve the measures needed to win the Dhofar War.
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Colonel Hugh Oldman, the contract officer serving as the Sultan's Defense Secretary, be-
gan plotting a coup d'6tat and the Commander of British Forces in the Persian Gulf, General Roly
Gibbs, set the tone for the conspirators, arguing that, "The Sultan must go, because if he did not,
Dhofar was liable to be lost to the rebels." 37 Oldman enlisted the help of the Commander of the
Sultan's Armed Forces, Brigadier John Graham, and obtained approval from the British Chiefs of
Staff Committee.38 Thus, the British armed forces took it upon themselves to overthrow the ruler
they were mandated to assist, replacing him with a relative who never asked to be given power in
this manner. Two British officers and six Omani soldiers stormed the Sultan's palace at Salalah
on 23 July 1970. After a gun battle, the British forced Sultan Said to abdicate in favor of his son.
Having been installed by pistol-wielding Englishmen, Qaboos bin Said assumed his father's man-
tle as Sultan.39 However, the British miscalculated and their coup d'dtat initially backfired.
Taking advantage of a new government's fragility, PFLOAG, South Yemen and sympa-
thetic intelligence services conspired to spread the insurgency to Northern Oman. Insurgents first
struck a military base in Northern Oman, before disappearing.40 Then, in early November 1970,
boats landed between 10 and 30 communist infiltrators on Oman's Musandam Peninsula in No-
vember 1970.41 Trained abroad and furnished with Soviet weaponry, the guerrillas were sup-
posed to rally the local tribes and establish bases for future waves of infiltrators.42 Soon alarming
news began filtering into British forces in the Persian Gulf, announcing that Musandam's tribes
were joining the insurgents.4 3
Disconcerted by this intelligence, the British Military Commander for the Persian Gulf,
proposed to use overwhelming force to nip this new insurgency in the bud. With British, Omani
and Emirate soldiers, working in conjunction with jet fighters, helicopters and warships, Gibbs
planned to cordon and search the entire peninsula.44 However, the Chiefs of Staff Committee
disagreed because Gibb's proposal was costly and would enflame anti-British sentiment through-
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out the Middle East, where colonialism was a recent memory.45 Upon the Committee's recom-
mendation, Gibbs revised his plan.46
Employing preponderant (albeit less) force, Gibbs launched Operation INTRADON on 16
December, with the aim of trapping the insurgents between an amphibious force and an SAS pa-
trol parachuted into their rear. Unfortunately, a cartographic error placed the amphibious force
several kilometers from its objective, permitting the insurgents to flee before the British could
spring the trap.47 With the infiltrators gone, Musandam's tribes rallied to the Sultan's govern-
ment. 48
With this rebel move checked, Graham and Oldman concentrated on Dhofar. They
planned to use two battalions to seal off Dhofar's western approaches and prevent rebels from re-
supplying themselves from South Yemen. 49 At London's insistence, Brigadier Fergie Semple, of
the Special Air Service (SAS) elaborated a plan for special forces to root out insurgent networks
in areas reoccupied by friendly forces. To maximize the effectiveness of these operations,
Semple emphasized the need for good intelligence and convinced the British government to dis-
patch an intelligence team to Salalah.
Once deployed to Oman, the SAS commander developed his own ideas. Lieutenant-
Colonel Johnny Watts wanted his troops to play a more proactive role in fighting the insurgency
and suggested using the SAS to lead bands of Omani irregulars, recruited from friendly tribes and
surrendered rebels.: Influenced by Watts, Graham revised his plan. Rather than defeat the in-
surgency from the "outside-in," beginning with Dhofar's western border and working towards the
rest of Oman, he now envisioned pacifying Oman from the "inside-out. "3 Regular forces would
now begin in eastern Oman by seizing population centers from which irregular bands, calledfir-
qats, would pacify the countryside. 4
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The British planned to launch their offensive after the 1971 monsoon. During the preced-
ing nine months, they expanded Oman's armed forces by a third, from three to four battalions and
recruited six irregularfirqats.55 British psychological warfare experts exploited Islam to drive a
wedge between Dhofaris and the PFLOAG rebels, whose communist secularism alienated
many.56 The slogan of British propaganda campaign became "Islam is Our Way, Freedom is Our
Aim," which rang-out from Radio Dhofar and adorned posters. 57 The British further stoked the
fires of religious war by persuading Oman's Qadi to declare a jihad.58 Conveying this message,
British propaganda leaflets declared (italics added):59
Now is your time to claim your freedom. Throw off the yoke of the communist
oppressors.
We, who are your brothers in freedom and in Islam, we who are from the jebel, we
understand your hardships, for the communists destroyed our flocks and murdered
our families.
Now we have returned!
We return in strength to take our revenge. Our brothers from all the tribes upon
the jebel, now is your chance for revenge. Join us in the Holyfight against the
ungodly communists.
Come to us in friendship, carry your rifle openly in your hand, join us in the fight
as a fellow warrior of Islam to defeat communism.
Justified for its military expediency, the British Army's exploitation of Islam posed long-term
political risks.6 0
By the time the annual monsoon abated, Brigadier Graham and Colonel Oldman were
poised to launch an offensive with 250 Omani soldiers, 300 firqatmen, 100 SAS, a pioneer pla-
toon and a platoon of irregular askars.61 Using this painstakingly assembled force, British com-
manders planned to crush the rebellion in eight months. Between October and December 1971,
the firqats would pacify the east of Dhofar while regular forces interdicted rebel supplies. Then,
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from December 1971 until May 1972, the Sultan's forces would pacify the center of Dhofar and
launch attacks on PFLOAG bases along the border. Finally, between May and June 1972, the
firqats and the regular army would pacify Dhofar's sparsely populated west. 62
Although British officers had intervened in Omani politics and religion in the interests of
military expediency, their own plans for a quick victory foundered on misperceptions and wishful
thinking. The first British disappointment occurred when factional strife tore onefirqat apart,
prompting forty of the unit's 68 warriors to desert.63 Then, when the Anglo-Omani offensive--
code-named Operation Jaguar--began on 2 October 1971, thefirqats proved cantankerous, refus-
ing to attack the town of Jibjat. After Jibjat, threefirqats refused to obey orders to seize a rebel
logistics base, citing the need to observe Ramadan. These pauses permitted the rebels to with-
draw, taking weapons and supplies with them.64
Having recaptured Eastern Dhofar but failed to damage the rebellion, Brigadier Graham
launched the next phase of his offensive--Operation Leopard--on 2 November 1970. Pausing
after capturing Jibjat and White City, Omani forces resumed their march in three columns. When
they reached predetermined locations, each column built a fortified base. The high command's
theory was that these three bases, surrounded by barbed wire and minefields, would prevent the
rebels from infiltrating Eastern Dhofar.65 However, PFLOAG adapted by sneaking camel cara-
vans through the gaps between them. Unable to halt the flow of rebel supplies, the Leopard posi-
tions tied down Oman's scarce military resources.66 By December, the "decisive" Anglo-Omani
offensive had become a fiasco. Watts "returned to Britain an angry and disenchanted man"67 and
Graham forecast a long, difficult war.68 In London, the Foreign Office referred to Oman as "a
kind of micro-Vietnam in the Arabian peninsula." 69
The failure of the 1971 Anglo-Omani offensive prompted both sides to take greater risks.
Shattered expectations of a rapid victory prompted Graham to undertake a perilous gamble, seiz-
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ing and holding a remote position in Western Dhofar. Meanwhile, Operations Jaguar and Leo-
pard convinced PFLOAG that it needed to regain the initiative by spreading the rebellion to
northern Oman and capturing the strategic town of Mirbat.
Graham acted before the rebels. Studying Oman's geography attentively, Graham vested
his hopes in the rocky outcropping of Sarfait, in the extreme west of Dhofar. Graham reasoned
that strong air supplied government forces in Sarfait would strangle the rebellion's supply lines
with "a major, permanent and, it is hoped, decisive blocking operation on all enemy supply routes
in the West."70 After meticulous planning, helicopters full of soldiers descended on Sarfait in
April 1972 and built a fortified base centered on an airfield and ringed by barbed wire and mines.
Although Sarfait's occupation went according to plan, Graham's understanding of geography
proved erroneous. Perched over 1,000 meters above the sea, artillery sited in Sarfait could not
reach the three successive plateaus, descending like stair-steps, to the sea. Realizing this, the
rebels shifted their camel trains to the coastal ledges, where they were immune from attack. 71
Worse, the British offensive escalated the war. Long-range Yemeni artillery riposted
pounding Omani territory in May 1972, killing five Omanis.72 Graham responded by ordering
Omani aircraft to bomb a South Yemeni military base. 73 Graham's ill- considered raid prompted
Soviet and Cuban aircraft to fly patrols up to the Omani border. This spiral of events raised the
specter of a full-scale war between Oman and South Yemen, with the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union supporting their local allies.74
Bad as the situation might have been, it soon became worse. Painstakingly trained by for-
eign advisors, 250 guerrillas infiltrated Dhofar and made their way to the provincial town of Mir-
bat.75 Rebel leaders calculated victory at Mirbat would crush government morale. After careful
preparation, the guerrilla commandos assaulted Mirbat on 19 July 1972. Achieving complete
surprise, the attackers overran the outer defenses. Then, Mirbat's heterogeneous garrison of 50
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regular soldiers, firqatmen and SAS troopers reacted heroically, contesting every inch of territory
and firing their cannon at point blank range. Desperate resistance slowed the rebels' momentum
long enough for aircraft to pound the rebels. Finally, advancing to the sounds of guns, a nearby
SAS detachment attacked the rebels from an unexpected direction, creating panic. The rebels left
7629 dead and 12 wounded comrades behind, while Mirbat's defenders lost 15 killed in action.
While they planned and executed their attack on Mirbat, rebel leaders prepared a very dif-
ferent offensive. In February 1972, the Soviet-trained dissident Zahir Ali Zaher infiltrated north-
ern Oman to foment revolution. Zahir's plan was to develop a clandestine network of activists
and smuggle arms into Oman, before igniting a campaign of assassinations in January 1973.77
However, British intelligence officers obtained knowledge of Zahir's plan and arrested 30 dissi-
dents and seized 165 rifles, 363 grenades and four mortars.78 With Zahir's defeat, the British
thwarted PFLOAG's final effort to foment revolution in northern Oman.
Despite, their best efforts neither the rebels nor the Anglo- Omani forces accomplished
much in 1972. With the end of the 1972 offensives, Brigadier Graham's mandate came to an end
as commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces. With Oman no closer to victory than two-and-a-
half years previously, British policymakers became increasingly pessimistic.79 To impart fresh
impetus to Britain's stalled war effort, the government appointed a new, higher ranking officer,
Major-General Tim Creasy, to lead the Sultan's Armed Forces. Studying the failures of his pre-
decessor, Creasy concluded that the Sultan's Armed Forces lacked the numeric preponderance for
offensive operations and had to establish a hermetic barrier to prevent rebel movements between
Dhofar and South Yemen. In essence, Creasy concluded that he needed more troops and wea-
pons to pursue Graham's strategy.
Creasy prodded Qaboos to more than double Oman's armed forces. Whereas the Sultan's
armed forces counted 2,500 soldiers when Qaboos took power and were thereafter expanded by
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one-third, Creasy now pushed for an army of 11,700 men by 1974.80 Creasy planned to use this
army to simultaneously hold a fortified line stretching across the breadth of Dhofar, sealing the
province off from the rebellion's Yemenite sanctuaries, and wage mobile offensive operations
throughout Dhofar's interior. Creasy's military buildup obliged Oman to borrow money on a
massive scale, risking bankruptcy in the long-term, and delaying decisive operations for a year.
While the British laid the basis for eventual victory, PFLOAG sought successes in 1973.
With Omani military power concentrated at Sarfait and Salalah, PFLOAG sought to cut both gar-
risons off from their air-transported supplies. Rebels maneuvered recoilless rifles onto a position
overlooking Sarfait's airfield, on 3 February 1973, annihilating a piston-engine aircraft unloading
supplies. Thereafter, accurate mortar and recoilless rifle fire prevented fixed-wing aircraft from
landing at Sarfait.8 Sarfait's position was desperate.82 However, the Omani government's credi-
bility was on the line and the Sultan refused to retreat.83
Only helicopters could save Sarfait, but neither the British nor the Omanis had any to
spare. Creasy soon discovered that the only way he could quickly obtain helicopters was by con-
travening the Foreign Office's long-established policy of excluding Iranian influence from Ara-
bia. 84 He, therefore, negotiated directly with the Iranians and obtained six helicopters.85 Despite
difficulties, the Iranians delivered precious supplies and saved Sarfait from an unenviable fate.
PFLOAG nevertheless continued to besiege Sarfait, harassing the base with a weekly average of
70 mortar rounds and occasionally pounding it with artillery based in South Yemen.86 Re-
supplied, but besieged, Sarfait became a "frontier fort" where 500 soldiers lived in a growing
complex of hand-built stone bunkers.87
After failing to take Sarfait, PFLOAG renewed its efforts against the larger logistics base
of Salalah in August. PFLOAG's prior mortar campaign on Salalah had been defeated between
1970 and 1972 by the British deployment of artillery and sophisticated mortar locating radars.88
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Now the rebels hoped to paralyze Salalah by introducing a new weapon--the "Katyusha" rocket.
Developed by the Soviet Union for conventional warfare, the Viet Cong had used the Katyusha
against American airbases in Vietnam. The Katyusha's long-range and erratic trajectory rendered
it undetectable by the mortar locating radars defending Salalah.89
The British obtained advanced intelligence about the rocket threat and deployed an acous-
tic-ranging detachment to Salalah a full month before the rebels used the rockets. However, the
rebels adapted by shifting positions after each rocket was launched.90 When the rocket offensive
began in August 1973, one landed near the Royal Air Force mess, wounding nine, including one
British pilot.91 Others destroyed parked aircraft. Soon civilian employees and contract officers at
Salalah threatened to quite work unless their security could be guaranteed.92 As the only func-
tioning airbase in Dhofar, Salalah's disruption would halt operations. To keep Salalah operating,
Anglo-Omani forces built fortified rock enclosures overlooking the dried riverbeds where the
rebels launched the rockets. The combination of observation posts and acoustic ranging pre-
vented the rebels from closing Salalah, but did not hinder their launching rockets.
Frustrated by his inability to quickly win the war in Oman, Creasy lobbied to escalate the
war, spreading it to South Yemen. The nomadic Mahra tribe, whose peregrinations embraced
Oman and South Yemen, was increasingly disenchanted with South Yemenite rule and prepared
to rebel. Creasy urged the United Kingdom to allow him to "raise the Mahra," which "would
relieve the pressure on the SAF [Sultan's Armed Forces] and would embroil PDRY [South Ye-
men] / PFLOAG resources in counter-insurgency operations."93 In other words, fighting an in-
surgency would prevent South Yemen from supporting one in Oman.
Creasy's offensive inclinations alarmed London. With Eastern Bloc support, South Ye-
men possessed conventional military superiority over Oman and would win an overt war. Never-
theless, the Defense and Overseas Policy Committee approved Creasy's plan with the proviso that
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British personnel not accompany the Mahra in Yemen. 94 With ministerial approval, Creasy inau-
gurated the Mahra insurgency, in early 1973, reassigning onefirqat from the counter-insurgency
in Dhofar.95
Meanwhile, Creasy began building an impenetrable barrier between Dhofar's population
centers and the rebel sanctuaries in South Yemen. In late-1972, Creasy established eight platoon
and company positions, collectively known as the "Hornbeam Line," from the sea to the desert,
60 kilometers away. At first this line was porous and undermanned, failing to stop rebel move-
ments. Creasy, however, insisted on using a Royal Engineer squadron to continually enhance the
Omani positions with barbed wire and minefields.96 Little by little the Hornbeam Line impinged
on PFLOAG's ability to sustain its guerrillas in central and eastern Dhofar. However, it would
take more than a year-and-a-half to join together the Hornbeam Line's positions into the formida-
ble barrier Creasy planned.97 While the Hornbeam Line was established in late-1972 and largely
built in 1973, its real impact came in 1974.98
Harried by the Mahra insurgency and recognizing the dearth of Omani reserves, South
Yemen escalated the conflict. In autumn of 1973, 150 South Yemeni regular soldiers joined
PFLOAG in attacking the Hombeam Line, adding formal training and expertise with heavy wea-
ponry to the guerrilla skills of the insurgents. Soon accurate mortar fire, averaging 30 to 40
rounds per week, struck the Hornbeam Line. 99 In an even more escalatory act, South Yemeni
bombers, piloted by Eastern Bloc pilots, bombed the Omani town of Makinat Shihan on 18 No-
vember. Thereafter, Yemeni artillery increased its shelling of Sarfait.100 Ordered by South Ye-
men and condoned by the Soviet Union, these attacks raised the specter of the Dhofar War meta-
morphosing into a larger regional conflict.
With South Yemen increasingly belligerent and the Sultan's Armed Forces overstretched,
the strategic situation appeared critical in late-1973. To reverse these trends, Creasy relied in-
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creasingly on Iran, which now offered a combined arms battle group of 1,500 soldiers.10 1 Despite
the Foreign Office's opposition to Iranian involvement, the desperate situation called for extraor-
dinary measures. When they arrived, the sudden influx of well-armed and conventionally trained
Iranian forces deterred South Yemen and its benefactors from enlarging their conventional opera-
tions and provided the numeric cushion needed to resume offensive operations.'0 2
The arrival of the Iranian battlegroup proved the final turning point in the Dhofar War.
Until this point, neither PFLOAG nor the Anglo-Omani forces had a clear advantage. Hence-
forth, British, Omani and Iranian forces would conduct an uninterrupted series of offensive op-
erations, destroying PFLOAG and leading to complete victory by the end of 1975. As Creasy
had planned, the Omani military build-up bore fruit in early 1974.103 With support units and the
Iranian battlegroup, Creasy now had 12,000 regular military personnel in Dhofar.104 Added to
these regular forces, the firqats now numbered 1,200 irregular combatants.105 Meanwhile, the
rebellion faced increasing difficulties replacing casualties. Compared with the 2,000 full-time
guerrillas and 4,000 militia active in 1970, PFLOAG could only mobilize 600 full-time and 1,200
occasional guerrillas.' 0 6 The shift in the correlation of forces, illustrated in Table III, was dramat-
ic.
Table III:
The Changing Balance of Forces, 1970-1974
1970 1974
Oman 2,500 regulars 10,500 regulars
400 askars 1,200 firqutmen
500 British 850 British
1,500 Iranians
Total 3,400 pro-govt troops 14,050 pro-govt troops
Rebels 2,000 guerrillas 600 guerrillas
4,000 militia 1,200 militia
Total 6,000 rebels 1,800 rebels
Correlation 1 to 1.8 7.8 to 1
Using his growing numeric superiority, Creasy reinforced the Hombeam Line. By Au-
gust 1974, the line constituted a continuous barrier, impenetrable to all but clandestine interlo-
pers.107 Although groups regularly infiltrated across, the rebels were unable to move heavy wea-
pons through the line, which cut the rebellion's Yemeni sanctuaries off from 85 percent of Dho-
far's population. 108 If Mao Tse-tung was correct that guerrillas must operate as fish, swimming in
the overall sea constituted by a region's population, Hornbeam isolated the guerrillas from the
Dhofari population.
In December 1973, the Iranian battlegroup began clearing the road from Salalah to Saudi
Arabia, which had been closed for years to all but heavily escorted convoys.109 After clearing the
road, Iran promised more forces, bringing the Iranian contingent up to brigade (2,400 men) size.
Now, the British planned to use the Iranians to re-conquer Western Dhofar's largest town, Rak-
hyut, which had been in rebel hands since 1969. Then, the Iranians would build a new fortified
line, equivalent to the Hornbeam Line, sealing off the newly conquered territories from further
infiltration. 10
Despite the overwhelming forces available, the Anglo-Iranian-Omani offensive encoun-
tered severe problems. The Iranians attacked on 2 December 1974, but the rebels defeated Ira-
nian units in several minor battles and then withdrew before the Iranians could bring their fire-
power to bear. Failing to inflict losses on the rebels, the Iranians nonetheless conquered their
geographic objectives within a month and set about building the new fortified line, known as the
Damavand Line.
While the Iranians fortified their line, a British-led Omani regiment struck another offen-
sive blow to weaken the enemy and divide his attention. On 4 January, 1,000 Omani troops, fir-
qatmen and British advisors assaulted the Sherishitti Caves, a natural fortress serving as a rebel
logistics base. Although only eight guerrillas defended the caves at the beginning of the offen-
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sive, the firqat's sluggishness permitted over thirty reinforcements to arrive. On 6 January, these
rebels trapped Omani regular forces in a textbook ambush, killing 13 and wounding 22, for a loss
of only four guerrillas. Renouncing capturing the caves themselves, the Anglo-Omani force then
seized a ridge overlooking the caves. Unwilling to hazard further lives in the Sherishitti bastion,
they contented themselves with harassing rebel efforts to use the caves.I
While regular forces pressured the rebels, Brigadier John Akehurst, the commander of
Anglo-Omani forces in Dhofar, planned to use thefirqats to seize and pacify the highlands in
central and eastern Dhofar. Although weakened by the Hornbeam Line, rebels still controlled
much of the countryside. Akehurst planned to implant firqats in their tribal districts and provide
them with substantial development assistance, enticing the inhabitants away from the rebels. The
pattern for subsequent operations was:'i2
1) Get a Firqat leader to identify a defensible location in his area
2) Mount a battalion level attack to secure the area
3) Build an access track to the area and an airstrip if possible
4) Move a drill up the track
5) Drill a water hole deep down to the plentiful aquifers
6) Build water storage tanks and cattle troughs
7) Build the basis of a village, with mosque, shop, school and clinic
8) Leave the Firqat to defend themselves with the threat that if any enemy
appeared in their area the water would be immediately cut off.
Akehurst's strategy harnessed Oman's burgeoning conventional military strength and its hitherto
disappointing irregular firqats in a single campaign. After it began in October 1974, Akehurst's
offensive bore fruit with firqats enticing civilians to their new villages, pacifying central and
eastern Dhofar by June 1975.
Hammered by conventional offensives, cut-off by fortified lines and undermined by Ake-
hurst's pacification effort, rebel morale collapsed in late 1974. During the second month of Ake-
hurst's campaign a record 41 guerrillas deserted the rebellion and monthly surrender averages
were, in late 1974, twice as high as during the preceding year.11 3
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As the rebels weakened, Anglo-Omani forces concentrated greater force on harrying the
rebellion's increasingly scarce combatants. In February 1975, seven Omani companies (over
1,000 men) assaulted the entrenchments of Ashoq, where a headquarters of 30 to 40 rebels had
directed attacks since early 1973. Using massive firepower, the Anglo-Omani forces seized
Ashoq, capturing large quantities of arms and ammunition for the first time in the war.'1 4 Then,
in May and June, the Omani garrison at Sarfait ventured from their fortifications and ambushed
two rebel camel trains, belatedly fulfilling Sarfait's role of interdicting rebel supply lines.' 15
Reeling from previous reverses, PFLOAG could now be destroyed in one more thrust.
When the 1975 monsoon ended, Anglo-Omani and Iranian forces launched four offensives within
12 days. On 14 October, the garrison of Sarfait captured the first of the three plateaus leading to
the sea. Then, far to the northeast, the Iranians attacked from the Damavand Line towards a ridge
overlooking rebel supply lines. When rebels concentrated against the Iranians, Akehurst ordered
the Sarfait regiment to advance all the way to the sea, capturing all three plateaus and blocking
the routes hitherto used by rebel caravans.
Ten days after the advance from Sarfait to the sea, another Omani battalion assaulted the
Sherishitti Caves. Supported by armored cars, artillery and fighter-bombers, the Omanis method-
ically advanced, seizing large quantities of rebel materiel, including 750,000 rounds of ammuni-
tion. 116 Assailed on all sides by Anglo-Omani and Iranian forces, South Yemen ordered its 250
combatants in Oman to withdraw closer to the South Yemeni border. Abandoned by their
erstwhile comrades-in-arms, the guerrillas began a general withdrawal as well. Although the
rebels had originally intended to regroup, their retreat soon degenerated into a route and they
abandoned their heavy weapons. With the rebellion rapidly collapsing, Akehurst ordered a heli-
copter-borne assault on Dhalqut, the last rebel village.
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Unfortunately, escalation threatened to produce an inter-state war even as Oman's civil
war drew to a close. General Kenneth Perkins ordered Omani fighters to bomb South Yemeni
artillery to prevent it from interfering with Akehurst's offensives. Unfortunately, Perkins miscal-
culated. His air strike, on 16 October, destroyed only one Yemeni gun and, far from being inti-
midated, the Yemenis responded by moving more artillery to the border and engaging the British
in gunnery duels." 7 However, economic woes forced South Yemen's leadership to think twice
before escalating further.
Dhalqut's fall on 1 December 1975 consecrated the Anglo-Omani victory over the Dhofar
rebellion. Unusual for an unconventional war, Oman's victory was so complete that Sultan Qa-
boos could publicly announce the end of the war on 11 December. From near defeat in 1973,
Anglo-Omani forces had rebounded to conquer Dhofar by late 1975. In two years of continuous
offensives, interrupted only by the annual monsoon, Anglo-Omani forces had whittled the rebel-
lion down from 1,800 combatants to 100 haggard guerrillas." 8
The Anglo-Omani victory in Dhofar is one of the most complete won against a well-
organized insurgency. One of the keys to this victory was the fusion of political and military
authority under British military commanders. British field commanders, both in Dhofar and
Oman as a whole, possessed broad powers to plan and conduct conventional military offensives,
development projects and a "hearts and minds" campaign. With the authority accorded them,
successive British commanders pursued objectives consonant with their institutional preferences.
From the outset, British field commanders demanded overwhelming force, securing an
eight-to-one advantage before the decisive offensives in 1974 and 1975. Even before they ob-
tained this numeric superiority, commanders favored offensive operations. When South Yemeni
forces increased their assistance to the rebellion, British officers urged escalation: bombing posi-
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tions in Yemen, fostering the Mahra insurgency, preemptively attacking South Yemeni artillery
and, ultimately, bombing and shelling South Yemeni forces.
British commanders meddled in Oman's internal politics, demanded financially excessive
levels of force and irresponsibly risked escalation. To secure the military buildup and develop-
ment spending they felt necessary, British officers conspired to overthrow Sultan Said, who was
the employer and supposed beneficiary of British assistance. Creasy's force goals meant that
Oman's 1975 defense budget was nearly twice as large as its national budget had been in 1973.
Without the 1973 Oil Crisis, Oman would have gone bankrupt.' 19
Besides risking Oman's financial health in their quest for overwhelming force, British
commanders undermined the Foreign Office's policy of limiting Iranian influence in Arabia. Af-
ter dangerously committing forces to Sarfait, Creasy needed Iranian assistance to prevent a hu-
miliating retreat. Although a self-induced crisis justified the original Iranian deployment, British
officers wanted as many Iranians as they could get. With their attacks on South Yemeni territory,
British field commanders also brought Oman and South Yemen to the brink of war on several
occasions. Table IV, below, illustrates when British field commanders sought London's permis-
sion and when they used their proper initiative.
Table IV:
When Field Commanders Sought London's Permission
Sought Permission Acted Alone
- Overthrow Sultan Said (1970) - Retaliatory Air Strike on South
Yemeni Artillery (1972)
- Foster Mahra insurgency (1972)
- Preemptive Air Strike on South
Yemeni Artillery (1975)
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Although British officers occasionally referred matters to political superiors, they also made deci-
sions with weighty political consequences.
III. The Falklands, 1982
No military intervention since the 1956 Suez intervention preoccupied British political
leaders more than the Falklands War. Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands posed acute
challenges for the United Kingdom's leadership. Because of an economic recession and labor
strife, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government was deeply unpopular. Disgrace would
bring defeat in the United Kingdom's upcoming 1983 elections. Winning a military victory
would be equally problematic given the distances and opposition. Diplomatically challenged as
well, the United Kingdom strove for international legitimacy, resisted allies' efforts to negotiate a
settlement.
Because of the stakes, the British government followed the eleven-week crisis intensely.
The main crisis management committee, known as the "War Cabinet," met at least daily.1
Comprising Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster and the Chief of Defense Staff, the War Cabinet took most political and diplomatic
decisions. The Prime Minister also consulted the full cabinet twice a week and the armed forces
chiefs of staff met daily.121 With the fate of Thatcher's Conservative government and Britain's
international prestige riding in the balance, political leaders established the nation's objective,
handled diplomatic initiatives and established broad limits on how force could be used. Military
leaders enjoyed a free hand to formulate operational plans and fight battles.
The Argentine invasion on 2 April 1982 caught the United Kingdom's political and mili-
tary leadership unawares. Few imagined that Argentina and the United Kingdom would fight a
war over an obscure territorial dispute over economically valueless islands. However, domestic
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unpopularity drove Argentina's ruling military junta to seek a foreign policy triumph in either the
Falklands or a territorial dispute with Chile. The United Kingdom's poor management of a dis-
pute with Argentine scrap metal workers on South Georgia Island convinced the junta to invade.
Deciding to invade the Falklands on 26 March, an Argentine expeditionary force landed on 2
April. 122 Although British intelligence predicted the invasion, it was too late to reinforce the is-
lands.
With firm intelligence about the coming invasion, the Navy's chief of staff, First Sea Lord
Admiral Henry Leach, rushed to the House of Commons. With the Chief of Defence Staff away
in New Zealand and the other service chiefs indisposed, Leech had the opportunity to shape
Prime Minister Thatcher's outlook. 123 Leach's organizational interests were clear.124 The Royal
Navy was the big loser of the 1981 Defense Review and a predominantly maritime campaign
would showcase the aircraft carriers, amphibious landing craft and multipurpose frigates on the
budgetary chopping block. In the Falklands, Leach saw an opportunity to reverse the planned
reductions in Royal Navy strength. 2 5 After Leach explained that the Falklands' garrison was
inadequate and could not be reinforced, Thatcher questioned whether the Islands could be recap-
tured. Emphatic, Leach told the Prime Minister, "Yes we could (retake the Falklands) and in my
judgement we should."126 Thatcher immediately authorized Leach to assemble an invasion force.
While Leach's sanguine advice prompted Thatcher to respond boldly to the Argentine in-
vasion, he alone was optimistic about the United Kingdom's prospects. Army Chief of Staff
Dwin Bramall doubted success would come easily and suspected Leach of pursuing bureaucratic
interests.127 More emphatically, the RAF's Chief of Staff thought it would be folly to attack the
Falklands against opposition from the Argentine Air Force.128 To everyone except Leach, the
Argentines stood a good chance of holding the Falklands, 300 miles from the Argentine coast,
against a British expeditionary force sailing from over 8,000 miles away.
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With the chiefs of staff divided, their meetings were acrimonious. However, despite se-
rious reservations, the chiefs papered over their internal differences to present political leaders
with unanimous opinions and collective advice. In this first instance, of several that would occur
during the war, the unwillingness of the chiefs of staff to convey disagreements to political lead-
ers swayed important political decisions. 129
With the dispatch of an expeditionary force, the British established a political-military
chain-of-command. The Chief of Defense Staff, Admiral Terence Lewin, became the main polit-
ical-military interface. Attending the War Cabinet's daily meetings, Lewin remained attuned to
the conflict's political dimensions. He was also the government's only military advisor, except on
occasions when the War Cabinet convoked the chiefs of staff committee. Below Lewin, Admiral
John Fieldhouse managed the war from his headquarters at Northwood, in western England.
Fieldhouse crafted the United Kingdom's military strategy and never directly dealt with political
leaders, who communicated via Lewin. Fieldhouse also retained personal control over Britain's
nuclear submarines, including three dispatched to the South Atlantic.,
Four operational commanders answered to Fieldhouse. 13 Admiral Sandy Woodward,
commanded most of the naval forces, including the aircraft carriers and surface combatants.
Commander Michael Clapp led the amphibious landing force carrying soldiers and equipment.
Aboard Clapp's ships, Brigadier Julian Thompson commanded the ground forces (3 rd Commando
Brigade) designated to retake the islands. When a second brigade was added, Major-General
Jeremy Moore superseded Thompson. Finally, Captain Brian Young commanded a separate na-
val and amphibious force detailed to retake South Georgia Island.
Although outside the chain of command, the chiefs of staff committee discussed the con-
flict daily. Several ideas, such as using strategic bombers to attack the largest airfield on the
Falklands, originated with the chiefs of staff. Lewin, as Chief of Defense Staff, normally pre-
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sented the chiefs' advice to the War Cabinet, however the combined chiefs of staff sometimes met
with the War Cabinet. Whether presenting its advice collectively or via the Chief of Defense
Staff, the chiefs of staff concealed their disagreements from political leaders. Without viable
alternatives, the War Cabinet approved virtually all of the military's requests.
After Thatcher ordered the expeditionary force south, the Chiefs of Staff committee rec-
ommended establishing an "exclusion zone" around the Falkland. An exclusion zone would pro-
vide British forces with the freedom they required to interdict Argentine efforts to reinforce the
islands, while placating neutral states with the assurance that fighting would disrupt neither the
high seas nor the South American mainland. Political leaders acquiesced and announced, on 8
April, a maritime exclusion zone with a radius of 200 knots.1
With the Falklands 8,000 miles distant, British ships needed three weeks to travel to the
South Atlantic. In the meantime, the United States and Latin America pressured the United
Kingdom to agree to a compromise. The United Kingdom wanted to preserve an aura of interna-
tional legitimacy and could not refuse mediation. After two rounds of shuttle diplomacy, by
United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Britain was only spared the problem of rejecting
an unwanted compromise because the Argentines did so first.
The War Cabinet wanted to preempt future attempts to pressure the United Kingdom into
accepting anything short of victory. As a participant in the War Cabinet's deliberations, Admiral
Lewin shared their impatience for military action. In Fieldhouse's view, South Georgia, an island
800 miles southeast of the Falklands, could be liberated before the expeditionary force neared the
Falklands. Beyond the reach of Argentine land-based aircraft, South Georgia was occupied by a
token garrison. In a move the Defense Secretary categorized as "pure politics" the United King-
dom hoped to derail efforts at international mediation by speedily re-taking South Georgia.133
However, attacking South Georgia would divert forces from the Falklands.
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On 20 April, a small naval squadron of four ships, carrying 220 Royal Marines and SAS
commandos, sailed towards South Georgia. Unfortunately, the operation ran into trouble when a
group of SAS commandos insisted on surprising the main Argentine garrison by climbing over
the Fortuna Glacier. After landing in a forbidding environment, the weather stymied twelve SAS
commandos, who struggled to survive in artic conditions. One day and two troop-carrying heli-
copters were lost recovering the SAS from the glacier. Having abandoned its equipment and suf-
fered from exposure, the SAS unit was momentarily incapacitated.134 The delays caused by the
Fortuna Glacier fiasco permitted the Argentine high command to send a submarine, the Santa Fe,
to South Georgia. When the British detected the Santa Fe's approach on 24 May, their ships dis-
tanced themselves from the island. Possessing few anti-submarine assets themselves, the South
Georgia invasion fleet was stymied.1 35 The conquest of South Georgia, which had been con-
ceived as an inexpensive means of influencing diplomatic events, was becoming a debacle.
Fortunately for the British, their luck soon changed. The next morning, a British helicop-
ter spotted the Santa Fe. Thereafter, several helicopters attacked, inflicting grievous damage.
Although not sunk, the Santa Fe beached itself. With the submarine incapacitated, Captain
Young ordered his small fleet to attack. By early evening, British soldiers were ashore, prompt-
ing the Argentine commander to surrender both his garrison and the Santa Fe.136 The recapture
of South Georgia fulfilled the British requirement to show activity before the main fleet arrived,
but it had nearly become a costly and embarrassing failure.
As the naval squadron retook South Georgia, the main expeditionary force neared the
Falklands. On 1 May, the British fleet stood poised to begin operations. On 30 April, the British
government declared that its maritime exclusion zone had become a total exclusion zone, mean-
ing that British forces would henceforth attack Argentine aircraft. For British military command-
ers, a combined Argentine air and naval attack constituted the greatest threat. The Argentine air
640
force could oppose 110 combat aircraft against less than 45 British Harriers and Sea Harriers.
Added to this the Argentine Navy could also inflict attrition on the British fleet.
Before landing, Woodward planned to attrite the Argentine Air Force and Navy by using
air strikes to draw the Argentine air force and navy into ill-considered attacks. Informed about
Woodward's plan, the Royal Air Force's (RAF) Chief of Staff protested at his service's absence
from British war plans. Although the RAF fulfilled an important logistic role, this was hardly
sufficient for the service's leadership. Faced with Woodward's plan, the RAF high command
worked out a means of contributing to the air battle. By flying from Ascension Island, 3,300
nautical miles away, and using all of the United Kingdom's available re-fuelling aircraft, a single
Vulcan bomber could reach the airfield at Stanley, in the Falklands. This exceptional mission
would permit the RAF to participate dramatically in the re-conquest of the Falklands.
Few outside of the RAF proved enthusiastic about the Vulcan proposal. The other servic-
es considered ultra-long-range bombing missions to be an expensive publicity stunt. Airfields are
difficult to disable and the runway at Stanley could be attacked at less cost by carrier aircraft or
naval gunfire. Some also worried about the diplomatic ramifications of using a heavy bomber, in
a hitherto limited conflict. Despite reservations, the other chiefs of staff agreed to present the
RAF's proposal as an inter-service recommendation, which the War Cabinet accepted.137
In the first blow in recovering the Falklands, a lone Vulcan dropped 21 bombs on Stan-
ley's airfield after 18 in-flight re-fuellings. Although the Vulcan mission was organizationally a
success, setting a record for history's longest bombing mission, the mission accomplished little
militarily. Only one bomb impacted on Stanley's runway, leaving a crater that was quickly re-
paired.138 Despite modest results, the RAF persisted with Vulcan raids. Altogether, seven Vul-
can missions attacked targets near Stanley between 1 May and 12 June. Unfortunately, the six
follow-up missions accomplished even less than the first, with bombs and missiles missing their
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targets. On the second to last mission, technical difficulties forced the bomber to divert to Brazil,
where it created a diplomatic incident, when Argentine authorities requested that Brazil impound
the aircraft. 139
After the Vulcan raid on 1 May, ship based aircraft and naval gunfire pounded Stanley's
runway. The Argentines fell for Woodward's ruse and launched 35 aircraft at the British expedi-
tionary force. Poorly coordinated, the Argentine air raids accomplished nothing and permitted
British aircraft to shoot down four Argentine jets. Intelligence soon picked up signs that the Ar-
gentine Navy was planning a decisive attack in the form of a giant pincher, with one fleet, includ-
ing Argentina's aircraft carrier, attacking from the north and another centered on the cruiser Bel-
grano thrusting up from the south. 140
Understandably, Woodward preferred to preempt the Argentine naval offensive by sink-
ing key units before they could attack. 14 British submarines could torpedo Argentine ships be-
fore they entered the total exclusion zone, but sinking warships outside of the zone would have
diplomatic consequences. When one submarine, the Conqueror, spotted the cruiser Belgrano
before dawn on 2 May, Woodward ordered the submarine to attack. However, Britain's subma-
rines answered directly to Admiral Fieldhouse, who countermanded Woodward's order and took
the matter to the chiefs of staff. 42 Shortly thereafter, Admiral Lewin asked the War Cabinet to
approve sinking the Belgrano.
Although the War Cabinet approved the request in 20 minutes, the Belgrano reversed
course before the message reached the Conqueror. Reasoning that the Belgrano would pose a
threat later, Woodward demanded once again that Conqueror sink it. Late, on 2 May, Conqueror
sunk the Belgrano with a spread of torpedoes, killing 321 of the cruiser's crew.
The military and diplomatic consequences of the Belgrano's sinking were weighty. Los-
ing the Belgrano frightened the Argentine navy into keeping its ships within Argentine territorial
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waters, where they posed no threat. Diplomatically, the British sneak attack enflamed anti-
British opinion in Latin American and Europe. Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia, Spain and
Ireland all condemned the United Kingdom's action and several proposed collectively breaking
diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.143 Although the worse eventualities never came
to pass, the British government felt obliged to devote more attention Peru's mediation attempts.
After the first two days of fighting had gone Britain's way, the Argentines scored a suc-
cess on 4 May. Using a single Exocet anti-ship missile, an Argentine aircraft sunk a modem de-
stroyer, the Sheffield. The Sheffield's loss highlighted the threat posed by Argentine aircraft and
Exocet missiles.144 Worse, the Argentine air force began withholding its aircraft for use against
the British landing force. Woodward's failure to provoke an air battle prompted the British high
command to search for alternative ways to reduce the Argentine air power. Bomber raids on
mainland Argentine air bases were rejected because the United Kingdom did not have enough
tanker aircraft to fly the extra distance. After dismissing air strikes, British planners turned to
special forces. On the night of 14 / 15 May, forty-five SAS commandos raided the Pebble Island
airfield in the Falklands, destroying eleven aircraft. However, all of Argentina's 82 high perfor-
mance jets were based further away, on the Argentine mainland.145
After the Pebble Island raid, British commanders hoped that SAS commandos could de-
stroy Argentina's Exocet missiles and Super Etendard jets. Unfortunately, military operations
against the Argentine mainland would fall within the scope of the Rio Treaty for Pan-American
defense and generate pressures for Latin American solidarity with Argentina.14 6 Despite foreign
policy risks, the Chiefs of Staff convinced the War Cabinet to approve raids against Argentina's
Rio Grande airbase in Tierra del Fuega. After an initial intelligence party scouted the airfield, a
raiding force of SAS would crash land two C- 130 transport aircraft. The SAS would demolish
aircraft on the runway and kill everyone in the Argentine officers' quarters, before escaping on
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Chile on foot. If all went according to plan, the Exocet threat would be extirpated. However, the
mission was risky politically and militarily.
The planned raid encountered problems from the moment the War Cabinet approved it.
On 17 May, British ships launched a helicopter with the SAS reconnaissance team. However, an
Argentine radar lock and two flares convinced the SAS that they had been detected. Poorly pre-
pared for a fight, the SAS aborted their mission. With the preparatory reconnaissance mission
cancelled, the SAS raid on Rio Grande became riskier. Undeterred, Director of the SAS, General
Peter de la Billiere, pushed to go ahead. Many in the SAS considered the raid a suicide mission.
Crash landing on an enemy airbase, overcoming unknown defenses and escaping across tundra
struck even SAS commandos as impossible. After one long-serving NCO resigned rather than
participate, the squadron commander counseled de la Billiere to abort the raid.147 Hoping to per-
severe with an operation judged critical to the SAS' future, de la Billiere sacked the squadron
commander. However, his initiative backfired when NCOs and enlisted men threatened mass
resignations, obliging de la Billiere to postpone the raid indefinitely.,48
In retrospect, the SAS raid was a perilous gamble. Success was unlikely, but could have
destroyed Argentina's most potent asset. However, in the event of failure, Argentine forces could
strike a psychological blow, inflicting casualties on British forces, capturing prisoners to display
and exposing the United Kingdom's extension of hostilities. Even if the SAS succeeded, the at-
tack would enflame Latin American opinion and increase diplomatic pressures for a compromise
solution.149
Having failed to deplete Argentina's combat aircraft, the British landing was opposed by
an intact air force. On 21 May, amphibious vessels landed 3rd Commando Brigade in Port San
Carlos. Expecting the landing elsewhere, the Argentines reacted feebly at first. However, they
soon riposted with an air campaign, transforming Port San Carlos into "bomb alley" between 21
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and 25 May. By the time the air offensive petered out, they sank five British ships and damaged
three, but lost 19 aircraft in the process.' 5 0 These attacks depleted the British fleet, worrying
Woodward lest defeat was imminent.'5 1
With a beachhead, the British terminated the most perilous stage of the re-conquest.
However, the landing created diplomatic pressures for a compromise peace. Few Western states
wanted the United Kingdom to humiliate Argentina and Latin American states wanted to avoid
Argentine bloodshed.is2 A number of states, including the United States, Colombia and Peru,
presented new peace proposals following the British landing, while Spain and Panama presented
an anti-British resolution to the United Nations Security Council.1 5 3 Although details differed, all
envisioned a ceasefire, to be followed by the evacuation of the islands by Argentine and British
military forces. Finally, a peacekeeping force would guard the islands, while negotiations de-
cided their status. 154
Having mobilized public opinion in favor of the war, Prime Minister Thatcher was no
longer willing to settle for anything short of victory. However, British policymakers doubted
how long they could avoid a compromise peace. The apparent lull in land operations after 21
May was particularly worrisome and British leaders counted on military momentum easing pres-
sures for a truce. While, British forces consolidated their beachhead and continued landing wea-
ponry and equipment, the British commander, Brigadier Thompson, interpreted his mission as
holding the beachhead until the second British brigade arrived. Meanwhile, the Argentines sank
the ship carrying transport helicopters, delaying the British advance.155
Participating in the War Cabinet's meetings, the Chief of Defense Staff appreciated the
diplomatic pressures. He therefore prodded Admiral Fieldhouse to reinvigorate the British offen-
sive. However, Brigadier Thompson insisted that an advance on Stanley was premature. For this
reason, Admiral Fieldhouse recommended that a battalion take Goose Green, which was 20 miles
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from the beachhead.156 However, located along a narrow isthmus, these Argentine forces occu-
pied a strong defensive position, but posed no threat to a British advance on Stanley. Thompson,
therefore, resisted pressures to attack. His military calculations clashed with the politico-military
reasoning of his superiors. Other field commanders sympathized with Thompson, while the high
command in London agreed with Fieldhouse and Lewin. 5 7
Matters came to a head on 26 May, five days after the landing. During a satellite conver-
sation, Thompson argued that he could not spare the helicopter transport to move artillery for-
ward. Unsympathetic, Fieldhouse told him to attack without artillery because "the people at the
backend were getting restless."15 8 When Thompson protested this rationale, Fieldhouse threat-
ened that, "if he did not launch the attack on Goose Green, he [Fieldhouse] would replace him
with someone who would."159 Lacking alternatives, Thompson attacked.
Given the emphasis on speed, Thompson did not reconnoiter Goose Green and his plan
was based on erroneous information about the enemy position and the terrain. Lacking time to
analyze soil samples, Thompson concluded that light tanks could not operate in the bogs around
Goose Green. Thompson, therefore, held the tanks back, when they could have been used.160
Meanwhile, British intelligence was imprecise, evaluating the Goose Green garrison at 300 per-
sonnel and then only later raising their assessment to 450, when 1,007 Argentines were
present.161
Following London's advice, Thompson detached only a single infantry battalion, the 2 "d
Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, and three artillery pieces. After learning about the strength
of the Argentine garrison, Thompson lamented, " I set the battalion an almost impossible task....
We did not appreciate how much firepower I should have deployed."162 Considering Goose
Green a distraction, Thompson remained distant from the operation and delegated tactical plan-
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ning to Colonel "H" Jones of the Parachute Regiment. With little time and imperfect intelligence,
Jones developed an overcomplicated plan.
When the British attack began at 2:00 am on 28 May, the result was an unexpectedly
bloody and difficult battle. British timetables became unhinged, attacks lost their synchroniza-
tion and the movements became chaotic. Soon, the offensive was stymied on the Argentine de-
fensive line, where soldiers suffered from Argentine artillery and air strikes. When Jones at-
tempted to charge the enemy trenches himself, he was gunned down, perishing from his wounds.
Bogged down and leaderless, a timely counterattack could have routed the British."6
However, Jones' second-in-command managed to get the offensive moving within an hour. Us-
ing all of the firepower at their disposition, the British broke up the Argentine defenses. After a
battle that lasted until the first hours of 29 May, the British took Goose Green. Overall, the Brit-
ish suffered 16 killed, 36 heavily wounded and 30 lightly wounded in their assault. In exchange,
they killed 45 Argentine soldiers, wounded 90 and took more than 900 prisoners.164 The assault
on Goose Green was a success, but nearly ended in disaster, and resulted in casualties dispropor-
tionate with the limited objective sought. Had the Argentines counterattacked when the British
attack floundered, they could have achieved a local victory. 165
In a broader sense, Goose Green accomplished its political objective of paralyzing efforts
at mediation. Thereafter, the land campaign proceeded, with the 3rd Commando Brigade advanc-
ing towards Stanley and the 5th Brigade arriving by sea. 166 By 11 June, both British brigades
were poised to assault the main Argentine defensive positions on the ridges and hills surrounding
Stanley. Carefully briefed on enemy positions and supported by all available artillery that could
be mustered, the British attack began just after midnight on 12 June. On the first day, three batta-
lions of 3rd Commando Brigade assaulted the Argentines' outer defensive line, anchored on the
rocky heights of Mount Longdon, Mount Harriet and Two Sisters. Despite the natural strength of
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the positions and stiff Argentine resistance, transforming the battle for Mount Longdon into the
war's bloodiest engagement, professional British troops overcame outnumbered Argentine con-
scripts in each encounter.' 67
After cracking the first Argentine line, British forces paused and consolidated before as-
saulting the final line of defenses. On 14 June, three fresh battalions assaulted the high-ground at
Tumbledown, Mount William and Wireless Ridge. Dispirited after the fighting on 12 June, the
Argentines offered less resistance. In comparison to the 24 British dead and 63 wounded suf-
fered on 12 June, the Argentines inflicted a mere 11 killed and 46 wounded on 14 June. 168
Having been forced from the commanding heights around Stanley, Argentine forces still
had the wherewithal to resist the British. Since the landing on 1 May, British forces had only
killed, wounded or captured 1,500 Argentine soldiers out of 11,000. The Argentine garrison in-
cluded three entire regiments and an armored car detachment that had not yet fired a shot, maga-
zines were brimming with ammunition, and combat aircraft and truck-mounted Exocet missiles
stood ready.'69 Stanley's commander attempted to form a defensive position west of Stanley, but
the Argentine governor of the Falklands wanted to retreat east of Stanley, to defend the zone
around the airfield as long as possible. Finally, aggressive regimental officers planned to counte-
rattack British forces on the high-ground or fight house-to-house, where civilian hostages would
impede British operations.17 0
Whatever possibilities might have existed, the British had shattered the Argentine Army's
cohesion. Units became intermingled as they retreated and men began to shirk. British Marines
overran the Argentine line west of Stanley before it could offer any serious resistance, while shel-
ling by British artillery and the breakdown of order amongst Argentine units prevented any last
ditch stand at the airfield. Realizing that further resistance was futile, Brigadier-General
Mendndez surrendered Argentine forces on the Falklands to Major-General Moore on 15 June."7
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Thus, after two-and-a-half months of political and military maneuvering, the United
Kingdom reestablished British rule over the Falklands and decisive military defeat prompted a
disgruntled Argentine electorate to replace the overthrow regime. The magnitude of the British
success and unexpectedly positive nature of its political aftermath warrant the Falklands' status as
a decisive military victory.
Many factors augured against a political-military triumph. Over a month-and-a-half was
needed to assemble and transport an amphibious forces to the islands and a host of countries tried
to impose a diplomatic compromise. Then, a well-timed Argentine air and naval offensive could
have thwarted the British amphibious landing. That the United Kingdom managed to accomplish
its objectives demonstrates the suitability of its decision-making processes, illustrated in Table V
below.
I Table V:
Levels of Command Authority
Chiefs of Staff
Committee - - * Ch
Chiefs of Staff regularly
advise Lewin and occa-
sionally the War Cabinet
(
War Cabinet Grand Strategic Level
ief of Defense Staff (Lewin) Military-Strategic
Level
Lewin participates in
War Cabinet meetings
Commander-in-Chief Fleet Operational Level
(Fieldhouse)
Commanders in South Atlantic Tactical Level
(Woodward, Clapp, Thomp-
son/Moore and Young)
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Each echelon occupied itself with a different level of decision-making. Political leaders never
enmeshed themselves in military detail, while British operational commanders rarely proffered
political advice.
Despite ultimate success, the British decision making process manifested defects. The
ability to present politicians with unified positions encouraged the services to logroll their differ-
ences to obtain desired institutional outcomes.172 On three distinct occasions, illustrated in Table
VI below, the Chiefs of Staff committee presented political leaders with a seemingly unanimous
opinion, which, only a single service chief really favored.
Table VI:
Cases of Inter-Service Logrolling
Group Favoring
Action Action Result
Advising political leaders Navy Falklands retaken in hazardous
that Falklands could be campaign; Planned cuts in naval
retaken forces cancelled
Strategic bombing raids on Air Force Seven costly, but ineffective raids
Stanley conducted; Air Force plays visible role in
conflict
Sending Gurkha battalion Army Battalion sent, but negative publicity
muted because it played little role in
combat; Gurkha battalions preserved
Admiral Leach's advising political leaders that they could retake the Falklands, produced a suc-
cessful, if dangerous campaign. Air Marshal Beetham's championing ultra-long-range bombing
missions, generated costly and desultory results. Finally, the Army's deployment of Gurkhas
failed to provoke the anticipated diplomatic storm despite their fearsome reputation and merce-
nary status.
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While collective advice facilitated logrolling, the British also demonstrated military myo-
pia. Throughout the conflict, the British high command proposed actions that only marginally
enhanced the United Kingdom's prospects of success, but bore high political or economic costs.
As table VII illustrates, below, the War Cabinet acceded to each of these demands, save one.
Table VII:
Military Actions Requiring Political Pennission
Action Dates Results
Permission to shoot down Boeing 707 4/22 - 4/23 War Cabinet refuses permission
Torpedoing the Belgrano 5/2 Argentine surface fleet neutralized
Strategic bombing raids on Stanley 5/1 - 6/12 Seven costly, but ineffective raids
Commando raid on Argentine mainland 5/14 - 5/18 Raid aborted because of compromised
reconnaissance and near mutiny
within the SAS
The War Cabinet refused only Admiral Lewin's request to shoot down Argentine Boeing 707
airliners tracking the British fleet, because of likelihood of accidentally shooting down a civilian
aircraft.173
The high command often exaggerated the military benefits to be gained from their chosen
course of action. Thus, torpedoing the Belgrano, conducting long-range bombing missions and
raiding mainland Argentine airfields were presented as critical to victory, when, in fact, the Bel-
grano was an antiquated cruiser, strategic bombing missions accomplished little and raiding the
Rio Grande airfield was a suicide mission. Meanwhile, the diplomatic costs of all four opera-
tions, each constituting an escalation over previously accepted limits, were mooted in the British
high command's presentations.
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If the high command promoted technical military and organizational factors at the ex-
pense of diplomatic and economic concerns, diplomatic concerns occasionally encroached on
military planning. At two critical junctures, listed in Table VIII, Admiral Fieldhouse ordered
subordinates to launch attacks to achieve diplomatic ends.
Table VIII:
Diplomatically Motivated Military Actions
Action Dates Results
Seizure of South Georgia 20/4 - 25/4 Early operations result in a debacle,
Argentine resistance collapsed after
the Santa Fe was incapacitated
Attack on Goose Green and Darwin 28/5 - 29/5 Poorly prepared British attack nearly
repulsed, but ultimately succeeds
Although the motives behind these attacks were diplomatic, British leaders played no direct role
in ordering them. Instead the Chief of Defense Staff conveyed the need for imminent action to
the operational commander, Admiral Fieldhouse. Fieldhouse, in turn, chose the objectives to be
attacked. 74
Overall, the Falklands War convincingly demonstrates the strengths, but also highlights
certain weaknesses, of the United Kingdom's institutions. A clear politico-military chain-of-
command and functional division of authority into levels of decision-making permitted the Brit-
ish armed forces to respond to an unanticipated military threat. Never once did political leaders
interfere with military operations, and only once did they refuse a military request. Although
military leaders abused their authority to push for escalatory and bureaucratically motivated poli-
cies, the Falklands War was an impressive demonstration of British military power, which saw
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the United Kingdom vanquish a competent adversary more than 8,000 knots from the British
Isles.
IV. The Gulf War, 1990-1991
Less than a decade after winning the Falklands War, the United Kingdom faced a differ-
ent, but substantial challenge following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Iraq's military power obliged
the United Kingdom to assemble its largest expeditionary force since 1956. Moreover, the crisis
forced the British into a subordinate position for the first time since the Korean War. At first, the
United Kingdom faced these challenges under the veteran guidance of Prime Minister Thatcher,
but midway through the crisis domestic politics led to Thatcher's replacement by an inexperience
John Major. Despite the change of leadership, the United Kingdom's political-military decision-
making proved remarkably stable. With a monolithic chain of command and field commanders
isolated from the cabinet via three echelons of military hierarchy, domestic politics failed to in-
fluence military preparations.
Employing the same institutional arrangements as during the Falklands War, Britain's
armed forces acquired disproportionate influence within the international coalition opposing Iraq.
Alone amongst the United States' allies, British military personnel participated in planning every
facet of the campaign, secured militarily significant roles and modified coalition strategy. The
trade-off for military influence came in terms of reduced political control over the armed forces.
British field commanders denied their political superiors access to intelligence and manipulated
the Cabinet into sending more forces than they intended and approving measures consonant with
the bureaucratic agendas of communities within the armed forces.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 surprised British political and military lead-
ers. Although intelligence tracked Iraq's build-up of forces along the Kuwaiti border and diplo-
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mats followed the tense negotiations between the two states, few considered invasion possible.
Prime Minister Thatcher and American President George Bush were together in Colorado when
the invasion occurred and the two leaders discussed the situation before meeting with their own
cabinets. 175
Urging resolution, Thatcher followed the United States' lead by sending two squadrons of
aircraft. The British high command insisted on stationing air defense Tornados alongside the
Americans at Dhahran, which was strategically located for defending the port cities and oil fields
of eastern Saudi Arabia.176 To reassure themselves against an attack from another direction, the
Saudi government proposed deploying British Tornados near its southern border. However, the
British armed forces eventually prevailed and the British Tornado squadron landed at Dhahran on
11 August.177 At the same time as dispatching aircraft, British authorities directed three warships
to enforce the United Kingdom's sanctions on Iraq.17 8
While these first decisions were undertaken, the British government began assembling the
institutions that would manage the crisis for more than six months. At the apex of the political-
military pyramid stood a restricted group of Cabinet members. Under Thatcher, the "War Cabi-
net" was an informal committee comprised of Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minis-
ter, Attorney General, Energy Secretary and Chief of Defense Staff. After Thatcher's fall from
power in November 1990, Prime Minister Major reorganized the War Cabinet as an official sub-
committee of the Defense and Overseas Policy Committee. Civil servants were included in the
new committee--officially termed the Overseas Policy (Gulf) Committee.179 Although Thatcher's
and Major's committees differed in terms of their statute (unofficial versus official) and the de-
tails of their membership, they were identical in terms of function and core membership, and are
both referred to as the War Cabinet.' 80
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As during the Falklands, the War Cabinet's only contact with the United Kingdom's mili-
tary establishment occurred via the Chief of Defense Staff, Air Marshal David Craig. Below
Craig, Air Marshal Patrick Hine served as Joint Commander and oversaw preparations for mili-
tary operations in the Middle East from his headquarters in England. In a departure from the
Falklands War, the British high command appointed another Joint Commander, subordinate to
Hine, to coordinate the field commanders in the Middle East. Field commanders, controlling the
land, air, naval and special forces, answered to the Joint Commander in the Middle East and
managed the tactical employment of their forces. Table IX below illustrates the British command
structure during the Gulf War.
Table IX:
Levels of Command Authority
War Cabinet Grand Strategic Level
Chiefs of Staff Chief of Defense Staff (Craig) Military-Strategic
Committee -- >
Level
Chiefs of Staff regularly Craig participates in
advise Craig and occa- War Cabinet meetings
sionally the War Cabinet
Joint Commander (United Kingdom)
(Hine)
Joint Theater Commander (Middle East) Operational Level
(Wilson/de la Billiere)
Field Commanders Tactical Level
(Cordingly/Smith, Craig, Wratten)
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The significant difference between decision-making structures in the Falklands and the Gulf War
was that the British high command introduced an additional echelon of command between politi-
cal leaders and field commanders. When Defense Minister Tom King informed the Joint Theater
Commander that he was "very much a hands on man," the Joint Theater Commander responded
that "when it came to decision making, I should have to deal through the chain of command and
not direct to him."' 8'
The upshot of the British chain-of-command was a clear division of responsibility be-
tween different echelons of command. Political leaders dealt with broad questions of policy and
diplomacy. Under them, commanders in the United Kingdom translated political desiderata into
military policy. Within the theater itself, the Joint Commander and field commanders crafted
operational plans and collaborated with their American and coalition counterparts.
Once deployed to Saudi Arabia, British air forces seamlessly integrated themselves into
the American activities. British commanders quickly discovered that American forces were op-
erating under looser rules of engagement (ROE). For Air Vice Marshal Wilson, American rules
were inappropriate for an international mixture of aircraft and real risks existed of Americans
mistakenly firing on allied craft. Wilson communicated his concerns to London, where the Brit-
ish Ministry of Defense pressured its American counterpart to agreed to a compromise over
ROE.18 2 Once the conflict over ROE was resolved, the United Kingdom dispatched a squadron
of ground-attack Tornados, on 22 August, to join the two squadrons already in the Persian
Gulf.'83
Because of the United Kingdom's early decision to place its forces under American au-
thority, Air Vice Marshal Wilson secured a place at General Schwarzkopf's nightly evening brief-
ing, alongside the American commander-in-chief and component commanders. As the only non-
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American at the evening briefing, the senior British officer in the Middle East acquired unrivalled
access to American planning and intelligence.184
Diplomatic pressure and the coalition military forces were met by Iraqi a growing military
presence in Kuwait. Faced with this reality, American leaders worried lest their armed forces
continue to be the only international contributions deployed in harm's way. American wishes
dovetailed with the British Army's own preferences, where Chief of the General Staff John
Chapple had been lobbying to send ground forces.
At first, the War Cabinet hesitated to send ground troops because it hoped to minimize the
United Kingdom's commitment, but gradually ceded to pressures from the Army and the Ameri-
cans. Once the War Cabinet agreed to send landforces, Chapple argued that an armored brigade
was the minimum viable tactical entity that could be sent.'85 Agreeing to deploy the 7 Armored
Brigade on 13 September, the British government announced the decision on 14 September.1 86
With nearly 5,000 personnel, 117 tanks and 52 infantry fighting vehicles, the brigade changed the
nature of Britain's involvement.'87 From a primarily aerial presence, land forces now became the
dominant element in the United Kingdom's deployment.
The War Cabinet's decision to deploy the armored brigade was a political decision, but
authority for employing the brigade devolved onto the joint commander in Saudi Arabia. Direct
negotiations with CENTCOM revealed that the United States wanted to integrate the British with
the United States Marines. From a military perspective, the British brigade was richly endowed
with modern tanks, but deficient in infantry, while the Marines possessed older tanks, but were
strong in infantry.188 Hine and Wilson accepted integrating their brigade with the Marines.
Wilson permitted the 7 th Armored Brigade's commander, Brigadier Patrick Cordingly, to
determine precisely how his unit would integrate into American command structure. From his
conversations with the Marine commander, two options emerged. According to Cordingly,
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We could operate as an independent brigade within the force reporting directly to the
general, or we could be placed under command of the 1" Division and Brigadier Gen-
eral Myatt. The first option gave us more independence and politically it looked at-
tractive -- we would seem to be less reliant on the US marines. The second option
was militarily neater. General Boomer was amenable to both plans, although it was
apparent he preferred the second, a view I shared.189
Cordingly decided to subordinate the British 7 Armored Brigade to the 1st Marine Division.
With an armored brigade in Saudi Arabia, the relative influence of British services began
to shift. Whereas reliance on airpower permitted RAF officers to monopolize the key command
assignments, the deployment of the 7th Armored Brigade meant that the Army contributed most
of the United Kingdom's manpower. The Army's COS argued that the Joint Commander in Saudi
Arabia, should be replaced by a higher-ranking Army officer. Although the RAF attempted to
protect Air Vice Marshal Wilson, Chapple commanded a majority in the Chiefs of Staff Commit-
tee. 190
The Army considered several candidates for the position of Joint Commander. General
Peter de la Billiere had a strong claim as Peacetime Permanent Commander (PPC) of the skeleton
Joint Forces Operational Staff, and a veteran of Middle Eastern fighting in Aden and Oman.191
However, de la Billiere's career in the SAS raised questions about his aptitude to direct armored
and air forces.1 92 General Chapple supported de la Billiere because he was the army's peacetime
commander designated to manage an intervention and Prime Minister Thatcher knew de la Bil-
liere from the Iranian Embassy siege of 1980 and threatened to appoint him as her personal advi-
sor if he was refused the joint command.193
Although the War Cabinet deployed an armoured brigade, the government feared over-
committing itself. In his first meetings with the high command, military leaders briefed General
de la Billiere that the War Cabinet was anxious about the costs it was accruing and the potential
casualties it might incur. Thatcher urged the armed forces "not to get its arm caught in the man-
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gle" and hoped to deploy no more than 6,000 personnel.194 In response to this injunction, de la
Billiere formulated the concept of "proportional risk" whereby British forces should strive to
make a militarily consequential contribution, while avoiding circumstances where they would
suffer disproportionate casualties.1 95
De la Billiere was dissatisfied with the 7th Armored Brigade's integration with the Ameri-
can 1st Marine Division, whose reputation as shock-troops raised fears of heavy casualties, in-
cluding up to 1,500 British dead.196 De la Billiere wanted to withdraw the 7th Armored Brigade
from Marine authority, but losing face with the Americans. In the meantime, de la Billiere la-
bored to maximize British influence.197 De la Billiere built on his predecessor's presence at
Schwarzkopf's evening briefings, by speaking twice a day with Schwarzkopf and weekly with the
Saudi Joint Forces Commander.198 De la Billiere used his growing influence to place British of-
ficers in CENTCOM's operations room and central planning team.'99
De la Billiere also negotiated an accord with Schwarzkopf whereby they exchanged in-
formation that could not be communicated to eithers' civilian superiors.200 In the coming weeks,
de la Billiere employed his influence vis-a-vis CENTCOM and London to obtain the transfer of
British ground forces from the Marines to the American VII Corps, the reinforcement of British
forces from brigade to division size, and a prominent role for British special forces.
When Schwarzkopf's staff began examining options to liberate Kuwait in early October,
CENTCOM settled on a frontal attack northwards, into Iraq's densest defenses. 20 1 For de la Bil-
liere, frontally attacking an estimated 90 Iraqi brigades in Kuwait with the 25 coalition brigades
available in Saudi Arabia was suicidal. Considering the plan unimaginative, de la Billiere feared
202that it would entail heavy British casualties.
Throughout October and early November, the British struggled to convince their Ameri-
can allies to modify their plans.203 Brigadier Cordingly denounced the American plan's short-
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comings to the United States Under Secretary for Defense. When de la Billiere informed the
Joint Commander in the United Kingdom, Hine immediately set his own staff to the task of
studying alternatives. Armed with their own assessments, Hine and de la Billiere suggested an
outflanking maneuver to Schwarzkopf in early November.205
Driven by criticism from his own superiors and promises of 250,000 reinforcements,
206Schwarzkopf adopted an outflanking strategy. As the coalition's war plan progressed, de la
Billiere found even more reasons for extracting the British 7th Armored Brigade from its attach-
ment to the Marines. According to the new war plan, the Marines would launch a diversionary
attack directly into Iraq's strongest defenses. Once Iraqi reserves had massed against the Ma-
rines, the American VII Corps would launch the principal offensive to the west.
Attacking heavy enemy concentrations, de la Billiere feared that the Marines and British
would suffer 17 percent casualties and receive scant attention for a diversionary action.207 After
studying the problem, de la Billiere developed a plan to extricate the 7 Armored Brigade from
Marine authority. If British troops were reinforced, he could argue that the British should par-
ticipate in the flank attack.
The War Cabinet had attempted to limit the United Kingdom's commitment to 6,000
Army personnel and only reluctantly accepted increases to 11,000. To obtain a further doubling
of the British force, to division size, de la Billiere used his autonomy to manipulate the British
208government. Rather than demand reinforcements, de la Billiere persuaded CENTCOM and the
Saudis to make the request for him. Hine added a provision for doubling the United Kingdom's
air contingent. 209 Manipulated by their generals, the War Cabinet increased British forces, from
17,000 to 45,000 personnel.20 Table X below illustrates the reinforcements agreed by the War
Cabinet in late November.
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Table X:
British Forces Present on Arabian Peninsula
Forces deployed Forces Present in
Component to 22 November January 1991 % Increase
Ground Component
Combat Units 1 Brigade 1 Division 100%
Tanks 117 175 50%
Army Personnel 11,000 33,000 200%
Air Component
Jaguar Units 1 Squadron 1 Squadron 0%
Tornado Units 2 Squadrons 4 Squadrons 100%
Total Personnel 17,000 45,000 165%
With reinforcements en route, de la Billiere transferred the 7th Armored Brigade to the American
VII Corps. When the British 4th Mechanized Brigade arrived in Saudi Arabia, it and the 7th Ar-
mored Brigade were grouped together to form the British 1st Armored Division.
Being the first coalition partner, following the United States, to announce significant troop
increases, the United Kingdom emerged as a leader of the effort to liberate Kuwait. However,
sending such a large contingent to Saudi Arabia taxed the British. The gravest problem proved
the unreliability of Challenger I tank engines, one of which broke down, on average, each time
the division advanced 2.8 kilometers.2 11 The British Army drew on all of its resources to keep its
tanks operational. All of the Army's engines, including those allotted to the three British armored
divisions in Germany, were shipped to Saudi Arabia, as well as large numbers of maintenance
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personnel.212 Eventually, last-minute modifications and plentiful spare-parts ensured that the
1 St Diision213British 1t Armored Division could conduct mobile warfare. However, the remainder of the
United Kingdom's armored forces were vitiated in the process.
Integrated with American headquarters and possessing powerful forces, British com-
manders ensured their forces would play significant roles in the coming fighting. The British Ist
Armored Division became the only non-American force to participate in the coalition's main at-
tack, outflanking Iraq's heaviest defenses and RAF Tornados and anti-runway munitions capabili-
ties featured heavily in the coalition's air offensive.
The British proved particularly influential in shaping the use of special forces. Because of
his Vietnam War experience, General Schwarzkopf opposed using special forces in Iraq. How-
ever, after directing the SAS, de la Billiere lobbied for British special forces to play a substantial
role and ordered his staff to formulate rescue plans when Iraq took foreign expatriates hostage.2 15
However, the difficulties of mounting a hostage rescue mission proved overwhelming. British
intelligence could not locate all 3,500 hostages and Iraqi forces were well trained and
216
equipped.2-
De la Billiere rotated the SAS' four "squadrons" through a desert training course in the
United Arab Emirates and shifted the focus of SAS preparations to hit-and-run raids in western
Iraq. Knowing where the coalition's main offensive would occur, de la Billiere reasoned that
small SAS teams could decoy large Iraqi forces from the main battle by raiding military targets in
Iraq's vast western desert. Without Schwarzkopf's approval, de la Billiere deployed three-
quarters of the SAS to Saudi Arabia.218 Once the SAS was in the theatre of operations, de la Bil-
liere gradually won acceptance for special forces operations. He promised that the SAS would
take care of themselves and obtained Schwarzkopf's approval for SAS raids.2 2 0
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At the same time as de la Billiere determined the roles of British ground forces and spe-
cial forces, his naval subordinate, Captain Christopher Craig, negotiated the employment of Brit-
ish naval forces with both the Americans and the Western European Union (WEU). During the
initial weeks following Kuwait's invasion, the United Kingdom committed itself to assisting the
United States' and the WEU's efforts to enforce the United Nations' embargo on Iraq. The War
Cabinet pushed for Anglo-American patrols when the United Nations approved sanctions, but
later agreed to coordinate sanctions enforcement efforts with other European states via the
WEU.221
Because the United States and WEU operated separately, British naval forces found them-
selves committed to two different sets sanction enforcement patrols. From a British military per-
spective, integration with the United States' forces would yield greater operational results. How-
ever, the WEU's presence was politically significant because its multi-national character and
symbolic affirmation of Europe's collective military power.222
Craig favored integration with the powerful and unified Americans rather than the more
223disparate and politicized European ensemble. When it came to allocating ships, Craig only
permanently devoted one vessel to WEU missions, withdrew warships without warning and
committed the majority of his 26 ships to Anglo-American operations.224 Craig denounced the
WEU's attempts to impose patrol zones and opposed centralized WEU planning.225
Meanwhile, Craig established direct liaisons with American task forces and discussed of-
fensive options with them. Over time, Craig's influence grew until he had liaison officers in
every American flagship.226 Craig vaunted the niche capabilities of Britain's fleet, including
state-of-the-art minesweepers, experienced anti-air warfare crews and ships, and a unique capa-
227bility to destroy small enemy warships with Lynx helicopters and Sea Skua anti-ship missiles.
American admirals came to view the Royal Navy as an essential adjunct to their own forces. At
663
American request, two British anti-aircraft destroyers were integrated into the American naval
forces' forward defenses.228 Meanwhile, the United States Navy placed even greater store in the
United Kingdom's four minesweepers, which they needed in order for the battleship Missouri to
229bombard the Iraqi coast.
In his enthusiasm to play a prominent role, Craig disregarded de la Billiere guidelines
about "proportionate risk."2 30 Craig's commitments to the Americans meant that he would send
over half of his 26 ships into the northern waters of the Persian Gulf, where the risks of Iraqi
mines and missile attacks were greatest. No other navy, including the United States, devoted
such a high percentage of its fleet to high risk operations.2
In sum, the British armed forces garnered unparalleled influence with the American high
command and fulfilled prominent roles in the coalition war plan. As Table XI illustrates, each
British service and branch had procured for itself a role of strategic importance and consonant
with its bureaucratic interests.
Table XI:
British Forces and their Roles in the Coalition War Plan
Comoonent Role
Army
Air Force
Navy
Special Forces
The 1s Armored Division was the only non-
American force integrated into VII Corps' main
offensive against the Iraqi Army
Ground attack Tornados to play key role against
Iraqi airfields
British warships to play large role in feigning an
amphibious assault in the northern Persian Gulf;
British to lead coalition minesweeping and provide
advanced anti-aircraft picket ships
British SAS are the only coalition special forces
permitted to conduct raids in Iraq
The Anglo-American coordination was the product of powerful British field commanders negoti-
ating how their individual contingents would be used.
The international coalition launched its air assault on Iraq on 16 January. On the first
night of the war, groups of four to eight British Tornado fighter-bombers attacked 10 Iraqi air
bases. For these attacks, each Tornado carried two JP233 munitions, which were designed to
pepper enemy runways with 30 bomblets and 215 anti-personnel mines.2 3 2 On the first night,
British Tornados struck all ten runways and lost one aircraft. In the days that followed, Tornado
crews repeated their runway attack missions, employing 100 JP233s by 22 January.2 33 They also
branched out from anti-airfield missions to attacks with 1,000-pound bombs.
However, Tornado losses began to mount. Iraqi air defenses shot down six Tornados be-
tween 16 and 22 January 1991. Considering that coalition losses comprised only 17 aircraft, the
British were losing a significant number of aircraft. Worse, evidence suggested damaged Iraqi
runways remained useable despite the attacks. 234 Although General de la Billiere and the Ameri-
cans wanted to halt low-level Tornado missions, neither challenged the RAF's judgement. For its
part, the RAF had invested too much in the Tornado / JP233 and persisted with its use. Only Air
Marshal Hine's intervention, on 23 January, brought low level raids to an end, after the United
235Kingdom lost nearly a fifth of its deployed Tornados.
Iraqi countered the coalition's air offensive by launching a total of 88 Scud missiles at Is-
rael and Saudi Arabia.236 Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein calculated that attacking and suffering
retaliatory strikes from Israel, would transform the conflict over Kuwait into an Arab-Israeli war.
American and British forces therefore sought ways of reassuring the Israelis and calming their
665
retaliatory instincts. The United States employed airpower against Iraq's mobile Scud missiles,
but it proved impossible to locate the missile launchers in Iraq's vast western deserts. 237
For de la Billiere, the Scud threat provided a golden opportunity for the United Kingdom
and his parent regiment, the SAS. De la Billiere reasoned that special forces on the ground would
prove better at locating and destroying Iraqi missiles than aircraft flying high overhead. More-
over, de la Billiere hoped that the SAS' reputation would convince the Israelis that the coalition
would soon neutralize the Scuds. Drawing on his influence with Schwarzkopf, de la Billiere ob-
tained permission for the SAS to "hunt" Scud missiles. Beginning on 20 January, SAS patrols
began infiltrating western Iraq to search for elusive missile launchers in 29,000 square miles of
desert.238
With approximately 120 personnel in Saudi Arabia, the SAS split into six units and began
patrolling western Iraq.239 Although the Israelis were reassured by the SAS' commitment, the
practical difficulties of interdicting Scud missile launchers became apparent. With comparatively
few personnel to cover a vast territory, the SAS struggled to locate missile launchers. Moreover,
Iraqi forces in western Iraq possessed heavier weaponry than the SAS, which relied on stealth
and off-road vehicles.
Before dawn on its first day in Iraq, one eight-man SAS patrol accidentally approached
within 300 meters of an Iraqi anti-aircraft battery and was discovered by Iraqi soldiers. Trucks
filled with infantry pursued the fleeing British, who either succumbed to a harsh winter in the
Iraqi desert or were captured by pursuing Iraqis. Three members of the patrol perished from hy-
pothermia, four were captured and tortured, and only one escaped to Syria after walking 300
kilometers. 240
Although the other SAS patrols fared better, several narrowly escaped disaster. One pa-
trol, with 26 men and 11 vehicles, fell afoul of an Iraqi artillery regiment, whose vehicles chased
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the SAS across the desert. 2 4 1 The Iraqis ambushed another patrol, destroying a vehicle and cap-
turing the patrol's sergeant, and dispersed a third SAS patrol after destroying two vehicles and
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wounding one British soldier. At one point, at least half of the SAS were either dispersed or
fleeing Iraqi forces. Nevertheless, the SAS recovered and patrolled western Iraq until the end of
the war. By most accounts, the SAS failed to destroy a single Scud, but successfully raided an
Iraqi communications facility.243 Although the results of SAS operations appear meagre, they
were politically significant, reassuring the Israelis that the coalition was doing everything in its
power to halt Scud launches and reminding the United Kingdom's allies about the value of its
contribution.244
Perhaps the greatest sign of the political value of the SAS came when American Secretary
of Defense Richard Cheney insisted on American special forces imitating their example. Hith-
erto restricted by Schwarzkopf, American special forces joined the SAS from 7 February (17
days after the beginning of SAS operations).245 Not coincidently, SAS adventures and misadven-
tures in the Persian Gulf contributed to the unit's subsequent popularity in the United Kingdom.
A series of memoirs by retired members of the SAS--at least seven to date--have given the unit's
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actions in Iraq extraordinary publicity and generated numerous of derivative products. Over-
all, the SAS lost four dead, five wounded and five prisoners of war. Given the SAS' small size,
its casualties were disproportionately heavy (over 10 percent) and could have been heavier given
a large number of close calls.2 47
While the SAS combated Iraq's Scud missiles, the Royal Navy participated in the coali-
tion's naval effort. Two British destroyers constituted, along with a handful of American ships,
the coalition's anti-aircraft picket in the northern waters of the Persian Gulf, where they were
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most exposed to Iraqi air attack. On 29 January, Iraq launched an attack towards the Saudi city
of Khafji with the aim of disrupting the coalition's offensive preparations. Three Iraqi Army di-
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visions advanced on Khafji by land, while an amphibious force of 17 small high speed ships
sailed southwards to outflank the coalition's defenses. While American air power decimated the
Iraqis on land, helicopters from Britain's two forward deployed destroyers devastated the Iraqi
amphibious force. Carrying Sea Skua missiles, the Lynx helicopters attacked the defenceless
Iraqi transports. Lynxes scored several hits and harassed the Iraqis until other British aircraft and
American helicopters could join the fray. Helicopters and aircraft sunk or damaged 16 out of the
convoy's 17 vessels, routing the Iraqis before they could land their soldiers.249
After British and American forces repulsed the Iraqi naval thrust, Iraqi missile boats and
minesweepers emerged haphazardly from the waters around Bubiyan Island. Whether the Iraqi
vessels sought to attack the coalition fleet more than 100 miles to the south or merely flee to Iran,
the British Lynxes pounced on their vulnerable prey.250 In the 36 hours of the so-called "Battle of
Bubiyan," British Lynxes fired 25 Sea Skuas, striking 18 targets, destroying seven Iraqi ships and
251incapacitating others. As at Khafji, American helicopters and aircraft followed up, destroying
further Iraqi ships.252 By 2 February, Iraq's 13 missile-carrying ships had either been disabled or
sunk.
The United Kingdom's disproportionate role in sinking the Iraqi Navy was soon followed
by an even more significant role in bombarding the Kuwait's coast. The United States Navy
planned to support the coalition's land assault by bombarding Kuwait's coast with the battleship
Missouri's mammoth guns. However, the United States lacked the minesweepers to clear a chan-
nel through Iraqi naval minefields. This gave Craig, who commanded five modern minesweep-
ers, enormous influence vis-a-vis his American counterparts, who only possessed three older
mnesweepers.
When the United States Navy unveiled a plan that Craig considered unworkable, he
threatened to withhold British support if American plans were not changed. Because of Craig's
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otherwise close relationship with the Americans, the United States Navy acceded to Craig's de-
mands for revised planning and greater consultation.253 To better direct affairs, Craig now de-
cided to take his flagship and other escorts north as well, where he could personally oversee the
minesweeping effort.2 5 4
On 14 February, 34 Anglo-American warships sailed north, towards mine infested waters
where allied warships would be within range of land-based anti-ship missiles. In what was ac-
knowledged the most dangerous naval operation of the war, British ships comprised half the coa-
lition fleet.255 Under a constant risk of Iraqi missile attacks, striking an undetected mine or col-
liding with drifting mines, the coalition's minesweepers gradually cleared a channel through the
belt of over 1,000 Iraqi mines.256
Unfortunately, operations in the northern Gulf proved dangerous. Silkworm missiles
obliged the minesweepers to retreat on 17 February. Then, after they returned, two large Ameri-
can ships--the amphibious assault ship Tarawa and guided-missile cruiser Princeton--struck
mines, heavily damaging both and forcing the Princeton from the war. Had smaller British
ships struck mines instead, they would have succumbed to the damage.
On 23 February, the day before the coalition land offensive, the battleship Missouri ad-
vanced through the mine-swept channel and bombarded Faylaka Island, before shifting fire to the
Kuwaiti coast on 24 February. The Iraqis responded with Silkworm missiles. Shifting 6,000 lbs
missiles into position, the Iraqis fired two Silkworm missiles at the Missouri, on 25 February, at a
range of 20 miles. Although one missile crashed into the Persian Gulf, the other successfully
tracked the Missouri. Now, only the alertness of the British destroyer Glouchester saved the Mis-
souri from missile damage. The Glouchester detected the Silkworm and destroyed it with two
anti-aircraft missiles.258
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The destruction of the Iraqi Silkworm constituted the final dramatic moment of the coali-
tion's naval campaign. Out of 230 American and coalition ships, only 34 operated in the northern
Persian Gulf, where Iraqi mines, aircraft and missiles all posed a threat. 259 Of these half of the
exposed ships were British and half American. However, the United States' exposed ships consti-
tuted only ten percent of their total force, while the British exposed over half of their much
smaller contingent.
After weeks of aerial bombardment, coalition land forces assaulted the Iraqi Army. Par-
ticipating in VII Corps' main attack, the British 1 't Armored Division entered the line on 25 Feb-
ruary, after the Marines launched their diversionary attack and American forces breached Iraq's
forward defenses. When the British overcame the first Iraqi defensive position without loss, Iraqi
forces staged an armored counterattack. However, a single volley from 14 British tanks devas-
tated the Iraqis, destroying five tanks and six armored vehicles. 260 The Iraqis followed up this
counterattack with a larger one before dawn on 26 February. Hoping to surprise the British by
operating at night, the Iraqis badly miscalculated. Using their thermal sites British tank crews
detected and engaged nearly fifty tanks and armored vehicles, destroying ten and routing the re-
mainder.26'
After the collapse of this second Iraqi counterattack, Iraqi infantry began surrendering in
large numbers. Although some Iraqi units fought tenaciously, others surrendered after token re-
sistance.262 On the morning of 27 February, British forces attained their ultimate objective eight
days before the divisional commander thought possible.263 Since the beginning of the ground
offensive, British forces advanced more than 350 kilometers, capturing 7,000 prisoners and de-
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stroying 300 tanks. Having accomplished their initial objectives, British forces stood by for
American orders, which were changed or rescinded before they could be executed until, on 28
February, a ceasefire brought hostilities to an end.
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Overall, the 1991 Gulf War highlighted British military capabilities and added to its
credibility vis-a-vis both the United States and the Arab world. Whether conducting high-risk
attacks on airfields, leading the hunt for Scud missiles, protecting the battleship Missouri from
mines and missiles, or accompanying the American VII Corps on its thrust into Iraq, British
forces played an ostentatious role. They also wielded disproportionate influence vis-a-vis their
allies. British officers were the only non-Americans to help plan the coalition offensive and Brit-
ish commanders shaped coalition strategy towards the "Scud hunt" and inshore naval operations.
Perhaps most tellingly, British forces were the only non-American contingent confided "critical
objectives," in the coalition war plan.26s
The exceptional degree of British influence over their allies resulted from the authority
wielded by the theatre commander and field commanders. Insulated from political considerations
and free to negotiate how their forces would be employed, British commanders established close
working relationships with their American counterparts and inserted liaison officers and planners
into American headquarters. Propinquity and the ability to consider purely military factors ren-
dered the British valued advisors.
The downside of the British military leadership's autonomy during the Gulf War came in
the armed forces' pursuit of bureaucratic objectives. Despite political leaders' intention to limit
the United Kingdom's participation in the conflict and exposure to casualties, the British theatre
commander and field commanders pushed for an ever greater commitment. From an early desire
to limit their commitment to 6,000, the British government eventually acquiesced to 43,500 per-
sonnel.
Competition for media attention and post-war funding prompted elements within the Brit-
ish armed forces to seek out hazardous assignments. The RAF persisted with low-level attacks
despite their losses, the SAS undertook perilous missions in western Iraq and the Royal Navy
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deliberately exposed itself to missiles and mines in the northern Persian Gulf. As a consequence,
British forces suffered disproportionate losses. Losing seven Tornados out of 50, the RAF's loss
rate was much higher than any other allied contingent.266 The SAS likewise ran enormous risks
in Iraq's western desert, where one patrol, out of six, was virtually annihilated and nearly 10 per-
cent of the total SAS force was either killed, wounded or captured. Altogether, the United King-
dom suffered only 24 deaths in combat, this constituted a higher percentage of its contingent and
a greater absolute number of losses than any state save the United States. Fortunately, the Iraqi
armed forces proved much less capable than feared and the United Kingdom's casualties re-
mained light, even if comparatively heavy.
V. Conclusion
Although undertaken in different regions and against a wide variety of opponents, the
British three interventions display a number of common traits. Huntington would undoubtedly
approve of the United Kingdom's radical division between politics and military strategy, whereby
military commanders assume control of operations once political leaders choose to act.267 Al-
though civilian leaders determined when to use force, military professionals elaborated war plans
and shaped decisions about which military units to send. This tended to produce interventions
that saw British forces employ maximum force, with few limits, to obtain limited and specific
foreign policy aims. Because of the military's role in shaping the use of force, British interven-
tions were competently managed according to practices held to be optimal by military profes-
sionals. However, the operational excellence exhibited by the British armed forces must be
weighed against their tendency towards escalation, parochially motivated policies and resistance
to political authority.
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The high degree of autonomy possessed by military commanders remained constant re-
gardless of who governed the United Kingdom and their interest in a given conflict. Political
attention varied significantly from one intervention to another. At one extreme, the counterinsur-
gency in Oman rarely graced the agenda of the Defense and Overseas Policy Committee and nev-
er figured among the cabinet's priorities, while, contrarily, the Falklands War warranted the crea-
tion of an ad-hoc "war cabinet" and involved the government's principal ministers in at least daily
deliberations. However, more attention from political leaders did not translate into greater politi-
cal control of military decisions.
Politicians scrutinized the diplomatic environment, managed public opinion and commu-
nicated their concerns to the armed forces, but never contravened the chain-of-command to seek
military advice from or issue orders to lower level commanders. As a consequence, political
leaders remained beholden to the Chief of Defense Staff and Chiefs of Staff Committee for ad-
vice and the transmission of orders to lower echelons. Their monopoly on military expertise and
role as essential intermediaries permitted the Chiefs of Staff to shape political leaders' under-
standing of the options available to them and interpret their directives in ways that maximized
their operational autonomy. Although the existence of four distinct chiefs of staff might have
been a source of alternative advice, the chiefs typically log-rolled their differences at regular
meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. From 1982, the designation of the Chief of Defense
Staff as the government's primary military advisor reduced the scope for obtaining alternative
advice still further.
There are many examples of the chiefs of staff manipulating or withholding information
from the government. During the Oman War, the chiefs concealed and then distorted information
about British officers' involvement in preparing the coup d'dtat against Sultan Said bin Taimur.
Later, during the Falklands War, they downplayed the difficulty of retaking the islands, resisted
673
giving estimates of how many ships the United Kingdom could or would lose, and exaggerated
the benefits of escalatory actions, such as using strategic bombers or torpedoing the Belgrano.
Never insubordinate, the chiefs of staff nonetheless used their privileged position to shape how
the British government viewed the options available to them. As a consequence, political leaders
rarely possessed the information to challenge the chiefs' recommendations.
Because of the chiefs of staffs' position as a filter between the government and the mili-
tary establishment, the commanders of military operations enjoyed considerable autonomy to
plan and fight as they saw fit. Never once did political leaders select bombing targets or desig-
nate the axis for a tank thrust, as often occurred in France and occasionally in the United States.
When operational commanders received political input, it came second-hand, via the chiefs of
staff. Thus, without political leaders playing a direct role, the armed forces assaulted San Carlos
and Goose Green to alleviate diplomatic pressures from a compromise peace.
Overall, Britain's autonomous military commanders performed excellently from a strictly
military point of view. All three interventions produced military victories. Won at a time when
communist insurgencies were considered almost unbeatable, specialists consider the British vic-
tory in Dhofar as a textbook example of how counterinsurgencies should be conducted. Because
of the joint nature of operations and the fantastic distances involved, the British campaign in the
Falklands has drawn even more attention. Some accounts view the Falklands as an "ideal type"
for how resolute civilian leadership and autonomous armed forces can together produce decisive
strategic results. Even when British forces were subsumed into a larger coalition, the quality of
the United Kingdom's contribution respect from allies and attention from the international media.
However, the United Kingdom's recent unblemished record of military success conceals
certain inherent flaws in Britain's defense policymaking structures. Because of their autonomy
and the pessimism inherent to the "military mind," British commanders lobbied for overwhelm-
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ing force as a hedge against unforeseen contingencies. The military challenges facing them justi-
fied political leaders sending all available conventional forces to the Falklands War, however the
Royal Navy even connived to take nuclear depth charges "just in case" Soviet submarines inter-
268fered. During the Dhofar War, the urge for overwhelming force drove British officers to
overthrow Oman's ruler and invited Iranian forces onto the Arabian Peninsula. Finally, through
prodding and manipulation, British commanders gradually pushed political leaders from an early
ceiling of 6,000 military personnel to an eventual total of 45,000. In each case, the British armed
forces pushed for and achieved either quantitative or qualitative overkill vis-a-vis their oppo-
nents.
In addition to coveting greater forces than they probably needed, military leaders failed to
appreciate the escalatory risks of their actions. Whether broadening the theater of operations,
introducing new weaponry or attacking an involved, yet non-belligerent power certain actions
have the potential of transforming hitherto limited conflicts into broader conflagrations. On each
occasion that the British armed forces possessed a choice, they chose to undertake a potentially
fruitful attack rather than respect the de facto rules prevailing during a conflict. During the Dho-
far War, they initiated a guerrilla war in South Yemen and repeatedly bombed Yemeni territory,
bringing Oman and South Yemen to the brink of war on several occasions and provoking retalia-
tory actions. In the Falklands, they successfully lobbied to torpedo warships outside the maritime
exclusion zone, employ strategic bombers and raid the Argentine mainland. When military
commanders felt obliged to seek permission for these acts, they exaggerated the benefits antici-
pated, which did not justify the risks.
Finally, the inability of British civilian leaders to penetrate the intricacies of military
planning permitted armed services and branches to push for policies consonant with their organ-
izational interests, but inimical to the objectives set by political leaders. Because of the continual
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struggle between military bureaucracies for resources and prestige, fighting organizations have an
incentive to "win the war on its own" or at least play a visible role in the collective effort.
If not controlled, the parochial interests of competing armed services can augment casual-
ties, increase the financial costs of a war or add to the dangers of escalation. In the Falklands,
bureaucratic politics drove the RAF to push for costly strategic bombing and impelled the SAS'
leadership to argue for a potentially suicidal raid. During the 1991 Gulf War, inter-service rivalry
was even more intense, prompting the RAF to persevere with murderous low-level missions, the
SAS to volunteer for perilous assignments and the Royal Navy to excessively expose itself. Not
surprising, these bureaucratically motivated operations contributed disproportionately to human
and financial costs of British operations.269
Thus, although effectively conducted, the British armed forces frequently manage British
interventions in a manner incompatible with political leaders' preferences. Because of their in-
ability to control events once they make an initial decision to intervene, British leaders were more
reluctant to employ military force than their French contemporaries. Table XII below details the
United Kingdom post-colonial military interventions from 1960 to 1991. 270
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Table XII:
British Post-Colonial Interventions, 1960-1991
Forces Nature
Deployed of Mission
Kuwait, 1961
East Africa, 1964
(Kenya, Tanzania,
Cyprus, 1964-74
Zambia, 1965-66
Oman, 1965-75
Anguilla, 1969
Icelandic Sea, 1975
Belize, 1975-93
(British Honduras
South Atlantic, 19
Rhodesia, 1979-80
Falklands, 1982
Persian Gulf, 1980
Gulf War, 1990-91
one brigade Deterrence
three battalions Supporting Civil
Uganda) Authorities
one brigade UN Peacekeeping
one battalion, Deterrence
one RAF squadron
850 personnel Counterinsurgency
one battalion Regime Change
-76 seven frigates Fishing Dispute
two battalions, Deterrence
six aircraft
77 one submarine, Deterrence
two frigates
1,100 personnel Peacekeeping
two brigades, Conventional Warfare
35 ships
-88 2 to 9 ships Shipping Protection
one division, Conventional Warfare
five RAF squadrons
34 warships
success
success
failure
success
success
success
failure
success
none apparent
success
success
qualified success
success
3.4 battalions (for 9 cases)
17.6 warships (for 5 cases)
77% successes,
16% failures
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L ocation Result
Mean
Location Denlo ed Result
Although the United Kingdom generally succeeded in accomplishing its objectives once it chose
to intervene, the difficulties of controlling military forces prompted British leaders to avoid situa-
tions where their forces would operate under an unclear mandate or without a well-defined objec-
tive. British leaders eschewed the hazards of military operations by preventatively deploying
large deterrent forces to potential trouble spots. As a consequence, deterrent deployments consti-
tute the most common category of British intervention, while complex missions such as peace-
keeping and regime change are comparatively rare.
By way of conclusion, the institutional processes governing British interventions privilege
military efficiency over political control. While the British armed forces have an enviable record
of operational excellence, they also have a tendency to subvert the wishes of their civilian mas-
ters, demanding more forces than necessary and pursuing escalatory operations. To their credit,
British officers never abused their autonomy for political ends, however bureaucratic politics and
military professionalism possess their own logic, which frequently runs counter to the overall
needs of the state. Recognizing that they have a blunt instrument at their disposal, political lead-
ers are less eager to employ military force than their French counterparts, who can modulate the
activities of their own armed forces to a much finer degree.
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ward, 1983.
131 Significant misunderstandings emerged between field commanders, particularly be-
tween Woodward, Clapp and Thompson, because of conflicting mandates conveyed to them.
Fieldhouse initially considered all four operational commanders to hold independent commands
of separate forces. However, on occasions, he treated Woodward as though he was the superior
to Thompson and Clapp. Three reasons explain Fieldhouse's favouritism to Woodward. Wood-
ward was higher ranking than the other two commanders (two-stars versus one-star). Woodward
also commanded the most important single component of the British force--the naval task force,
including two aircraft carriers. Finally, Woodward and Fieldhouse were both submariners and
had long known each other. Meanwhile, based on the same ship, Clapp and Thompson quickly
developed a good rapport with one another. When they first collectively met with Woodward, to
determine where and when to land on the Falklands, their discussion became acrimonious.
Woodward treated Clapp and Thompson as subordinates, while Clapp and Thompson found
Woodward's efforts to lead deliberations on an amphibious landing misguided, given that Clapp
and Thompson possessed more professional expertise on the subject. After the meeting, Wood-
ward, Clapp and Thompson verified their command relationship with Fieldhouse, who informed
them that they were co-equal component commanders. Although this apparently solved the mat-
ter, Fieldhouse nonetheless told Woodward to "yell at Thompson until he moves" when Field-
house had become discouraged about Thompson's lack of activity towards Goose Green. On this
occasion, Woodward reminded Fieldhouse that he was not Thompson's superior. Interview with
Admiral Sandy Woodward, July 6, 2005; Interview with Commador Michael Clapp, June 9,
2005; and Interview with Major-General Julian Thompson, London, May 6, 2005.
132 The Maritime Exclusion Zone was rapidly declared because the War Cabinet felt that
it was necessary to maintain a state of conflict until the British fleet would be available to retake
the islands. It was feared that if the Argentine invasion were not militarily challenged from the
beginning, Britain would appear to be the aggressor when it later attempted to expel Argentina
from the Falklands. The term Maritime Exclusion Zone was chosen with care because of the
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legal difficulties associated with blockades. See Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands
Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplomacy, 85-89; and Interview with Admiral Sandy Woodward,
July 6, 2005.
133 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplo-
macy, 221.
134 The SAS has been consistently criticized for its conduct on South Georgia. The local
SAS officer, Major Cedric Delves, insisted on going over the Fortuna Glacier despite warnings
from Captain Nick Barker, of the Antarctic survey ship Endurance, and Richard Law, director of
the British Antarctic Survey. The SAS unit chosen, mountain troop, was experienced in moun-
taineering but entirely devoid of local topographical knowledge. Because of wide crevasses and
harsh winds, the SAS managed to advance only 800 meters in five hours on the glacier, before
being obliged to seek shelter against the elements. Nicholas van der Bijl, Nine Battles to Stanley
(Barnsley, the United Kingdom: Leo Cooper, 1999), 68-72.
135 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplo-
macy, 241-43.
136 Thid., 244-49.
137 Interview with Henry Leach, July 16, 2005.
138 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplo-
macy, 274-83.
139 Rowland White, Vulcan 607 (London: Bantam, 2006); and Rowland White, "Rio Ren-
dezvous," Flypast no. 299 (June 2006): 22-3 1.
40 Argentina's second-largest ship, next to the aircraft carrier, the Belgrano was not con-
sidered particularly formidable. The Belgrano was a Second World War-era American cruiser.
Armed with guns alone, it was comparatively obsolete. In his own analysis of the Argentine
fleet, Woodward considered Argentina's four submarines, aircraft carrier 25 Mayo and modem
British-built Type 42 destroyers to pose the greatest threat to the British fleet. The Belgrano
ranked a distant fourth in Woodward's analysis of the Argentine Navy. Interview with Admiral
Sandy Woodward, July 6, 2005.
141 Leach and Woodward disagreed about the relative threat posed by the Argentine Navy.
Leach reasoned that because the Argentine Navy would doubtless lose virtually all its surface
ships if it engaged in battle, the fleet's high command would avoid fighting, knowing that there
would be no political will or financial resources to rebuild the fleet, even if Argentina won the
war. Given Leach's recent trauma of trying to protect the British fleet from defense cuts, he may
have been projecting his own reasoning onto his Argentine opponents based on his recent experi-
ence during naval maneuvers with the Americans in the Indian Ocean. Using aggressive tactics,
decoys and the ruse of announcing the destroyer Glamorgan to be a commercial Indian vessel,
Woodward succeeded in closing to within 20 miles of the aircraft carrier Coral Sea. At this dis-
tance, the Glamorgan's Exocet missiles could have disabled the carrier. Given that Woodward
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accomplished this feat with only four warships, he was understandably worried what the Argen-
tines might accomplish if they fought daringly. Woodward's reading of naval history impressed
upon him what could be accomplished both by guile and desperate courage, such as shown by the
auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay when it fought a suicidal but vital holding action against a German
pocket battleship in 1940. Interview with Admiral Sandy Woodward, July 6, 2005; Interview
with Henry Leach, July 16, 2005; and Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of
the Falklands Battle Group Commander, Revised Edition (London: HarperCollins, 2003), 83-90.
142 Interview with Admiral Sandy Woodward, July 6, 2005.
143 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplo-
macy, 315-75.
After the fact, there is still a lack of consensus about how dangerous Exocet missiles
were to the British fleet. Overall, six Exocets (five air-launched and one truck mounted) were
fired at British ships. Of these, four struck British targets, sinking the Sheffield and Atlantic Con-
veyor, and damaging the Glamorgan. On the face of it, four hits out of six launches is a remark-
able success rate. The list of Exocet victims includes not one properly defended recent-
generation warship. Although modem, the Sheffield was lost because of gross incompetence (the
Operations Officer [on duty] was off the bridge when the Exocet alert was detected, rather than
initiate defensive measures on his own, the Anti-Air Warfare Officer left the bridge to look for
the Operations Officer). The Atlantic Conveyor was a defense-less merchant ship. Finally, the
Glamorgan was a comparatively old destroyer, but was hit despite taking proper evasive action.
Interview with Admiral Sandy Woodward, July 6, 2005.
145 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplo-
macy, 430-31;
146 At odds with their populations, most Latin American governments blamed Argentina
for the war and considered it a local affair, outside of the scope of the Rio Treaty. Freedman, The
Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplomacy, 504-05.
147 Interview with General Peter de la Billiere, London, July 13, 2005.
148 Nigel West, The Secret War for the Falklands: The SAS, M16, and the War Whitehall
Nearly Lost (London: Warner Books, 1997), 135-48; and Freedman, The Official History of the
Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplomacy, 432-35.
149 Throughout the conflict, British decision-makers worried about Peruvian military as-
sistance to Argentina. During the conflict, Peru requested that France hasten the delivery of Exo-
cet missiles that Peru had already ordered, presumably for re-export to Argentina. Possessing
one of South America's most modem air forces, direct Peruvian involvement was also feared.
Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplomacy, 508-09.
15 Ibid.484-85.
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151 According to Julian Thompson, "If the Argentines had been prepared to take heavy
casualties from the beginning, losing perhaps half of their air force, they could have caused such
casualties that we would have said 'it isn't worth the candle' [to retake the Falklands]." Wood-
ward worried that the loss of escorts was depleting his ability to protect the United Kingdom's
two aircraft carriers, which constituted the core of the fleet. Gaps were likely to appear and it
would soon be possible for the Argentine air force to sink a British carrier. If the British lost a
carrier, Woodward feared that the British would be forced to renounce retaking the Falklands if
either carrier was lost. Imperial War Museum Oral History Archive, Recording 17144, Major-
General Julian Howard Thompson, 1995/1996; Interview with Admiral Sandy Woodward, July 6,
2005; and Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplo-
macy, 483-85.
1 Because of the United States' critical role in supporting the British military interven-
tion, American fears lest a defeated Argentina either turn to the Soviet Union or indefinitely con-
tinue its vendetta against the United Kingdom weighed heavily on British decision-makers. The
United States feared two scenarios. One was that the Argentina's military junta would collapse,
to be replaced by an ultra-nationalist Peronist regime, which would continue military operations
after suffering a conventional defeat. In many respects, American decision-makers seem to have
anticipated the Argentines responding to defeat in the same way that the Arab powers had after
Israel's remarkable victory in 1967, i.e. by continuing military operations at a lower and variable
scale of intensity. The other fear of American policymakers was that a defeated Argentina would
embrace the Soviet Union and Cuba, either pragmatically because the United States had opted to
support the United Kingdom, or ideologically following a emergence of a left-wing Argentine
government. See Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and
Diplomacy, 510-16.
5 The resolution was only voted on 4 June, after the Battle of Goose Green. The essence
of the resolution was: 1) calling for an immediate cease fire, 2) authorizing the United Nations
Secretary General to use any means to impose one, and 3) asking the Secretary General to inform
the Council within 72 hours of the implementation of the ceasefire. The resolution received nine
votes in favour, versus four abstentions and two votes against. However, the votes against came
from the United States and United Kingdom, which both possess veto powers. To the United
Kingdom's consternation, the United States government had decided to abstain, but the instruc-
tions reached their delegate too late. Thus, the British government began finding itself increas-
ingly isolated. Ibid., 521-25.
1 Ibid.
1 Ibid., 548-5 1.
156 The Goose Green proposal originated with Admiral Fieldhouse's advisor on land oper-
ations, Lieutenant-General Richard Trant. The Commander-and-Chief of United Kingdom Land
Forces, General John Stanier, deliberated with Trant about what objective Thompson should be
ordered to attack. An element of inter-service prejudice may have influenced deliberations, with
Fieldhouse's land advisers in London coming from the British Army, while Thompson was a
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Royal Marine officer. Army officers seem to have felt that "Marines were incapable of seeing
beyond beachheads." See Tillotsen, 196-97.
157 There appears to have been a real disconnect between field commanders, who were
more attune to the operational situation in the South Atlantic, and the high command, which was
more aware of political pressures. Fieldhouse had originally told Admiral Woodward to fly to
San Carlos and shout at Thompson until he moved. However, Woodward refused because he was
not clearly Thompson's superior and felt unable to pressure him on matters outside of his compe-
tence (which applied to Fieldhouse and Lewin as well). Clapp was entirely in sympathy with
Thompson and felt that Admirals in London should not meddle operationally in the land cam-
paign. However, senior Army officers in the United Kingdom sided with Fieldhouse. Drawing
on historic analogies to Gallipoli and Anzio, Army commanders, including the Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff, Dwin Bramall and General Trant, that British forces would lose the initiative if they
did not immediately advance from their beachhead. Thompson himself best encapsulates the
divide between field commanders and the high command. According to Thompson, "The fact
that the feeling in Northwood was that I did not need artillery to support the operation said to me
that they really did not understand what was going on. And the reason for that was quite simple
and that was that they were 8,000 miles away and there was no commander on the spot with
overall responsibility for the conduct of the campaign.... I think that the lack of understanding
was a factor of the distance between the two places and unless you were actually there and could
see what the terrain was like, it was very difficult to see what the problems were like for the peo-
ple on the ground." See Tillotsen, 195; Interview with Admiral Sandy Woodward, July 6, 2005;
Imperial War Museum Oral History Archive, Recording 17144, Major-General Julian Howard
Thompson, 1995/1996.
158 Imperial War Museum Oral History Archive, Recording 17144, Major-General Julian
Howard Thompson, 1995/1996; and Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign,
vol. II, War and Diplomacy, 556.
159 Interview with General Peter de la Billiere, London, July 13, 2005.
160 Interview with Major-General Julian Thompson, London, May 6, 2005.
161 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplo-
macy, 559-60.
162 Imperial War Museum Oral History Archive, Recording 17144, Major-General Julian
Howard Thompson, 1995/1996.
163 See van der Bijl, 133-34.
164 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplo-
macy, 575.
165 Interview with Major-General Julian Thompson, London, May 6, 2005.
697
166 By the time the second British brigade, the 5 Brigade, arrived off the Falklands in
early June, the political calculus had already changed. Rather than rush the brigade, in a small
number of vessels, as near to Stanley as possible, Admiral Fieldhouse now preferred to avoid
situations that could produce significant casualties, even if doing so slowed the pace of British
operations. As Freedman notes, "The balance of political risks was now changing. Before he
[Fieldhouse] had been worried that the international calls for a cease-fire, and uncertainty in the
Government, would bring his campaign to a stuttering halt. Now he was more confident: 'PM has
held out resolutely for victory not ceasefire."'... What might undermine public opinion would be
a 'catastrophe at sea with large loss of life."' Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands
Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplomacy, 597.
167 The 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment assaulted Mount Longdon, the Royal Ma-
rines 42 Commando attacked Mount Harriet and the 45th Commando attacked Two Sisters. At
Mount Longdon, one British battalion faced 220 Argentine defenders. The assault lasted 10
hours and resulted in 18 British dead and 40 wounded, against 50 Argentine dead and a similar
number taken prisoner. According to a British NCO, the Argentine positions were poorly sited
and constructed, and their minefields badly laid. However, the natural strength of the position
and fighting spirit of the Argentine defenders rendered the British assault difficult. At Two Sis-
ters, the Argentine conscripts showed less determination, permitting the Royal Marines to dis-
lodge the two Argentine companies defending the position at a cost of only four dead and 10
wounded. Finally, at Mount Harriet, the 45th Commando approached the Argentine position from
an unexpected direction, provoking a precipitate Argentine flight, whereupon Argentine officers
and NCOs fired on their own troops in an effort to prevent their fleeing. Freedman, The Official
History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplomacy, 611-28.
168 Two of the battalions employed on 14 June belonged to the 5th Brigade. The remain-
ing battalion, the 2 Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, belonged to the 3 Commando Bri-
gade and had already fought at Goose Green. The defending forces during the battles of 12 June
numbered between 170 and 220 for each Argentine position, as compared to the single British
battalion (approximately 600 men) assigned to attack each. On 14 June, the defenses of Tumble-
down and Wireless Ridge counted, respectively 700 and 500 defenders each. Freedman, The
Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplomacy, 634-44; and van der
Bijl, 189-211.
169 Martin Middlebrook, The Argentine Fightfor the Falklands (Barnsley, Yorkshire: Pen
and Sword, 2003, originally published in 1989), 273; and Interview with General Jeremy Moore,
Wells, June 10, 2005.
170 The head of the Argentine junta, General Leopoldo Galtieri, was dumb-founded about
how Argentine defenses could have collapsed so quickly. He lectured Mendndez that the Argen-
tine code of military justice required him to have suffered at least 4,000 casualties before surren-
dering. van der Bijl, 212-13; and Middlebrook, 272-73.
171 Interview with General Jeremy Moore, Wells, June 10, 2005.
12 The head of the Royal Navy dodged giving political leaders estimates of how many
ships he expected to lose and the Chief of Defense Staff refused to give Cabinet members written
698
copies of military plans. Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War
and Diplomacy, 447; and Interview with Admiral Henry Leach, 16 July 2005.
173 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, War and Diplo-
macy, 215-20.
174 Over 800 miles distant and possessing no airfields, South Georgia was incapable of
exerting any influence on the fight for the Falklands, while the Argentine garrison on Goose
Green was easier to contain than attack.
175 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 816-
22.
176 Alan Munro, Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy Behind the Gulf War (London: I.B.
Tauris, 2006), 75-76.
177 Ibid., 77-79.
178 The United Kingdom had sustained a permanent naval presence of three surface com-
batants (destroyers or frigates) in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean since 1980. When Iraq in-
vaded Kuwait, one ship was located in the Persian Gulf, one in Mombassa, Kenya and the third in
Penang, Malaysia. Chris Craig, Callfor Fire: Sea Combat in the Falklands and the Gulf War
(London: John Murray, 1995), 160.
179 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (London:
Penguin, 2000), 441-43.
180 Major himself appears unaware that there was a difference between his own committee
and Thatcher's. In his memoirs, he wrote, "Margaret [Thatcher] had already established the
Overseas Defence (Gulf) -- OD(G) -- Cabinet committee to oversee the crisis." John Major, The
Autobiography (London: HarperCollins, 1999), 221.
181 Peter de la Billiere, Storm Command: A Personnal Account of the Gulf War (London:
HarperCollins, 1992), 20-21.
182 Munro, 82-84.
183 Ibid., 86.
184 de la Billiere, 39.
185 Michael Carver, Britain's Army in the 20'h Century (London: Macmillan, 1998), 460.
186 The Army jumped the gun, anticipating the War Cabinet's approval. As early as 11
September, the Army's high command contacted Brigadier Cordingly to inform him that his bri-
gade would probably be deployed to the Persian Gulf. The War Cabinet actually decided to send
the brigade on 13 September and was forced to delay announcing its decision until Saudi permis-
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sion had been obtain for the deployment. Patrick Cordingly, In the Eye of the Storm: Command-
ing the Desert Rats in the Gulf War (London: Hodder and Sloughton, 1996), 6; and Munro, 93-
95.
187 Cordingly, 4-7.
188 The British brigade possessed 117 Challenger 1 tanks. Entering service during the
1980s, the Challengers were heavily armored with hi tech composite (Chobham) substances and
armed with a powerful 120 mm cannon. The 1st Marine Division possessed approximately 120
M60A3 tanks. The M60's basic design dated back to the 1960s. Possessing only traditional steel
armor and a 105mm gun, the tank lacked either the firepower or protection of the Challenger 1.
Compared to Iraqi tanks, the M60A3 outclassed the T-55s, T-62s, Type-59s and Type-69s com-
prising the bulk of Iraqi armored forces. However, the T-72s equipping Iraq's elite Republican
Guard possessed numerous advantages over the M60. Cordingly, 23-25.
189 Thid., 26-27.
190 de la Billiere, 16.
191 Ibid., 12-13.
192
192 Interview with General Peter de la Billiere, London, July 13, 2005.
193 Thatcher, 825-26.
194 About personnel numbers, de la Billiere claims, "At first Whitehall wanted to keep
numbers down to about six thousand, the Army bid for ten thousand, but was prepared to settle
for seven thousand five hundred. And yet the total requirement identified after an in-theatre re-
connaissance soon reached eleven thousand five hundred, a fact which had yet [on 25 September]
to be communicated to the Prime Minister." de la Billiere, 17; and Imperial War Museum Oral
History Archive 13470, General Peter de la Billiere, February 1993.
195 Interview with General Peter de la Billiere, London, July 13, 2005; and Craig, 187.
196 In de la Billiere's own terms, "I was concerned by the idea of our forces going into bat-
tle with the US Marines, for not only had they been placed in the sector opposite the most heavily
fortified Iraqi positions, they also had the reputation of being exceptionally gung-ho and the offi-
cial prognosis put the amount of casualties they might suffer in an attack as high as seventeen
percent. Further, we knew that the Marine Corps were nervous about their own future... and that
they imagined that the best way of avoiding cuts would be to win the war against Saddam on
their own." de la Billiere, 48, 93; and Interview with General Peter de la Billiere, London, July
13, 2005.
197 According to de la Billiere, "It was my job to make sure that I got along with Norman
Schwarzkopf and Khaled. And I put a great deal of effort into this because if I fell out with them
it was going to ripple down the system as far as the troops were concerned and was going to rip-
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ple down the system so far as Whitehall was concerned." Imperial War Museum Oral History
Archive 13470, General Peter de la Billiere, February 1993.
198 Imperial War Museum Oral History Archive 13470, General Peter de la Billiere, Feb-
ruary 1993; and de la Billiere, 39.
199 According to de la Billiere, "To infiltrate him (Lieutenant Colonel Tim Sullivan) into
Schwarzkopf's innermost sanctum was no easy task. For one thing the American planners were
pathologically secretive about their plans: they habitually classified documents 'Noforn' (not to be
shown to foreigners), and at least once tore down maps from the walls when a British officer en-
tered the room unexpectedly." de la Billiere, 90-91; and Interview with General Calvin Waller,
Deputy Commander of Central Command, Frontline: The Gulf War www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/waller (last consulted April 6,2008).
200 De la Billiere therefore became privileged to information classified 'Noforn,' for no re-
lease to non-American personnel, which his political and military superiors were not. Interview
with General Peter de la Billiere, London, July 13, 2005; and de la Billiere, 39-40.
201 The extent to which the American plan from early October was motivated by military
calculations or desiderata is open to question. Falcona, who participated in the briefing, claims
that insufficient forces rendered a frontal attack necessary. Schwarzkopf himself wanted rein-
forcements and admits that, "I had tried every way I could to make it very clear to everyone in
Washington that were we required to go on the offence, it would require more forces." Many in
Washington felt that Schwarzkopf's preliminary plan was deliberately intended to pressure Wash-
ington into sending him reinforcements. See Rick Francona, Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness
Account of Iraq's Fallfrom Grace (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 70; and Interview
with General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of Central Command, Frontline: The Gulf War
www.pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/schwarzkopf (last consulted April 7,2008).
202 Casualty estimates for the initial American plan ran as high as 20,000. de la Billiere,
84-85; and Francona, 74.
203 Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney requested options for liberating Kuwait in early
October. The American planning group, which included the United Kingdom's Lieutenant-
Colonel Sullivan, concluded that the only feasible attack with the forces available was directly
into Kuwait, where Iraqi defenses were the strongest. Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell both
hoped that the gloomy provisions of this plan would prompt the American government to send
massive reinforcements. See Francona, 69-77.
204 Wolfowitz was visiting the 1st Marine Division, to which Cordingly's 7th Armored Bri-
gade was attacked. Cordingly told Wolfowitz, "The odds are appalling. There are something of
the order of thirty Iraqi divisions in Kuwait now. The Marine Corps has what? -- one large divi-
sion. There's the US Army's 2 4 th Mechanical Division and a few others. Say five, maybe six
divisions in all.... as soon as we hit the obstacle belt and start to bunch up behind it, he'll hit us
with everything he's got, artillery and chemical." Cordingly, 50.
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205 de la Billiere, 84-85; and Interview with General Peter de la Billiere, London, July 13,
2005.
206 Both Secretary of Defense Cheney and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft had
pushed for a flanking movement to the west and were incensed by CENTCOM's original plan.
207 de la Billiere, 93; and Interview with General Peter de la Billiere, London, July 13,
2005.
208 Munro, 176-77.
209 de la Billiere,
210 Carver, 461.
211 Even Thatcher recalled the problems posed by the Challenger's unreliability in her
memoirs. Thatcher, 825; and de la Billiere, 264.
212 According to Thatcher, she had personally convoked the leadership of Vickers to en-
sure that they provided exemplary support for Challengers deployed in Saudi Arabia. Interview
with General Peter de la Billiere, London, July 13, 2005; and Thatcher, 825.
213 Through modifications and constant filter cleaning, British mechanics and engineers
improved the Challenger's reliability from one tank incapacitated every 2.8 kilometers, to one
incapacitated every 6.8 kilometers. While the Challenger engine reliability was still poor, this
142 percent increase in reliability, coupled with plentiful spare engines, enabled the British to
fulfil their role in the offensive. de la Billiere, 265.
214 According to de la Billiere, "I think everybody was really surprised. I think a lot of
people had been saying that we were under-resourced in Germany and that the equipment wasn't
properly maintained. But I don't think that anybody really thought that it was going to boil down
to the fact that all we could really put in the field with effective armor that was going to be capa-
ble of fighting and sustaining the logistic demands--that it would come down to one division [out
of the four in Germany].... They had to cannibalize all the armor from the other divisions. A lot
of the personnel from other divisions. A lot of the other military equipment you know, gunners
and so on, from other divisions from within the corps and effectively Germany would have been
unable to hold the line if the Russians had attacked." Interview with General Sir Peter de la Bil-
liere, Senior British Commander, Frontline: The Gulf War www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/billiere (last consulted April 8, 2008).
215 Interview with General Peter de la Billiere, London, July 13, 2005.
216 Although planning continued between October and December 1990, the SAS greeted
the hostages' release on 6 December with relief because of their failure to produce a viable rescue
plan. Most well-known hostage rescues have succeeded because of the incompetence of the
forces holding the hostages. The Belgian hostage rescue in Stanleyville in 1964 and the French at
Kolwezi in 1978 both occurred against poorly trained opponents. The possible fate of a SAS
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attempt in Iraq may best be seen by examining the many vicissitudes they faced while "Scud
hunting" in Western Iraq. According to de la Billiere, "I thought that we had to do something
about the release of the hostages, particularly if we were going to embark on bombing operations.
Special forces in the initial stages were tasked with the role of collected adequate intelligence and
trying to devise a means of releasing as many hostages as we could. It was an impossible task
and we didn't get the information we needed because it just wasn't available, and as soon as we
got information, it was dated because Saddam Hussein was moving the hostages around." Impe-
rial War Museum Oral History Archive 13470, General Peter de la Billiere, February 1993; and
Peter Ratcliffe, Eye of the Storm: Twenty-five Years in Action with the SAS (Miami Florida:
Lewis International, 2000), 180-81.
217 Ratcliffe, 181.
2 The SAS is divided into four squadrons. Three squadrons deployed to Saudi Arabia,
while one remained behind in the United Kingdom to deal with a possible terrorist threat. At the
time, there were significant fears of Iraqi sponsored terrorists. Ibid., 185-86.
219 According to de la Billiere, "Initially Norman Schwarzkopf was understandably skep-
tical about special forces and he did not want to see a lot of special forces deploying deep into
Iraq, way out on the Western flank, outside the area where he was going to be fighting, where he
would be forced to rescue them." Imperial War Museum Oral History Archive 13470, General
Peter de la Billiere, February 1993.
220 Interview with General Peter de la Billiere, London, July 13, 2005; and Interview with
General Sir Peter de la Billiere, Senior British Commander, Frontline: The Gulf War
www.pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/billiere (last consulted April 8,2008).
221 Andr6 Dumoulin and Eric Remacle, L'Union de l'Europe occidentale: Phenix de la
difense europienne (Brussels: Bruylant, 1998), 231.
222 Ultimately, the WEU force achieved the respectable size of 32 ships (21 warships, 2
minesweepers and 9 support ships) provided by nine states (France, Italy, the United Kingdom,
Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Turkey and Denmark). Although France, Italy and the
United Kingdom would have deployed forces anyways, most of the other states would not have
participated in sanctions enforcement had the WEU not provided an international varnish to such
activities. Belgium even went so far as to prohibit its ships from transiting the Suez Canal before
the WEU had agreed to collective action. Ren6 van Beveren, "Belgium and the Gulf Crisis, Au-
gust 1990-March 1991," in Western Europe and the Gulf (Paris: The Institute of Security Stud-
ies, Western European Union, 1992), 9-12; Carlos Zaldivar and Andres Ortega, "The Gulf Crisis
and European Cooperation on Security Issues: Spanish Reaction and the European Framework,"
in Western Europe and the Gulf, 129-36; Pierre Bonnot, "La marine dans la guerre du golfe," in
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223 According to his own recollections, Craig preferred bilateral coordination with "frank,
plain-talking, friendly and uncomplicated" Americans to "complex multilateral" coordination
with "bickering Europeans." Craig, 199.
224 Interview with Admiral Pierre Bonnot, Saumur, December 4, 2004.
225 Craig, 168, 189-90, and 243; and Interview with Admiral Pierre Bonnot, Saumur, De-
cember 4, 2004; and Craig, 194.
226 Craig mentions the Blue Ridge, Midway and Lasalle by name. See Craig, 199.
227 Ibid., 214.
228 The destroyers involved, Gloucester and Cardiff, both belonged to the same Type 42-
class as the Sheffield, which had been sunk by Exocet attack during the Falklands War (see previ-
ous case study). Ibid., 198, 220.
229 Ibid., 236-38.
230 De la Billiere had discussed the concept of "proportionate risk" with Craig earlier in
the campaign. However, Craig's bid to play a significant role led him to commit himself to
commit more British ships to hazardous situations than he ideally should have. Craig freely ad-
mits this in his memoirs, "I committed my forces... making just the disproportionate contribution
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Chapter IX:
Conclusion
I. Introduction
This dissertation explores how civil-military relations and institutional structures of de-
fense policymaking shape how states develop military power. In this concluding chapter, after
summarizing the main argument, I briefly consider what civil-military legacy theory has to say
about efforts to create a European Defense and Security Identity and reform NATO. I then sug-
gest avenues for future study that build on the findings presented here.
II. Civil-Military Crises and their Legacies
Civil-military legacy theory is a valuable analytic framework for combining civil-military
and institutional outlooks on defense policymaking into a powerful tool capable of predicting the
types of military power that different states will produce. As explained in Chapter 2, European
defense policymaking institutions evolved considerably between the industrial and political revo-
lutions of the late 18th century and the middle of the Cold War-era. Although many develop-
ments were the functional product of the evolution of technology and warfare, variations in civil-
military relations exercised a profound impact on who came to control defense policymaking in
different states. In states that experienced significant civil-military strife, such as France, civi-
lians developed control mechanisms for managing the armed forces and limiting their influence
over politics. In states where modernization occurred against a backdrop of military obedience to
political authorities, such as the United Kingdom, the result was institutions that guaranteed an
autonomous sphere of military competence.
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Compared to Samuel Huntington's classic analysis of civil-military relations, civil-
military legacy theory reverses the causal relationship between forms of civilian control over the
armed forces and the degree to which a state suffers from civil-military conflict. In France, inva-
sive civilian control of the armed forces was not the cause of problematic civil-military relations,
but an understandable response to civil-military crises. The fundamental cause of poor French
civil-military relations is to be sought in the nation's chaotic political evolution, which saw 12
changes in the form of regime between 1789 and 1958, of which five were the result of revolu-
tions, four of military defeat and three of coups d'itat. Battling for power, opportunistic civilian
factions learned to instrumentalize portions of the army to win power. However, once soldiers
developed a taste for political intrigue and advanced policy preferences of their own, it became
necessary to develop institutional structures to control them.
If French invasive control mechanisms were the product of civil-military strife beginning
with the revolution of 1789, the comparative autonomy enjoyed by the British armed forces was
the result, rather than the cause, of the United Kingdom's tranquil political evolution. Rather than
suffering from revolutionary tumult, British political institutions progressively adapted to the
pressures of modernity, accommodating in a single constitutional framework the gradual weaken-
ing of the monarchy and the House of Lords, increases in popular suffrage and the creation of
social welfare provisions. In this context, the armed forces had few opportunities or motivations
to intervene in politics, and political leaders had even less cause to develop invasive control me-
chanisms to prevent them from doing so.
Although defeat in warfare and developments in military technology also effected the
evolution of defense policymaking institutions, the frequency of civil-military strife was the prin-
cipal cause for the existence of institutional mechanisms permitting civilian leaders to invasively
control the armed forces. The institutional causes of defeat in inter-state warfare are frequently
710
ambiguous and can lead to either the strengthening or weakening of military autonomy. Argua-
bly, the German Army was never as politically influential as in the years of the Weimar Republic
and the immediate result of France's defeat in 1940 was a military dictatorship that put many of
the country's elected leaders on trial. Likewise, technologically driven developments, such as the
creation of general staff structures to manage railway mobilization or procurement organizations
able to oversee high technology military innovation, can be accommodated by institutions that
accord a greater or lesser degree of authority to the military high command.
The causes of civil-military tension diminish as a state industrializes economically and
consolidates democratically, such that the risk of a military coup d'dtat is virtually non-existent in
today's advanced industrialized democracy. For this reason, the civil-military control mechan-
isms of advanced industrial states are essentially fixed. In those states where invasive control
mechanisms have not been developed for lack of civil-military problems, they are unlikely to be
created once a state reaches advanced industrial status. Conversely, states that have developed
invasive civil-military control mechanisms are likely to conserve them even once political and
economic developments have eliminated the root causes for their creation. As theories of path
dependency indicate, institutions persist long after the circumstances underlying their creation
have changed because of organizational inertia and the fact that institutions frequently unders-
core positive externalities unanticipated at the time of their creation.
Changes in defense policymaking institutions do occur in advanced industrial states as a
result of evolving military foreign policy realities. However, these changes are generally of the
second order and obey a path dependent logic. Thus, the strengthening of the British Chief of
Defense Staff's position in the early 1980s reinforced the already substantial authority of the Brit-
ish high command by forclosing the ability of civilian policymakers to instrumentalize inter-
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service rivalry. Likewise, measures strengthening the General Delegation for Armaments (DGA)
in the late 1970s further diminished the French armed services' input into procurement decisions.
In short, the key steps in a state's development of civil-military policymaking institutions
occur during the long process of political and economic modernization culminating in the estab-
lishment of modern advanced industrial democracies. States that have suffered from severe civil-
military strife will possess invasive control mechanisms permitting civilian leaders to closely
manage the creation of military doctrine, the conduct of military operations and the elaboration of
procurement programs. Contrarily, armed forces possess greater autonomy in states where civil-
military relationships were historically unproblematic. Thus, the dead hand of tumultuous years
of economic and democratic development continues to influence defense policymaking in states
that are now virtually immune to civil-military crises.
III. Institutions and Policies
The fundamental role of civil-military policymaking institutions is to apportion authority
between civilian and military actors. This dissertation has focused on institutional strategies for
maximizing civilian control over armed forces, including divesting armed forces of all non-
military functions, monitoring their activities with electronic means and oversight agencies, coun-
terbalancing their advice with civilian think-tanks, dividing them with inter-service rivalries and
commanding them via parallel, yet redundant, joint staffs. When these control mechanisms were
present, civilian leaders exercised maximal civilian control over the armed forces. This meant
that their preferences prevailed when it came to elaborating doctrine, developing procurement
policies and managing military interventions. Absent the above-mentioned control mechanisms,
the military high command will dispose of a greater measure of autonomy to shape these policy
areas as they see fit.
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As suggested by theories of bureaucratic politics and affirmed by the case studies pre-
sented in chapters 3 through 8, political leaders and military professionals have different outlooks
on how military forces should be produced and wielded. These differences in perspective are a
product of individuals' professional educations and their belonging to bureaucratic organizations.
Because of the transversal nature of the three policy domains considered in this dissertation--
doctrine, procurement and military operations--differences in perspective between military pro-
fessionals and civilian policymakers are particularly stark.
In the realm of doctrine, the key criteria for military professionals is maximizing the mili-
tary performance should war come. This entails tailoring military doctrine to comply with the
technical characteristics of armaments and the quantity of military manpower available. Military
commanders are also conditioned to prefer the offensive and have bureaucratic incentives for
doing so. Thus, when a military high command controls the elaboration of doctrine, it favors
solutions that are considered technically sound and, if possible, contain an offensive component.
By way of contrast, the primary desire of political leaders is to not lose control of the
state's strategic affairs and, if possible, to achieve their foreign policy goals without the hazardous
trial of war. For these reasons, they are more apt to favor deterrent or defensive doctrines. They
also are prone to tailor military doctrines to complement diplomatic efforts, reassuring allies of
support and convincing adversaries of one's willingness to fight.
In terms of procurement policy, military professionals seek to maximize the value of wea-
ponry they can obtain for a given quantity of money. Armed services are also dominated by plat-
form communities, which seek to regularly replaced existing platforms such as fighter aircraft,
with newer and more technologically sophisticated follow-on systems. Contrarily, political lead-
ers have a more holistic view of the economy and attempt to counterbalance the costs of military
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procurement by developing arms that can be exported abroad and by spinning technology off into
the civilian economy.
Finally, when it comes to operations, military officers draw clear distinctions between war
and peace (or "operations other than war" in American parlance). When called upon to intervene,
they prefer to do so with a clear mission, overwhelming force and uninhibited by restrictive rules
of engagement. Partial to offensive operations, military commanders favor ending a military in-
tervention by decisively destroying an enemy's ability to wage war. For this reason, military pro-
fessionals abhor being called to use force to bluff, posture or convey diplomatic messages.
For political leaders, military force is only one tool among many for achieving a state's
foreign policy objectives. As such, military force is best used in tandem with other policy in-
struments. Force should rarely be called upon to generate decisive political results on its own.
Even if a state is unwilling to bear the costs of sending an adequate military force to a trouble
spot, it can send a smaller contingent to bluff or deter an opponent. Likewise, used in limited
quantities, military force can be employed to send diplomatic signals.
Because political leaders and military professionals have such different outlooks, it is crit-
ical to know the relative influence of the two groups over the policymaking process. As demon-
strated in chapters 3 through 8, the preferences of political leaders prevailed in France because
they were empowered by the intrusive civil-military control mechanisms originally developed as
a response to military interventions in politics. Contrarily, doctrine, procurement and operations
were mostly the prerogative of the military high command in the United Kingdom, where these
activities fell within the so-called "independent sphere of military competence." Military authori-
ty in these domains is a result of the United Kingdom's never having developed invasive civil-
military control mechanisms, that would have enhanced political authority to these domains.
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Abstracting from the French and British cases, it is reasonable to expect that policy in
other advanced industrial states will also be conditioned by the presence or absence of invasive
civil-military control institutions. Political leaders will be better able to ensure that their prefe-
rences prevail whenever a record of contentious civil-military relations leads states to develop
invasive civil-military control institutions. Contrarily, the absence of civil-military conflict trans-
lates into more autonomous armed forces, which will be able to pursue their favored policies. At
present, nine of the world's advanced industrial democracies have suffered from problematic civ-
il-military relations.' In these states, one would predict political leaders' preferences to prevail
over military imperatives. The world's 16 other advanced industrial democracies that did not
suffer from civil-military crises should see the preferences of military professionals feature more
prominently.2
IV. Comparative Institutional Advantage
As demonstrated in chapter 3 through 8, defense policymaking institutions underscore
comparative advantages in how states generate military power. Neither the British nor the French
system can be demonstrated to be superior to its counterpart. However, each produces a different
sort of military output, which may be more or less appropriate to a given situation. As shown in
the body of this dissertation, comparative institutional advantage can be discerned in each of the
three policy areas--doctrine, procurement and operations--examined.
In terms of doctrine, the presence of invasive civil-military control mechanisms in France
translated into military doctrines that were finely calibrated to the state's foreign policies. As
such, military doctrine sought to deter the would-be aggressor, affirm France's political indepen-
dence and convince allies that they would be supported in the event of an attack. Reconciling .
these oftentimes contradictory imperatives and adapting to the exigencies of the moment (such as
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the greater [late-1970s] or lesser [late-1960s] perception of the Soviet threat) required tight civi-
lian control over the formulation of doctrine and that civilian leaders be able to tap into sufficient
technical expertise that the resulting doctrines were militarily viable. The parallel staff systems,
think-tanks and other advisory bodies beholden to French political leaders fulfilled this role.
The result of France's high degree of civil-military integration was a series of military
doctrines that reflected and complemented the state's foreign policy and leaders' perception of the
international environment. Political leaders had little difficulty modifying these doctrines to keep
them relevant to change political circumstances. When de Gaulle perceived ddtente as possible
and the Atlantic Alliance as solid, his military doctrine of "two battles" permitted him to affirm
his autonomy vis-a-vis the United States and position France as a privileged intermediary be-
tween the two blocs. Later, when the Soviet Union was perceived as increasingly threatening and
NATO as dangerously fragile, Giscard and Mitterrand elaborated doctrines that demonstrated a
greater commitment to supporting France's allies. The diplomatic value of politically-attuned
military doctrines can be seen in a range of foreign policy successes, from de Gaulle's 1966
voyage to Moscow, the revival of Franco-West German political collaboration in the late-1970s
and France's key role in brokering NATO's policy towards the Euromissile Crisis.
The downside of politically-inspired military doctrines is that they may be sub-optimal
from a purely military point-of-view. Many of France's military doctrines demonstrated serious
technical flaws. The "two battles" doctrine engaged France's ground forces piecemeal; the con-
cept of a single tactical nuclear "warning" salvo was technically complicated given the reconnais-
sance and command-and-control technologies available; and the Rapid Action Force (Force d'Ac-
tion Rapide or FAR) remained controversial amongst military professionals. In the case of
French doctrine, sub-optimality does not mean that French doctrines were amateurish or unwork-
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able, only that they did not yield the maximum military results for a given quantity of combat
power.
In the United Kingdom, the absence of invasive civil-military control mechanisms led to
doctrines very different from their French counterparts. Formulated by an autonomous military
command using the means put at their disposition by political leaders, British military doctrines
focused single-mindedly on achieving the maximum military results possible given scarce re-
sources. As such, British military doctrines reflected the lessons that the high command drew
from recent conflicts, exercises and what considered to be military "best-practices." Multi-centric
and frequently bottom-up (from the brigade level), this process of British innovation permitted
the armed forces to incorporate tactical nuclear weapons and anti-tank guided missiles into their
doctrines in a timely fashion.
The comparative disadvantage of permitting the armed forces to exercise a substantial in-
fluence over the creation of doctrine can be found in poor political-military integration and an
emphasis on offensive actions. In the British case, the military doctrines the British Army of the
Rhine (BAOR) evolved entirely independently of the state's foreign policy. Whenever consi-
dered remotely feasible, which should have been rare given the asymmetry of forces in Central
Europe, the British armed forces adopted offensive doctrines. Britain's aerial nuclear interdiction
doctrine of 1958 and its maneuver warfare doctrine of the mid-1980s stand out for their offen-
siveness and the enormous risks of escalation that they entailed. By responding to an outbreak of
hostilities with either a tactical nuclear interdiction campaign throughout Eastern Europe or a
preemptive conventional attack towards Magdeburg, British doctrines could have transformed am
limited or accidental conflict in a global conflagration.
In terms of military procurement, the comparative advantage of intrusive political-military
control mechanisms can be found in the promotion of broad economic goals though procurement
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policies. By developing weaponry that corresponded to the requirements and budgets of export
customers, the French managed to prolong weapons production runs and amortize development
costs through extensive arms sales. Meanwhile, by focusing research and development efforts on
dual-use technologies, with both commercial and military applications, French weapons produc-
ers were comparatively successful at spinning technologies off from military applications to the
civilian economy. While Dassault's conquest of the business jet market is emblematic of this
process, France's success in commercial jet engines, nuclear power, satellite launches and con-
sumer electronics are all symptomatic of an aptitude to develop dual-use technologies and spin
them off into the civilian economy.
The downside of a procurement process controlled by political and economic actors is that
it frequently neglected specifically military requirements. For example, the French Air Force
received one exportable lightweight fighter after another when it thought it needed heavier inter-
ceptors, long-range strike aircraft and combat aircraft capable of taking off from short or impro-
vised runways. Likewise, the French Army received certain weapons for which it had no need,
such as the ERC-90 Sagaie armored car, because the vehicle was supposedly marketable to a
large number of African and Middle Eastern states. Meanwhile, weapons that had poor export
potential and featured few dual-use technologies featured infrequently in the French defense
budget. During the Cold War, tanks were a particular victim of this phenomenon. Thus, while
invasive political control of procurement diminishes the costs of increases the positive externali-
ties associated with sustaining an independent defense industrial base, armed forces are likely to
suffer from weapons that do not meet their operational needs.
The comparative advantage of armed forces playing a more active role in the procurement
process lies in the acquisition of weapons tailored to a state's military commitments. In the Unit-
ed Kingdom, this translated into an embrace of high technology solutions needed to counter So-
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viet military capabilities to counter Soviet military capabilities. Aircraft were acquired with the
VTOL and variable geometry capabilities to survive Soviet attacks on airfields and penetrate
enemy air defenses; tanks were developed with the large caliber guns and heavy armor to counter
superior Soviet numbers; and warships were produced with the high altitude air defense capabili-
ties to thwart saturation attacks by enemy bombers. At times, remaining militarily formidable
entailed purchasing foreign weaponry, such as the F-4 Phantom fighter, M- 109 self-propelled
artillery piece, Milan anti-tank guided missile and Exocet anti-ship missile.
The disadvantage of this approach resides in the fact that military professionals lack a
broader economic perspective. Unconscious of the costs of developing certain military capabili-
ties, commanders frequently demanded technologies exceeding the state's budgetary capabilities.
In the United Kingdom, the Royal Air Force's demands for a bi-sonic lower-altitude long-range
strike aircraft (TSR-2) and supersonic VTOL fighter (P.1154) are prominent examples of this
phenomenon. Even when brought to fruition, specialized weapons designed to counter the
world's most sophisticated adversary are rarely desirable or affordable from the point-of-view of
small and medium states. Meanwhile, the industrial effort needed to produce these weapons di-
vert a state's scientific and engineering skills away from promising dual use technologies and into
commercially limited avenues. In the British context, technical exploits in low altitude naviga-
tion systems, VTOL and variable geometry wings was accompanied by a continual contraction in
the state's commercial aircraft sector.
In terms of military operations, the comparative advantage of tight political control is that
it permits a state to tailor its use of force to the political goals it hopes to obtain. In France, this
meant that military actions were closely tied to diplomatic initiatives. Bombing schedules were
decided in function of diplomatic meetings and offensives were launched or concluded based on
the progress of negotiations. In general, the object of these interventions was not the military
719
defeat of an enemy, but obtaining some change in an adversary's behavior. Because they did not
fear losing control of the situation or being obliged to pay the political or economic prices for
deploying overwhelming force, political leaders felt comparatively uninhibited in using force. As
a consequence, France conducted (and still conducts) an extraordinary number of foreign military
interventions --more than any state besides the United States in the second half of the Cold War.
The drawbacks of political micromanagement of military operations are that purely mili-
tary factors can be underestimated, operations suffer from a lack of direction when political lead-
ers are inattentive and states may engage in commitments without possessing a military strategy
for accomplishing their goals. Military factors were clearly underestimated during the 1969-72
Chadian intervention, where insufficient forces were initially deployed and the 1971 Bison Of-
fensive was aborted for dubious diplomatic reasons. Later, France engaged forces in Lebanon
(1978 and 1982 to 1984) and Chad (1978) without having a real plan for how military power
would help achieve political goals. Thus, while political control eases the use of the force and
favors the achievement of political goals for a minimal expenditure of military resources, inten-
sive political control privileges military miscalculations.
The comparative advantage of greater military control over military operations is that it
generally results in overwhelming force being efficiently used to destroy an enemy's military ca-
pabilities. Used in this manner, British military forces emerged victorious from each of its mili-
tary engagements after the dolorous process of decolonization. In many respects, the high degree
of autonomy accorded field commanders contributed to hard-won victories in Oman and the
Falklands, and underscored the United Kingdom's exceptional influence during the 1991 Gulf
War.
The disadvantage of high levels of military influence over foreign interventions lies in the
influence over foreign interventions lies in the tendency of military leaders to engage in escalato-
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ry policies and their penchant to reduce political problems to military challenges. Because they
abhor spatial or qualitative limits on the use of force, military professionals are prone to escalate
limited conflicts by using hitherto unavailable means or attacking previously prescribed targets.
In Oman, this translated into various efforts to extend the war to South Yemen, while during the
Falklands War, the armed forces insisted on using heavy bombers and attacking targets on the
Argentine mainland. As a result of their armed forces' escalatory behavior and demands for
overwhelming forces, British political leaders were less willing to use force than their French
counterparts. Thus, while autonomous military establishments are well-suited to effectively us-
ing military force, political leaders frequently lose control of the process and must be prepared to
pay the high costs of providing overwhelming force.
Thus, states possess distinctive comparative advantages in how they develop and employ
military force. These comparative advantages are rooted in the institutional processes by which
civilian leaders control the armed forces. Because civil-military control institutions change little
once a state has industrialized and democratized, these comparative institutional advantages are
practically immutable. Understanding the applicability of the concept of comparative institution-
al advantage to defense policymaking provides a powerful intellectual tool for students of securi-
ty studies. Once a state's civil-military past is understood, it becomes possible to predict the type
of defense policies it will enact. Also, knowing the comparative advantages and disadvantages of
a state's defense policymaking structures permits one to better its actions. Whereas, doctrinal
nuances and tactical events are likely to reflect deliberate foreign policy choices in countries
marked by maximal political control of the armed forces. Contrarily, escalatory behavior and
offensive doctrines are frequently the inadvertent products of an autonomous military establish-
ment when military political control prevails.
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V. The Soldier and the State Reconsidered
No work on civil-military relations would be complete without reexamining Samuel Hun-
tington's The Soldier and the State. Within this context, civil-military legacy theory trumps Hun-
tington's classic theory of civil-military relations in four crucial respects. Firstly, civil-military
legacy theory postulates that modes of civilian control over the armed forces are the product, ra-
ther than cause, of distinct patterns of civil-military relations. Secondly, civil-military legacy
theory refutes Huntington's claim that civilian control of the armed forces is maximized by re-
cognizing an autonomous sphere of military competence (objective control). Thirdly, Hunting-
ton's typology of civilian control of the armed forces presents a false dichotomy because it does
not account for the possibility of professional yet closely controlled armed forces. Fourth and
finally, legacy theory challenges Huntington's assertion that "objective control" represents the
optimal formula whereby political leaders can control the armed forces.
In The Soldier and the State, Huntington argues that civil-military relations are a reflec-
tion of how political leaders exercise control over the armed forces. On the one hand, when sta-
tesmen accord a large measure of autonomy to the armed forces, the armed forces will be ani-
mated by a professional ethic and dutifully fulfill the missions assigned to them. On the other
hand, persistent political interference in military matters will politicize the armed forces and pro-
voke civil-military crises. Table I, below, illustrates the causal relationship between forms of
political control over the armed forces and civil-military relations as presented in The Soldier and
the State.
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Thus, Huntington's argument is based on the promise that misguided civilian attempts to assert
control of the armed forces are the primary cause of civil-military crises, while according armed
forces a healthy degree of autonomy provides a sure guarantee of their loyalty and professional-
ism.
In sharp contrast to Huntington's argument, legacy theory contends that forms of civilian
control over the armed forces are the product, rather than cause, of historic patterns of civil-
military relations. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, French political leaders developed increasingly
invasive methods of controlling the armed forces in response to repeated military interventions in
politics, while Britain's history of untroubled civil-military relations permitted the state's armed
forces to retain a high degree of autonomy as the state matured politically. In this context, max-
imal political control is the product, rather than cause, of poor civil-military relations. The origin
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of civil-military tensions lies, as Finer argued in The Man on Horseback, in the overall political
evolution of the state. 3 States afflicted by revolution, political cabals, radicalism and civil strife
are likely to experience civil-military conflicts as well, while states whose political evolution is
more stable will enjoy peaceful civil-military relations. Table II, below, illustrates the relation-
ship between civil-military legacies and forms of civilian control of the armed forces according to
legacy theory.
Table II:
Relationships Between Civil-Military Relations and Forms of Political Control
According to Legacy Theory
"Maximal Control"
Political Leaders
Develop Invasive ,Maximal Political
Civil-Military Crises Civlop on - Control of the ArmedroCivil-Military Con-
trol Mechanisms ( e
"Minimal Control"
table Political De-
troubled Civil-
Military Relations
Armed Forces
Retain Much
Autonomy
Minimal Polical
Control of the Armed
Forces
In short, legacy theory differs fundamentally with Huntington's argument on the interrelationship
between forms of political control of the armed forces and the nature of civil-military relations.
While theoretically important, the opposed causal assertions of Huntington's framework
and legacy theory bear weighty normative consequences. Whereas Huntington asks his readers
to look to a state's mode of political control of the armed forces for the root causes of civil-
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military tensions, legacy theory enjoins policymakers to view civil-military control mechanisms
as a symptom and response to civil-military crises. In practical terms, Huntington pleads with
states that have suffered from civil-military strife to accord greater autonomy to their armed
forces as a means of preventing further troubles. By way of contrast, legacy theory postulates
that states that suffered from civil-military crises will have developed control mechanisms to pre-
vent their repetition. In this context, it would be imprudent for governments to accord greater
autonomy to military establishments which have already demonstrated their willingness to inter-
vene in politics. Only when a state has developed economically and democratically to the point
where a civil-military crisis is unlikely can it afford to dispense with the control mechanisms ela-
borated during times of duress.
Alongside their divergent analyses of the relationship between forms of civilian control
and civil-military tensions, legacy theory differs with Huntington as to how to maximize political
control over the armed forces. Huntington argued that political leaders can maximize political
control by according military professionals an autonomous sphere of competence within which
political leaders will not interfere. According to Huntington, any effort to impose a greater de-
gree of control will backfire by politicizing the armed forces and prompting military interventions
in politics.
In opposition to Huntington, legacy theory proposes that political leaders can impose a
greater degree of control over the armed forces than entailed in Huntington's "objective" civilian
control. Through intrusive control institutions, including parallel command structures, think-
tanks and monitoring mechanisms, political leaders can shape military operations, doctrine and
procurement. This maximal form of political control over the armed forces is more complete
than Huntington's objective control, which limits the purview of civilian authority to a narrow set
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of issues, such as designating foreign political objectives and allocating the budgetary means to
accomplish them.
The fact that Huntington's favored model of "objective control" features weaker civilian
control of the armed forces vis-a-vis "maximal control" highlights two shortcomings in Hunting-
ton's analysis. Firstly, Huntington underestimated the capability of institutional structures to
permit political leaders to exert power over the armed forces without undermining their profes-
sionalism. Thus, Huntington's theoretical framework is based on a false dichotomy wherein the
only alternative to granting the armed forces a large margin of autonomy is by politicizing the
officer corps through "subjective control." The second flaw in Huntington's analysis is his faith
in the ability of a well-developed professional ethic to render military officers disinterested ser-
vants of the state. As Morris Janowitz argued in The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political
Portrait the development of a professional ethic imbues military officers with policy preferences
designed to enhance their prestige and influence as a group.4 Consequently, when given a wide
measure of autonomy, as Huntington recommends, military leaders pursue their own policy
agendas rather than those of the governments they serve. In the British case, the preferences of
the British officer corps as a professional group were manifested in offensive doctrines and esca-
latory behavior during foreign interventions.
Overall, the picture of civil-military relations provided by legacy theory is more complex
and nuanced than that Huntington articulated over 50 years ago. Contrary to Huntington's asser-
tion, there is no formula for simultaneously optimizing civilian control and military effectiveness.
Based on a dense network of institutions, "maximal" civilian control of the armed forces offers
the highest degree of political authority over defense policymaking attainable in a democracy.
From a strategic point-of-view, the advantage of such a system is that it guarantees that military
actions and preparations will be tailored to the state's overall policy. Huntington's "objective con-
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trol," equated in this dissertation with "minimal control," offers comparatively less political con-
trol of military activities. The countervailing advantage of minimal control is that is maximizes
the tactical and operational effectiveness of a military force. Ultimately, it is far from apparent
whether either of these two models is clearly superior to the other.
By comparison with both "maximal control" and "minimal/objective control," efforts to
control a military organization by politicizing its officer corps--Huntington's "subjective control"-
-are likely to be detrimental to both political control and military efficiency in the long term.
However, the tendency of states to develop institutions to regulate civil-military tensions and the
easing of civil-military problems as a state develops make it unlikely that pure forms of "subjec-
tive control" persist in advanced industrial states. Rather, "subjective control" is most likely to be
found in transitional or unstable democracies, where civil-military tensions are still prevalent and
political leaders have not yet had the time to develop appropriate institutional responses.
VI. Domestic Institutions and International Alliances
At peace amongst one another, many advanced industrial democracies collaborate with
one another in multilateral structures and bilateral alliances. This trend is particularly advanced
in Europe, where most states are involved in multiple overlapping security structures, including
NATO and the European Unions' emerging European Security and Defense Policy. A bewilder-
ing variety of more specialized bi- and multi-lateral structures have also emerged, including a
Franco-German security council, an Anglo-Dutch amphibious force, a Belgian-Dutch mines-
weeping flotilla, the multinational (France, German, Spain and Belgium) Eurocorps and a Ger-
man-Polish armored corps. Armaments are increasingly being developed in collaboration by
consortiums of states and military interventions are more frequently undertaken by coalitions.
Because of the growing role of cooperation, military doctrines may soon become international as
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well. Within this context, it is worthwhile to examine the impact of distinct national defense po-
licymaking institutions on inter-state security cooperation.
Conceptually, there are reasons to suppose that differences in national defense policymak-
ing institutions can impede international cooperation. Most international collaboration in the
security field is structured around meetings between individuals occupying similar functions in
separate national bureaucracies. For example, a collaborative aircraft program usually begins
formally with a meeting of political leaders from the partner countries. Then, representatives of
the armed forces from each state establish a set of common requirements for the weapons system.
Once requirements are finalized, procurement officials from the relevant states negotiate how the
research and development, and production activities will be divided amongst partner states. Fi-
nally, a consortium composed of the defense industries of the partner states builds an aircraft ac-
cording to the requirements agreed upon.
Classic alliances, such as NATO operate according to the same principle. Representatives
of the heads of state of the member states decide the orientation of policy at meetings of the
North Atlantic Council. Then, directives involving the use of force are transmitted to multina-
tional planning committees composed of military personnel from the member states. When it
comes to actually employing force, responsibility passes to a multinational military headquarters.
Although the European Union's institutional procedures for managing the use of force are less
developed than NATO's, it will probably evolve along similar lines.
Given the importance of peer-to-peer meetings to security collaboration, what happens
when the influence of individuals representing their respective national bureaucracies varies dras-
tically? Large and fluctuating asymmetries should impede collaboration. To understand why this
is the case, it is worthwhile to examine a generic case of Anglo-French armaments collaboration.
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When British and French officers meet to establish requirements for the future weapons
system, the influence of the two groups of actors could not be more different. Whereas British
military commanders exercise a high degree of control over setting their national requirements,
their French counterparts are frequently circumvented or overruled. Then, when it comes time to
negotiate work-shares, these asymmetries in power are reversed. Whereas British procurement
personnel have the functional of managing projects to answer military requirements, their French
counterparts are the dominant actors in their own national procurement process. Responsible for
the overall health of the state's military-industrial complex, the DGA's armament engineers regu-
larly re-write military requirements and tamper with the industrial arrangements envisioned to
fulfill them. Finally, when it comes time to collaborate at the industrial level, British companies
enjoy less direct political access than their French alternatives.
To judge the impact that multiple power asymmetries can have on a collaborative pro-
gram, we should return to the example of the Anglo-French Variable Geometry (AFVG) aircraft,
which was detailed in chapters 5 and 6. The AFVG was an abortive Anglo-French attempt to
create a variable geometry fighter-bomber. As is usual, a joint military committee was estab-
lished to elaborate requirements for the aircraft once political leaders had signed a memorandum
of understanding. Laboriously, the military representatives from the two states negotiated an
agreed set of joint requirements. Unfortunately for the AFVG project, neither France's procure-
ment agency (the Ministerial Delegation for Armaments or DMA) nor aircraft manufacturer
(Dassault) felt bound by the requirements agreed upon by the French Air Force. Dassault re-
sented the work-share agreement and the DMA thought the aircraft too large and sophisticated.
Opposition from these two groups precipitated France's withdrawal from the AFVG shortly after
joint requirements have been agreed upon.
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While different domestic policymaking processes contributed to the failure of the AFVG,
similar trends hindered cooperation during foreign military interventions. As discussed in chap-
ters 7 and 8, France had a comparatively difficult time operating alongside allies during the 1990-
91 Persian Gulf Crisis because of incompatible defense policymaking processes. Whereas the
international coalition's leading partner, the United States, delegated a high degree of autonomy
to its commanders, French political leaders micromanaged events from Paris. In the field, the
inability of French military commanders to negotiate on equal terms with their allies led to fru-
stration, suspicion of French motives and a loss of French influence within the coalition.
Ironically, the inverse phenomenon occurred in the waters surrounding Arabia at precisely
the same time as the French had trouble defining their place in the international coalition. When
tasked with participating in the Western European Union's (WEU's) sanctions enforcing opera-
tions, the British Royal Navy had difficulty integrating itself with the politically-driven WEU
command structure. The local British commander considered the meetings between political rep-
resentatives of the member states to be tedious and unproductive. Ultimately, the British Navy
starved the WEU of anything more than symbolic cooperation.
From the above cases, it appears that states with similar domestic defense policymaking
processes collaborate well together, while those with dissimilar systems cooperate only with great
difficulty. If states' institutional structures of defense policymaking impact their ability to colla-
borate together, what impact is this likely to have on European security cooperation?
A close examination of the pre-enlargement (1999 and 2005 respectively) memberships of
the European Union and NATO were divided amongst states with histories of civil-military strife
and those with more constructive civil-military legacies. Overall, the British Isles, Scandinavia,
the Benelux countries and Anglophone states in North America enjoyed good civil-military rela-
tions, while Mediterranean and Central European states suffered from civil-military crises. Table
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III, below, classifies the historic members of the European Union and NATO according to their
civil-military legacies.
Table III:
Civil-Military Legacies of European Union and NATO Members
States with Good States with Poor
Civil-Military Legacies Civil-Military Legacies
Members of Both.theEuropean Union and NATO
Belgium France
Denmark Italy
Luxembourg Germany
the Netherlands Greece
the United Kingdom Portugal
Spain
Members of NATO Alone
Canada Turkey
Iceland
Norway
the United States
Members of the European Union Alone
Finland Austria
Ireland
Sweden
If collaboration is difficult between states with diverse patterns of defense policymaking,
then both the European Union and NATO are likely to face problems in achieving greater degrees
of policy integration than currently exists. Within NATO, this problem is partially resolved by
the United States' predominant role. However, even in NATO's case, differences in national de-
fense policymaking processes can undermine collective endeavors. For example, during the 1999
Kosovo War, American military commanders were taken aback by the willingness of certain Eu-
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ropean political leaders to forbid the bombing of a wide range of targets. Without a single domi-
nant member, the European Union will probably face even greater problems.
Overcoming the difficulties posed by distinct national policymaking processes is certainly
possible, but will require states either converging on a common model or surrendering national
sovereignty to supranational institutions. Within the European Union's history, both of these
phenomena have occurred. States have harmonized their competition, fiscal and trade policies,
and have surrendered control of their monetary policy to the European Central Bank. However,
until present, European leaders have been unwilling to spend the political capital or compromise
their national sovereignty by supplanting distinct national institutions with a single collective
structure. Short of this radical step, which would transform the European Union from a suprana-
tional institution to a confederal state, differences in national defense policymaking institutions
are likely to constitute a durable obstacle to European security cooperation.
If tensions between distinctive national policymaking processes are likely to undermine
large multinational alliances such as NATO and the European Union, similar concerns do not
apply to smaller groupings of compatible states. In fact, the record shows a growing and impres-
sive amount of collaboration between advanced industrial democracies that possess similar insti-
tutions. For example, after the frustrating experience of the Kosovo campaign, NATO self-
selected into two ensembles for the Afghanistan War. Whereas the United States and United
Kingdom have operated together under the aegis of Operation Enduring Freedom, other NATO
members have collaborated under a common International Stabilization Force (ISAF) command.
Earlier, during the WEU's first intervention in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988, the par-
ticipating states divided into two ensembles that correspond to their historic differences in civil-
military relations. The United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands--all states without lega-
cies of civil-military crises--formed one operational group, while France and Italy formed the
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other one. According to participants, coordination of British, Belgian and Dutch operations was
informal and managed by commanders in the field, while Franco-Italian cooperation was more
political and formulistic.
As far as can be ascertained, successful armaments collaboration is also more common
between states with similar defense policymaking institutions. For example, while Anglo-French
programs have generally proved disappointing, 14 Franco-German collaborative programs were
brought to a successful conclusion between 1958 and 1998. More recently, international defense
industry consolidation has followed the lines drawn by domestic policymaking institutions.
While aerospace companies in France, Germany and Spain have merged to form the EADS con-
glomerate, the United Kingdom's BAE Systems has acquired Tracor and United Defense Indus-
tries in the United States, Hagglunds in Sweden and Reumech OMC in South Africa.
In short, distinct national defense policymaking institutions will shape security coopera-
tion between advanced industrial states into the distant future. Large formal organizations en-
compassing states practicing both maximal and minimal control of the armed forces are likely to
find it difficult to deepen the degree of security integration that already exists. This means that
NATO will have trouble adapting itself to new missions and the European Union's road to creat-
ing a truly integrated European army and defense industrial base will be rocky.
However, a more promising future awaits states that choose to pursue integration with
other polities sharing the same civil-military legacies. Already, steps can be discerned in this
direction. States practicing minimal civilian control of the armed forces are operating increasing-
ly together, as witnessed by the frequency of Anglo-American-Australian operations and a proli-
feration of joint structures, such as the British-Dutch landing force and a Nordic battlegroup.
Meanwhile, states practicing maximal civilian control of the armed forces have also increased
their collaborating, giving rise to the European Operational Rapid Reaction Force (EUROFOR)
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established by France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, a Italo-Spanish amphibious battle group, a Fran-
co-German brigade and the multinational Eurocorps.
It very well may be that the future of transnational defense integration will see Europe
evolve into two blocs. A grouping of states practicing minimal civilian control of the armed
forces could emerge under British leadership, encompassing the Benelux states and Scandinavia,
and maintaining strong ties with the Anglophone democracies of North American and Oceania.
Meanwhile, Central and Mediterranean Europe may integrate around a Franco-German partner-
ship. This grouping will practice maximal civilian control of the armed forces and will maintain
more distant relations with the United States.
VII. Avenues for Future Research
The most obvious avenue for exploring the generalizability of civil-military legacy theory
is to expand the number of cases considered. Although developed in the context of the British
and French cases, civil-military legacy theory should be applicable to other advanced industria-
lized democracies where armed forces no longer pose a threat, actual or potential, to civilian gov-
ernments. Because the theory yields clear predictions about what form of civilian control of the
armed forces should follow from different patterns of civil-military relations, civil-military lega-
cy theory is easy to verify or disprove. At present, there is very little literature linking historic
civil-military relations to present-day defense policymaking in advanced industrial states and
civil-military legacy theory provides a good analytic framework for exploring these issues.
Besides re-verifying civil-military legacy theory, expanding the number of cases ex-
amined may shed new light on aspects of the theory. The present work identified five institution-
al mechanisms by which civilian leaders can invasively control the armed forces. These mechan-
isms include divesting armed forces of non-military functions, intrusively monitoring their activi-
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ties, weighing their advice against that provided by think-tanks, exploiting inter-service rivalries,
and establishing parallel military staffs. While these institutional strategies are well-documented
in the civil-military relations literature and played a critical role in explaining maximal political
control of the armed forces in France, there is no reason for supposing that these five institutional
strategies represent the sum total of options available to the leaders of democratic states.
Another reason for expanding the list of cases studies would be to examine the relation-
ship between constitutional structures and the form of civil-military control exercised. Both the
United Kingdom and France represent cases of powerful control governments that face few insti-
tutional checks and balances. Once elected, French presidents or British prime ministers face few
constitutional obstacles to imposing the form of defense policy they like best.
This situation is far from ubiquitous in advanced industrial democracies. Some states,
such as the United States, feature both a powerful executive and an independent legislature. In
Deborah Avant's comparative study of British and American responses to insurgencies, this con-
stitutional difference was credited with fostering weaker American political control of the armed
forces. Huntington himself viewed the United States' constitutional checks and balances as a
cause of the greater politicization of defense policy. Within this context, it would be valuable to
compare the American case, where political checks and balances coexist with a history of peace-
ful civil-military relations, to a state with comparable political institutions, but a legacy of poor
civil-military relations.
One group of states deserves particular attention from scholars desirous of understanding
institutional processes of defense policymaking. Since the end of the Cold War, Eastern Europe
has transitioned from command to free-market economies, and from communist dictatorship to
liberal democracy. While many former communist states have not yet obtained advanced indus-
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trial status or finished the process of democratic consolidation, they appear to be moving in this
direction.
With the admission of ten former communist states to the European Union and NATO,
these states are becoming critical to the functioning of both international organizations.5 Unfor-
tunately, many former communist states are difficult to classify according to civil-military legacy
theory. While states such as the Czech Republic and Hungary may never have suffered from
domestic civil-military turmoil, one of the primary missions of their armed forces was upholding
the Soviet Union's domination of Eastern Europe. In other states, such as the Baltic Republics
and Slovenia, national independence has been a recent phenomenon. In these cases, it is ques-
tionable the extent to which today's small nation states indentify with the civil-military legacies
of the larger ensembles (the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia respectively) to which they formerly
belonged.
Former communist states also pose an interesting challenge for civil-military legacy
theory because of the mechanisms by which political control of the armed forces was once main-
tained. Totalitarian communist states maintained large secret police organizations to spy on their
armed forces and insisted on ideological purity (party membership) to climb the ranks of the of-
ficer corps. Are civil-military control mechanisms such as these likely to survive transitions to
democracy? If not, what will replace them?
Another group of states that may prove anomalous from the point-of-view of civil-
military legacy theory are states where armed forces imposed the conditions for a return to de-
mocracy after long periods of military rule. In Spain, Chile, Turkey and Brazil, military regimes
surrendered power after negotiating conditions meant to preserve the autonomy of the armed
forces under subsequent civilian governments. Thus, while civil-military legacy theory predicts
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that states such as these should feature maximal civilian control of the armed forces, outgoing
military regimes left power only once they had obtained a commitment to minimal control.
Perhaps the most fruitful avenue for applying civil-military legacy theory in the future lies
in the effects of distinct domestic civil-military institutions on the functioning of international
allies. While I have touched on this issue, its full development deserves a specialized study. At
peace amongst each other, advanced industrial democracies collaborate together with greater fre-
quency than states with any other form of regime. Peacekeeping, peacemaking, collaborative
armaments projects and transnational military industrial mergers are only some of the ways that
the security of modem day advanced industrial democracies is becoming a collective good. Giv-
en this phenomenon, understanding the factors dictating the success or failure of multinational
collaboration will be increasingly essential.
In the final analysis, the manner that today's advanced industrial democracies produce and
use military power remains conditioned by events in their pasts. Whether or not military officers
ever crossed the ill-defined Rubicon separating loyal service to the state from efforts to impose
their will over it continues to demarcate one set of advanced industrial states from another.
While future generations of policymakers may forget or forgive military interventions in politics,
the collective memory of the state remembers these indiscretions by erecting durable institutions
designed to prevent their repetition. These institutions continue to shape defense policies decades
after they outgrew their original function.
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Endnotes
States suffering from legacies of contentious civil-military relations include, Austria,
France, Italy, Germany, Greece, Japan, Portugal, South Korea and Spain.
2 States with unproblematic civil-military pasts include, Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Israel, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom and the United States.
3 In his own way, Amos Perlmutter also argued that it was the overall nature of the state
that determined what form of civil-military relations would predominate. Perlmutter argued that
three types of military organization prevail in the modem nation state. The professional soldier
characterizes stable political systems; the praetorian soldier emerges in conditions of political
instability; and the revolutionary soldier develops from new or transitional political orders. S. E.
Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: West-
view, 1988, originally 1962); and Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times:
On Professionals, Praetorians and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977).
4 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York,
1960).
5 The states so far admitted include, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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